

COLD WAR  
INTERNATIONAL  
HISTORY PROJECT

# *BULLETIN*

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Issues 6 - 7

Woodrow Wilson International Center

for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

## *THE COLD WAR IN*

# *The Cold War International History Project*

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Ambassador Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the *Bulletin*. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request.

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1000 Jefferson Drive, SW  
Washington, D.C. 20560  
Tel.: (202) 357-2967  
Fax: (202) 357-4439  
e-mail: [wwcem123@sivm.si.edu](mailto:wwcem123@sivm.si.edu)

Editor: James G. Hershberg  
Managing Editor: P.J. Simmons  
Associate Editor: Bonnie Southwick  
Researchers: Anne Chiorazzi, Helen Christakos, Andrew Grauer, Michelle King, Sara Kirchhoff, Mark Torok  
Special thanks to: Malcolm Byrne, Chen Jian, Mark Doctoroff, Ilya Gaiduk, Maxim Korobochkin, Mark Kramer, Sasha Mansourov, Christian Ostermann, Priscilla Roberts, Danny Rozas, Kathryn Weathersby, Odd Arne Westad, Vladislav Zubok



# STALIN'S CONVERSATIONS

## Talks With Mao Zedong, December 1949-January 1950, And With Zhou Enlai, August-September 1952

with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok

This issue of the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* leads off with translations of five meetings between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and top leaders (Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai) of the newly-created People's Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 1952. The originals of the documents, which constitute some of the most intimate glimpses of the personal interaction between Soviet and Chinese leaders yet to emerge from the formerly closed archives of the communist world, are kept in the Russian Presidential Archives (officially known as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) in Moscow. They were recently declassified by Russian authorities in connection with efforts to gather materials related to the Korean War for presentation by the Russian Government to South Korea. CWIHP obtained copies of these documents, as well as many other Russian archival records concerning the Korean War which appear later in this issue of the *Bulletin*, as a consequence of its cooperation with a research project involving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia University, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

(Photocopies of all the Russian documents obtained by CWIHP are available to researchers through the National Security Archive, a non-governmental documents repository, library, and research institute located on the seventh floor of The Gelman Library at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and will also be made available through Columbia University.)

The documents that follow begin with transcripts of two conversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950, during the Chinese leader's two-month visit to the USSR shortly after the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. Those conversations came as the two countries negotiated the terms of the incipient Sino-Soviet alliance following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and also constituted the first and only personal encoun-

ter between these two communist titans and major figures of 20th-century world history.

Next come three transcripts of conversations in Moscow between Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in August-September 1952, where issues on the table for discussion included the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and the relationship of both to the broader Cold War. The transcripts yield insights into these issues, and also into the state of mind of Stalin himself in his final months (he died in March 1953), one of the murkiest periods in his nearly-three decade reign over the USSR.

To assess the significance of these documents, the *CWIHP Bulletin* has assembled four specialists familiar with Sino-Soviet relations, and the personalities of Stalin and Mao, from various perspectives: **Prof. Chen Jian** (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale), author of *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); **Prof. Vojtech Mastny** (Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, currently at the University of Hokkaido, Japan), author of *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953* (Oxford University Press, 1996), a forthcoming sequel to his *Russia's Road to the Cold War, 1941-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); **Dr. Odd Arne Westad** (Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute), author of *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and **Dr. Vladislav M. Zubok** (National Security Archive), co-author (with Constantine Pleshakov) of *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, March 1996).

Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHP by Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from Kathryn Weathersby and Chen Jian.

—Jim Hershberg, Editor, *CWIHP Bulletin*



for 300,000,000 dollars between the governments of the USSR and China.

Comrade Stalin: This can be done. If you would like to formalize this agreement now, we can.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, exactly now, as this would resonate well in China. At the same time it is necessary to resolve the question of trade, especially between the USSR and Xinjiang [Sinkiang], though at present we cannot present a specific trade operations plan for this region.

Comrade Stalin: We must know right now what kind of equipment China will need, especially now, since we do not have equipment in reserve and the request for industrial goods must be submitted ahead of time.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We are having difficulties in putting together a request for equipment, as the industrial picture is as yet unclear.

Comrade Stalin: It is desirable to expedite the preparation of this request, as requests for equipment are submitted to our industry at least a year in advance.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would very much like to receive assistance from the USSR in creating air transportation routes.

Comrade Stalin: We are ready to render such assistance. Air routes can be established over Xinjiang and the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic]. We have specialists. We will give you assistance.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would also like to receive your assistance in creating a naval force.

Comrade Stalin: Cadres for Chinese navy could be prepared at Port Arthur. You give us people, and we will give you ships. Trained cadres of the Chinese navy could then return to China on these ships.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Guomindang [Kuomintang] supporters have built a naval

could be translated into Russian.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I am currently reviewing my works which were published in various local publishing houses and which contain a mass of errors and misrepresentations. I plan to complete this review by spring of 1950. However, I would like to receive help from Soviet comrades: first of all, to work on the texts with Russian translators and, secondly, to receive help in editing the Chinese original.

Comrade Stalin: This can be done. However, do you need your works edited?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, and I ask you to select a comrade suitable for such a task, say, for example, someone from CC VKP/b/ [All-Union Communist Party of bolsheviks].

Comrade Stalin: It can be arranged, if indeed there is such a need.

Also present at the meeting: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinskii, [Soviet translator N.T.] Fedorenko and [Chinese translator] Shi Zhe /Karskii/.

Recorded by comr. Fedorenko.

[signature illegible 31/XII]

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis (op.)*

*1, delo (d.) 329, listy (ll.) 9-17; translation by Danny Rozas.]*

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## II. Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 22 January 1950

RECORD OF CONVERSATION  
BETWEEN COMRADE I.V. STALIN  
AND CHAIRMAN  
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S  
GOVERNMENT OF THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
MAO ZEDONG

22 January 1950

After an exchange of greetings and a short discussion of general topics, the following conversation took place.

Stalin: There are two groups of questions which must be discussed: the first group of questions concerns the existing agreements between the USSR and China; the second group of questions concerns the current events in Manchuria, Xinjiang, etc.

I think that it would be better to begin not with the current events, but rather with a discussion of the existing agreements. We believe that these agreements need to be changed, though earlier we had thought that

they could be left intact. The existing agreements, including the treaty, should be changed because war against Japan figures at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war

earlier are cardinal in changing our future treaty from the existing one. Previously, the Guomindang spoke of friendship in words only. Now the situation has changed, with all the conditions for real friendship and cooperation in place.

In addition, whereas before there was talk of cooperation in the war against Japan, now attention must turn to preventing Japanese aggression. The new treaty must in-





# RECORD OF CONVICTION

20 August 1952

Zhou Enlai sends communique  
Stalin thanks Zhou Enlai  
Zhou Enlai sends communique

strong on its own feet.

Zhou Enlai informs that they would like to receive an additional 800 specialists from Soviet Union.

Stalin says that this request will be examined and that we will try to send as many as we can.

Zhou Enlai asks also for assistance with technical documentation (blueprints, etc.).

Stalin answers that this is, indeed, necessary.

Zhou Enlai asks if it will be possible to continue to educate students in the USSR and to send interns to Soviet enterprises.

Stalin expresses agreement.

Zhou Enlai touches on the question of the military five year plan. Informs that materials are under preparation and that a written report will be presented. Also wishes to receive military equipment.

Stalin asks what Zhou Enlai has in mind: shipments of weapons or equipment for military factories.

Zhou Enlai says that he meant shipments of weapons. Noting that since agreement has already been expressed with regard to weapons for 60 divisions, he would like to discuss shipments for naval forces. Asks what sort of assistance could be received in the way of airplanes.

Stalin asks whether the Chinese government is thinking of building aero-manufacturing plants.

Zhou Enlai says that this would be very difficult to do in the course of the first five year plan, particularly with regard to jet airplanes. Notes that such construction is not planned to begin until at least 5 years from now, and motor-building - in 3 years.

Stalin points to the example of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which began with assembly plants. Says that the USSR could send China motors and other airplane parts, and China could organize the assembly of these airplanes. Cadres can be trained in this way. We went through the same process. Such a process would be more beneficial for Chinese comrades as well. First you must build 1-2 factories for motor assembly. We will send motors and other airplane parts which would then be assembled in China. That's how it was done in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. This ought to be organized. Having organized assembly plants, you could then, in another 3 years, build an airplane factory. That is the easiest

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observation and notes that the Chinese government is addressing this matter. They have maintenance factories and are currently working to organize assembly plants; these plants will open next year.

Stalin inquires whether China has worker education schools in their factories. Adds that we have such a school in every factory.

Zhou Enlai admits that this is one of the

patience is needed here. Of course, one needs to understand Korea - they have suffered many casualties. But they need to be explained that this is an important matter. They need patience and lots of endurance. The war in Korea has shown America's weakness. The armies of 24 countries cannot continue the war in Korea for long, since they have not achieved their goals and cannot count on success in this matter. Koreans need our help and support.

Stalin asks about the bread situation in Korea. Says that we can help them.

Zhou Enlai says that Korea is having difficulties in this regard. The Chinese government knows that USSR has helped Korea. Says that they have also helped Korea and have told Kim Il Sung that this is not an obstacle, that they will give them foodstuffs and clothing and everything they ask for, but that they cannot give weapons.

Stalin says that we can give Korea additional weapons. We will begrudge nothing to Korea.

Zhou Enlai repeats that they cannot yield to the Americans during the negotiations.

Stalin observes that if the Americans back down a little, then you can accept, assuming that negotiations will continue on questions still unresolved.

Zhou Enlai agrees, adding that if the Americans don't want peace, then we must be prepared to continue the war, even if it were to take another year.

Stalin affirms that this is correct.

Zhou Enlai emphasizes the truth of comrade Stalin's observations, namely that this war is getting on America's nerves and that the USA is not ready for the world war. Adds that China, by playing the vanguard role in this war, is helping to stave off the war for 15-20 years, assuming that they will succeed in containing the American offensive in Korea. Then the USA will not be able to unleash a third world war at all.

Stalin says that this is true, but with one stipulation: Americans are not capable of waging a large-scale war at all, especially after the Korean war. All of their strength lies in air power and the atom bomb. Britain

unsure of what Kim Il Sung thinks. Perhaps it would be good to speak to them about this.

Stalin agrees.

Zhou Enlai repeats that the Chinese government believes that it is wise to continue the negotiations in Panmunjom. But China is preparing for the possibility of another 2-3 years of war. Again asks for assistance with aviation, artillery, and ammunition, as China cannot deal with these matters on its own.

Stalin announces that everything we can give you, we will.

Asks how is the Korean morale. Is there confusion?

Zhou Enlai explains that, indeed, there has been much destruction in Korea, especially after the bombing of the electric power station on the Yalu river. This has had an impact on Korean morale and on their efforts to accelerate the struggle to achieve peace.

Stalin says that the American strategy is fright. But they have not frightened China. Could it be said that they have also failed to frighten Korea?

Zhou Enlai affirms that one could essentially say that.

Stalin. If that is true, then it's not too bad.

Zhou Enlai adds that Korea is wavering somewhat. They are in a slightly unsteady state. Among certain elements of the Korean leadership one can detect a state of panic, even.

Stalin reminds that he has been already informed of these feelings through Kim Il Sung's telegram to Mao Zedong.

Zhou Enlai confirms this.

Asks how should the Chinese delegation proceed further.

Stalin proposes to start work immediately. Informs that Soviet Union has assigned a commission under the chairmanship of comrade Molotov and consisting of comrs. Bulganin, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii and Kумыkin, and that the Chinese delegation can speak to Molotov about when to start work.

Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the information and asks comrade Stalin to name the time when he can brief comrade Stalin on the internal situation in the PRC.

Stalin agrees to see Zhou Enlai as soon as he receives a finished version of the written report.

Transcribed by

A.Vyshinskii [signature]

N.Fedorenko [signature]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 54-72; translation by Danny Rozas.]

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#### IV: Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 3 September 1952

##### RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN COMRADES I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI

3 September 1952

Present:

on the Soviet side  
comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin,  
Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich,  
Vyshinskii, and Kумыkin.

on the Chinese side  
comrs. Chen Yun, Li Fuchun,  
Zhang Wentian, and Su Yu

translated by  
comrs. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe.

After an exchange of greetings the discussion began with the question of the five year plan of the People's Republic of China.

Stalin. We have familiarized ourselves with your five year plan for construction. You are setting the yearly growth at 20%. Is not the setting of yearly industrial growth at 20% strained, or does the 20% provide for some reserve margin?

Zhou Enlai draws attention to the fact that they do not yet have sufficient experience in such planning. The experiences of the past three years has shown that the PRC is underestimating its capabilities. The feasibility of the plan will depend on the efforts of the Chinese people and on the assistance that China is counting on receiving from the USSR.

Stalin. We draft the five year plan with a reserve margin, as it is impossible to take into account every instance. There are various reasons that may affect the plan in one direction or another. We always include the civil and military industries in the plan. The

PRC five year plan does not. In addition, it is necessary to have the complete picture of all expenditures provided by the plan.

We must know how much is required from us on a paragraph by paragraph basis. It is necessary to do the calculations. The given documents do not contain such data. Hence we cannot give our final answer. We need at least two months in order to do the calculations and tell you what we can provide you.

Usually it takes us at least a year to prepare our five year plan. Then we analyze the prepared draft for another 2 months, and still we manage to let mistakes go by.

We would like you to give us some two months to study your plan, so that we could answer your questions.

How do things stand in other matters? It seems that the question of Port Arthur has been examined. In that case we need to make a decision. If there are any sort of objections then they should be discussed right now.

In addition, it seems that there are also no objections to the draft communiqué on the transfer of KChZhD.

The third question concerns hevea [rubber] trees. We would like to receive from you 15 to 20 thousand tons of caoutchouc [natural rubber] each year. You, it seems, object, citing difficulties. The fact is that we have a tremendous need for caoutchouc, since automobiles and trucks, which are also being sent to you, require large amounts of rubber. We would like to receive at least 10-15 thousand tons of caoutchouc. We have not much opportunity to buy caoutchouc, since Britain keeps it to itself. We ask you to reexamine the question of purchasing for us the necessary amount of caoutchouc.

If all these questions get resolved, then the remaining can be decided with other delegation members, as it seems that Zhou Enlai is hastening to return.

Zhou Enlai says that it's difficult for him to remain here for two months, that he would like to return to China in mid-September. [Vice chairman of the Northeast (China) People's Government] Li Fuchun can remain here.

Stalin. Fine.

There still remains the question of constructing the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsuan railroad. The Mongolian Premier, who was just here in Moscow, has given his approval.

In other words, four questions remain to be decided by Zhou Enlai: Port Arthur,







maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma, where PRC has been trying to influence its government through peaceful means. The same in Tibet. Asks whether this is a good strategy.

Stalin. Tibet is a part of China. There must be Chinese troops deployed in Tibet. As for Burma, you should proceed carefully.

Zhou Enlai says that the Burmese government is concealing its true position with regard to China, but is actually maintaining an anti-China policy, orienting itself with America and Britain.

Stalin. It would be good if there was a pro-China government in Burma. There are quite a few scoundrels in the Burmese government, who make themselves out to be some sort of statesmen.

Zhou Enlai explains that Chinese troops were deployed in Tibet a year ago, and are now at the Indian border. The question of whether there should be Chinese troops in Tibet is moot.

Emphasizes that maintaining communication with Tibet is difficult. In order to communicate with Lhasa one needs 4-motor transport planes, equipped with oxygen tanks and de-icing devices. Could not the Soviet Union provide such planes? 2-motor planes can go 3/5 of the way, but that's as far as they'll go.

Stalin replies that Soviet Union can assist with this.

Zhou Enlai. In that case could China request 20 4-motor planes from the USSR?

Stalin replies that first we will provide 10, and then another 10.

Points out the importance of building a road to Tibet.

Zhou Enlai says that such a road is being built, but that its construction will take up all of next year and part of 1954.

Stalin notes that without a road it's difficult to maintain the necessary order in Tibet. Tibetan Lamas are selling themselves to anyone - America, Britain, India - anyone who will pay the higher price.

Zhou Enlai says that, indeed, the Lamas are hostile. This year (February, March, April) they were planning a rebellion, but the Chinese People's Government was able to suppress the rebels.

Notes that as a result of this, the Dalai Lama's brother fled abroad.

Stalin says that a road to Tibet must be built, and that it is essential to maintain

Chinese troops there.

At the end of the discussion a meeting was arranged for 4 September, at 9 o'clock in the evening.

Recorded by A. Vyshinskii  
[signature]  
N. Fedorenko  
[signature]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 75-87; translation by Danny Rozas.]

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## V. Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1952

[Classification level blacked-out:  
"NOT SECRET" stamped]

### RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN COMRADE STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI 19 September 1952

Present: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov,  
Beria,  
Mikoyan, Bulganin, Vyshinskii.

Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian,  
Su Yu, Shi Zhe

STALIN, opening the conversation with the Mexican proposal concerning the ex-

pay for the maintenance of Chinese and Korean POWs.

STALIN says that this proposal can be acceptable, but we must keep in mind that the Americans will not want to deliver all the POWs, that they will keep some captives, with the intention to recruit them. This was the case with our POWs. Now we are capturing several of our POWs a day, who are being sent over by America. They are withholding POWs not because, as they say, the POWs don't want to return - America often refers to this - but so that they could use them for spying.

ZHOU ENLAI concedes that this is precisely so.

He introduces the following scenario: to cease fire and resolve the issue of POWs later. He reminds that comrade Stalin agreed with this, if no agreement is reached regarding the percentage [of POWs] withheld.

STALIN acknowledges that this can be considered as one of possible scenarios, but America is not likely to agree to it.

ZHOU ENLAI says that perhaps America will suggest this in the Assembly.

STALIN. This would be good.

ZHOU ENLAI says that in the last discussion comrade Stalin suggested that China take initiative in creating a continental or regional UN. He asks whether there would be any other instructions regarding this matter.

STALIN answers that he continues to hold his previous point of view. In addition he says that, besides the current UN, it is necessary to create separate organizations for Asia, Europe, etc., not in lieu of the UN, but parallel to the UN. Let America create an American organization, Europe - a European one, Asia - an Asian one, but parallel to the UN, not contrary to the UN.

ZHOU ENLAI says that China has no interest in the UN and obviously it is necessary to take initiative in creating a continental organization.

STALIN emphasizes that UN is an American organization and we should destroy it, while keeping up the appearance that we are not against the UN; we should conduct this with an appearance of respect to the UN, without saying that it should be destroyed, weakened, but in reality weaken it.

He reminds, that during the war Churchill suggested to create a continental UN, but America opposed this. We quietly

observed the debate, but then Britain rejected its position and we supported the proposal regarding the creation of the UN.

ZHOU ENLAI asks whether there will be letters concerning this matter from comrade Stalin to Mao Zedong.

STALIN explains that it will be better without a letter. He sees that Zhou Enlai is taking notes and he fully trusts him.

ZHOU ENLAI mentioned the Peace Congress in Peking, scheduled in the end of September, saying that now it will be necessary to move the Congress to the beginning of October. He adds that China is striving for the participation of Japan and India in this Congress.

STALIN asks if Pakistan will participate.

ZHOU ENLAI agrees that Pakistan should participate as well and that Pakistan representatives are invited, but the Pakistan government is not issuing them passports. As for India, a part of the Indian delegation has already arrived, and the Japanese delegation will arrive via Hong-Kong.

STALIN says further that we should aim for China to have the principal role [in the Congress], because:

1/ the initiative in assembling the Congress belongs to China;

2/ it will be better this way, because the USSR is only partly located in Asia, and China is entirely in Asia, therefore it should have the principal role.

ZHOU ENLAI asks what specific actions will be taken by our delegation.

STALIN answers: peace.

ZHOU ENLAI talks about Nehru's proposal concerning the conference of five countries - the Soviet Union, China, England, France and USA.

MOLOTOV explains that this was a proposal of the Committee of the National Congress Party.

STALIN says, that this proposal should be supported.

ZHOU ENLAI emphasizes that at such a conference India, it goes without saying, will speak [in agreement] with England, but, it would seem, that it would be advisable to utilize this proposal.

STALIN agrees with this.

ZHOU ENLAI says, that in connection with the publication of the note about Port Arthur, the position which the PRC should USSR is on

and a group of CC members was directed to take care of the excesses. In general discontent was eliminated, and cases of defection, including those to USSR territory, have been halted.

STALIN says, that the excesses resulted from the desire to obtain land and domestic animals faster, confiscating both from the rich.

ZHOU ENLAI notes that as soon as the rumors about reforms had spread, the hostile elements began to slaughter domestic animals.

STALIN notes that similar incidents took place at a certain time in our experience as well. It is necessary to hurry up with the reform. If the agricultural reform is not instituted, such looting will continue to occur.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that the agricultural reform is being instituted in crop farming regions, and redistribution and excesses connected with it [are occurring] in the animal farming regions. Since animal herders participated in the redistribution, the Chinese government has decided to improve their condition, which should improve the general condition as well.

STALIN says: of course, it is up to you.

ZHOU ENLAI says that according to the Liu Shaoqi report, two representatives from the Indonesian communist party should arrive at the XIX [Party] Congress, and he asks whether it would be timely to discuss party issues in Moscow with them.

STALIN says that it is difficult to tell yet. It depends on whether they will address the CC. He points out, that when the representatives from the Indian communist party arrived, they asked us to help in determining the party policy, and we had to do it, even though we were busy.

ZHOU ENLAI reports that the Japanese comrades should arrive as well, and it is likely they will also want to discuss party issues.

STALIN answers that older brothers cannot refuse their younger brothers in such a matter. He says that this should be discussed with Liu Shaoqi, who has substantial experience, and clarified how the Chinese comrades perceive it.

ZHOU ENLAI points out that Liu Shaoqi intends to bring with him appropriate material, in order to discuss a number of questions.

STALIN notes that if the Chinese com-

rades want to discuss these issues, then of course we will have no contradictions, but if they do not want it, then we will not have to discuss anything.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that the Chinese comrades will definitely want to talk.

STALIN answers that, in this case, we shall find the time.

ZHOU ENLAI says that it is possible that the comrades from Vietnam will also arrive.

STALIN notes that the Vietnamese comrades are our friends and will be our welcome guests.

ZHOU ENLAI, ending the conversion, says they would like to receive instructions concerning all these issues.

STALIN asks - instructions or suggestions?

ZHOU ENLAI answers that from comrade Stalin's perspective perhaps this would be advice, but in their perception these would be instructions.

STALIN notes that we give only advice, convey our opinion, and the Chinese comrades may accept it or not; instructions, s persrons or sugges-

Recorded by: [signature] /A. Vyshinskii/  
[signature] /N. Fedorenko/

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 343, ll. 97-103; translated by Danny Rozas with Kathryn Weathersby.]

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## COMMENTARIES

### **Comparing Russian and Chinese Sources: A New Point of Departure for Cold War History**

**By Chen Jian**

These documents from the Russian Presidential Archives provide significant new insights into the making and development of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1949-1950. They usefully complement the account contained in the memoirs of Shi Zhe, Mao Zedong's Russian language interpreter, who has been one of the main sources of our knowledge about the relationship between Beijing and Moscow during the early Cold War period. (See Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu* [Together with Historical Giants: Shi Zhe's Memoirs] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1992).) As the translator of Shi Zhe's memoirs, I am deeply impressed by the richness of the information in these documents. I am also surprised, in spite of some discrepancies, by the extent to which Russian and Chinese materials (including Shi Zhe's memoirs and other sources) are in accord. I will therefore focus my comments on comparing Chinese and Russian sources on the same events as reflected in these documents.

Let me start with the meeting between

particular. The two leaders also discussed the agenda of Zhou's visit, which included the issues of Luda, Soviet support of China's first Five-year Plan, Soviet technological support to China in establishing rubber tree plantations in southern China, and the construction of a railway from Ji'nin, a city on the Sino-Mongolian border, to Ulan-Bator. The two leaders then had a long discussion on the Korean armistice issue. Zhou Enlai told Stalin that China would be willing to end the war on acceptable conditions but would not yield to unreasonable American terms. In Mao's view, Zhou informed Stalin, if the Communists could demonstrate a more enduring patience than the Americans, the enemy would sooner or later make additional concessions. Zhou particularly emphasized that it was Mao's belief that a firm Communist stand in the armistice negotiations might prolong the war in Korea but would not trigger a third world war. Rather, in Mao's opinion, the conflict in Korea had exposed the weakness of the United States, and delayed the coming of a new world war. Zhou also mentioned that the Chinese did have difficulties in continuing war operations under the current conditions, especially as the Americans held a 9 to 1 superiority in artillery pieces over the Communist forces. Stalin expressed his full agreement with Mao Zedong's assessment of the situation, offering to increase Soviet military equipment delivery to China so that the Chinese troops would hold a 20 to 9 superiority in artillery fire power against the Americans. Stalin also advised that the Chinese-North Korean side should take three steps in dealing with the Americans on the prisoner issue. First, if the enemy insisted on holding thirty percent of Chinese-North Korean prisoners, Beijing and Pyongyang could suggest holding a comparable proportion of the enemy's prisoners in exchange. The purpose of this suggestion was to force the Americans to change their position. Second, if the first design failed to work, the Chinese-North Korean side could propose a ceasefire to be followed by an exchange of prisoners. Third, if the second proposal was unacceptable to the Americans, the Chinese-North Korean side could make the following proposal: if some prisoners did not want to be returned, they might be temporarily maintained by a neutral third country, and then, after their intentions were ascertained, they would either be released or returned. In

order to strengthen the Chinese-North Korean position at the negotiating table, Stalin agreed to send five Soviet anti-aircraft artillery regiments to Korea. However, he warned the Chinese not to send their air force across the 38th parallel. He believed that the Americans were not in a position to continue a prolonged war in Korea. If the Chinese-North Korean side remained patient in negotiations while at the same time maintaining a powerful position on the battlefield, the Americans would sooner or later yield to one of the aforementioned three Communist designs. (Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian*, pp. 510-511, 520-522.)

Again, if one compares Shi Zhe's description of the meeting with the Russian minutes, they are compatible even in some small details. For example, in both records, Stalin said that the Soviets would assist the Chinese in establishing a 20 to 9 superiority in artillery pieces on the Korean battlefield.

Yet these Russian documents do raise questions about existing Chinese sources in several aspects. While these Russian documents are declassified by the Presidential Archives in their original format, existing Chinese sources are usually released on a selective basis, and published in compilations rather than made available in their original form to scholars working in archives. As a result, serious omissions exist in the Chinese sources. In the Russian minutes on the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Stalin on 20 August 1952, for example, the two leaders discussed the differences between Chinese and North Korean leaders over the Korean armistice issue. In Shi Zhe's memoirs, although he implied that problems existed between Beijing and Pyongyang, he does not explain what the problems were and why and how they emerged. Further, the accuracy of the information provided by memoirs is subject to the limits of human memory. In the case of Shi Zhe's memoirs, even with his marvelous memory of historical events (enhanced by his experience of writing "confessions" several hundred times during the Cultural Revolution and assisted by his privileged access to archival sources), ambiguities exist and mistakes occur. For example, comparing Shi Zhe's account of Mao Zedong's meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949 with both the Russian records and Mao's own telegram summarizing the meeting, one finds it too general and ambiguous in some places.

Shi Zhe also confuses some important dates in his memoirs. For example, Liu Shaoqi, the Chinese Communist Party's second most important person, visited the Soviet Union from 28 June to 14 August 1949, but Shi Zhe mistakenly states in his memoirs that Liu's visit started on 8 July 1949. Access to original Russian documents will certainly help scholars to establish a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the historical past.

But even the original Russian documents could also contain important omissions. In describing Mao Zedong's first meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949, for example, Shi Zhe consistently recalls that wh abhrson,d(rs wv second moiroalcess)Tj T\* 1

## A Palpable Deterioration

by **Vojtech Mastny**

The two sets of documents about high-level Sino-Soviet conversations, separated in time by less than three years, illustrate the palpable deterioration of relations between the two communist powers under the strain of the Korean war. Yet the nature of the deterioration, as well as its extent—not to mention the personalities of the principals—appear quite different from these contemporary Russian records than they do from the retrospective Chinese accounts which have so far been the main source of information on the subject and which project the later Sino-Soviet rift into a period when a fundamental conflict of interest was neither present nor anticipated.

Even with the allowance made for a tendency of the Russian note taker to embellish the atmosphere prevailing at the meetings, there cannot be a doubt that Mao Zedong on his first visit to Moscow treated Stalin as the supreme authority of world communism, with a reverence that was not merely pretended but rooted in a perception of common interests, to which the Chinese leader repeatedly and cogently alluded. The same perception determined Stalin's uncharacteristically considerate, even generous, attitude toward his junior partner, so much in contrast with the condescension he usually displayed in dealing with his eastern European lieutenants. The Russian documents hardly bear out the self-serving Chinese descriptions of his stinginess and boorishness, an image that Mao himself—no doubt retrospectively embarrassed by the extent of subordination he had once been willing to accept in regard to Moscow—later tried to disseminate.

Of course not everything was sweet and smooth between the two ruthless and devious dictators; still, their ability to dispose of potentially contentious issues was remarkable. Of these, none was more important than the question of whether the treaty Moscow had concluded with China's previous government should remain in effect or be replaced by a new one. During the month that elapsed between his two meetings with Mao, Stalin reversed himself, and on both occasions Mao readily followed suit. Whereas in mid-December Stalin considered the treaty an outgrowth of the Yalta

agreement indispensable to safeguard Soviet territorial acquisitions in the Far East, by January 22 he was ready to send Yalta "to hell" and dispense with the treaty on the ostensible grounds that it had merely been a temporary expedient required by the war against Japan. He proved amenable to Mao's insistence that the new pact must be stronger, including the obligation for the two signatories to consult with each other on all important international matters.

This proposed provision is one of the few possible hints in the record at the impending communist aggression in Korea, whose preparation also provides the most compelling reason for Stalin's reversal on the Sino-Soviet treaty. During their December meeting, the two chieftains still gave no inkling of plotting the Korean adventure, despite North Korea's Kim Il Sung's persistent entreaties to obtain Moscow's support for his plan for a forcible reunification of the country. If in December they knew of the plan but did not yet consider it topical, the thrust of their January conversation suggests that by then they had begun changing their minds. Their assessment, in view of recent U.S. public statements and behavior implying a diminished likelihood of effective American opposition, offers the most plausible explanation of the change.

Besides the decision to proceed toward a tighter Sino-Soviet alliance, the subject of the January conversation most relevant to the prospective North Korean action was the presence of Soviet forces at the naval base of Port Arthur on the Chinese mainland. Unanimous in their view that the forces should remain there as a deterrent to any possible American military move against China, Stalin and Mao anticipate keeping the place under Soviet control until the conclusion of what they look forward to as a satisfactory peace settlement with Japan; in the final agreement signed three weeks later, the t(th n changinenew ofoantha-c -0 Tw (for hisnd. shoule wej TT\* -0or

ing, rooted in the ideologically motivated belief that sooner or later “objective” forces would compel the capitalist enemies to behave that way he wanted them to behave. It is also possible, and not mutually exclusive, that he was making a disingenuous argument to persuade the Chinese to go on fighting, thus perpetuating their dependence on him while keeping the United States engaged. He is certainly not helpful in advancing any practical proposals to induce an armistice, insisting instead on demands that he knew were unacceptable to the U.S. side.

Playing a weak hand as a *demandeur*, Zhou has the difficult task of convincing the Soviet ruler to provide enough material assistance for both the prosecution of the war and China’s economic development while dissuading him from blocking a compromise that alone could lead to the termination of hostilities. By dwelling on China’s determination to fight on for several more years, if necessary, rather than to make any concessions, Zhou secures Stalin’s promises of huge military and economic assistance. He makes good use of the Soviet leader’s fascination with turning China into the “arsenal of Asia” and his support for the Chinese conquest of Tibet, though he sidetracks Stalin’s unsolicited advice to expel the Portuguese “scum” from the enclave of Macau. At the same time, they both agree not to provoke the Americans by acceding to the North Korean request for the bombing of South Korea—an escalation Stalin refuses to authorize with the priceless explanation that the air force belongs to the state and could therefore not be used by the Chinese “volunteers.”

Zhou Enlai fares less well in trying to break the deadlock in the armistice negotiations caused by the disputes about the disposition of the Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war unwilling to be repatriated. While professing China’s insistence on the complete repatriation of all prisoners, he nevertheless outlines to Stalin his plan for the transfer of the unwilling ones to a neutral country, such as India; noting the inconsistency, Stalin demurs. Nor does Zhou suc-

leagues were Soviet references to Xinjiang, Mongolia, and (to a lesser extent) Manchuria: in Mao's image six years later these areas were "turned into spheres of influence of the USSR." (See Mao's conversation with Yudin, 31 March 1956, reprinted elsewhere in this issue of the *Bulletin*.)

The centerpiece of Stalin's conversations with Zhou Enlai in Moscow in the summer of 1952 is the search for an armistice in Korea, a solution which at this stage both allies wanted, but which was held up by Stalin's ceaseless maneuvering on the issue. The Soviet leader most likely wanted the Chinese to go firmly on record in requesting a ceasefire (possibly to be arranged by Moscow) and to back away from their position from the previous summer, when Stalin had wanted an end to the war and Mao had turned him down. In his conversations with Zhou, Stalin paid lip-service to Mao's previous position, while underlining that the Chinese and the North Koreans should not undertake further offensives and could postpone the contentious POW issues until after an armistice had been signed. But neither Stalin nor Zhou would admit to the other that they were looking for a way out of the war against the United States and its allies.

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**"To hell with Yalta!"—  
Stalin Opts for a New Status Quo**

by Vladislav Zubok

The two transcripts of conversations during the Stalin-Mao talks in December 1949-February 1950 provide a unique insight into Stalin's doubts and second thoughts about the creation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Although the groundwork for holding the summit meeting had been laid during an exchange of secret high-level missions over the previous year (Anastas Mikoyan's visit to China in February 1949 and Liu Shaoqi's trip to Moscow in July-August), there were still unresolved issues and obstacles on the path to the new alliance. One issue was the matter of Soviet interests in Northeast China. Another was the invisible presence of the Americans at the Sino-Soviet negotiating table and the possible consequences of the alliance for vital Soviet broad interests, not only in the

Far East. Many other issues involving Chinese and Soviet interests were also on the table.

But the delicate and complicated question of establishing a personal relationship between Stalin and Mao also mattered greatly, and the tacit struggle between the two great revolutionary personalities is as important in understanding the talks between them in Moscow as their substance. At first, Stalin seems to have succeeded in impressing Mao with his posture as world leader and magnanimous emperor. Shi Zhe, Mao's interpreter, recalls that at the welcoming banquet Stalin seemed strongly interested in developing a new relationship with China. "The victory of the Chinese revolution will change the balance of the whole world," he quoted Stalin as saying. "More weight will be added to the side of international revolution."<sup>1</sup> According to the official Soviet record of the 16 December 1949 conversation, Mao asked what was the likelihood that a peaceful "breathing spell" would last for the next 3-5 years. Stalin seemed to sound even more optimistic than the previous July, when Liu Shaoqi had asked a similar question. There was no immediate threat to China, he said, because "Japan has yet to stand up on its feet and is thus not ready for war; America, though it screams war, is actually afraid of war more than anything; Europe is afraid of war; essentially, there is nobody to fight with China...." In the most significant breach with the framework of Yalta, Stalin suggested that "peace depends" on the alliance between the two communist powers. "If we continue to be friendly, peace can last not only 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhaps even longer."

Shi Zhe recalls that the conversation became uneasy, because Mao avoided speaking about the terms of a future Sino-Soviet treaty, waiting for Soviet initiative. Mao presented a different version to the USSR ambassador to the PRC, Pavel Yudin, six years later: "During my first meeting with Stalin I submitted a proposal to conclude a [new] state treaty, but Stalin evaded a response. Subsequently, Stalin avoided any meetings with me."<sup>2</sup> The official Soviet record of the meeting provides a much more vivid picture of this episode.<sup>3</sup>

When Mao asked about the treaty, Stalin immediately presented him with three options: to announce the preservation of the 1945 treaty, to announce "impending

changes" to the treaty, or (without announcement) to proceed with changes "right now." In other words, Stalin had flatly reneged on his commitment—relayed to Mao via Mikoyan the previous February<sup>4</sup>—to discard what the Chinese regarded as an "unequal" treaty. Stalin reminded Mao that the 1945 treaty "was concluded between the USSR and China as a result of the Yalta Agreement which provided for the main points of the treaty (the question of the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty was concluded, so to speak, with the consent of America and England. Keeping in mind this circumstance, we, within ourminioith the (Mxthe tr hi0R and han105s



from previous months of contacts and correspondence that it would be hard for the Chinese, and Mao in particular, to retain the old treaty which Stalin had concluded with the Guomindang (GMD). Therefore, he tried to sweeten the bitter pill by telling Mao that it would be possible to preserve the existing treaty only “formally,” while chang-



7. See the text of Mao's cable to Beijing of 2 January 1950, as reprinted in Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, *Uncertain Partners*, 242.

8. Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, *Uncertain Partners*, 98, 101; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 336-337.

9. On the importance of espionage data in the reversal of Soviet policy toward the Marshall Plan, see Mikhail M. Narinsky, "The Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan," in Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1994), 45-46.

10. See record of meeting in f. 0100, op. 43, d. 8, papka 302, ll. 4-6, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), Moscow, cited in B. Kulik, "Kitaiskaiia Narodnaia Respublika v period stanovleniia (1949-1952) (Po materialam Arkhiva vneshnei politik RF)" ["The Chinese People's Republic in the founding period (Materials from the Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation)"], *Problemi Danego Vostoka* 6 (1994), 77.

11. AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 235, papka 18, l. 134; also in *SSSR-KNR (1949-1983): Dokumenti i materialy* [Documents and materials on USSR-PRC relations, part one (1949-1983)] (Moscow: Historico-Documentary Department and Far Eastern Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1985), 31-32; see also Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, *Uncertain Partners*, 121. 12. *SSSR-KNR (1949-1983)*, p. 35.

## WESTAD

continued from page 7

a divided China. The visit of Soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan to the CCP headquarters later that winter did not do much to mitigate mutual suspicions; indeed, Mao on several occasions during the decades to come referred to this episode as an example of Soviet duplicity.

The documents were translated from Russian by Maxim Korobochkin; see also S.L. Tikhvinskii, "Iz Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g.," *Novaya i noveisha istoriya* 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.

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### Stalin to Mao Zedong, 10 January 1949

Comrade Mao Zedong.

On January 9 we received a note from the Nanjing government, proposing that the Soviet government act as a mediator between the Nanjing government and the Chinese Communist party [CCP] in the termination of war and the conclusion of peace. A similar proposal was sent simultaneously to the governments of the USA, Britain and France. The Nanjing government has

not received any answer from these governments yet. Neither has the Soviet government given its answer. Obviously, the government's proposal had been inspired by the Americans. The aim of this proposal is to present the Nanjing government as the advocate of the termination of war and a peaceful settlement, while the Communist party of China would be presented as the advocate of the continuation of war, if it would directly reject peace negotiations with Nanjing.

We think we will give the following answer: the Soviet government was and continues to be in favour of the termination of war and the establishment of peace in China, but before agreeing to mediation it would like to know whether the other side—the Chinese Communist party—agrees to accept Soviet mediation. Therefore the USSR wishes that the other side—the Chinese Communist party—would be informed of the peace action by the Chinese government, and that the other side would be asked for its agreement to the mediation by the USSR. That is how we are planning to answer and we ask you to inform us whether you agree to this. If you do not, give your advice for a more expedient answer.

We also think that your answer, in case you will be asked for it, should be something like this:

The Chinese Communist party has always been a supporter of peace in China, because the civil war in China had not been started by it, but by the Nanjing government, which should bear all responsibility for the consequences of the war. The Chinese Communist party is in favour of talks with the Guomindang, but without the participation of those war criminals who provoked the civil war in China. The Chinese Communist party is in favour of the direct negotiations with the Guomindang, without any foreign mediators. The Chinese Communist party especially finds it impossible to accept the mediation by a foreign power which takes part in the civil war against the Chinese Popular Liberation forces with its armed forces and navy, because such a power cannot be regarded as neutral and impartial in the liquidation of the war in China.

We think that your answer should be approximately like this. If you do not agree, let us know of your opinion.

As for your visit to Moscow, we think that in the view of the abovementioned circumstances you should, unfortunately, postpone your trip again for some time, because your visit to Moscow in this situation would be used by the enemies to discredit the Chinese Communist party as a force allegedly dependent on Moscow, which, certainly, could bring no benefit to the Communist party of China or to the USSR.

We are waiting for your answer.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: *Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF)*, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 95-96.]

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### Stalin to Mao Zedong, 11 January 1949

As you can see from what you have already received, our draft of your reply to the Guomindang proposal is aimed at the undermining of the peace negotiations. Clearly, the Guomindang would not agree to peace negotiations without foreign powers' mediation, especially that of the USA. It is also clear that the Guomindang will not agree to negotiate without the participation of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] and other war criminals. We assume therefore that the Guomindang would reject peace negotiations on CCP terms. The result will be that the CCP agrees to the peace negotiations and it will be impossible to accuse it of being eager to continue the civil war. The Guomindang, however, will receive the blame for breaking the peace talks. Thus, the peace maneuver of the Guomindang and the USA will be frustrated, and you will be able to continue your victorious war of liberation.

We are waiting for your answer.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: *APRF*, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 97-99.]

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### Mao Zedong to Stalin, 13 January 1949

Comrade Filippov,

I received your telegram of January 10.

1. We think that the government of the USSR should give the following answer to the note by the Nanjing government proposing that the USSR accepts mediation in the termination of the civil war in China:

The government of the USSR has always wished, and still wishes, to see China as a peaceful, democratic and united country. But it is for the people of China itself to choose the way to achieve peace, unity and democracy in China. The government of the USSR, relying on the principle of noninterference in the other countries' internal affairs, cannot accept mediation between the two sides in the civil war in China.

Chinese people.

We are deeply concerned by the fact that this deception will have a large influence on the people and make us start another political detour, i.e. to refrain from rejecting peace negotiations with the Guomindang. We are delaying the creation of the coalition government. Our principal objective is to make the Americans and the Guomindang put all their aces on the table, while we keep our aces until the last moment.

We have recently published a list of war criminals, 43 persons, unofficially (a statement by a person of authority). The PLA has not yet issued an order to arrest these war criminals.

On January 1 Jiang Jieshi delivered his peace proposal. We gave an unofficial answer to this, too (an editorial article by a journalist). To sum up, we have left some room for a volte face, to see how the Chinese people and international opinion would react to the Guomindang's deceptive negotiations.

But now we are inclined towards rejecting the peace deception by the Guomindang with full righteousness, because now, as the balance of class forces in China has already changed irreversibly and the international opinion is also unfavourable to the Nanjing government, the PLA will be able to cross the Yangzi this summer and start the offensive towards Nanjing.

It looks like we do not have to make one more political detour. In the present situation this maneuver would be damaging rather than beneficial.

4. Thank you for asking for our opinion on such an important issue. If you do not agree with my opinion as expressed here or would introduce corrections, please let me know.

Mao Zedong

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**Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 January 1949**

To Comrade Mao Zedong.

We received your long telegram on the Nanjing peace proposal.

1. Certainly it would be better if the Nanjing government's peace proposal did not exist at all, if this whole peace maneuver by the USA was nonexistent. Clearly, this maneuver is disagreeable, because it can bring some trouble to our common cause. But, unfortunately, this maneuver does exist, it is a fact and we cannot close our eyes on this fact, we have to accept it.

2. Undoubtedly, the peace proposal by Nanjing and the USA is a manifestation of a policy of deception. First, because Nanjing does not really want peace with the Communist party, as the peace with the Communist party would mean the rejection by the Guomindang of its principal policy of liquidation of the Communist

party and its troops, and that would lead to the political death of the Guomindang leaders and the total disintegration of the Guomindang army. Second, because they know that the Communist party will not make peace with the Guomindang, as it cannot abandon its principal policy of liquidation of the Guomindang and its troops.

So what does Nanjing want after all? It wants not peace with the Communist party, but an armistice, a temporary termination of hostilities to use the armistice as a respite to restore order among Guomindang troops, to fortify the south bank of the Yangzi, to ship armaments from the USA, to reinforce and then to break the truce and deliver a blow on the People's Liberation 9mwill a10.035

will not accept these conditions, the people will realize, that the Guomindang and not the Communist party is to blame for the continuation of civil war. The banner of peace in this case rests in the hands of the Communist party. This issue is especially important now, when a lot of people in China are tired of the civil war and are ready to support the advocates of peace.

But let us assume the impossible and imagine that the Guomindang had accepted these terms. What should the Communist Party's plans of actions be like?

First, it would be necessary to refrain from terminating the hostilities and then to create the central coalition government organs in such a way that approximately three fifths of seats in the Consultative Council and two thirds of the posts in the government would be retained by the Communists, and the other seats and posts would be distributed between other democratic parties and the Guomindang.

Second, it is necessary that the posts of the prime minister, Commander in Chief, and, if possible, that of the president, be occupied by Communists.

Third, the Consultative Council should declare this coalition government the only government of China, and any other government, pretending to be the government of China, should be declared a rebel group, subject to be disbanded.

And, finally, the coalition government should order both your troops and the Guomindang troops to swear allegiance to the coalition government and that hostilities against the troops which had given the oath would be terminated immediately, while they would be continued against the troops which had refused to give the oath.

It seems unlikely that the Guomindang would agree to these measures, but if they would not, it would be also detrimental for them, because they would be totally isolated, and these measures would be carried out without them.

4. This is our understanding of the issue and our advice to you. Maybe we were not able to present our advice clearly enough in our previous telegram.

We ask you to regard our advice as advice only, which does not impose any obligations on you and which you can accept or turn down. You can be sure that your rejection of our advice will not influence our relations and we will remain your friends as we have ever been.

5. As for our answer to the Nanjing mediation proposal, it will be in the spirit of your proposals.

6. We still insist that you postpone temporarily your visit to Moscow, as your presence in China is essential now. If you want we can immediately send an authoritative member of the Politbureau to Harbin or some other place to negotiate on issues of interest to you.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 110-113.]

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### Mao Zedong to Stalin, 14 January 1949

Comrade Filippov,

1. I was glad to receive your supplementary telegram of January 11. On the principal line (the breakdown of large scale negotiations with the Guomindang [GMD], the continuation of the revolutionary war to the end) we agree with you completely.

Today we published eight conditions under which we [would] agree to enter into peace negotiations with the Guomindang. These conditions are put forward against the five reactionary conditions which Jiang Jieshi mentioned in his peace proposal of January 1.

Several days ago already the Americans sounded out our opinion—whether we would wish to conduct peace negotiations with the Guomindang without the 43 war criminals. So this sole condition—negotiating without war criminals—is no longer sufficient to undermine the intrigue of the Guomindang peace negotiations.

2. [This point dealt with the work of the CCP radio station.]

3. Since the publication of the Guomindang's peace proposals there has been much fuss in the GMD-controlled areas and the population is en masse demanding peace from the Guomindang, reproaching the Guomindang that its peace conditions are too severe.

The agitation and propaganda organs of the Guomindang are hastily explaining why the Guomindang needs to preserve its legal status and its army. We think that this disorder in the Guomindang-controlled regions will be increasing further.

Mao Zedong

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 104-105.]

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### Stalin to Mao Zedong, 15 January 1949

To Comrade Mao Zedong.

We have just received your last short telegram, which shows that we now have unanimous opinions on the issue of the Nanjing peace proposal and that the Communist party of China has already started its "peace" campaign. Thus, the matter is now closed.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, p. 118.]

### The Official Statement on the Soviet Government's Answer to the Note by the Nanjing Government (*Izvestia*, 18 January 1949)

On January 8 the Chinese Foreign Ministry presented a memorandum to the Soviet Embassy in China, containing an appeal by the Chinese government to the Soviet government to act as a mediator in the peace negotiations between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist party. As the Soviet Ambassador was informed, the Chinese government had sent a similar appeal to the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France.

On January 17 the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR comr. Vyshinsky A. Ya. received the Chinese Ambassador in the USSR Mr. Fu Bing Ciang and gave him the answer of the Soviet government, which points out that the Soviet government, always loyal to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, does not regard it expedient to accept the int-4.88, whiccomrd.peo67 Tistelf the Nanjingent a simics

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# NEW RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS ON THE KOREAN WAR

## Introduction and Translations

by Kathryn Weathersby

In the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* (Issue 5, Spring 1995 pp. 1, 2-9), I described the collection of high-level documents on the Korean War that Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented to President Kim Young Sam of South Korea in June 1994. I also presented translations of six key documents from that collection that illuminate the decision-making behind the outbreak of full-scale war in Korea in June 1950. Since the publication of the Spring 1995 *Bulletin*, the base of documentary evidence on the Korean War has been enriched even more by the release of virtually the entire collection of high-level documents on the war declassified by the Presidential Archive in Moscow, which numbers approximately 1,200 pages. Through a joint project of the Center for Korean Research of Columbia University and the Cold War International History Project, these documents are now available to all interested researchers.<sup>1</sup>

The Presidential Archive (known officially as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) is the repository to which, during the Soviet era, the Kremlin leadership sent its most sensitive records for safekeeping and ready access. Its holdings are therefore more selective than those of the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CC CPSU), and the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, the other major repositories used by historians of the Cold War. The release of a large portion of the APRF's documents on the Korean War consequently provides a critical addition to available evidence on the high-level decisions and deliberations of the communist side during this pivotal conflict.

This article presents translations of and commentary on a sizable portion of this recently-released APRF collection on the Korean War. It begins with most of the released documents covering February 1950 through January 1951, providing a close look at the Soviet role in Korea during the

significant first months of the conflict. (Unfortunately, some key materials from this period, particularly the months immediately preceding the war, have not yet become available; for key documents from mid-September to mid-October 1950, covering events from the Inchon landing to China's decision to intervene in the war, see the article by Alexandre Y. Mansourov elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.) It then offers a more selective sample of documents from spring 1951 through the end of the war, focusing primarily on Stalin's approach to the armistice negotiations. As the reader will quickly discover, these documents of high-level decision-making within the Soviet government and within the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang alliance shed light on many questions about the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet alliance, Soviet relations with North Korea



collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Resuming the story in late October 1950, document #31, the Politburo decision of 25 October 1950, suggests that the Soviet leadership worried that the United States might use the war in Korea as a pretext for rearming Japan. Stalin's continued fear of a resurgent Japan may seem surprising, but in 1947 the U.S. military had considered rearming Japan to buttress the forces available along the Soviet Pacific border, a move vigorously opposed by the Soviet representative to the Far Eastern Commission. Furthermore, two weeks after the North Korean attack on South Korea, U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur ordered the Japanese prime minister to create a "National Police Reserve" of 75,000 men, some of whom were, in fact, deployed to Korea. (At the same time, analogous moves toward constituting a West German military contribution to the Western alliance were stepped up.) We have no record of Japanese participation in the battles referred to in the Soviet statement cited here, but forty-six minesweepers with 1,200 Japanese military personnel were dispatched to the eastern coast of North Korea between 2 October and 10 December 1950, to clear the way for an amphibious assault by UN forces.<sup>8</sup> Japanese participation never became a major issue during the Korean War, either militarily or diplomatically, but it does appear that one of Stalin's reasons for taking the risks associated with a North Korean offensive against South Korea was to eliminate the possibility that a resurgent Japan would be able to use southern Korea as a beachhead for an attack on the Soviet Union. (This argument also animates Stalin's arguments to Mao in early October 1950 in favor of Chinese entry into the war to save the North Korean regime; see documents accompanying Alexandre Mansourov's article.)

Despite Stalin's concern to avoid direct military conflict with the United States, he finally agreed to provide air cover for Chinese ground troops crossing into Korea. Given the intensity of American bombing, Chinese troops could hardly have entered the war without such cover and they did not have the means to provide it for themselves. On 1 November 1950, Soviet air force units first engaged American planes in air battles over the Yalu River bridge that was the route for Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) entering Korea. Stalin's military envoy to

Mao, S.E. Zakharov, reported on 2 November 1950 (document #35) on the results of the first day of combat between Soviet and



# **KOREA MAP**

**This page**

some American armed forces retreating before the troops of his junior ally, Stalin ordered Vyshinsky to propose instead terms that the Americans would surely reject. In the same vein, Stalin replied to Zhou (document #49) that it was not yet time “for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated,” and advised him to adopt the more cunning strategy of requesting US and UN opinions on conditions for an armistice. When the UN group presented its proposal on 11 January 1951, Zhou again turned to Stalin for “advice and consultation” (document #52), and in accordance with Stalin’s recommendation the PRC rejected the UN proposal.

Stalin’s telegram to Mao Zedong on 5 June 1951 (document #65) reveals the new attitude toward the war that Stalin adopted after Chinese successes on the battlefield removed the threat of an American advance toward Chinese and Soviet borders. He informed Mao that he agreed that “the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of Anglo-American troops.” We have no record of Mao’s reaction to Stalin’s enthusiasm for this costly “learning experience” for China and one may imagine that the Chinese leadership may have been less enthusiastic about the massive casualties suffered in Korea, which ran to many hundreds of thousands by the end of the war. At the same time, however, Mao’s correspondence with Stalin indicates that the Chinese leader was in fact willing to continue the war until he obtained from the United States terms he considered acceptable. Russian records of Mao’s correspondence with Stalin thus lend support to Chen Jian’s argument that Mao Zedong intervened in Korea primarily in order to reassert China’s place in the international order and to revive revolutionary momentum within China.<sup>12</sup>

Despite Stalin’s interest in continuing the war in Korea, the serious losses suffered by Chinese and North Korean troops in their failed offensives of April and May 1951 forced the communist allies to consider opening negotiations with the UN command. On June 5 Soviet Ambassador to the UN Jacob Malik informed the American diplomat George F. Kennan that “the Soviet govern-

ment wanted peace and wanted a peaceful solution of the Korean question—at the earliest possible moment” and advised the United States “to get in touch with the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in this matter.”<sup>13</sup> A few days later Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang, a Chinese leader with close ties to the Soviet Union, went to Moscow to discuss the situation with Stalin (documents #67, 69-72). Mao Zedong considered it advisable to open negotiations with the UN command because for the next two months the Chinese and North Koreans would have to occupy a defensive position (documents #73, 74, 76). If the Chinese and North Korean forces could avoid facing an enemy offensive during this period, by August they would be strong enough to launch their own new offensive.

Stalin agreed with Mao that armistice negotiations were desirable at that time (see document #69) and instructed Moscow’s ambassador to the United Nations to take the appropriate initiative.<sup>14</sup> This evidence suggests that the “hawks” within the Truman Administration who opposed opening negotiations in Korea on the grounds that the enemy was only trying to buy time to build up its forces were, in fact, correct. From Mao’s assessment of the condition of the Chinese and North Korean troops in the summer of 1951, it appears that if the UN forces had pushed their advantage in June and July 1951, before the Chinese had time to dig fortifications, they may well have advanced the line of the front, and hence the eventual border between the two Koreas. After August 1951 the CPV and PLA were sufficiently well dug in that the war remained a stalemate.

An examination of Chinese and North Korean strategy during the armistice negotiations, which lasted from July 1951 to July 1953, is beyond the scope of this essay, though the Presidential Archive documents provide extensive evidence on this subject. I will note only that it appears that while Mao Zedong opened negotiations in 1951 primarily in order to buy time to reinforce his position on the battlefield, his communications with Stalin in July and August 1951 (documents #84-88) suggest that if he had been able to secure satisfactory terms in the negotiations, he may have been willing to conclude an armistice. However, the documents reveal that Stalin consistently took a “hard line” toward the negotiations, advising Mao that since the Americans had an even

greater need to conclude an armistice, the Chinese and North Koreans should “continue to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations” (document #95).

The evidence presented below suggests that as the fighting dragged on through 1952, the North Koreans became increasingly desirous of ending the war (documents #102, 106). The Chinese approach to the war, however, seems to have been contradictory. On the one hand, Mao Zedong was clearly anxious to avoid undermining the prestige of the PRC by accepting unfavorable armistice terms (document #108). As Zhou Enlai explained to Stalin in a conversation in Moscow on 20 August 1952 (the transcript of which is published elsewhere in this issue of the *Bulletin*), the Chinese leadership felt that as a matter of principle it could not yield to the Americans on the issue of repatriation of POWs. Zhou also reported to Stalin that Mao believed that the war in Korea was advantageous to China because it kept the United States from preparing for a new world war. Specifically, by fighting the Americans in Korea, China was helping to delay the next world war by 15-20 years. On the other hand, however, Zhou stated toward the end of this conversation that if America makes some sort of compromise on the POW issue, the communist side should accept it.

We need additional records from China in order to determine more clearly the Chinese leadership’s thinking regarding the war in Korea during the long months of armistice negotiations. However, from an internal report on the Korean War written by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1966 (published in Issue 3 [Fall 1993] of the *Bulletin*), it appears that by the time of Stalin’s death in March 1953, Beijing was eager to bring the war to an end. According to this report, during conversations held while Zhou Enlai was in Moscow for Stalin’s funeral, the PRC foreign minister “urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of an armistice.” As the tortuously worded USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 19 March 1953 (document #112) reveals, ending the war in Korea was also a high priority for the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow; in the midst of the great anxiety and confusion following Stalin’s death, the new leadership drafted and approved this major foreign policy decision in only two weeks. The evidence thus suggests that Stalin’s desire to

continue the war in Korea was a major factor in the prolongation of the war; immediately after his death the three communist allies took decisive steps to reach an armistice agreement.

The timing of the Council of Ministers' resolution also suggests that it was Stalin's death rather than U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons that finally brought a breakthrough in the armistice negotiations. The Eisenhower Administration later asserted that it finally broke the stalemate at Panmunjom by virtue of its "unmistakable warning" to Beijing that it would use nuclear weapons against China if an armistice were not reached—a claim that had great influence on American strategic thinking after 1953.<sup>15</sup> However, Eisenhower's threats to use nuclear weapons were made in May 1953, two months after the Soviet government resolved to bring the war to an end. The Russian documents thus provide important new evidence for the debate over "nuclear diplomacy."<sup>16</sup>

The final two documents presented below provide intriguing information about Mao Zedong's attitude toward the Korean War and the effect the war had on his relations with Moscow. In a discussion with Soviet officials in Beijing on 28 July 1953 (document #114), Mao was remarkably bellicose, speaking of the war as though it had been a great victory for China. He even commented that "from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year." Mao may have been mainly posturing before the Russians, part of a larger effort to redefine his relations with Moscow following the death of Stalin; the Soviet documents need to be combined with the new Chinese sources before one can draw firm conclusions about Mao's thinking. It is clear, however, as the excerpt from a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing in April 1956 (document #115) suggests, that the Korean War profoundly affected relations between the PRC and the USSR. Stalin desperately wanted Mao Zedong to pull his chestnuts out of the fire in Korea, but the PRC's stunning success against the formidable American foe, combined with Moscow's tightfistedness toward its ally, made the communist government in Beijing much less willing to tolerate subsequent Soviet demands.

As is apparent from the documents pre-

sented below and the others from this collection published in this issue, the documents declassified by the Presidential Archive greatly expand our knowledge of the Korean War and of Soviet foreign policy in general in the late Stalin years, particularly Soviet relations with the new communist government in China. It will be some time before these new sources can be adequately analyzed and integrated with documentary and memoir evidence from other countries. In the meantime, readers may wish to consult the following recent publications using other new sources from China and Russia in order to place this new evidence in a broader context: Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Thomas Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," *International Security* 17:1 (Summer 1992), 122-54; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Michael Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," *Political Science Quarterly* 107: 3 (Fall 1992), 453-78; William Stueck, *The Korean War, An International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Zhang Shu Guang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995).

1. Photocopies of these documents have been deposited at the National Security Archive in Washington DC, located in The Gelman Library (7th fl.), George Washington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037 (tel.: (202) 994-7000). The National Security Archive, a non-governmental organization devoted to facilitating increased access to declassified records on international relations, is open to all researchers. Copies of this collection will also be available at Columbia University.

2. "New Findings on the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18; and "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 1,2-9; and "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-458.

3. See Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 149.

4. Although Kim Il Sung secured Mao's approval before launching the attack on South Korea, he did not inform Mao of the specific plan for the invasion or the

timing of the attack. The North Korean leadership informed Beijing about the military operation only on June 27, after the KPA had already occupied Seoul. See Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 134.

5. Members of the Russian declassification committee for Korean War documents have reported that further records regarding the preparations for the military offensive against South Korea in the spring of 1950 are

NOTE ON TRANSLATION: In translating these documents I have retained the style of the Russian texts, which in most cases is the cumbersome, indirect, bureaucratic prose characteristic of official Soviet documents. The telegrams from Mao Zedong to Stalin in 1951 and 1952 are written in particularly poor Russian; I have kept as much to the original text as possible while still rendering the prose intelligible. The numbers of the ciphered telegrams are given when they are legible, but in many cases the "DECLASSIFIED" stamp obscured the number of the telegram. Personal names and place names are given in the standard English spelling wherever possible; otherwise they are transliterated from the Russian. An index of abbreviations and identifications of the most important persons mentioned are provided after the documents. Dates are given in the Russian manner: day, month, year. Note on archival citations: Those documents that were provided by the Russian Government to South Korea have a citation to the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (AVPRF) as well as to the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF); both archives are locreveruth Korrg

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government of the USSR within three days concerning all the questions touched upon in your telegram.

10/II-50. SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, List 129, Fond and Opis not given]

**4. 23 February 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Maj. Gen. A.M. Vasilevsky, Head of Soviet Military Advisory Group in DPRK**

Ciphered telegram    Strictly Secret  
Copying prohibited

From Pyongyang

To Vasilevsky, Copy to Vyshinsky.

Lieutenant-General Vasiliev has arrived and has taken over the responsibility of main military adviser of the Korean People's Army. He has familiarized himself with the position in the staff and units of the army.

In connection with this I understand that the functions of main military adviser are removed from me.

I ask you to confirm.

23.II.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, List 130, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 148]

**5. 9 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting note from Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government**

Ciphered telegram    Strictly Secret  
Copying is prohibited

From Pyongyang.

To Vyshinsky.

I transmit the text of a note received from the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK:

“The Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic reports to you about the following:

In 1950 the Korean People's Democratic Republic, in order to strengthen the people's army and to fully equip it with arms, ammunition and technical equipment, asked the Soviet government to send to Korea military-technical equipment in the amount of 120-150 million rubles, in accordance with an application made earlier to the Government of the USSR.

The Korean People's Democratic Republic correspondingly will deliver to the

Soviet Union this year:

9 tons of gold — 53,662,900 rubles

40 tons of silver — 1,887,600 rubles

15,000 tons of monazite concentrate —  
79,500,000 rubles

In all a sum of 133,050,500 rubles.

Korea is interested in the soonest possible receipt of the goods indicated in this application.

I ask you to inform the Soviet government of our request.

Kim Il Sung

Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.”

9.III.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, Listy 131-132, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 149-150]

**6. 12 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Soviet Ambassador » 1 Tf 1.818 5Dbinet of yang.OpissageSoviIl**

Copying is prohibited

[Source: APRF, List 142, Fond and Opis not given]

**9. 21 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung**

Ciphered telegram    Strictly Secret  
Copying Prohibited

From Pyongyang  
To Vyshinsky.

In accordance with your order on March 20 I had a meeting with Kim Il Sung, at which [DPRK Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong was present. During the meeting I transmitted to Kim the text of the telegram of Comrade Stalin.

During this meeting Kim asked me to transmit to Comrade Stalin his request that he, together with Pak Hon Yong, would like have a meeting with Comrade Stalin at the beginning of April.

They want to make the trip to Moscow and the meeting with Comrade Stalin unofficially, in the manner as [it was done] in 1945.

Kim Il Sung said further that they are completing the preparation of all materials for the trip and intend to raise the following questions at the meeting with Comrade Stalin:

1. About the path and methods of unification of the south and the north of the country.

2. About the prospects for the economic development of the country.

3. Also possibly several party questions. I ask your order.

21.III.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, Listy 143-144, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 94-95]

**10. 24 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung**

Ciphered telegram.    Strictly secret.  
From Pyongyang.  
To Vyshinsky.

On March 24 I visited Kim Il Sung and communicated to him that Comrade Stalin has agreed to receive him and [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong.

Kim Il Sung plans to leave Korea for Moscow on March 30 of this year. I consider it advisable to arrange a special plane for

transporting Kim and Pak to Moscow. For this purpose I request a corresponding order to apportion a plane. The designated plane should arrive in Pyongyang on March 29 of this year. In case it is not possible to send a plane, the departure from Korea can be organized by naval transport from Seisin to Vladivostok. From Vladivostok to Moscow [Kim and Pak can travel] by train in a special car.

Kim intends to take with him to Moscow as an interpreter Mun Il, who was interpreter during the negotiations in Moscow, and the personal adjutant of So Chen Diu, who was also with him in Moscow in 1949.

I request an order regarding whether it is necessary for someone from the embassy to accompany Kim to Moscow.

I ask for corresponding orders.

24.III.50 Shtykov

[Source: APRF, Listy 146-147, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 96-97]

**11. 10 April 1950, ciphered telegram, Soviet representative Aleksei Ignatieff in Pyongyang Ignatiev to Vyshinsky**

Ciphered telegram    Strictly Secret  
Copying Prohibited

From Pyongyang  
To Vyshinsky.

The deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK has reported to me about the following:

1. A report to Kim Il Sung was received from the ambassador of the DPRK in the Chinese People's Republic Li Zhou-yuan in which he reports about a meeting between Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan that took place in Beijing at the end of March 1950.

In the conversation between Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan, at the initiative of the latter, the question of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed.

Mao Zedong responded positively to the question of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and selected the end of April or the beginning of May of this year as the approximate time for this meeting.

Mao Zedong connected the proposed meeting with the question of the unification of Korea, indicating in this regard that if there is a concrete plan for the unification of Korea, then the meeting should be organized secretly [not openly], but if there is not yet

such a plan for unification of Korea, then the meeting with Kim Il Sung can be conducted officially.

Li Zhou-yuan has not given a concrete answer to the question of the time and form of the meeting, referring to the fact that Kim Il Sung is presently undergoing medical treatment. [Ed. note: Kim was making a secret visit to Moscow.] Further, Mao said in the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan that if a third world war begins, Korea will not escape participation in it, therefore the Korean People's Democratic Republic should prepare its armed forces.

In the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan, Mao Zedong expressed the wish to develop wider trade between the Chinese People's Republic and the DPRK.

2. Kim Ch'aek has reported that Kim Dar Sen, the leader of the partisan detachments in the south of Korea whom the southern press and radio have repeatedly officially reported as killed in battles with punitive units of the South Korean army, arrived in Pyongyang from South Korea on April 3. Kim Dar Sen came to North Korea to report about the position of the partisan movement in South Korea and to receive orders on this question.

Kim Ch'aek asked me to transmit the above indicated questions to Kim Il Sung through Comrade Shtykov.

10.IV.50. [A.] IGNATIEV

[Source: APRF, Listy 148-149, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 98-99]

**12. 25 April 1950, ciphered telegram, Ignatiev to Vyshinsky**

Ciphered telegram    Strictly Secret  
Copying Prohibited

From Pyongyang  
To Vyshinsky.

25 April at 16:00 hours local time Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong arrived in Seisin (North Korean) from Voroshilov by plane. Both feel well.

25.IV.50 IGNATIEV

[Source: APRF, List 150, fond and opis not given]

**13. 12 May 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung**



infantry rose up and went on the attack in good spirits. In the first three hours individual units and formations advanced from 3 to 5 kilometers.

The attack of the troops of the People's Army took the enemy completely by surprise.

The enemy put up strong resistance only in the direction of Ongjin, Kaizin and Seoul. The enemy began to put up a more organized resistance after 12:00 on the first day.

On the first day of battle the following towns were taken: Osin (Ongjin direction), Kaesong, Sinyuri—(map 1:1,000,000 published by the General Staff in 1943).

In the Sunsen direction units of the P.A. [People's Army] advanced 12 kilometers.

On the eastern coast [they advanced] 8 kilometers.

On the very first day the DPRK navy made two landings on the coast of the Sea of Japan. The first landing party was in the Korio area and consisted of two battalions of naval infantry and around a thousand partisans. The second landing group was in the region of Urutsyn and consisted of 600 partisans.

The landings took place at 5 hours 25 minutes and were carried out successfully.

The group of partisans took the city of Urutsyn and a number of districts adjoining it.

The landings were carried out with a battle between warships of the People's Army and ships of the South Korean army. As a result of the battle one Southern trawler was sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet had no losses.

On June 26 troops of the People's Army continued the attack and, with fighting, advanced deep into the territory of South Korea.

During June 26 (left to right) the Ongjin peninsula and Kaisin peninsula were completely cleared and units of the 6th division made a forced crossing of the bay and took the populated point in the direction of Kimpo airport.

In the Seoul direction, the 1st and 4th divisions took the cities of Bunsan and Tongducheb and the 2nd division took the provincial center Siunsen.

On the coast of the Sea of Japan the advance has continued. The port of Tubuir has been taken.

During the course of the day there has been no communication with the 12th Infan-

try Division, moving in the direction of Kosen, or with the 3rd Infantry Division and the mechanized brigade attacking through Sinyuri in the direction toward Geisif.

Conclusions regarding the North.

It is necessary to note the following substantial insufficiencies in the operations of the People's Army:

1. With the beginning of military actions and the forward advance of units and formations, staff communication was lost from top to bottom. The general staff of the People's Army already on the first day did not direct the battle, since it did not have firm communication with a single division.

The commanders of units and formations are not trying to establish communications with the senior staff, command posts from combat level and higher change the senior staff without permission, the General Staff still has not established communications with the brigade operating along the eastern coast or with the 12th Infantry Division.

2. The command staff of the KPA does not have battle experience, after the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers they organized the battle command poorly, they use artillery and tanks in battle badly and lose communications.

3. However, our military advisers note great enthusiasm in the units of the Korean People's army and a general aspiration to fulfill their allotted tasks.

4. The political mood among the people of North Korea in relation to the beginning of military operations is characterized by a general enthusiasm, by faith in the government of the DPRK and belief in the victory of the Korean People's Army.

On 26 June KIM IL SUNG made an appeal to the Korean people in the name of the government of the DPRK, in which

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## **CHINA'S ROAD TO THE KOREAN WAR**

**by Chen Jian**

In October 1950, one year after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadership sent "Chinese People's Volunteers" (CPV) to Korea to fight against United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese-Korean border. Although China's intervention saved Kim Il Sung's North Korean Communist regime from imminent collapse, it was unable to fulfill the Beijing leadership's hopes of overwhelming the UN forces. Therefore, when the Korean War ended in July 1953, Korea's political map remained virtually unchanged, while America's military intervention in Korea and China's rushing into a conflict with the United States finally buried any hope for a Sino-American accommodation, and the Cold War in Asia entered a new stage characterized by a total confrontation between the PRC and the United States that would last nearly twenty years.

The newly established Chinese Communist regime faced enormous problems during its first year, including achieving political consolidation, rebuilding a war-shattered economy, and finishing reunification of the country. Why then did Mao





American imperialists, I am obliged to appeal to you with a request to allow the use of 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the staff of the front of the Korean Army and the staffs of the 2nd Army Group, since the national military cadres have not yet sufficiently mastered the art of commanding modern troops.

Faithfully, KIM IL SUNG, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers DPRK.

Pyongyang. 8 July 1950.

SHTYKOV

No. 481/sh

8.7.50

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 143-144 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 151]

**21. 8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin in PRC transmitting message to Mao Zedong**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3231

BEIJING. Soviet Ambassador.

Only by telegraph

Sent 18:40 8.7.50

Delivered 8.7.50

Communicate to MAO ZEDONG that the Koreans are complaining that there is no representative of CHINA in KOREA. A representative should be sent soon, so that it will be possible to have communications and resolve questions more quickly, if, of course, MAO ZEDONG considers it necessary to have communications with KOREA.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].

No. 379/sh.

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 82 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 117]

**22. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3305

BEIJING Only by ciphered telegraph

SOVIET AMBASSADOR Sent 03:15

13.7.50

Transmit to ZHOU ENLAI or MAO ZEDONG the following:

“1. The English have officially appealed to us through their ambassador in Moscow and declared that they, being bound by the decision of the Security Council, cannot now make proposals regarding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, but if the Korean People’s Democratic Republic withdraws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this could hasten a peaceful resolution of the Korean question.

The English ask the Soviet government to express its opinion.

We consider the following:

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 826, Listy 108-109]

**25. 25 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Roshchin transmitting message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai**

MID USSR

Tenth Department Received 4 hours 30 minutes 25/VII.1950

Dispatched 5 hours 55 minutes 25/VII.1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

To Beijing To Soviet Ambassador Roshchin

SPECIAL

TOP PRIORITY

To Your No. 1503.

On the authorization of Filippov, transmit to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that we agree with the proposed procedure and time period for training Chinese pilots on jet planes.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

VYSHINSKY

25.VII.50

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 90]

**26. 27 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3962

Beijing

To Comrade Kotov

To No. 1726.

Visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the reply to his telegram about military advisers.

“To Comrade Zhou Enlai.

The Soviet Government has satisfied your request about sending Soviet military advisers—specialists in PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] and VVS [Air Force] to the Eastern and Northeastern military districts. 38 advisers will be sent to China, of which 10 will be specialists in PVO and 28 specialists in VVS.

As regards the remaining 26 advisers, we consider that there is no special need to send them, since the work of these advisers can be fulfilled by the 38 advisers being sent to China, specifically: Adviser to the Chief of Staff PVO, apart from his main work can advise the work of the Chiefs of the opera-

tional and intelligence departments of the PVO district; Adviser to the Chief of Staff of the VVS can advise the work also of the Chief of the Operational Department of the Staff of the VVS district.

The 38 advisers will leave for China of the Staff of

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[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 47 telegrame Sta8

СІПІРОВАНО ПРАВОМ ВІСЬ (ignomin-t-)w12 Tc ue 3s0o ldehou Enlai

sary then he can do it. KIM IL SUNG replied that he would convene the PolitSoviet tomorrow and read them the contents of this letter.

SHTYKOV

No. 1001

30.8.50

Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 159-160]

**29. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

FYN-SI [Stalin].

I transmit the letter I received.

According to the report of KIM IL SUNG's secretary, MUN IL, this text of the letter was confirmed by the PolitSoviet of the CC of the Labor Party.

SHTYKOV

No. 1011/sh

31.8.1950

Copies to Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of the 8th Department.

"DEAR comrade STALIN, I.V.

We are deeply touched by your attention.

We bring to you, our dear teacher, gratitude for the warm sympathy and advice. In the decisive period of the struggle of the Korean people we have received great moral support from you. We have firmly resolved to win the final victory in the struggle against the American interventionists, who are trying anew to enslave Korea.

In the noble struggle for independence and freedom we constantly feel your fatherly care and assistance.

We wish you many years of life and health.

Yours faithfully,

KIM IL SUNG

(upon commission of the PolitSoviet of the CC [Central Committee] of the Labor Party of Korea)

city of PYONGYANG

31.8.1950."

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 14-15 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 162]

**30. 13 September 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600155/III.

From Pyongyang Sent 13.9.50 Received 13.9. 13:15

Sent to the 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 13.9 13:22.

By telegraph.

Extremely urgent.

Moscow—Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

In connection with the forthcoming session of the [UN] General Assembly, we consider it advisable to recommend to the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic to send a statement to the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which, on the basis of documents found in the archives of the Rhee Syngmann [South Korean] government, to show how the clique of RHEE SYNGMANN prepared an attack on the north, to set forth once again the position of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic on the question of the illegality of the American intervention in Korea, to illuminate the barbaric acts of the American armed forces in Korea and to demand the adoption of measures for the immediate cessation of the American intervention and the withdrawal from Korea of the troops of the foreign interventionists.

In addition to this statement [we advise] to send to the General Assembly and the Security Council photocopies of the documents to which reference will be made in the statement of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

In such case as you agree to this proposal, we ask you to communicate when it would be convenient to send such a statement.

We would consider it advisable also to inform the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic about the position which the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly will take on the Korean question.

We ask your orders.

SHTYKOV

No. 1154/sh.

13 September of this year

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,

Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 18-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 163-164]

[documents from 21 September 1950 through 14 October 1950 appear following the article in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov]

**31. 25 October 1950, VKP(b) CC [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] Central Committee Politburo decision with approved directives to Foreign Minister Vyshinsky (at the United Nations in New York) and to Soviet Ambassador in Washington**

All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P78/332 To Comrades Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.

Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKPR(b).

Decision of 25 October 1950

332. - About the use by the United States of Japanese in the war against Korea.

To confirm the draft order of MID USSR to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission (attachment 2).

SECRETARY CC

To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78

Attachment 1

NEW YORK

TO VYSHINSKY

353. Your proposal about the inadvisability of supporting in the General Assembly the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, which is using Japanese in the aggressive war against the Korean people, we consider incorrect. A statement by the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly with a declaration of support for the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, cannot weaken our position with regard to this question in the Far Eastern Commission. Therefore it is necessary for you to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the Americans of Japanese servicemen in the war in Korea. Use the facts brought forth in the statement of Pak Hon-Yong, in one of your next speeches in the

General Assembly at an appropriate moment, according to your discretion.

We are simultaneously giving an order to the Soviet representative in the DVK [Far Eastern Commission] to make a corresponding statement on this question and to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the United States of Japanese in military operations in Korea.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].

A. GROMYKO

To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78

TOP SECRET

Attachment 2

WASHINGTON

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

It is necessary for you to make the following statement at the next meeting of the Far Eastern Commission:

“As is known, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, Pak Hon-Yong, has sent to the chairman of the General Assembly and to the chairman of the Security Council a protest against the use of Japanese servicemen in military actions in Korea. In this protest it is shown that in the fundamental facts found in the decree of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, it is established that Japanese servicemen participated in this battle and in the operations of the United States in the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.”

found in the report on the operations of Japanese servicemen in military operations in Korea.

List 84, and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 161]

**35. 2 November 1950, ciphered telegram, S.E. Zakharov, Soviet military representative in Beijing, to Fyn Si (Stalin)**

Second Main Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26416

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, Lomov  
From Beijing 15 hours 30 minutes  
2.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY E

FYN SI [Stalin]

To No. 5228 of 2.11.50

I report: Through Colonel Petrachev, adviser to the Korean air force, I have obtained the following specific information:

1. By the first of November a regiment was formed using 26 Korean pilots that have been trained and 24 Yak-9 planes that are located in An'dun.

2. On November 1 of this year, 8 planes of this regiment went into battle for the first time, in the region of ANSIU. As a result of this flight 2 B-29 planes and a Mustang were downed. Two Yak-9's did not return from the battle.

The first report from comrade Belov to me about the loss of the two Yak-9 planes in a battle in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU was thus imprecise.

The losses relate to a battle in the region of ANSIU.

3. In a battle on November 1 of this year, in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU, two F-82 planes were downed by our pilots in MIG-15's and two planes were downed by anti-aircraft artillery. In all 4 planes [were downed].

We had no losses in the air battle.

4. MIG-15's of Comrade Belov flew from airbases at MUKDEN and AN'SHAN'. In all, 8 sorties were made from each airport.

5. At present there are 16 battle [as opposed to training] Yak-9's at the airbase at ANDONG. In an attack on the Andong airport on 1 November 1950 one Yak-9 was burned and 3 were put out of action, but it is possible to restore them. In addition, 2 planes were lost while patrolling.

In all 22 planes and 2 planes did not return from the region of ANSIU.

In addition to the Yak-9's there are:

a) 6 PO-2 planes, which are fully combat ready and are carrying out night missions. There are 14 pilots, and from the 15 PO-2 available, 5 planes crashed during landings and takeoffs at the airfield itself and 4 planes were lost while on missions.

b) 25 pilots for IL-10 planes, but up to now there are no planes for them

6. The command of the mixed air division of Koreans in ANDONG has been formed. It is headed by General LI FART.

7. Comrade PETRACHEV asks about the possibility of receiving 25 IL-10 planes and 10 PO-2 planes.

[S.E.] ZAKHAROV

No. 2702

2.11.50

Report: No. 5228 of 2.11.50 asked Comrade Zakharov about the fact that there are discrepancies between his report and Belov's report about the air battle in the region of Andong. He was ordered to elucidate this discrepancy and report about the participation of Korean planes in battles and about the fact that two of them did not return.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 71-72 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 187-188]

**36. 8 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26637

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko  
From Beijing Received 02 hours 00 minutes 8.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

In view of the fact that the infantry arms of the People's Liberation Army are mainly trophies captured from the enemy, there is a great variety in the calibers of the rifles.

Such a situation creates great difficulty for the manufacture of ammunition, and in particular for the production of rifle and machine gun cartridges, especially as our factories can produce only very small quantities of these cartridges.

At present the troops of the volunteer army, in the amount of 36 (thirty-six) division machine gun airpoion of 1 ary lGa Tw (Ate3 Tw p[e and]Tj T\* ef5.







With regard to the preparation of pilots for one bomber regiment, it is more convenient to prepare them in the Korean school we have in the Far East Maritime Region. The materiel, TU-2 planes for the bomber regiment, will also be given.

3. We agree to accept an additional 120 men in the Korean pilot school that we have in the Far East Maritime Region, to train them as technicians and crew for attack planes.

4. It is better that the Korean pilots receive flight training in the place where they will study, i.e. in MANCHURIA or in our Maritime Region.

If you agree with these proposals, corresponding orders will be given to our military command.

FYN SI [Stalin].

No. 4/7556

20 November 1950

Copies: Bulganin, Shtemenko, Stalin.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 90-91 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 165-166]

**44. 22 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Kim Il Sung to Fyn Si (Stalin) via Shtykov**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600782/sh  
From CORRESPONDENT No. 18 Sent 22.11.50 6:30 Received 22.11 9:55  
Sent to 8th Department of General Staff of Armed Forces 22.11 10:02

By telegram

Extremely urgent

To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin].

I transmit the letter I received from KIM IL SUNG addressed to you with the following contents:

"To Comrade FYN SI

I received your telegram of 20.11.50 about the preparation of pilot cadres. We fully agree with your opinions.

Accept, Comrade FYN SI, our deepest gratitude for your tireless assistance to the Korean people in its struggle for its independence.

Yours truly - KIM IL SUNG 21.11.50"  
SHTYKOV

No. 35

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, File of 8th Department

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, List 94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 182]

**45. 1 December 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING - SOVIET AMBASSADOR

To transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG  
Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

I received your telegram No. 3153.

I thank you for the information about the state of affairs in China, in connection with the successful offensive of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Korea.

Your successes gladden not only me and my comrades in the leadership, but also all Soviet people. Allow me to greet from the soul you and your friends in the leadership, the People's Liberation Army of China and the entire Chinese people in connection with these enormous successes in their struggle against the American troops.

I have no doubt that in the war against the up-to-date and well-armed American army the Chinese army will receive great experience in contemporary warfare and will turn itself into a fully up-to-date, well-armed, formidable army, just as the Soviet Army in the struggle with the first-class-armed German army received experience in contemporary warfare and turned into an up-to-date well-equipped army.

I wish you further successes.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

1 December 1950

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 5]

**46. 5 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved orders to Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Beijing (with message for Zhou Enlai)**

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY  
(bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P79/167 To Malenkov,  
Molotov, Gromyko

December 1950

Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting of Politburo CC

VKP(b)[Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]

Decision of 5 December 1950

167.- Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No.

802.

To confirm the draft orders to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to Comrade Roshchin (attachment 2).

TOP SECRET

Attachment 1

to p.167(op) pr. PB No. 79

New York

To Vyshinsky

802. We are answering point by point.

Regarding point one. We agree with your proposal. However, you should not make the stipulations you proposed, that the Assembly has the right to review a question of aggression if the Security Council turns out not to be in a condition to fulfill its obligation regarding supporting peace. Such a stipulation would mean that we recognize as having legal force the resolution of November 3, which the Soviet delegation declared unlawful, as a contradiction of the UN Charter.

Regarding point two. We agree with your proposal. As for the invitation to a representative of the Chinese People's Republic to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly, do not introduce a proposal about the invitation before you receive a document with additional order, which we will give after the government of the PRC makes it clear whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.

Regarding point three. We agree with your proposal.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].

A. GROMYKO3.636 -[i.u

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ion of the government of the Chinese People's Republic—whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of the question raised by the Americans in the General Assembly. If Zhou Enlai asks what the point of view of the Soviet Government is on this question, you should answer that in this case, as well as in the case of the discussion of MacArthur's report in the Security Council, the Soviet Government considers it more advisable that the Chinese government not take part in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.

Telegraph the results.

A. Gromyko

*[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Listy 19-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 4-6]*

**47. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

tions military activity cannot be ceased. In addition, we consider that you should not be too open and show all your cards too early before the representatives of the three states, who, frankly speaking, are spies of the USA. We think that the time has not arrived for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated. Moreover, the USA could use China's five conditions to box us on the ear by [making] a UN resolution. It is not necessary to give this advantage to the USA.

We therefore think that it is possible at the present time to limit oneself to the following:

1. The Chinese Central People's Government along with you, gentlemen delegates of England, Sweden, India would welcome the soonest possible conclusion of the military actions in Korea. China is applying all its strength in order to conclude quickly the military activity forced on Korea and China.

2. Therefore, we would like to know the opinion of the UN and the USA with regard to conditions for an armistice. As far as we know, you have not been commissioned by the UN or the USA to discuss with anyone the conditions for an armistice. Moreover, the delegation from England together with the delegation from the USA, France, Norway, Ecuador and Cuba already introduced into the First Committee [of the General Assembly] of the UN a resolution condemning China, thereby hindering the matter of a settlement of the Korean question.

3. In view of this we will eagerly await the opinion of the UN and USA about the conditions for a cessation of military actions in Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

Telegraph the fulfillment.

GROMYKO.

7/XII-50

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 20-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 196-197]

**50. 8 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 4 January 1951 message from Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak Il U to Kim Il Sung**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 02 hours, 40 minutes 8.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T.  
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin].

I send you a copy of the telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung from Comrades Peng Dehuai, Kim Son and Pak Il U, sent 24:00 4.1 [January 4].

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it:

"To Premier Comrade Kim Il Sung. We are simultaneously sending a copy to the commanders of the corps and army Comrades Hun Xianchu, Wu Ruilin, Chzhou Biao, Pan Khe-som and to the commander of the 1st Corps NRVS and to the staff of the Northeast.

1. Today (4 January) the 116th infantry division and a unit of troops from the 117th infantry division occupied the city of Seoul. Enemy troops defending Seoul withdrew to the south bank of the Kanko river. The city of Siumsen was also taken on 3 January by units of our 66th army.

The enemy withdrew to the area of Kosen and to areas further south.

It is supposed that the next attempt by enemy troops will be the defense of the river, which is beginning in the area of Chemul'po [Inchon], Kimpo, Iokhei, and is going on along the south bank of the Kanko river, through Gensiu, Seikheisio to Korio.

It is possible that the enemy, regrouping behind the natural barriers, like the Kanko river and the mountainous areas, will gather the remnants of its forces, gain time and make preparations for new military operations.

Another possibility is that, in case of further more powerful strikes by our troops, the enemy will withdraw to the south.

2. If we give the enemy the possibility to continue to occupy defensive positions along the south bank of the river Kanko, to control the airport at Kimpo and to use the port at Chemul'po for supply, then although Seoul will be in our hands, it will be under constant threat from enemy air force and artillery, which will be extremely disadvantageous for preparing our troops for a spring offensive.

If, in the presence of success, our troops make one more effort and destroy another unit of enemy troops and force the enemy to retreat from the south bank of the Kanko river, then we not only will be able to take the

Kimpo airport and control the port of Chemul'po, but this will create more advantageous conditions for the preparation of our troops for a spring offensive.

In order to achieve the aforementioned goals the following plan has been worked out:

a) To leave 1 division of 1st corps of the People's Army for garrison duty in the city of Seoul.

The main forces of the corps will be deployed in the area of Toto, Tok-heiri, Dzinsori, Mokudo.

After rest and regrouping, in three days they must prepare to make a forced crossing of the Kanko river and at the appropriate moment occupy the Kimpo airport, Chemul'po port and consolidate themselves there.

b) Troops of the left column as before are under the unified command of Khan' Sian'-chu.

The 50th army will continue to advance in the direction of Kosainairi, Kando, Kiriudo and the area to the northwest of these points. It will send out immediately a strong detachment to control the bridge across the Kanko river (by a counterattack attempt to occupy the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river). This detachment will find out what the situation is, make active preparations for a forced crossing of the Kanko river, attack the enemy on the south bank and continue to carry out the battle in cooperation with the main forces.

If the enemy continues to withdraw to the south, then it is necessary, while pursuing him, to occupy Suigen and to wait for further orders.

The line of delimitation between the 50th army and the 1st corps of the People's Army runs through Kokusekiri, Riuzan, Kasaivairi. The line itself and the areas to the west of it belong to the 50th army, the areas to the east of this line belong to the 1st corps.

The 38th, 39th and 40th armies will put themselves in order, rest for three days (until 7.1 inclusive) and prepare for a forced crossing of the Khokukan-ko river above and

c) The 42nd and 66th armies under the unified command of Wu Ruilin and Chzhou Biao, and also the 2nd and 5th corps of the People's Army under the unified command of Pan Kho-Son, in accordance with the joint forces plan established earlier, must destroy the enemy troops in the region of Kosen, Odzio, and afterwards await further orders.

All the aforementioned troops must send spies and outposts toward the enemy troops located in front of the frontline.

When the troops of the right column begin a new offensive these units must be ready to render assistance. Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, Pak Il U. 24:00 4.1."

With bolshevik greetings.

MAO ZEDONG.

No. 103

7.1.51.

*[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 88-90]*

**51. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram,**

**Zakharov to Filippov (Stalin)**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF  
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET  
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15451

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 00 hours 50 minutes 13.1.51

EXTREMELY URGENT

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I report - your ciphered telegram of 11.1 of this year to MAO ZEDONG was handed to ZHOU ENLAI at 23 hours local time 12.1. of this year.

ZAKHAROV

No. 207

*[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 121]*

**52. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram,  
Roshchin to USSR Foreign Ministry**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Copy.

From BEIJING No. 1309 20 hours 05 minutes, 13.1.1951

Special No. 62

SPECIAL

TOP PRIORITY

Your order No. 48 has been fulfilled.

Enlai and transmit to him Filippov's telegram regarding the memorandum of the Chinese government.

*[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 122 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 13]*

**53. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)**

carry out good preparation so that it will be possible to continue to fight. In the opposite case, we can repeat the mistakes allowed by the Korean troops in the period from June to September 1950.

But it is also possible that objective causes will force us to make a single operation in February, after which again to continue the respite and reformation for the purpose of completing the necessary preparation for the next operation. This also must be taken into account. However, if this does not happen, then conducting the last decisive operation after finishing the necessary preparation in two-three months, which was discussed above, will be necessary and practicable.

Chinese and Korean comrades must be patient and carry out the necessary preparation.

I ask you to communicate your opinion. MAO ZEDONG.”

With Bolshevik greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 260

15.1.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 1-3]

**55. 27 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 19 January 1951 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao re meetings with Kim Il Sung**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 19 hours 35 minutes 27.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send you a copy of the telegram from Comrade Peng Dehuai to me of 19 January 1951.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it.

“To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

Copy: To Comrade GAO GANG.

I arrived at Premier Comrade KIM IL SUNG’s in the evening on 16 January 1951 and returned on the evening of 18 January 1951.

I report about the results of our meeting:

1. Comrade KIM IL SUNG and his

comrades think that it is not possible to pursue the retreating American and puppet [South Korea] troops with the forces of the Korean People’s Army alone. This would also take on an adventurist character.

They stated that the Politburo regards as correct the proposal made from my side about the necessity of conducting rest and reformation for two months in order to make a forward advance cautiously, without hurrying. Although Comrade PAK HON-YONG had his own opinion, after the second elucidation I made on 17 January, about the positive and negative sides of a risky forward advance without carrying out preparation and a cautious forward advance with advance preparation, he was satisfied.

The Soviet adviser also agreed that the next operation is decisive, therefore with the approval of the Politburo of the Korean Workers’ party, it will be conducted better.

2. The question of the defense of the sea coast.

Premier KIM IL SUNG and Comrade RAZUVAEV put forth the following opinions: 26 brigade will be based in TSINNAMPO, 23 brigade in KAISIU, 24 brigade in GENZAN, 63 brigade in BUGTKHENG, 69 brigade in KORIO. These brigades will occupy by battalion, portions of the defense along the western and eastern sea coast, where they will serve as sentries. Each brigade to have an average of 3,000 men, and moreover their combat capability is not high.

In addition to this, three newly organized corps (6th, 7th and 8th) will control the following regions: 6th corps - ANSIU, 7th corps - KOKUZAN, 8th corps - KANKO. No decision was made about which units to leave in SEOUL and CHEMUL’PO. They also ask to leave one army of Chinese Volunteers, as a skeleton. We gave agreement to leave one army, which will be located in TET-SUGEN.



2. Our troops must immediately conduct preparations for the fourth operation, with the goal of the destruction of 20,000 to 30,000 American and puppet [South Korean] troops and the occupation of the area to the north of the Taiden-Anto boundary.

3. In the course of the preparation for this operation it is necessary to hold Chemul'po, the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river and the city of Seoul, and also to draw out the main enemy forces to the Suigen-Risen region. After the beginning of the operation the main forces of the North Korean and Chinese

7. After the Chinese and Korean troops occupy the region to the north of the Taiden-Anto boundary, they must again make a two to three months long preparation, after which to accomplish the last, fifth, operation of decisive significance. This is advantageous in all respects.

8. The ninth army group must in the near future be redeployed to the region of Pyongyang, Seoul, Chemul'po, Suigen for rest and reformation. At the same time they must fulfill the task of defending the given region so as not to give the possibility to the enemy troops to take Chemul'po, Suigen, Tsinnampo. At the time of the fifth operation the given army group must participate in military operations on the western portions of the front.

8. The goal of Chinese and North Korean troops is to draw out the enemy forces to the Suigen-Risen region.

9. (After the completion of the first operation) the Chinese and North Korean troops must divide into two echelons. Troops of each echelon must have a five day dry ration. Troops of the first echelon must make the breakthrough and carry out the pursuit of the enemy to a determined border, and the troops of the second echelon must continue the pursuit of the enemy, so that the operation will continue for 10-12 days and that in this time it will be possible to destroy as many enemy troops as possible.

9. At the time of implementing the fourth operation I ask you to think over the question of whether it will be better for the main forces of the Chinese and North Korean troops to divide into two echelons. Troops of each echelon must have a five day dry ration. Troops of the first echelon must make the breakthrough and carry out the pursuit of the enemy to a determined border, and the troops of the second echelon must continue the pursuit of the enemy, so that the operation will continue for 10-12 days and that in this time it will be possible to destroy as many enemy troops as possible.

I ask you to communicate your opinion.

MAO ZEDONG, 28.1.51

19:00."

No. 478.

28.1.51. MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 41-43]

**57. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 633  
BEIJING TO ZAKHAROV  
FOR COMRADE MAO ZEDONG

Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

I received your telegram to PENG DEHUI of 28 January. I agree with you. From the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that CHEMUL'PO and SEOUL not be seized by the enemy, so that the Chinese-Korean troops can make a serious rebuff to attacking enemy troops.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 60/sh

30 January 1951.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 44]

**58. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Razuvaev with message for Kim Il Sung**

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR  
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100269

To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

Discuss the following telegram with Comrade Kim Il Sung and his closest friends and communicate their opinion.

1. It is possible to consider it incontestable that the present [North] Korean divisions are less battle capable than the old divisions in the summer of last year. This is explained by the fact that the Koreans had 10 divisions, well fitted out with officer corps and more or less satisfactorily trained. And now the Koreans have 28 divisions, of which 19 divisions are at the front and 9 are in Manchuria. It is clear that the Koreans are not in a position to supply such a large number of divisions with officer corps. According to our norms, each division, having, let's say, 8,000 men must have at least 800 officers, not counting sergeants. I have in mind the genuine officers, capable of cementing a division, and not hastily commissioned officers. It is clear that the Koreans still don't have such a number of officers. Therefore the present Korean officers are understrength, unstable and little capable of battle. The Koreans increased the number of divisions and forgot about quality, but quality plays the decisive role here.

2. It would be advisable in the given situation to have not more than 23 divisions in the Korean army, so that the officer corps of the reduced 5 divisions can be used to fill out the officer corps of the remaining weak divisions, and the rank and file to use as reinforcement. This will strengthen the divisions, lessen the expenses and make for a gain in arms. The same needs to be said regarding the four Korean infantry brigades which are in poorly combat readiness and which also can be used to fill out the divisions with officers and rank and file.

3. At this stage the organization of corps administration is inadvisable, since there are no, or almost no, commanders capable of

leading the corps, but there are already army apparatuses. It would be better to organize the 5 army administrations with 4 divisions in each army, so that the army apparatus itself directly commands its divisions. In this case the Korean armed forces would have in its composition 5 armies (in all 20 divisions), and 3 divisions could be in the reserve of the main command for assisting the most needy armies according to the course of the operation. With time, when the commanders mature, when there will be enough of them and when they learn to command joint divisions, then it will be possible to transfer to a corps system.

Of course, this reform should not be carried out now, but during a time of rest after conducting the operation.

Discuss these proposals and communicate your opinion.

30 Jan 1951

FYN SI [Stalin]

No. 4/854

Copies: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko

[Source: APRF, Fese1oBJIOPis 1, Delo 348, Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fese1059aJIOpis 5a, Delo BJIPapka 11, Listy 15-16]

**59. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Razuvaev**

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100319

To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

You did not understand my telegram of January 30 about the Korean divisions. This telegram is not a directive, but my proposal for discussion together with Korean comrades. I asked you to communicate to me the opinion of the Korean comrades and your own opinion. You answer me that my order will be fulfilled by you. You did not understand my telegram. Once again I ask you to familiarize KIM IL SUNG and his friends with my telegram and after my proposal is discussed, communicate to me the opinion of the Koreans.

FYN SI [Stalin]

3 February 1951.

No. 81/sh

[Source: APRF, Fese1oBJIOPis 1, Delo 348, List 20 and AVPRF, Fese1059aJIOpis 5a, Delo 3JIPapka 11, List 198]

**60. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung via Razuvaev**

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100320

To RAZUVAEV for KIM IL SUNG

To Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

We have insufficient lead not only for satisfying the needs of China and Korea, but also for our own needs. In view of this we have decided to send to Korea a group of Soviet specialists to assist the Korean organizations in working out measures for the restoration of mines, concentrating mills and lead factories for the purpose of increasing the production of lead. We would like also to organize the export of lead ore to the USSR, since it is not being processed now in Korea for [industrial] processing.

We hope that you will not be opposed to this.

We await your answer.

FYN-SI [Stalin].

No. 83/sh.

3 February 1951.

[Source: APRF, Fese1oBJIOPis 1, Delo 348, List 20]

**61. 4 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Razuvaev to Fyn-Si (Stalin) reporting message from Kim Il Sung**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 500361/sh  
From Correspondent 20 Sent 4.2.51 14:35  
Received 4.2. 15:10

Sent to the 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 4.2 15:25

To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].

To No. 4/854 and No. 81/sh.

I report:

KIM IL SUNG and the Korean comrades discussed your telegram about the composition of forces of the Korean People's Army and arrived at the following conclusion:

1. To raise the battle readiness of the troops and to improve their quality, it is necessary to lower the number of army administrations and the number of divisions.

2. To produce the decrease in army administrations and divisions by increasing the three army administrations from Manchuria.

To reduce: two army administrations;  
— four pd [infantry divisions]: 2nd army

- 27th and 31st pd, 5th army - 43rd pd, one pd by increasing 8th army

3. To temporarily keep naval brigades for the defense of bases and coastline.

To strengthen the naval brigades to significantly reduce VMU ["battle friction" that results from being understrength]; the sailor school and apparatus of naval command.

4. To carry out further reductions after the next operation, which will begin February 7-13, 1951.

the fact that “serious rightist moods” have appeared among the Chinese troops. In my opinion this is explained by the fact that your local maneuvers with some forward advance but then a falling back, repeated several times, create among your troops the impression of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, but create among the Anglo-American troops the impression of their might. I fear that this situation can undermine the spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. I think that it will not be possible to crush these unhealthy moods unless you prepare and carry out a serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of three to four enemy divisions. This would lead to a serious turnaround in the moods of the Chinese-Koreans as well as among the Anglo-American troops. This, of course, will not be broad and far from being an offensive, will be only a serious short blow against the enemy, but this will be the kind of blow that will sober up the enemy and raise the fighting spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. Moreover this would give you the possibility of undertaking then wider and more successful local maneuvers needed to exhaust the enemy.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 297/sh  
5 June 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 17-18]

**66. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF  
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET  
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20448

Copies: Stalin (2)

From Beijing Received 18:30 5 June 1951

SERIES G T.

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV!

In the course of conducting the war in KOREA we have run into such serious questions as the financial question, the question of the conduct of military operations directly at the front, the question of the danger of a possible enemy landing on the sea coast in our rear.

We intend to send Comrade GAOGANG to MOSCOW by plane in a few days to inform you regarding the aforementioned questions and to ask your directions in the

matter of the resolution of these important questions.

At the present time Comrade KIM IL SUNG is in BEIJING. He wishes to go with Comrade GAO GANG for discussion of these questions with you.

I ask you to communicate your opinion about the possibility of this trip.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 2787

5.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 23]

**67. 7 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY

for Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegram about the trip to us of Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. We are ready to receive Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG and to discuss with them the questions indicated in your telegram.

On 8 June in the morning we will send a plane from Moscow to Peking to transport Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG to Moscow. The plane will arrive in Beijing on 9 June.

We ask you to give an order to your authorities about the unimpeded flight of the plane and its reception at the airport in Beijing.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 26 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 30]

**68. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet military advisor in Beijing Krasovsky**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3559

BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

According to our information, our pilots are training the Koreans very slowly and in a slipshod manner. You and General Belov apparently intend to make professors rather than battle pilots out of the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be overcautiousness on the side of our aviation specialists. If Russian pilots were trained during the war in five

to six months, then why is it impossible to complete the training of Chinese pilots in seven to eight months? Isn't it time to throw away this harmful overcautiousness? The Chinese troops will not fight without air cover. Therefore it is necessary to create more quickly a group of eight Chinese air fighter divisions and send them to the front. This is now your main task.

Belov can send one division closer to the Chinese border in Manchuria, and two divisions can be held in the rear in North Korea, thus freeing up two airports for the Chinese fighter divisions closer to the front. This is absolutely necessary. It is necessary to arrange matters so that the Chinese rely only on their own aviation at the front.

Report the fulfillment.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 303/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 47 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 33]

**69. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meeting in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3557

BEIJING, TO ROSHCHIN

Deliver immediately to the addressee.

“To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

Today there was a conversation with your representatives from Manchuria and Korea [Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung]. Three questions were raised:

First—about an armistice. We recognized that an armistice is now advantageous.

Second—about military advisers. If they are very necessary to you, then we are ready to satisfy you.

Third—about the delivery of arms for sixteen divisions. There will not be objections from our side.

I won't write about the details, since your representatives will report to you about them.

We consider it absolutely necessary now to start moving at least eight fighter aviation divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions. We think that besides two or three aviation divisions of MIG-15s, you could take to the front from central and southern China five or six divisions of MIG-9's, which operate very effectively against bombers. Eight fighter

divisions on your front could fully satisfy the needs of the front. According to our information your pilots are already ready to

does not send new reinforcements to Korea and does not make an amphibious landing, then in August we will be significantly stronger than now.

5. Right now we are planning the transfer of our aviation units to the front.



SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF  
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET  
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21334

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 11:20

30.6.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

1. I have received your two telegrams (of 24.6.51 and 28.6.51). I fully agree with your opinion.

a) As regards the time periods for the delivery of armaments for sixteen divisions, we should act only on the basis of the productive and transport possibilities of the Soviet Union, that is [we should] complete the deliveries of arms for sixteen divisions in the course of three years, and in 1951 complete the deliveries for ten divisions.

b) The staff-organizational structure you have proposed for the present Chinese infantry divisions is very good. We are implementing it. With sixteen divisions armed in accordance with this staff-organizational structure, the Chinese army will be far stronger than at present.

2. Malik's statement secured us the initiative in the matter of conducting peace negotiations. On 28.6.51 I received through Comrade Roshchin the main positions of the contents of the conversation of Comrade Gromyko with the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, [Alan] Kirk. At the end of the text is stated: "Only two representatives



parallel in the area of the city of Kaesong. If you agree, our representatives will be prepared to meet with your representatives July 10-15.

Commander in Chief of the Korean People's Army

KIM IL SUNG

Commander in Chief of the Chinese Volunteer Units

PENG DEHUI

Date."

In your telegram you propose that we direct the negotiations about an armistice from Moscow. This, of course, is inconceivable and not necessary. It's up to you to lead, Comrade MAO ZEDONG. The most we can give is advice on various questions. We also cannot maintain direct communication with KIM IL SUNG. You must maintain communication [with him].

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

30 June 1951

No. 335/III

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 95-96 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 14-15]

**81. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Razuvaev to S.M. Shtemenko reporting message from Kim Il Sung to Filippov (Stalin)**

#### CIPHERED TELEGRAM

From Correspondent 20 Sent 1.7.51 5:30  
Received 1.7.51 7:16  
Dispatched to 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 1.7.51 7:25

By telegram

Extremely urgent

To Comrade SHTEMENKO S.M.

I report:

1. The text of an answer of KIM IL SUNG to a meeting on negotiations was given by me according to the line of MID. It is proposed to give an answer 2- 3.7.51.

Agreement of MOSCOW is urgently needed.

2. The composition of the delegation from the Korean People's Democratic Republic is proposed to be three persons—the chief of staff of the Korean People's Army NAM IL, the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs PAK DENCHO and [one] from the Chinese volunteers.

3. It is proposed that NAM IL declare

the following points:

a) Time of ceasefire and cessation of military operations;

b) Withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel to the north and south for 5-10 km;

c) Crossing the 38th parallel by land or air is prohibited from the moment of the ceasefire;

d) Withdrawal of naval forces from the territorial waters of KOREA and removal of the blockade;

e) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from KOREA within a two month period;

f) Carrying out an exchange of prisoners of war and return of civilian population.

Comrade KIM IL SUNG awaits corresponding advice of Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin].

I ask your orders.

RAZUVAEV

No. 1751

1 July 1951

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky, Shtemenko, File of 8th Department

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 3-4]

**82. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvaev with message for Kim Il Sung**

8TH ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES

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*[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339,  
Listy 6-7]*

**84. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao  
Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF  
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET

a 1 S BT /Fluement of the sides. The fifth point

the 38th parallel.

If our final goal consists of conducting a struggle for the principle of the determination of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line and if in this regard we can admit only certain alterations, then we should have in mind a breakdown in the negotiations and we must prepare for this.

In the opposite case we should have some kind of compromise position determined. Our past proposal, it is true, could not foresee the possible development of the present situation, but it is also not possible to win much time through action in accordance with your orders contained in the telegram of 17.7.51 about a concession to the enemy for the purpose of gaining time,

4. We (Li Kenong, Deng Hua, Xie Fang and Qiao Guan-hua) suggest that the final goal of the enemy is to cease military operations at the present front line. In relation to this the enemy may allow small alterations.

It is thus necessary for us to decide: to struggle for the 38th parallel and prepare for an end to the negotiations or, avoiding a breakdown in the negotiations, to carry on the struggle for the cessation of military operations and to study the question of the cessation of military operations at the present front line.

Having studied, on the basis of the limited materials we have, the general world situation, the needs of our state and the fact that at present Korea cannot continue the war, we think that it is better to think over the question of cessation of military operations at the present front line than to carry on the struggle for the 38th parallel and bring the conference to a breakdown.

In connection with this it is necessary to take into consideration that it is possible to gain some concessions from the enemy in the discussion of the proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line.

Thus it will be possible to secure 3-5 years time for preparation of forces.

Of course, if the enemy does not in any way abandon his unfounded proposal, which he is at present insisting on, then we also intend to choose only the path of a schism.

Having limited materials at our disposal, the situation has been studied superficially. We urgently ask your instructions for future actions.

LI KENONG 12.8.51 4:00."  
MAO ZEDONG

No. 4061

13.8.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, Listy 56-58]

**88. 27 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF  
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET  
ARMY

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which would lead to a turn in the negotiations and to force the enemy to agree with this.

Comrade Kim Il Sung suggests for the purpose of securing the neutral zone at Kaesong to ask representatives of neutral states to participate at the conference as monitors and witnesses for the period of negotiations, as a necessary condition for the resumption of the negotiations. Moreover, these representatives can be used in the future as a control organ for the implementation of the ceasefire.

How do you view this? Do you consider this necessary or do you have a better way? I ask your orders on the above.

With greetings. Mao Zedong.

*[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 86-88 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 51-53]*

**89. 28 August 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from**

### **Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong**

All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks),  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P83/280

28 August 1951 Copies: Malenkov,  
Molotov, Vyshinsky, Vasilevsky  
Excerpt from protocol No. 83 of meeting of  
the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee,  
All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]

Decision of 28 August 1951

280. Telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong  
of 27 August (No. 4279)

To adopt the attached draft answer of  
Comrade Filippov to Comrade Mao Zedong.

SECRETARY CC

To p.280(op) pr.PB No. 83

TOP SECRET

BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

For transmission to MAO ZEDONG

"Comrade Mao Zedong!

We received your telegram of August  
27.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations in Kaesong and with your line on the necessity of getting a satisfactory answer on the question of the incident provoked by the Americans to pressure the Chinese-Korean side. As before, with regard to this we will proceed from the fact that the Americans have greater need to continue the negotiations.

We do not see the use in inviting, according to your initiative, representatives of neutral states to participate in the negotiations as monitors and witnesses during the present period of negotiations. The negative side of this proposal is that the Americans will view it as [an indication] that the Chinese-Korean side has more need quickly to reach an agreement about an armistice than do the Americans. If you are of such an opinion on this question, then you must communicate this to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

*[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,*

*Listy 4-5 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 54-55] The telegram was sent to Beijing on August 29 [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 89]*

**90. 30 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23397

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 19:00 30.8.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV.

I received your telegram of 29.8.1951. I agree that it is not advisable to take the initiative in inviting representatives of neutral states as monitors and witnesses at the present stage of the negotiations.

I have already communicated about this to Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 4358

30.8.51

*[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 56]*

**91. 8 September 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23703

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 16:20

8.9.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV!

In my telegram to you of 27.8 of this year I communicated to you that we intend to ask the Soviet Government to send its military advisers for work among the troops of the Chinese volunteers in Korea.

After studying this question and consulting with the Main Military Adviser Comrade Krasovsky, we consider that it is necessary to invite 83 advisers:

1. Advisers for the staff of the volunteer troops: in all nine persons, including: Main adviser - 1, adviser of the chief of staff - 1, adviser on operational questions - 1, adviser on intelligence - 1, adviser on communications - 1, adviser on the rear - 1, adviser on VOSO [*voennye soobshcheniie*, military communications] -1, adviser on artillery - 1, adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns [*samokhodnym ustanovkam*] -1, adviser on engineering matters - 1.

2. Advisers for the five armies: in all 10 persons. Two advisers to each army, specifically: adviser of the command of the army and jointly adviser of the chief of staff of the army -1, adviser on operational questions -1.

3. Advisers for twenty one corps: in all 83 persons. Three persons in each corps, specifically: adviser of the command of the corps and jointly adviser of the chief of staff - 1, adviser on artillery -1, adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns -1. It is hoped that the aforementioned advisers be sent to Korea through Beijing in September and October 1951.

I ask you to study this question and communicate your decision.

With greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 4492

8.9.51

*[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, Listy 98-99]*

**92. 10 September 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong**

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tions at the present front line and the designation of the present line contiguous to the troops of both sides as the demarcation line with the introduction of alterations in the line contiguous to troops of both sides in case of alterations of it in the period of the achievement of an agreement on all points of the agenda. At the present time the enemy is fighting with us precisely on this question, but we assume that this fight will not continue for long.

Our proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line and our agreement to set aside the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea before the convening of a political conference, was made not only because the present negotiations are negotiations about cessation of military operations and [because] the enemy will not in any case want to exchange eastern mountainous regions to the north of the 38th parallel for

Korea, which was transmitted to the Center on 14 November through Krasovsky.

Zhou Enlai acquainted me with the telegram and added that while awaiting the reply of Comrade Filippov the Chinese side had already twice declined to meet with American representatives in Korea.

19.XI.51 ROSHCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 22 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 62]

**95. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong**

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bolsheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
No. P84/421

19 November 1951 Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko, Vasilevsky  
Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]

Decision of 19 November 1951

421. Telegram of Mao Zedong on questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

To adopt the attached draft answer of Comrade Filippov to the telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong on questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

SECRETARY CC

To p.421(op) pr.PB No.84  
Top Secret

BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

For transmission to Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

"Comrade Mao Zedong!

We received your telegram on the questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations.

The entire course of the negotiations for some time past shows that although the Americans are dragging out the negotiations, they nonetheless are more in need of rapidly concluding them. This is based on the overall international situation.

We consider it correct that the Chinese/Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line,

not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations.

We consider your position on the definition of the line of demarcation and the establishment of monitoring in one or two border points to be correct. We also agree with you about the composition of the commission for the fulfillment of monitoring functions.

Your position on the question of an exchange of prisoners of war is completely correct and it will be difficult for the opponent to dispute it.

As regards the possible variants of convening a conference for the further resolution of the Korean question after the conclusion of an armistice, it seems to us that it would be more expedient to convene a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting the negotiations, with the obligatory participation of representatives of North and South Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

19 November 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828 [9], Listy 42-43 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 64] A copy of the telegram sent to Beijing is found in [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 23]

**96. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Razuvaev**

b

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
No. P84/422 Copies: Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko  
19 November 1951

Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]

Decision of 19 November 1951

422. Telegram of Comrade Razuvaev No. 1352.

To adopt the attached draft instruction to Comrade Razuvaev.

SECRETARY CC

To p.422(op) pr.PB No. 84  
Top Secret  
Top Priority

NORTH KOREA

To RAZUVAEV

1352. From your telegram it is not clear in connection with what and on whose initia-

tive the question arose about an appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and the Security Council with a demand concerning a speeding up of the resolution of the Korean question. It is also not clear how the Chinese friends regard this, since you do not communicate anything about this in your telegram.

An appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and to the Security Council as it is set forth in your telegram: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops along the front line and the creation of a two kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea, could be evaluated in the present situation, in conditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a sign of weakness on the Chinese-Korean

/XI/1951

[Source:

Gromyko

o





Copies: Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan,  
Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

*[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,  
Listy 94-97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis  
5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 76-77]*

**100. 31 January 1952, ciphered telegram,  
Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)**

all 15 points.

At each point a region of operation for the neutral state must be established within a radius of 30 miles from the center of the point.

We consider that the enemy has proposed too many points, the area of operation is too broad, and the number of open points is not equal. We intend to agree that both sides open 3-5 points each in North Korea: Singisiu, Seisin, Khanko, Manpkhodin and one airport. In South Korea: Pusan, Chemulpo, Suigei, Reisui, Khokodo. We also intend to propose that the radius of operations of the neutral group be established as 5 kilometers from the center of the point.

6. Neutral groups of observers will be attached to the monitoring organ of neutral states. The group must be organized as a minimum from four mid-level officers (lieutenant-major), two officers each from the representatives of neutral states invited by each side. In case of necessity subgroups can be created attached to the monitor groups, composed of two representatives, one person from each side.

The American side proposes to create 40 neutral groups of observers. We consider that this is too many. If an agreement is reached that both sides will each open 5 of their rear points, then it will be sufficient for fulfilling the obligations of the monitoring organ to have 16 neutral groups of observers, of which 10 groups will be permanently located at mutually agreed upon points of disembarkation and 6 groups can be used as reserves to send to the site of incidents.

7. The monitoring organ of neutral groups and the commission on the military armistice must be located in one place. The neutral groups of observation during the fulfillment of the tasks of inspection and observation do not have the right to study the "construction and characteristics" of all types of arms and ammunition.

As concerns the reports about results of the work of the neutral groups of observation, we consider that official reports must be adopted by the majority of the members of the given group, but reports not adopted by the majority of members or reports from individual persons cannot be official documents. They can be used as reference materials.

8. Material supply of the monitoring organ of neutral states and the groups subor-

dinate to it must be provided by both warring sides. Both sides must provide the monitoring organ with transport for trips of its members to points and to places where a violation of the agreement on armistice occurs.

All the 8 points set forth above concern questions of monitoring by neutral states in the rear regions of both sides outside the demilitarized zone.

I ask you to review whether our point of view is correct and whether anything needs to be added.

If you agree with our opinions, then do you consider it necessary to communicate about this in advance to the comrades leaders of the parties of Poland and Czechoslovakia[?]

I ask you to give your answer.

Note: The texts of the agreement reached on two agendas was sent to you by separate telegram.

With greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 326

31.1.52

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 73-77]

**101. 3 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 709

TOP PRIORITY

SPECIAL

BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

Transmit the following answer to MAO ZEDONG.

"Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegrams of January 31 concerning the negotiations on questions of an armistice.

We agree with the plan outlined by you and the evaluation of the course of the negotiations which you give. The firm position taken by you has already given positive results and must force the enemy to make further concessions.

We consider that you must make an agreement with the leading comrades of Poland and Czechoslovakia about including their representatives in the commission of observers, and they, of course, will agree with this.

With greetings. FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

Confirm receipt.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

No. 72/III

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 80]

**102. 8 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 22 January 1952 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao and 4 February 1962 reply from Mao to Peng Dehuai**

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16293

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 21:45

8.2.1952

SERIES "G" T

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send you for familiarization the abbreviated text of the telegram to me from Peng Dehuai of 22.1 of this year and my answer of 4.2 of this year.

The telegram of Comrade Peng Dehuai of 22.1 of this year.

"1. 16.1 of this year the Minister of Foreign Affairs of [North] Korea Pak Hon-Yong was at my place. In a conversation he said that the Korean people throughout the country demand peace and do not want to continue the war.

If the Soviet Union and China consider it advantageous to continue the war, then the Central Committee of the Labor Party will be able to overcome any difficulties and hold to their position.

I answered that a peaceful settlement on the basis of justice and rationality is advantageous for us. I also explained to him about the favorable conditions of our side in the present military situation and about the increase in the difficulties of America. Therefore an agreement on an armistice can be reached. However in military relations we will carry out active preparation of our forces for further conduct of military operations.

While departing, Minister Pak Hon Yong agreed with my point of view about the general situation and said that his visit had the goal of a simple meeting and his opinion is not the opinion of the Central Committee of the Labor party and the Korean government, but purely his personal opinion.

2. In 1951 the Korean government col-

lected agricultural taxes in kind in grain in the amount of 650,000 tons, which constituted too large a percentage of the entire yield. At the present time 10 percent of the population is suffering from hunger. The majority of the peasant population will be able to subsist only until April-May.

If there is no assistance soon, then this will influence not only the carrying out of spring sowing but also the gathering of the harvest.

They say that our government has already resolved to deliver to the Korean government 30,000 tons of grain. I do not know, is this true? If it is not true, I consider that it is necessary to prepare for timely delivery of 30,000 tons of grain in March for the purpose of providing assistance so that the peasants can engage in spring planting.

3. I consider that although our budget is also very strained, in 1952 we nevertheless need to plan to apportion 1,600,000 million yuan (which constitutes approximately 237 million rubles) according to the plan of 1951 budget year for rendering aid to Korea. This amount can hardly be reduced. I ask that all this possibly be planned earlier in the general budget.”

My answer of 4.2 of this year.

“I received your telegram of 22.1 of this year. As concerns rendering aid to Korea, in our budget for 1952 we have already included expenditures of 1,500,000 million yuan (approximately equal to 222 million rubles), which somewhat exceeds the sum of







We have received your telegram of 17 December.

Your observations regarding the probability of an attack by the Americans in the spring of 1953 reflect the plans of the present American command in Korea, who are operating under the leadership of the Truman government. It is fully possible that these plans will be changed by the Eisenhower government in the direction of less tension on the front in Korea. Nevertheless, you are acting correctly when you count on the worst and proceed from the probability of an attack by the Americans.

We have reviewed your application for military goods for 1953 and the application for urgently needed military goods.

The quantity of arms, ammunition and other military goods which you requested oversteps the limits of our possibilities in 1953. Our calculations are based on the fact that we must deliver to you in 1953 arms, ammunition and other goods for 20 infantry divisions, this means that we must deliver for each of 20 divisions around 800,000 [units of] ammunition, 1320 artillery pieces of various types and other goods.

Taking into account the situation you speak of in your telegram, with great difficulty we can deliver to you in 1953, besides the arms and ammunition for 20 divisions [already] earmarked, with equal shipments until the end of the year, approximately one-fourth of the quantity you stated in your telegram of 17 December, specifically: 600,000 pieces of ammunition, 332 pieces of artillery of various types, tractor artillery, detonating fuses and other goods; the amounts of the deliveries of each will be determined by our War Ministry.

Thus, with a calculation of the arms and ammunition being delivered for 20 infantry divisions in 1953, there will be shipped to you: 1400 pieces of ammunition, as opposed to the 1,125,000 delivered in 1952, 1652 pieces of artillery of various types, as opposed to 1056 guns delivered in 1952.

As regards the applications for materials for military production mentioned in your telegram, transmitted to us by Minister of Foreign Trade Comrade E Tsz Chzhuanom—this application is now being studied by our Ministry of Foreign Trade.

SEMENOV [Stalin].

27 December 1952.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343,

*Listy 115-116]*

**112. 19 March 1953, resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with draft letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet delegation at United Nations**

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR  
RESOLUTION

Of 19 March 1953 No. 858-372cc.  
Moscow, Kremlin

Question of MID

The Council of Ministers of the USSR  
RESOLVES:

1. To confirm the attached draft letters of the Government of the USSR to Comrades Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung (Attachment No. 1).

To transmit the present letter to Comrade Mao Zedong through Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Kuznetsov V.V., and [the letter] to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Comrade Malik, who will immediately be sent to Pyongyang.

2. To confirm the directive to the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly (Attachment No. 2).

Representative of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov

Business Manager of the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Pomaznev

Attachment No. 1

The Soviet Government has thoroughly reviewed the question of the war in Korea under present conditions and with regard to the entire course of events of the preceding period. As a result of this, the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it would be incorrect to continue the line on this question which has been followed until now, without making those alterations in that line which correspond to the present political situation and which ensue from the deepest interests of our peoples, the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea, who are interested in a firm peace throughout the world and have always sought an acceptable path toward the soonest possible conclusion of the war in Korea.

It is not necessary to dwell in detail on all that the aggressor has done in the course

of the war in Korea. In the eyes of honest people of the whole world, the actions of the aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Korea more and more expose that bloc, and especially the aggressive forces of the USA, as an international factor that is pursuing a policy of preparing a new war and is ready to shift to a policy of broadening the war solely in order to dictate to people their aggressive imperialistic will, which expresses an aspiration for world domination, for the subjugation of peoples to their imperialistic aims.

The Soviet Government considers that we should regard all these important circumstances of the international order in the same way that we have regarded them until now. This does not mean, however, that in present conditions we must simply mechanically continue the line followed until now in the question of the war in Korea and not attempt to display initiative or to use an initiative of the opposing side and to secure the withdrawal of Korea and China from the war in accordance with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Korean peoples and also in accordance with the interests of all other peace-loving peoples.

In connection with all the abovementioned and taking into account the concrete facts of late regarding the war in Korea, we consider it urgently necessary to carry out a number of measures, in particular:

1. It is necessary that Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai give a positive answer to the appeal of General [Mark W.] Clark on February 22 on the question of an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

2. Immediately after the publication of the answer of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai, an authoritative representative of the government of the PRC (best of all would be Zhou Enlai) should make a statement in Beijing in which is underscored a positive attitude toward the proposal on an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and also to indicate that the time has arrived to resolve the entire question of prisoners and, consequently, to secure the cessation of the war in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

3. Simultaneously with the aforementioned statement in Beijing, the head of the government of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung, should make a statement in Pyongyang which declares full support for and the justice of the aforementioned statement of the government of the PRC.





convened within three months of the signing and implementation of the armistice...for the resolution by means of negotiations of questions regarding the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops, the peaceful resolution of the Korean question etc.” (point 60).

A significant portion of the articles of the draft agreement concerning prisoners of war was also agreed to, with the exception of the question of repatriation of prisoners. The government of the PRC (Government of the DPRK), following its policy of preserving and strengthening peace, striving for a peaceful resolution of the Korean question and applying all its efforts to the immediate cessation of the war, proposes to resolve also the question of prisoners of war as a whole. The government of the PRC (Government of the DPRK) on its side is prepared to adopt measures to eliminate the disagreements on this question, which is at present the only obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on ceasefire and armistice. Toward this goal, the Government of the PRC (DPRK) proposes that all prisoners of war who insist on repatriation be immediately repatriated and the remaining prisoners be handed over to a neutral country to secure a just resolution of the question of their repatriation.

The Beijing statement must also say the following:

Our new step, which is directed at the conclusion of the war in Korea, should also serve as an example for a positive resolution of a number of other important and urgent international questions, first of all the restoration of the rights of China and Korea in the UN.

Third. On the statement in Pyongyang. We suggest that in this statement Comrade Kim Il Sung should indicate that the aforementioned statement of the representative of the PRC was worked out jointly by the governments of the PRC and DPRK and that the Government of the DPRK fully shares both the evaluation of the political situation contained in the Beijing statement and the concrete conclusions and proposals contained in it. In connection with this, underscore not only the full support for, but also the justice of, the statement of the representative of the PRC.

Fourth. About the statement in Moscow. We consider expedient a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, which should be made immediately after the aforementioned statements in Beijing and

Pyongyang. We see the point of the Moscow statement to be underscoring before the whole world the full solidarity and concordance of action between the USSR, PRC and DPRK on the question of the war in Korea.

Fifth. On the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly of the UN in New York. The Soviet delegation in the General Assembly must act in accordance with the entire abovedescribed political plan with regard to the war in Korea. In this connection it is necessary that as soon as the Polish draft resolution “On Averting the Threat of a New World War” comes up for discussion, the Soviet delegation would secure the introduction of the corresponding alterations to this draft in the part concerning Korea and also the necessary statements by the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Sixth. Additional notes. It goes without saying that at the present time we cannot foresee all steps and measures which the governments of the USSR, PRC and DPRK will need to make. However, if there is full agreement between our governments in the conduct of a general line on this question, for which we fully hope, then the remaining points can be agreed upon in the course of the affair.

#### DIRECTIVES FOR THE





While it is apparent that these sources have created new opportunities for fresh studies,





that due to the changed international situation they agreed with the proposals by the Koreans to set upon unification. The final decision of the issue must be made jointly by Chinese and Korean comrades. If the Chinese comrades disagree, the decision must be postponed till a new discussion.”<sup>15</sup>

In talks with North Korean leaders Mao approved their analysis of the situation and stressed that he supported a speedy military solution of the Korean problem. He was sure of its success. Mao did not exclude the possibility of American interference. In such an event, China would help.<sup>16</sup>

### **5. Preparations for the war**

Even before Kim Il Sung received, in January 1950, the first hints from the Kremlin that Stalin had become more favorably disposed to a war in Korea, Pyongyang had embarked upon a concerted effort to upgrade its military potential. Stalin responded positively. After Kim’s talks in Moscow in April 1950 the war was energetically prepared by the two sides jointly.

On June 1949 a special protocol was signed between the USSR and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) on military-technical assistance. Moscow agreed to supply its ally with large numbers of air force planes, tanks, cannons, landing ships, machine-guns, engineering equipment, etc.<sup>17</sup>

At the end of 1949 Kim Il Sung again addressed himself to Moscow a request for large quantities of armaments and ammunition necessary for the creation of new 5 round units and enlargement of the fleet.<sup>18</sup> In March 1950, Kim Il Sung asked to use the Soviet credit allocated for 1951 in 1950 and to acquire additional quantities of military hardware; these requests were met.

In April 1950, leaders of the guerilla movement in the South arrived in Pyongyang to work out a program of action for before and after the invasion. On 12 May 1950, Kim Il Sung informed the Soviet ambassador that his General Staff had already started to plan the operation. Pyongyang wanted to attack in June but was not sure that preparations could be completed by that time.<sup>19</sup> By the end of May, the armaments which had been promised by Stalin arrived and the plan of the invasion was ready. Kim Il Sung insisted on an attack in June, not in July as Soviet advisers preferred, arguing that infor-

mation about the imminent attack could leak to the South; and that in July rain would slow the advancement of troops.

While making final preparations for the war, the North continued a propaganda campaign, proposing initiatives on the peaceful unification of Korea. Initially the communists wanted to strike at the Ongjin peninsula, but at the last moment the strategy was changed. It was believed that Seoul had learned about the attack and beefed up its defenses in the Ongjin direction. The North Koreans now asked Moscow for permission to attack along the whole front.

Unfortunately the final period (May-June 1950) before the attack is not well documented, and additional research in the archives is required to get a clearer and more detailed picture of the final preparations by the communist side for the war.

### **6. The initial stage of the war**

Throughout the initial stage of the Korean War Stalin was clearly in charge: his word was final on the date of the invasion, he told the Koreans how to fight and he kept instructing the Sino-Korean command on its every move. As for the mood of both Stalin and Kim Il Sung, it was quickly changing for the worse as the adversary hit back harder and harder.

Already on 1 July 1950, Stalin seemed to be worried about a halt in the advancement of North Korean troops and the impact of American air raids on North Korean territory.<sup>20</sup> Soviet Ambassador Shtykov admitted that American air raids had worsened the political mood in the North. Doubts regarding final victory surfaced and some officials began to hint that it was difficult for Pyongyang to rely purely on its own forces in the war with America.<sup>21</sup> Meeting with the Soviet ambassador on July 3, Kim Il Sung confirmed the seriousness of the situation on the front due to American bombing. He wanted Soviet advice on how to reorganize the command of the military actions, and also hoped for new supplies of weapons.

On July 8, Kim Il Sung requested Soviet military advisers in order to strengthen his army. Stalin agreed to provide some of these advisers, but his main preoccupation was to give moral support to Pyongyang. In an August 28 cable to Kim, he emphasized the fact that “the great liberation struggle of the Korean people ... was conducted with bril-

liant success,” that Kim Il Sung “should not feel embarrassed ... because of delays in advancement and because of some local defeats... The biggest success of Korea is



derestimated the probability of American military intervention, ignoring Mao Zedong's warnings back in May 1949 and 1950. Zhou passed on Mao's advice to the North Koreans to create a strong defense line in the area of Inchon, because American troops could land there. The Chinese leadership feared landing operations by Americans in other parts of the Korean peninsula as well. In this conversation Zhou Enlai confirmed that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese troops, disguised as Korean, would engage the opponent. Three Chinese armies, 120,000 men in total, had already been concentrated in the area of Mukden. Zhou inquired if it would be possible to cover these troops with the Soviet air force.<sup>26</sup>

By July 8, Stalin was already showing a certain irritation with China. In a cable to Ambassador Roshchin he ordered: "Tell Mao Zedong that Koreans complain that there is no representative of China in Korea. They should quickly send a representative... if, of course, Mao Zedong feels it is necessary to have a communication link with Korea."<sup>27</sup>

On July 13, Stalin approved the Chinese decision to deploy troops in the vicinity of the Korean border and promised to train Chinese pilots and to provide China with military planes. In August-September 1950, on a number of occasions, Mao personally expressed concern over the escalation of American military intervention in Korea and reiterated the readiness of Beijing to send troops to the Korean Peninsula "to mince" American divisions. Simultaneously the Chinese leaders complained that the North Korean military command had committed many mistakes and ignored Beijing's recommendations. Moreover, Pyongyang did not even inform China of developments on the front.<sup>28</sup>

On September 20, Stalin in a cable to Mao agreed that it was not normal and correct that the North Korean leadership did not properly inform their Chinese comrades about the development of combat activities in Korea. Stalin, however, defended the Koreans, explaining the aforementioned fact by the lack of proper communications and noting that Moscow too had only received "sporadic and outdated" information from the front. Stalin reminded Mao that the (North) Korean People's Army was very young and inexperienced and it had to fight

against perfectly equipped foreign troops, not simply South Koreans.

In general, Moscow and Beijing held similar views at that time on the strategy and tactics of the war, though with the landing of Americans at Inchon, the mood in China started to change. In a conversation with Roshchin on September 21, Zhou Enlai admitted that there were persons in China who complained that the Korean war would drag on and would require sacrifices on the part of Chinese. It is also significant that China's authorities leaked to the Soviets intelligence information, showing the Kremlin's policy in Korea in a bad light. Thus, at one point Moscow was informed by Beijing that the British consul in the Chinese capital had reached the conclusion that the USSR and the USA had colluded in Korea, trying, with the help of the war there, to prevent China from capturing Taiwan, completing the civil war and becoming a strong power.<sup>29</sup>

## **8. Stalin pressures a reluctant China to enter the Korean war**


On 1 October 1950, Stalin came to the conclusion that China had to come to the rescue of the collapsing Kim regime. On that day he sent an urgent message to Mao and Zhou asking them "to move to the 38th parallel at least 5-6 divisions in order to give our Korean comrades a chance to organize under the protection of your troops' military reserves to the North of the 38th parallel." Stalin added that Pyongyang was not informed of this request.<sup>30</sup> It did not take Mao long to respond to Stalin's cable. Mao declined to fulfill his own promise under the pretext that Chinese troops were not strong enough and a clash between China and the USA would ruin Beijing's plans for peaceful reconstruction and could drag the USSR into a war with Washington. Instead, he suggested that the North Koreans accept defeat and resort to guerrilla tactics.<sup>31</sup>our Koreacghe Us

<sup>30</sup> Mao to th equi th



into an awkward position.”<sup>48</sup> Stalin rejected the idea, saying: “In your cable you proposed that we, from Moscow, should direct the armistice talks. This is, of course, unthinkable and not necessary. It’s you, comrade Mao Zedong, who’ll have to direct negotiations. We can at best give advice on some questions. We are not able to be in direct communication with Kim Il Sung. You must have direct communication with him.”<sup>49</sup>

To raise the stakes at the forthcoming negotiations the communists decided to be





them were puppets of the Soviet Army, it is evident that North Korean Communist leaders like Kim Il Sung were under the tutelage of the Soviet Army. Even though the Soviet Army leaders tried to make their rule look like an indirect one, their intervention was always direct and full-scale. In other words, the Shtykov diaries show that the Soviet Army in North Korea was a de facto Occupation Army, not merely a "Stationary Army." In addition, we now know from the diaries that the Soviets were more deeply involved in politics and social unrest in the south than we had known previously; leftist parties in the north and south were strongly dependent upon the Soviets in the north and, ultimately, Moscow.

1. Lebedev, "S soznaniem ispolnennogo dolga," in *Osvobodzhdenie KOREI* (Moscow, 1976), 79.
2. Zhdanov was the First Secretary of the party committee of Leningrad. Shtykov had absolute loyalty to Zhdanov. When Zhdanov died on 31 August 1948, Shtykov expressed his deep grief over his death in his diary. *Diaries*, 31 August, 1, 3 September 1948.
3. When the Communist regime was established in North Korea, Stalin immediately appointed Shtykov to this important post. Interestingly enough, Shtykov refused the offer at first because of his heart problem. However, he could not refuse Molotov's urgent request along with promise to send Shtykov to a center for medical treatment and provide him with competent aides. See *Diaries*, 2 December 1948.
4. *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 1980), 544
5. Ibid.
6. His memoirs stopped at the years of his childhood. Interview in 1995 with Viktor Terentevich Shtykov, General Shtykov's son, in St. Petersburg.
7. For example, Kravtsov, a special aide to Shtykov, recollected that he had burned in the 1950s all of his documents, including reports he had written.
8. For convenience's sake, I use North Korea and South Korea although there were only the *de jure* U.S. Occupation Government in the south and de facto Soviet Occupation Government in the north from 1945- 1948.
9. The 3 November 1946 election in North Korea was another example.
10. Kim Il Sung's Report to Shtykov on Kim's meeting with Kang Jin. *Diaries*, 22 October 1946.
11. *Diaries*, 2 December 1946.
12. *Diaries*, 6, 7, 11, 12, 25, 27 December 1946
13. *Diaries*, 28 September, 7, 8, 22 December 1946.
14. At that time one seom of rice (a big sack of rice) cost 15 yen in the north and 150 yen in the south).

*Hyun-su Jeon is a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; this article was edited and translated by Gyoo-hyoung Kahng, a fellow of the Contemporary History Institute, Ohio University. A longer version of this article appeared in the Fall 1995 issue of the Korean-language publication Yoksa biyong [Critique of History].*

General Dmitrii Volkogonov, a prominent Russian military historian, died of cancer on 6 December 1995 at age 67. Volkogonov spent much of his career as a high-ranking political officer in the Soviet Army, and for several years was director of the prestigious Institute of Military History. More recently, he served as a military adviser to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and as co-chair of the joint U.S.-Russian commission on prisoners of war. Even

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At 5:45 a.m. on 15 September 1950, the 5th Marine Brigade of the X Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond began its unprecedented amphibious landing onto the beaches of Inch'on. There were about 500 North Korean soldiers on Wolmido, a tiny island protecting the entry into the Inch'on harbor, another 500 at Kimp'o, and about 1,500 within Inch'on.<sup>2</sup> They were confronted with more than 70,000 troops from the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Holland, and the UK disembarking from more than 260 ships. The surprise of the UN attack, and the preponderant firepower and manpower of the U.S.-led forces, destroyed pockets of the dazed North Korean resistance within hours. By the next morning the 1st Marines had been able to squeeze the remnants of the Korean People's Army (KPA) out of Inch'on and had started their rapid advance towards Kimp'o and Seoul. Operation Chromite was a complete success and later labelled as "a masterpiece of amphibious ingenuity."<sup>3</sup> In a little more than a week Seoul was recaptured by the UN forces. On 1 October 1950, they crossed the 38th parallel, and began their rapid, sweeping advance northward. The KPA surrendered Pyongyang on October 19, and soon the first Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. battalions approached the Yalu River on the Chinese-North Korean border.

However, U.S./UN Commander Douglas MacArthur's promise to "Bring the Boys Home by Christmas" never came true. The Thanksgiving offensive proved stillborn, for it was a new enemy that the UN troops confronted in Korea from then on: 36 divisions of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) who entered North Korea in late October-early November, supported by almost twelve wings and air defense divisions of the Soviet Air Force operating from nearby airfields in Northeast China. Recognizing new patterns in the enemy's behavior, in his special communiqué to the UN dated 28 November 1950, MacArthur called it "an entirely new war." Indeed, it was.

In the Western literature there are many

scholarly and eyewitness accounts of the preparation, implementation, and strategic and military significance of Operation Chromite, as well as the subsequent prosecution of the war by the UN forces, including the origins and aftermath of the reversal of fortunes for the UN troops in November 1950.<sup>4</sup> In addition, in his 1960 study *China Crosses the Yalu*, Allen S. Whiting persuasively showed how national security concerns, as well as domestic political and economic considerations, may have led the People's Republic of China (PRC) government to decide to enter the Korean War. His preliminary conclusions were supported almost three decades later by Russell Spurr,<sup>5</sup> who focused his research on the psychological background of the Chinese leaders' decision to provide military assistance to a friendly communist regime in Pyongyang.

Then, a wave of memoirs<sup>6</sup> published in the PRC by former high-ranking Chinese officials, military leaders, and other insiders allowed scholars to reconstruct in great detail the relevant decision-making processes in Beijing and Northeast China regarding the merits of Chinese military intervention in Korea, including debates within the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and among PLA senior commanders. These

Zhou Enlai as an intermediary between Stalin and Mao in managing (mismanaging?) the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the role of the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang in the initial stages of the war, T.F. Shtykov, as an intermediary between Stalin and Kim Il Sung in the ill-fated handling of the USSR-DPRK alliance.

Shortly before the 40th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, the Russian government released a new batch of previously classified documents related to the events on the Korean peninsula from 1949 to 1953, including some correspondence between Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong, internal correspondence between the Kremlin and various Soviet government ministries involved in the prosecution of the war in Korea, and ciphered telegrams between Soviet representatives in North Korea (known officially as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and their respective superiors in Moscow. In total, these new primary source materials amount to well over a thousand pages and come from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from the Military Archive at the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

This article introduces and analyzes a selection of these newly declassified documents from the Russian Archives related to the period after the U.S.-UN troops' landing at Inch'on on 16 September 1950, until mid-October 1950, when the PRC decided to send its troops to Korea to save Kim Il Sung's collapsing regime. The newly released documents primarily from the APRF, offer new information and insights into how Stalin and his political representatives and military advisers in Korea; Kim Il Sung and his close associates; and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and their personal representatives in Korea, viewed and assessed the strategic and military significance of the UN forces' landing at Inch'on, recapture of Seoul, crossing of the 38th parallel, and drive to the Yalu. These new archival materials provide researchers with a fascinating window into the internal dynamics and politics of alliance relationships among the Soviet Union, PRC, and the DPRK from the aftermath of the Inch'on landing until the Chinese crossing of the Yalu River. They present startling

trial for disinformation and panicking. In their correspondence with Stalin, they doubted the need to redeploy KPA troops from the Naktong River front to the defense of Seoul, instead favoring a strategy of exerting additional pressure on the southeastern front in order to throw the U.S. and ROK troops defending the Pusan perimeter off the cliffs into the Sea of Japan in a final great offensive. Consequently, they dragged their feet in executing Stalin's order to withdraw four KPA divisions from the Southeast to the vicinity of Seoul.

As the military situation around Seoul deteriorated due to the rapid advance of the U.S. X Corps toward the ROK capital from the west, and their recapture of Kimp'o on September 18, Stalin urgently dispatched to Korea a special mission headed by Army General Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov,<sup>11</sup> (known by the pseudonym Matveyev), the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army, carried Stalin's order that Shtykov and Vasiliev tell Kim Il Sung to halt the offensive along the Pusan perimeter, to assume the defensive and pull out all his divisions from the Naktong River front and

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fall of Seoul nothing would stop the UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel; that if they did cross the parallel, the remaining KPA units would not be able to render any serious resistance, and, consequently, the war would be over in a very short period of time, with the North Korean state being eliminated by the aggressive American imperialists. Unanimously, the North Korean leadership agreed to ask both allies, the



drawal of all foreign troops, and general elections in all Korea to be held under international supervision. However, at this stage of the war, after a miraculous landing at Inch'on and the recapture of Seoul when the KPA was in ruins, a ceasefire was out of question and totally unacceptable to the West. By now, the decision made in Washington, on mostly tactical grounds, to cross the 38th parallel, after Inch'on had become an official United Nations operation.

While waiting for Mao's reply, on October 2, Stalin received information that the North Korean frontier defenses had begun to crumble under incessant attacks from Rhee's revenge-hungry troops, and the ROK forces had pushed north beyond the parallel on the east coast road heading towards Kosong. He sent an angry ciphered telegram to Matveev in Pyongyang [Document #11], reiterating his earlier directive to his chief military representative in Korea to do his utmost to bring the remnants of the KPA mired in the south back into the north, and to hold the frontline along the 38th parallel.

In the meantime, in Beijing, the crisis was building on October 2: ignoring Zhou's warnings, ROK troops with U.S. backing had crossed the 38th parallel a day earlier; Kim Il Sung was begging for direct military assistance; and, finally, Stalin was personally urging Mao to intervene in Korea. Consequently, that day Mao convened the first of a series of enlarged meetings of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCP CC) Politburo in Beijing to formulate the Chinese response. New documents from the Russian Presidential Archive suggest that at their first meeting the CCP CC Politburo members discussed general reasons why the PRC should or should not enter the war in Korea and decided that the risks outweighed the benefits of China's direct military intervention at that time. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao's negative position prevailed, and Mao felt obliged to inform Stalin of the Chinese hesitations and lack of decision.

On October 3, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Roshchin, relayed Mao Zedong's negative response. [See Document #12.] Replying to Stalin's October 1 entreaty to enter the war, Mao acknowledged that the Chinese leadership had "originally planned" to send "several volunteer divisions" to assist the "Korean comrades" once the enemy crossed the 38th parallel. However, he ex-

plained, after "thoroughly" considering the matter, many of his comrades now advocated a more cautious course of action. Consequently, the PRC would refrain from sending troops to Korea, at least for the time being. Mao attributed this reversal to three principal considerations. First, the Chinese army was poorly armed, ill-prepared, and had "no confidence" it could defeat the modern American military, which could "force us into retreat." Second, Chinese intervention in the conflict would "most likely" lead to an open Sino-American war, which in turn could drag the USSR into the war due to its commitments under the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, "and the question would thus become extremely large." Finally, after decades of civil war, Chinese entry into the Korean conflict to confront a powerful American adversary would provoke widespread domestic resentment within the PRC toward the newly-established People's Government, and wreck the leadership's plan for peaceful reconstruction.

Therefore, Mao reluctantly concluded, it was necessary to "show patience now," focus on building military strength for a possible later conflict, and in the meantime accept a temporary defeat in Korea while the North Koreans "change the form of the struggle to partisan war." Mao concluded his message by noting that this decision was provisional and awaited a final determination by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; in the meantime, he was ready to send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to Stalin's vacation home for direct consultations. In conveying Mao's telegram, which was dated October 2, an obviously shocked Roshchin noted that this new position flatly contradicted repeated assurances from Chinese leaders that the People's Liberation Army was ready, indeed, in high "fighting spirit," to aid the Koreans and to defeat the Americans. The Soviet envoy could only speculate on the reasons for the turnaround in the Beijing leadership's stand: the international situation, the "worsening" predicament in Korea, and/or Anglo-American "intrigues" through the intercession of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (It is important to note that this account of Mao's October 2 communication to Stalin, informing him of Chinese refusal to enter the war, based on newly-declassified documents in the Russian archives, fundamentally contradicts the purported Mao to Stalin message of

October 2 which was published in 1987 in an official Chinese document compilation and has since been relied upon for numerous scholarly accounts; see the attached footnote for further information.)<sup>30</sup>

Stalin, while undoubtedly sorely disappointed, did not know whether Mao had given his final word or was simply for bargaining for better terms for China's participation in the war. During the day of October 5, Stalin conferred with the members of the (VKP(b) CC) Politburo. Although the official agenda was designated as "the Question of Comrade Shtykov," the real issue under consideration was the nature of the Soviet national security interest in Korea and how to protect it on the ground. All Politburo members agreed that a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation in Korea should be avoided at all costs, even if the USSR had to abandon North Korea. In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalls that "When the threat [after Inch'on] emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea that North Korea would be annihilated, and that the Americans would reach our border. I remember quite well that in connection with the exchange of opinions on the Korean question, Stalin said: 'So what? Let the United States of America be our neighbors in the Far East. They will come there, but we shall not fight them now. We are not ready to fight.'"<sup>31</sup> The upshot of the Politburo discussion was a decision to increase pressure on Mao to extract an unequivocal commitment from China to enter the war.

Thus, it appears that as a result of cumulative discussions and a series of incremental decisions dated September 27, September 30, and October 5, the Soviet Politburo adopted a major policy shift in the Soviet policy toward Korea. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided to begin to limit Soviet military and political exposure in Korea, and at the same time permit a greater Chinese role in the alliance decision-making on Korea.

In this light, given the continuous deterioration of the military situation in Korea, as well as the Soviet leaders' determination to see Chinese, not Soviet, troops fighting there, the Politburo overruled the Foreign Ministry's objections and decided, as one of the first steps aimed at curtailing the Soviet presence in Korea, to grant Ambassador Shtykov the evacuation powers that he requested with respect to some Soviet specialists employed by the DPRK government and

by Soviet organizations in Korea [Politburo Decision No. P78/168, Document #14]. He was notified of this policy change by wire the same day. Ironically, the permission arrived just as Shtykov, sensing a policy shift in Moscow, losing all his faith in Kim Il Sung's ability to defend his regime on his own, and unsure if any help was coming from Moscow or Beijing, requested even more extended evacuation powers, now including the families of the Soviet citizens of Korean nationality,<sup>32</sup> the personnel of the Soviet Air Force units stationed in Korea,<sup>33</sup> and all other Soviet citizens in Korea [Document #16]. It took less than a day for Vasilevsky and Gromyko to get Stalin's approval and immediately wire the affirmative response.

After the conference with his Politburo associates sometime during the day of October 5, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Mao and Zhou [Document #13]. Without mentioning the latest policy shift in Moscow, he outlined his reasoning why it was in China's national interest to dispatch the Chinese "Volunteers" to save the collapsing North Korean regime and why this had to be done *immediately*. First, he reiterated his conviction that the United States was not ready to fight a major war at present, while Japan, whose militaristic potential had not yet been restored, was not currently capable of militarily assisting the Americans. Therefore, he argued, the U.S. would be compelled to concede in the Korean question to China, which was backed by its ally, the USSR, and to agree to terms of settlement favorable to (North) Korea thus preventing the Americans from transforming the peninsula into their springboard. Following the same hard-nosed *realpolitik* reasoning, Stalin stated that, consequently, not only would Washington have to abandon Taiwan, but also they would have to reject the idea of separate peace with the Japanese "revanchists," and to jettison their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their bridgehead in the Far East.

Having depicted his vision of an emerging new geopolitical order in the Far East, Stalin blandly told Mao that he proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if she were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy. Without some serious struggle and an imposing display of force, he argued, not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions,

but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan, which at that time the United States was clinging to; not for the benefit of Nationalist Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), in Stalin's view, but to use the island as its own strategic base or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

In conclusion, Stalin displayed a singularly unusual propensity for high-stakes gambling which was fraught with the potential for global disaster. He reassured Mao that he had taken into account the possibility that the United States, albeit unready to fight a major war then, could still be drawn into a big war (i.e., with China) on a question of prestige, which, in turn, would drag the USSR, which was bound with China by a Mutual Assistance Pact, into the war. Stalin asked Mao: "Should we be afraid of this possibility? In my opinion, we should not, because, together, we will be stronger than the United States and Great Britain, whereas none of the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany, which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) possess any military power at all. If war is inevitable, let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese imperialism will be restored as a U.S. ally and when the U.S. and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in the form of all Korea run by Syngman Rhee." This telegram was a call for action. Stalin forcefully indicated to Mao that all the chips were down, and Mao had to show what hand he was playing after all.

The embattled Mao must have received this telegram amidst a series of tense emergency sessions of the CCP CC Politburo in Beijing sometime on October 6. It was at one of these meetings that Mao reportedly announced his decision to appoint Peng Dehuai as the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). Later that evening, Mao dined together with Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai,

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Soviet Union and PRC provide sanctuary for Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA if they could no longer fight on their own; the main forces, arms, equipment, and some cadres of the KPA would be redeployed to northeast China, while the disabled and wounded men, as well as Koreans of Soviet origin, could be moved to the Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East. In their new bases in northeast China they would train new troops, master new weaponry, and prepare themselves for the day of their reentry into Korea. Stalin reiterated that since the Chinese did not intend to send troops, the Soviet Union and China should work out concrete plans to provide shelter for their Korean comrades and their forces, and make sure that one day they would be able to return to Korea.

Reportedly, Zhou was stunned at what he heard. He backed away from his initial tough stance, and asked Stalin whether China could count on Soviet air cover should it decide to fight in Korea. Without a pause, Stalin responded positively: "We can send a certain number of aircraft to offer cover [for the CPV in Korea-AM]." Stalin also reassured Zhou that the Soviet Union would take care of weapons and equipment supplies for the CPV, including their replacements, immediately after the Chinese side ascertained its needs in actual combat.

The Stalin-Zhou talks lasted for two days, and yet no mutually agreed upon decisions were reached at the end. Zhou simply said that he needed to communicate with Beijing in order to ask for new instructions. Stalin replied that he could wait but that time was fast running out. They parted, reportedly, both confused about each other's true intentions.<sup>39</sup>

Contrary to Goncharov, Xue, and Lewis' account in *Uncertain Partners*<sup>40</sup>—citing the recollections of Zhou aide Kang Yimin—Stalin and Zhou Enlai did not agree to send a joint telegram to Mao Zedong the next day. Nor did Molotov call Zhou after the latter's arrival in Moscow with "startling news that the Soviet Union would not offer any military equipment to China." These are stories, perhaps elaborated by Zhou's entourage in order to persuade Mao that Stalin, not Zhou's obduracy, was to blame for the "breakdown of talks;" that

Stalin was in (un)friendly alliance with the PRC, and that Stalin's belief from Mao Zedong

Walker's Eighth Army mopped up KPA remnants in the Pyongyang area and then advanced toward the northwest.

This was a decisive moment for Stalin. A week earlier, the Soviet Politburo had decided that the USSR would rather abandon North Korea than risk a direct military confrontation with the U.S., unless the latter deliberately attacked Soviet territory. Therefore, Stalin did not intend to send Soviet ground troops to save Kim Il Sung. As Zhou had told Stalin a couple of days earlier, the Chinese also decided to refrain from sending the CPV to Korea for the time being. Realizing that neither he nor Mao was willing to save Kim Il Sung from total defeat, Stalin evidently resigned himself to viewing the entire Korean situation as a matter of cutting his losses and saving face.

Such a conclusion is supported by the dramatic order Stalin appears to have sent a Kim Il Sung via Ambassador Shtykov on the afternoon of October 13.<sup>46</sup> Informing Kim of his talks with Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, Stalin reported with regret that Zhou had stated that the Chinese were not yet ready to enter the war. Consequently, they concluded that it would be better for Kim to withdraw the remnants of his forces from Korea to China and the USSR. Therefore, Stalin ordered that Kim Il Sung "evacuate North Korea and pull out his Korean troops to the north." He also directed that Shtykov assist Kim in drawing up a plan of measures to implement this evacuation order. In effect, Stalin was fed up with Kim Il Sung and had thrown in the towel.

Late on the night of October 13, Shtykov, following Stalin's instructions, met with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong and read the text of Stalin's telegram to them. In Shtykov's telegram addressed to Fyn Si (another Stalin pseudonym), which he wired from Pyongyang at 3:15 a.m. on October 14 [Document #18], he described the North Koreans' reaction as follows: "Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong were very much surprised by the content of the telegram. Kim Il Sung stated that it was extremely hard for them to implement such advice; however, since there was such advice, they would implement it." Then, Kim asked Shtykov to give him his practical recommendations and directed that Pak Hon-Yong write them down. Also, he asked Shtykov and Matveyev to assist him in drafting a plan of measures to be taken regarding the KPA evacuation plan.

After receiving Stalin's evacuation order on the night of October 13, Kim Il Sung called Major-General Ch'oe Kyong-dok<sup>47</sup> to his headquarters in Kosangjin and ordered that Ch'oe leave immediately for the northeastern provinces of China in order to set up guerrilla bases for Kim and the KPA remnants there. Ch'oe is said to have departed with two adjutants the same night. In the next several hours, Kim is said to have repeatedly told his close associates that they would have to wage a guerrilla war from China again. Within a day Ch'oe and his two aides had mysteriously disappeared. Kim Il Sung dispatched a small team of scouts to find them, but in vain.<sup>48</sup>

Meanwhile, however, even before seeing Kim's response, Stalin had changed his mind and dramatically reversed himself, thanks to some welcome news from Beijing. Early in the morning of October 14, at 3:20 a.m., he received two extremely urgent telegrams (#2406 and #2408) from the Soviet envoy to the PRC described a late-night meeting with Mao which took place immediately after the CCP CC Politburo finally decided, at an emergency session, to intervene in Korea before the war ended in a U.S. victory. Roshchin cited Mao as saying: "Our leading comrades believe that if the U.S. troops advance up to the border of China, then Korea will become a dark spot for us and the Northeast [China] will be faced with constant danger." Mao confirmed that "past hesitations by our comrades occurred because the questions of the international situation, the questions of the Soviet assistance to us, the question of air cover were not clear to them," and stressed that "at present, all these questions have been clarified." Furthermore, Mao pointed out, "now it is advantageous for us to dispatch Chinese troops into Korea. China has the absolute obligation to send troops to Korea" [Document #19]. He mentioned that at this point they were sending a first contingent of nine divisions. Although poorly armed, it would be able to fight the troops of Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chinese comrades would prepare a second echelon. As for air cover, Mao expressed hope that the Soviet air force would arrive in northeast China as soon as possible, but not later than in two months. Mao concluded by saying that the CCP CC believed that the Chinese must assist Korean comrades in their difficult struggle; therefore, he had

asked Zhou Enlai to discuss the matter of China's entry into the Korean War with Comrade Filippov again. He stressed that "Zhou Enlai was being sent new instructions."

What is important about this telegram is that it contains Mao's admission that, in essence, Zhou's position was to stonewall because of the hesitations and reservations displayed by some prominent CCP CC leaders in Beijing. However, once these domestic political disputes were resolved, Mao wanted Stalin back in the game.

Indeed, Stalin rejoiced at Mao's new decision because he had been so reluctant to abandon North Korea to begin with. At once, he hand-wrote a note to Shtykov for immediate delivery to Kim Il Sung [Document #20], the second telegram within hours, temporarily halting the implementation of his order of October 13.<sup>49</sup> It said: "I have just received a telegram from Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CCP Central Committee discussed the situation again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao Zedong. In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I ask you to postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to you yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and withdrawal of the Korean troops to the north." This telegram makes perfectly clear that the crucial consideration in Stalin's position on intervention in Korea was the role of China. When Mao balked, so did Stalin. When Mao decided to make a commitment to Kim Il Sung, Stalin again followed suit. Still unsure whether Mao's decision was irrevocable, Stalin displayed some caution and ordered that Kim Il Sung "temporarily" postpone, not cancel, the implementation of measures advised to him a day earlier.

Only after Stalin received further clarifications and proof from Beijing that this time Mao meant it, did he order that his previous recommendations to Kim be annulled. He reiterated his commitment to supply the CPV with weapons and equipment. Most importantly, he felt compelled to indicate to Kim that he was relinquishing some of his authority on the Korean matter to Mao and his CPV commanders. A few hours later on October 14, he dispatched a



third ciphered telegram to Shtykov for Kim [Document #21] which said: “After hesitations and a series of temporary decisions, the Chinese comrades at last made a final





**Document 1: Soviet Defense Minister  
A.M. Vasilevsky to Stalin, 21 September  
1950**

To Comrade STALIN

Regarding the question of the transfer of fighter aviation regiment of "YAK-9s" to provide air cover to Pyongyang, I herewith report:

1. In order to speed up the regiment transfer, we consider it the most expedient to use the 84th fighter regiment of the 147th aviation division based on 40 metal-made "YAK-9s", deployed in the Maritime Region in the vicinity of Voroshilov. The regiment shall be dispatched by air via Chinese territory by the route Yanji-Andong-Pyongyang. The regiment's overflight should take two days. During the preparation for the overflight one has to take into account the inevitability of air combat in the area of Andong-Pyongyang.

2. In a very cautious manner, we made a number of inquiries to Comrade Shtykov concerning the following questions:

- the suitability for the landing of our aircraft of airbases in the vicinity of Pyongyang which have been badly damaged by the enemy's air raids, especially lately;
- the availability of aircraft maintenance personnel, fuel, and munitions thereat.

3. If the Koreans do not have aircraft maintenance crews, before the regiment's transfer we will have to dispatch an aviation maintenance battalion for this regiment, composed of 223 men with air-base equipment, to Pyongyang by the railroad via Andong. It is likely to take us five-six days to transfer this battalion, given the transport overload across the Yalu River in the vicinity of Andong.

If the Koreans do not have fuel and munitions, we will have to ship them to Pyongyang simultaneously with the battalion transport.

In this case, accounting for the transfer of the personnel, it is likely to take up to eight-ten days for the final readiness of the regiment for combat in the vicinity of Pyongyang.

4. Bearing in mind the lack of Korean aerial surveillance and alert system in the vicinity of Pyongyang, in order to create normal conditions in combat for our regiment, we would consider it necessary to dispatch along with the regiment at least

several radar units designed to locate the enemy's aircraft, as well as a team of radio operators who can set up communications between the airbase and these radar posts. Otherwise, our airplanes on the ground will be subject to sudden raids by the enemy's aviation.

5. We ask You to give us permission to report all our final calculations regarding the regiment's transfer to Pyongyang as soon as we find out in Pyongyang the details related to the questions of the regiment's redeployment. At the same time, we will report to You our considerations concerning the organization of the air defense system of the airbase from which the regiment will operate.

[signature]

V A S I L E V S K Y

"21" September 1950

No. 1172cc

Copies: Stalin, Malenkov, Beriia, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

*[Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 79-80]*

**Document 2: Vasilevsky to Stalin, 23  
September 1950**

To Comrade STALIN

I herewith report concerning the undertaken measures relating to the redeployment

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VKP(b) CC  
# P78/73  
27 September 1950  
[To:] Cmrds Malenkov, Bulganin,  
Vasilevsky

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the  
Meeting of the Politburo of the CC  
VKP(b) Decision dated September 27,  
1950

#73. - Questions of Korea.

Approve of the attached directive  
to Comrades Matveyev and Shtykov.

Secretary of the C[entral] C[ommittee]

\* \* \* \* \*

**Attachment to  
#73 (op) of the Politburo Protocol #78**

Top Secret

Pyongyang

TO MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV]  
TO SHTYKOV

The serious predicament in the area of Seoul and in the South-East in which the Korean People's Army has found itself lately has to a great extent been caused by a series of grave mistakes made by the Frontline Command, the Commands of the Army Groups and army groupings in matters related to command and control over troops, as well as to the tactics of their combat use in particular.

It is our military advisers who are even more to blame for these mistakes. Our military advisers failed to implement scrupulously and in a timely fashion the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the withdrawal of four divisions from the central front to the area of Seoul despite the fact that at the moment of adopting this decision such a possibility existed. Consequently, they lost seven days which brought about an enormous tactical advantage in the vicinity of Seoul to the U.S. troops. Had they pulled out these divisions on time, this could have changed the military situation around Seoul considerably. Odd battalions and separEMCg\*(lated to comm) Odd battalions and separEMCoe1j E43cnhe U.S.13BDCi \* orrUh considerably. ty eof adopting thisan/Toffecine< 322.parElackparEco000inLine<J 1 >> BDC -0.089 Tw 1.2 TL 6.B 418 /J 1 >> BDC.20y situa Seoul and in the 1Seoul despite thdoubtve









for Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950

the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC  
VKP(b)

Comrade STALIN I.V.

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 3172

Decision dated 30 September 1950

Coded, only by wire  
Submitted at 23:45 p.m. on 07/05/50  
Distribution List - 3 copies: Stalin - 2,  
Molotov -1  
To BEIJING, [SOVIET] AMBASSA-  
DOR

118. Telegram from Comrade Matveyev #  
1298.

The attached draft of the reply to Com-  
rade Matveyev regarding his telegram # 1298  
has been approved.

The Ambassador of the USSR to the  
DPRK Comrade Shtykov has reported that  
as a result of air bombardments by the U.S.  
Air Force many enterprises of the DPRK  
have been ruined and are not in operation. At  
the present time, Koreans do not intend to  
rebuild these factories and plants.

In this situation Comrade Shtykov con-  
siders it expedient to send some of the Soviet  
specialists back to the Soviet Union and asks  
to be given the right to dispatch the Soviet  
experts back to the USSR regardless of the  
length of their stay in Korea upon consulta-  
tions with the government of the DPRK.

Comr. Shtykov also requests that he be  
permitted, at his judgement and upon con-  
sultations with heads of the Soviet organiza-  
tions in Korea, to evacuate some of their  
personnel working in Korea without whom  
they can still continue to do their work.

The M[inistry of] F[oreign] A[ffairs of  
the] USSR considers it possible to recall  
some of the Soviet specialists from the DPRK  
only if the initiative for their return to the  
Soviet Union were to come from the govern-  
ment of the DPRK.

As far as Comr. Shtykov's suggestion  
about the evacuation of the personnel of the  
Soviet organizations from the DPRK, the  
MFA [of the] USSR proposes that we main-  
tain the existing procedures according to  
which the recall of personnel is to be done  
via the MFA of the USSR upon consulta-  
tions with appropriate ministries and organi-  
zations of the USSR.

A draft [cable to Shtykov - AM] is  
attached.

I request Your consideration.

A. G R O M Y K O

Re Your ciphered telegrams ## 1112-  
1126

Tell Zhou Enlai the following:

1. We agree with the opinion of Chi-  
nese comrades regarding the Indian inter-  
mediation in the matter of admitting the  
People's [Republic of] China into the UN  
membership.

2. We consider it correct to concentrate  
immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the  
Chinese-Korean border for volunteers' ac-  
tions in North Korea in the event of the  
enemy's crossing the 38th parallel. We will  
do our best to provide the air cover for these  
units.

3. Your report about the flights of the  
Soviet aircraft over the Manchurian terri-  
tory has not been confirmed. But we have  
issued an order not to permit such over-  
flights.

F I L I P P O V [STALIN]

\_ 373/sh

5.7.50 [5 July 1950]

Typed by Stepanova at 0:55 a.m. on 07/  
06/50

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 331,  
list 79]

**Document 8: Draft Telegram, Chan Fu  
(Stalin) to Matveyev (Zakharov), 30  
September 1950**

VKP(b) CC

# P78/118

09/30/50

To: Cmrds. Malenkov, Bulganin,  
Vasilevsky

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of

SECRETARY OF THE CC

\* \* \* \* \*

Attachment to the Decision of the Polit-  
buro #78 on #118

PYONGYANG

To MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV]

RE: # 1298

We consider correct the decisions  
adopted by Kim Il Sung at his meeting with  
You, in particular, regarding the combining  
of the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-  
Chief and Defense Minister in the hands of  
Kim Il Sung, the establishment of the Staff at  
the office of the Supreme Commander-in-  
Chief, the formation of six divisions and  
withdrawal of manpower reserves from South  
Korea.

The formation of six divisions must be  
accelerated. Necessary armaments, ammu-  
nition, and other materials will be supplied  
from October 5 to October 20.

As far as the question about the expedi-  
ency of recommending that Kim Il Sung ask  
the Chinese friends to dispatch drivers to  
Korea, You may give such advice but with-  
out citing Moscow.

Upon the directive of Instantsia

C H A N F U [STALIN]

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827,  
listy 100-101]

**Document 9: Memorandum Gromyko  
to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft  
cable from Gromyko to Shtykov**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

30 September 1950

# 182-sh

1 copy

Attachment

TOP PRIORITY





in conversations of MAO ZEDONG with YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU SHAOQI with me, which were reported at the time. In these conversations, it was noted by them that the people and the PLA [People's Liberation Army] are ready to help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to defeat the American troops, regarding them as weaker than the Japanese.

2. The Chinese government undoubtedly could send to Korea not only five-six battle ready divisions, but even more. It goes without saying that these Chinese troops are in need of some technical equipping in antitank weapons and to some extent in artillery.

The reasons for the changes in the position of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It is possible to suppose that it has been influenced by the international situation, the worsening of the position in Korea, [and] the intrigues of the AngoJ 1 >> BDC 0 Tc 0.164 Tw 1.0007 3r6blocB 466.0007 /J 1 >> BDC 0.03354c 0.25 Tw 1.2 TL Ten SHAw10 04/Touch-Dec[iph<rituat]C /aushkC /12.2ion.1058.50.0003 /J 1 >> BDC 0.0438 Tw 1tillery. </B 634.0002 /J 1 >> BDC -0.02 Tw 11tillery.

USSR into the pilot training program.

I will keep you informed about further talks with the Chinese comrades. 8 October 1950.

F Y N S I [STALIN]

the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its conversion into its military-strategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East.

In my opinion, the struggle of our people for its independence, freedom and state sovereignty will be protracted and very hard.

For a successful struggle against a strong enemy armed with the latest achievements of military science and technology we will have to train pilots, tankists, radio operators, and engineering officers urgently.

It is very difficult to train them inside our country. Therefore, we turn to You, comrade STALIN, with the following request:

1. To permit the training of 200-300 pilots from among Korean students studying in the Soviet Union.

2. To permit the training of 1,000 tankists, 2,000 pilots, 500 radio operators,













The statement that “interrogations will continue in Pekton (Pyoktong),” a city on the North Korean side of the Yalu near the border with China, could be read as a sign that the Soviets wished to make it clear that the prisoners—and the intelligence gained from their interrogations—should be shared.

A later Soviet document, acquired by the American side of the commission in early 1995, also appears to lift any previous prohibition against Soviet involvement with American POWs—if the prohibition ever existed. Sent on 29 January 1953, and addressed to three top Soviet leaders including Lavrenti Beria, then head of the MGB, the message read:

“The minister of public security of China, having reported on 27 January 1953 to our advisor on this decision of the TSK KPK [the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party], requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and oversee their work. The MGB advisor was ordered by us to render such help.”

A second document that illustrates the involvement of Soviet military intelligence in the interrogation of American POWs in Korea deals with the 4 December 1950 shootdown of a USAF RB-45 reconnaissance plane.

None of the four men aboard the plane—the pilot, Capt. Charles McDonough, two other crewmen, and Col. John R. Lovell, a top-ranking Air Force intelligence officer believed to be on a mission from the Pentagon—made it back to the U.S.

Thus, like the Cold War spy flights, the

RB-45

tive obscurity. But in a move whose motivation and meaning to this day remains somewhat of a mystery, Yeltsin in June 1992 suddenly announced that a number of American military prisoners had indeed been held on Soviet territory. And he vowed an investigation that would determine whether any remained alive.


His statement revived the hopes not only of thousands of families seeking information about MIAs in Indochina—the most vocal and media-noticed segment of the POW/MIA community—but also of a quieter and more patient community representing the families and friends of nearly 8,200 unaccounted-for men from the Korean War and dozens more from the shootdowns of U.S. spy planes during the 1950s and 1960s.

This community—unaligned with and largely separate from the academic community that had begun to forage in Soviet archives for its own purposes—had two powerful allies in its search for information about American MIAs assumed to be in Russian hands.

Each of these allies—the Senate Select Committee on POWs and MIAs and the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission—would end up disappointing the Korean War and Cold War MIA community in its own way.

The Senate committee, whose co-chairs were Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts and Sen. Robert Smith of New Hampshire, lasted for one year and drew significant media attention. But, predictably, it spent the vast majority of staff time and investigative effort on Indochina. The life of the committee was marked by private and public quarrels over the value of certain evidence and the integrity of some of the witnesses.

But in every case, the context of the news and controversy was the Vietnam War. In the public hearing a significant number of American military prisoners were held in Russian hands for one year and a public hearing in Russia and Cold



**CONSTRUCTING A HISTORY  
OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY**



decade earlier and proceeded with Mao's approval and the party leadership's sup-



the subject by historians of modern China. The paucity at least until recently of adequate sources provides the most obvious explanation for this indifference. But perhaps even more important is the fall of foreign relations from historical grace—from the position of prominence and respect it

tists with their own understandably distinct agenda and style. The consequence of their dominance is a literature tending in two directions, each bearing features that are worrisome because of the effect they may have in slowing and skewing the use of new materials on the CCP.<sup>13</sup>

One tendency, marked but by no means dominant, is a preoccupation with theoretical abstractions. What may most strike historians is how this theory-building enterprise tends to thrive under conditions that are euphemistically described by those who attempt it as “data poor” (if imagination rich). We can all call to mind efforts to construct and test high-flying theoretical formulations that get off the ground only after the perilous potholes along the evidentiary runway are carefully smoothed over. Once airborne, those formulations stay aloft only so long as no dangerous mountains of data intrude in the flight path. The virtuosity of the performance can be impressive, but it usually comes at the price of obscuring the fascinating complexity of political life with sometimes mind-numbing abstractions.<sup>14</sup>

The second, perhaps more pronounced tendency among political scientists is to approach Chinese policy with a stronger commitment to description and a more developed historical sensibility. Political scientists working along these lines bring to their work an awareness of the way that skimpy documentation hobbles their interpretive effort. This group also follows an old-fashioned faith in the importance of individual leaders’ values, style, and personality—especially Mao’s.<sup>15</sup> But the paucity of good documentation long locked CCP decisionmaking in a black box and forced these China-watchers to find modes of analysis that would help them make sense of limited evidence and communicate their findings promptly and clearly to the broad policy community. Determined to make some sense of what was going on inside the black box, these analysts developed a variety of tools to penetrate its mysteries. However, the problematic nature of some of those tools is becoming apparent as the new CCP sources open up that box for the first time and permit comparison of past interpretations with the newer, more richly documented understanding.

The reading of public pronouncements, long a mainstay of China-watchers, is rendered particularly tricky by all the ways

those pronouncements can deceive. Usually couched in explicit and correct ideological terms, they may not reflect the more direct, less jargon-ridden inner-party discussions and directives. They are, moreover, sometimes intended to manipulate foreigners, and thus are couched in terms that the party thinks will be effective on its target audience, not in terms that are revealing of inner-party calculations. Finally, they may be directed at an audience altogether different from the one the contemporary foreign reader may have assumed was the target.<sup>16</sup>

American observers’ misreading of the CCP’s propaganda line from mid-1945 to mid-1946 offers a good example of these interpretive difficulties. Inner-party documents now capture Mao Zedong as a backstage operator, carefully orchestrating an attempt to manipulate Washington into an engagement in Chinese politics beneficial to the CCP. He was not intent, as most students of the period have naturally concluded on the basis of the public record, on dismissing American contacts or rejecting American involvement.<sup>17</sup>

interview, on 3 October 1950s with the ambassador P. Of note cited prospectively  
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steadily better as fresh publications appear and archives open on Taiwan and within the PRC. The new CCP material helps round out an already rich documentary base and makes all the more urgent an integrated treatment of China's external relations. Drawing on this range of sources, historians can begin to offer in-depth treatment of all the kinds of topics associated with a well developed foreign-relations literature—from important personalities to the relation of policy to the “public.” It should also convey a more complex sense of policy with features—economic opportunism, political flexibility, cultural ambivalence, strategic opportunism, and policy confusion—long associated with the better studied policies of other countries. To bring these themes into better focus specialists will want to place the CCP's historical experience in a comparative framework and look for insight on the CCP that might emerge from juxtaposition with other foreign-relations histories.<sup>22</sup>

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that we need a more subtle and expansive notion of ideology—one that includes more than the formal ideology that the party utilized as an organizational glue and mobilization guide—if we are to move toward a richer understanding of CCP external relations. The network of ideas that make up an informal ideology is a complex, unstable amalgam drawn from a wide variety of sources and varying significantly from individual to individual. Some party leaders had experienced formative brushes with anarchism. Others had reacted strongly against disturbing urban conditions that made capitalism the main foe. Yet others constructed from their rural roots a populist outlook. Each borrowed from a rich, complex intellectual tradition, drew from distinct regional roots, and learned from diverse political experience as youths. A more penetrating grasp of Chinese policy depends ultimately on exploring the enormous diversity of thinking that shaped its course.

The negotiation of these and other points of difference between historians and political scientists will redefine the agenda for CCP foreign-policy studies and in the process help recast a field already in the midst of important change as a result of the revival of CCP studies in China. Historians taking a more prominent place in the field will be advancing a new constellation of questions and methods. The response by political scientists will doubtless vary with those of a descriptive bent finding it easy, while those devoted to theory may well find the transition awkward. How much this interaction across disciplinary lines will lead to a new mix of concerns and approaches and how much historians and political scientists will turn their back on each other, effectively creating a schism in the field, remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome outside of China, party historians within China are for their part likely to maintain a largely autonomous community interacting selectively with foreign counterparts. Thus this trend toward a more historical picture of CCP external relations, at work in both the United States and China, is not likely to lead to a new monolithic field. And perhaps this outcome, marked by national and disciplinary diversity, is to be welcomed if it proves conducive to the wide-ranging inquiry and lively discussions associated with a field in renaissance.

1. The observations that follow draw in part on Jin Liangyong, “Jianguo yilai jindai Zhongwai guanxishi yanjiu shuping” [A review of post-1949 research on the history of modern Sino-foreign relations], *Jindaishi yanjiu*, 3 (1985), 193-214; Wang Xi and Wang Bangxian, “Woguo sanshiwu nianlai de ZhongMei guanxishi yanjiu” [Research on the history of Sino-American relations in our country over the last thirty-five years], *Fudan xuebao* 5 (1984), 73-76; Tao Wenzhao, “ZhongMei guanxishi yanjiu shinian huigu” [Looking back on a decade of research on the history of Sino-American relations], in *Xin de shiye: ZhongMei guanxishi lunwenji* [New fields of vision: a collection of articles on the history of Sino-American relations] (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue, 1991), 282-307; a fairly extensive reading in party history periodicals; and conversations with Chinese colleagues working on the CCP’s foreign relations.

2. Yao Xu, “KangMei yuanChao de yingming juece” [The brilliant decision to resist America and aid Korea], *Dangshih yanjiu* 5 (1980), 5-14. A new generation of scholarship heralded by Yao’s work did greatly improve on earlier thin and domestically oriented accounts such as Hu Zhongchi, *KangMei yuanChao yundong shihua* [An informal history of the resist-America aid-Korea campaign] (Beijing: Zhonghua qingnian, 1956), which had its own, even more pronounced patriotic premises.

3. These tendencies are evident in Ding Shouhe and Yin Shuyi, *Cong wusi qimeng yundong dao makesi zhuyi de chuanbo* [From May Fourth enlightenment to the propagation of Marxism] (rev. ed.; Beijing: Sanlian, 1979), esp. 88-108; Lu Mingzhuo, “Li Dazhao zai wusi yundong shiqi de fandi sixiang” [Li Dazhao’s anti-imperialist thought during the period of the May Fourth movement], in *Jinian wusi yundong liushi zhounian xueshu taolunhui lunwenxuan* [A selection of articles from a scholarly conference in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the May Fourth movement], ed. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1980), 2: 151-63; and Zhu Jianhua and He Rongdi, “Shilun Li Dazhao de fandi sixiang” [An exploration of Li Dazhao’s anti-imperialist thought], in *Li Dazhao yanjiu lunwenji* [A collection of research papers on Li Dazhao], ed. Han Yide and Wang Lishan (2004), 131-44.

Shi jiazhang@china.com.cn

Postwar American Historiography of China," *positions* 1 (Fall 1993), 486-525. For a helpful evaluation of the literature on imperialism accompanied by suggestions on fruitful modes of inquiry, see Jürgen Osterhammel, "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: A Reconsideration," *Journal of American Studies* 41 (London: Tj EMC /Touch-Up\_Line<</B 695.70282U2Ta517. Imperialism and After, 4 Cotienitfis ond ADiscotienitfis Tj /F6 1 Tf 12125 0 Td (B)Tj EMC /Touch-Up\_Line<</B 696.5 242U2Ta517. .5 Se Je.g., Susn HNaur Ond AEvelyn S. Rawski

*xi*).Tj EMC /Touch-Up\_Line<</B 6597044 3U2Ta517.

York: Oxford University Press, 1985), are notable efforts at moving Soviet history beyond a thin, simple, and strongly judgmental “totalitarian” model associated with the Cold War. An elaborated, well-grounded alternative appears to await the completion of a new generation of historical research.

30. Paul A. Cohen, “The Post-Mao Reforms in Historical Perspective,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 47 (August 1988), 518-40, highlights the dangers of a heavy reliance on an abstract Leninist party model to the neglect of long-term historical patterns.

31. For an effort at teasing out an informal foreign-policy ideology that might be applicable to China, see my own *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) and my follow-up essay, “Ideology,” in “A Roundtable: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations,” *Journal of American History*



*Origins of Chinese Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Lawrence Sullivan and Richard H. Solomon, "The Formation of Chinese Communist Ideology in the May Fourth Era: A Content Analysis of *Hsin ch'ing nien*," in *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973); Hans J. van de Ven, *From Friends to Comrades: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Michael Y. L. Luk, *The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism: An Ideology in the Making, 1921-1928* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989); Marilyn A. Levine, *The Found Generation: Chinese Communists in Europe during the Twenties* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993); and Benjamin Yang, *From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990). Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (originally published 1951; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), is a classic that still commands attention.

There is good material on early party leaders. See in particular Maurice Meisner, *Li Dazhao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Huang Sung-k'ang, *Li Ta-chao and the Impact of Marxism on Modern Chinese Thinking* (The Hague: Mouton, 1965); *Li Dazhao wenji* [Collected works of Li Dazhao], comp. Yuan Qian et al. (2 vols.; Beijing: Renmin, 1984); Lee Feigon, *Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); *Duxiu wencun* [A collection of writings by (Chen) Duxiu] (originally published 1922; 2 vols.; Jiulong: Yuandong, 1965); and Zhang Guotao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party: The Autobiography of Chang Kuo-t'ao* (2 vols.; Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1971-72).

The variant views on imperialism in the 1920s emerge from A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "Marxism, Sun Yat-sen, and the Concept of 'Imperialism'," *Pacific Affairs* 55 (Spring 1982), 54-79; Herman Mast III, "Tai Chi-t'ao, Sunism and Marxism During the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai," *Modern Asian Studies* 5 (July 1973), 55 (Spring 1973); and Meisner, *Li Dazhao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 142-143.







Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1989), 78-81; and Cheek, "The 'Genius' Mao: A Treasure Trove of 23 Newly Available Volumes of Post-1949 Mao Zedong Texts," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 19-20 (January-July 1988), 337-44.

To make the post-1949 Mao materials available in English, Michael Y. M. Kau and John K. Leung launched a translation series in 1986. Two volumes of their *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976* (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1986-) have appeared to date covering the period down to December 1957. Their formidable task has been complicated by the continuing flow of new materials out of China. Translated fragments are available elsewhere—in a variety of publications

*zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* [Reflections on some major decisions and incidents] (2 vols.; Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1991-93); Li Shengzhi, *YaFei huiyi riji* [A diary of the Asian-African conference] (Beijing: publisher not indicated, 1986); Liu Xiao, *Chushi Sulian banian* [Eight years as ambassador to the Soviet Union] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1986); Wang Bingnan, *ZhongMei huitan jiu nian huigu* [Looking back on nine years of Sino-American talks] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1985); and Wu Xiuquan, *Zai waijiaobu banian de jingli, 1950.1-1958.10* [Eight years' experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1950-October 1958] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1983). This last item, the second volume of the Wu memoirs, is translated as *Eight Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1950-October 1958: Memoirs of a Diplomat* (Beijing: New World Press, 1985).

Documentary collections are beginning to open the window on PRC foreign relations. See in particular *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (cited above); the tightly held collection compiled by Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi xueyuan dangshi jiaoyanshi (renamed Zhongguo jiefangjun guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi), *Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao* [Reference materials for the teaching of CCP history] (vols. to date numbered 12-27 with 25-27 withdrawn; n.p. [Beijing?], n.d. [preface in vol. 12 dated 1985]); Xinhuashe xinwen yanjiubu, comp., *Xinhuashe wenjian ziliao xuanbian* [A selection of documentary materials on the New China News Agency] (4 vols.; no place and no publisher, [1981-87?]); and Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi and Guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi, comps., "*Wenhua dageming*" *yanjiu ziliao* [Research materials on "the Cultural Revolution"] (3 vols.; Beijing: publisher same as compiler, 1988; withdrawn from circulation). The second series of *ZhongMei guanxi ziliao huibian* [A collection of materials on Sino-American relations], comp. Shijie zhishi (2 vols.; Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1960; "internal circulation"),



how the situation has changed in the age of “reform and opening to the outside world.” Insofar as the original works of CCP leaders are concerned, the archives storing them, especially Beijing’s Central Archives, remain inaccessible to most scholars (both Chinese and Western). If one carefully examines the contents of the selected works of CCP leaders that have been compiled and published since the early 1980s (especially the editions “for internal circulation only”), however, it is easy to find that the policy of “reform and opening to the outside world” has made its stamp on them. Put simply, the “selected works” compiled and published in the 1980s and 1990s are more substantial, and, so far as their texts are concerned, more reliable than previous collections. To make this point clear, I will introduce and examine several major “selected works” compiled and published during this period.

1. *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* (Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee). This documentary collection covers the period from 1921 to 1949 in two different editions: A fourteen volume internal edition published in the mid-





supply lines. Therefore, when the American troops started a counteroffensive on 25 January 1951, Peng Dehuai, the Chinese commander, proposed a temporary retreat in a telegram to Mao on January 27. Mao, however, overestimated China's strength. In a telegram to Peng the next day, he ordered Peng to use a Chinese/North Korean offensive to counter the American offensive. He even argued that the Chinese troops possessed the capacity to advance to the 36th parallel.<sup>20</sup> Mao's instructions contributed to the military defeat of the Chinese troops on the Korean battlefield in spring 1951. This telegram is certainly important because it revealed Mao's strategic thinking at a crucial point of the Korean War, and reflected the goals he hoped to achieve in Korea—driving the Americans out of the Korean peninsula, thus promoting China's reputation and influence in East Asia while at the same time enhancing the Chinese revolution at home. However, this telegram

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*Translators' Notes: In February 1950, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the Sino-Soviet alliance, made between two "brotherly" Communist countries, would last forever. However, serious problems*

from my head? The tag was removed after [China] decided to resist America [in Korea] and came to [North] Korea's aid and when [we] dealt the US imperialists a blow.

The Wang Ming line<sup>3</sup> was in fact Stalin's line. It ended up destroying ninety percent of our strength in our bases, and one hundred percent of [our strength] in the white areas.<sup>4</sup> Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi<sup>5</sup> pointed this out in his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress.<sup>6</sup> Why, then, did he not openly attribute [the losses] to the [impact of] Stalin's line? There is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself could criticize Stalin; but it would be inappropriate for us to criticize him. We should maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union. Maybe [we] could make our criticism public sometime in the future. It has to be that way in today's world, because facts are facts. The Comintern made numerous mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages were not so bad, but its middle stage was not so good: it was all right when Lenin was alive and when [Georgii] Dimitrov was in charge.<sup>7</sup> The first Wang Ming line dominated [our party] for four years, and the Chinese revolution suffered the biggest losses.<sup>8</sup> Wang Ming is now in Moscow taking a sick leave, but still we are going to elect him to be a member of the party's Central Committee. He indeed is an instructor for our party; he is a professor, an invaluable one who could not be purchased by money. He has taught the whole party, so that it would not follow his line.

When he was in Moscow, he flattered Stalin and was the worst of Stalin.

The second time was during the anti-Japanese war. Speaking Russian and good at flattering Stalin, Wang Ming could directly communicate with Stalin. Sent back to China by Stalin, he tried to set [us] toward right deviation this time, instead of following the leftist line he had previously advocated. Advocating [CCP] collaboration with the Guomindang [the Nationalist Party or GMD], he can be described as "decking himself out and self-inviting [to the GMD];" he wanted [us] to obey the GMD wholeheartedly. The Six-Principle Program he put forward was to overturn our Party's Ten-Principle Policy. [His program] opposed establishing anti-Japanese bases, advocated giving up our Party's own armed force, and preached that as long as Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] was in power, there would be peace [in China]. We redressed this devia-

tion. [Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us correct this mistake: while Wang Ming "decked himself out and fawned on [Jiang]," Jiang Jieshi "slapped his face and kicked him out." Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China's best instructor: he had educated the people of the whole nation as well as all of our Party members. Jiang lectured with his machine guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with his own words.

The third time was after Japan's surrender and the end of the Second World War. Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give the whole of China to America and Jiang Jieshi. In terms of material and moral support, especially moral support, Stalin hardly gave any to us, the Communist Party, but supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later told Tito [this decision] who mentioned his conversation [with Stalin on this decision] in his autobiography.

Only after the dissolution of the Comintern did we start to enjoy more freedom. We had already begun to criticize opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and unfolded the rectification movement. The rectification, in fact, was aimed at denouncing the mistakes that Stalin and the Comintern had committed in directing the Chinese revolution.

"decked himself out and self-inviting [to the GMD];" he wanted [us] to obey the GMD wholeheartedly. The Six-Principle Program he put forward was to overturn our Party's Ten-Principle Policy. [His program] opposed establishing anti-Japanese bases, advocated giving up our Party's own armed force, and preached that as long as Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] was in power, there would be peace [in China]. We redressed this devia-

tion. [Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us correct this mistake: while Wang Ming

"decked himself out and fawned on [Jiang]," Jiang Jieshi "slapped his face and kicked him out." Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China's best instructor: he had educated the people of the whole nation as well as all of our Party members. Jiang lectured with his machine guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with his own words.

The third time was after Japan's surrender and the end of the Second World War. Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give the whole of China to America and Jiang Jieshi. In terms of material and moral support, especially moral support, Stalin hardly gave any to us, the Communist Party, but supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later told Tito [this decision] who mentioned his conversation [with Stalin on this decision] in his autobiography.

Only after the dissolution of the Comintern did we start to enjoy more freedom. We had already begun to criticize opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and unfolded the rectification movement. The rectification, in fact, was aimed at denouncing the mistakes that Stalin and the Comintern had committed in directing the Chinese revolution.

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them, it would be a bewildering thing if socialism could be built in China! Look out, [they warn]. China might become an imperialist country—to follow America, Britain, and France to become the fourth imperialist country! At present China has little industry, thus is in no position [to be an imperialist country]; but [China] will become formidable in one hundred years! Chinggis Khan<sup>11</sup> might be brought to life; consequently Europe would suffer again, and Yugoslavia might be conquered! The “Yellow Peril” must be prevented!

There is absolutely no ground for this to happen! The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist Party. The Chinese people are peace-loving people. We believe that aggression is a crime, therefore, we will never seize an inch of territory or a piece of grass from others. We love peace and we are Marxists.

We oppose great power politics in international relations. Although our industry is small, all things considered, we can be regarded as a big power. Hence some people [in China] begin to be cocky. We then warn them: “Lower your heads and act with your tails tucked between your legs.” When I was little, my mother often taught me to behave “with tails tucked between legs.” This is a correct teaching and now I often mention it to my comrades.

Domestically, we oppose Pan-Hanism,<sup>12</sup> because this tendency is harmful to the unity of all ethnic groups. Hegemonism and Pan-Hanism both are sectarianism. Those who have hegemonious tendencies only care about their own interests but ignore others’, whereas those Pan-Hanists only care about the Han people and regard the Han people as superior to others, thus damaging [the interests of] all the minorities.

Some people have asserted in the past that China has no intention to be friends with other countries, but wants to split with the Soviet Union, thus becoming a troublemaker. Now, however, this kind of people shrinks to only a handful in the socialist countries; their number has been reduced since the War to Resist America and Assist Korea.<sup>13</sup> It is, however, a totally different thing for the imperialists: the stronger China becomes, the more scared they will be. They also understand that China is not that terrifying as long as China has no advanced industry, and as long as China continues to rely on human power. The Soviet Union

remains the most fearsome [for the imperialists] whereas China is merely the second. What they are afraid of is our politics and that we may have an enormous impact in Asia. That is why they keep spreading the words that China will be out of control and will invade others, so on and so forth.

We have been very cautious and modest, trying to overcome arrogance but adhering to the “Five Principles.”<sup>14</sup> We know we have been bullied in the past; we understand how it feels to be bullied. You would have had the same feeling, wouldn’t you?

China’s future hinges upon socialism. It will take fifty or even one hundred years to turn China into a wealthy and powerful country. Now no [formidable] blocking force stands in China’s way. China is a huge country with a population of one fourth of that of the world. Nevertheless, her contribution to the world is yet to be compatible with her population size, and this situation will have to change, although my generation and even my son’s generation may not see the change taking place. How it will change in the future depends on how [China] develops. China may make mistakes or become corrupt; the current good situation may take a bad turn and, then, the bad situation may take a good turn. There can be little doubt, though, that even if [China’s] situation takes a bad turn, it may not become as decadent a society as that of Jiang Jieshi’s. This anticipation is based on dialectics. Affirmation, negation, and, then, negation of negation. The path in the future is bound to be tortuous.

Corruption, bureaucracy, hegemonism, and arrogance all may take effect in China. However, the Chinese people are inclined to be modest and willing to learn from others. One explanation is that we have little “capital” at our disposal: first, we did not invent Marxism which we learned from others; second, we did not experience the October Revolution and our revolution did not achieve victory until 1949, some thirty-two years after the October Revolution; third, we were only a branch army, not a main force, during the Second World War; fourth, with little modern industry, we merely have agriculture and some shabby, tattered handicrafts. Although there are some people among us who appear to be cocky, they are in no position to be cocky; at most, [they can merely show] their tails one or two meters high. But we must prevent this from happening in the future: it may become dangerous [for us] in

ten to twenty years and even more dangerous in forty to fifty years.

My comrades, let me advise you that you should also watch out for this potential. Your industry is much modernized and has experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin made you suffer and hence, justice is on your side. All of this, though, may become your [mental] burden.

The above-mentioned four mistakes Stalin committed [concerning China] may also become our burden. When China becomes industrialized in later years, it will be more likely that we get cocky. Upon your return to your country, please tell your youngsters that, should China stick her tail up in the future, even if the tail becomes ten thousand meters high, still they must criticize China. [You] must keep an eye on China, and the entire world must keep an eye on China. At that time, I definitely will not be here: I will already be attending a conference together with Marx.

We are sorry that we hurt you before, thus owing you a good deal. Killing must be compensated by life and debts must be paid in cash. We have criticized you before, but

futureh.



Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping<sup>18</sup> and others assumed the primary functions.

**2. Speech, Mao Zedong, "On Sino-American and Sino-Soviet Relations," 27 January 1957<sup>19</sup>**

Source: *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 280-283

[Let me] talk about U.S.-China relations. At this conference we have circulated a copy of the letter from [Dwight D.] Eisenhower to Jiang Jieshi. This letter, in my view, aims largely at dampening the enthusiasm of Jiang Jieshi and, then, cheering him up a bit. The letter urges [Jiang] to keep calm, not to be impetuous, that is, to resolve the problems through the United Nations, but not through a war. This is to pour cold water [on Jiang]. It is easy for Jiang Jieshi to get excited. To cheer [Jiang] up is to continue the hard, uncompromising policy toward the [Chinese] Communist Party, and to hope that internal unrest would disable us. In his [6 755.75 m 583 25s]lm, atedj EMC /Touch-Up\_Line<</B 55043004 /6 1 >> BDC 0.14 Tw 1.8 -L T\*(disns, ,ternal unrest



could this be? Taking the office of the first secretary can also become a source for being blinded by lust for gain, making it easy for one to be out of one's mind. Whenever one is out of his mind, there must be a way to bring him back to his senses. This time Comrade [Zhou] Enlai no longer maintained a modest attitude but quarreled with them and, of course, they argued back. This is a correct attitude, because it is always better to make every [controversial] issue clear face to face. As much as they intend to influence us, we want to influence them too. However, we did not unveil everything this time, because we must save some magic weapons [in reserve]. Conflict will always exist. All we hope for at present is to avoid major clashes so as to seek common ground while reserving differences. Let these differences be dealt with in the future. Should they stick to the current path, one day, we will have to expose everything.

As for us, our external propaganda must not contain any exaggeration. In the future, we shall always remain cautious and modest, and shall tightly tuck our tails between our legs. We still need to learn from the Soviet Union. However, we shall learn from them rather selectively: only accept the good stuff, while at the same avoiding picking up the bad stuff. There is a way to deal with the bad stuff, that is, we shall not learn from it. As long as we are aware of their mistakes, [we] can avoid committing the same mistake. We, however, must learn from anything that is useful to us and, at the same time, we must grasp useful things all over the world. One ought to seek knowledge in all parts of the world. It would be monotonous if one only sticks to one place to receive education.

### 3. Report, "My Observations on the Soviet Union," Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and the Central Leadership, 24 January 1957 (Excerpt)<sup>24</sup>

Source: Shi Zhongquan, *Zhou Enlai de zhuoyue fengxian* [Remarkable Achievements and Contributions of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1993), 302-305

Having already spoken considerably about the achievements of the Soviet Communist leadership in public, now let [me] illustrate again the major mistakes it has made:

(1) In my view, the mistakes of the Soviet Communist leadership arise from erroneous thinking. They often set the interests of the Soviet Communist Party ahead of their brotherly parties; they often set their own interests as the leaders ahead of those of the party. As a result, they often fail to overcome subjectivity, narrow-mindedness, and emotion when they think about and resolve problems; they often fail to link together the interests of the above-stated sides in an objective, far-sighted, and calm fashion. Although they may correct one mistake, they are not free of making others. Sometimes they admit that they made mistakes; but it does not mean that they fully come to grips with their mistakes for they merely take a perfunctory attitude toward these mistakes.

For instance, the dispatch of their troops to Warsaw was clearly interference with the internal affairs of a brotherly party by armed forces, but not an action to suppress counter-revolutionaries. They admitted that they had committed a serious mistake, and they even stated in our meetings this time that no one should be allowed to interfere with other brotherly parties' internal affairs; but in the meantime, they denied that [their intervention in Poland] was a mistake.

When we had a general assessment of Stalin, analyzing the ideological and social roots of his [mistakes], they kept avoiding any real discussion. Although they seemingly have changed [their view] in measuring Stalin's achievements and mistakes, to me, such an alteration was to meet their temporary needs, not the result of profound contemplation.

We immediately sensed this shortly after our arrival in Moscow. At the dinner party hosted by Liu Xiao<sup>25</sup> on the 17th [of January], Khrushchev again raised the Stalin issue. Spelling out a good deal of inappropriate words, however, he made no self-criticism. We then pushed him by pointing out that, given the development of Stalin's authoritarianism, ossified way of thinking, and arrogant and conceited attitude over twenty years, how can those comrades, especially those [Soviet] Politburo members, who had worked with Stalin, decline to assume any responsibility? They then admitted that Stalin's errors came about gradually; had they not been afraid of getting killed, they could have at least done more to restrict the growth of Stalin's mistakes than

to encourage him. However, in open talks, they refused to admit this.

Khrushchev and Bulganin claimed that as members of the third generation [of Soviet] leadership, they could not do anything to persuade Stalin or prevent his mistakes. During [my visit] this time, however, I stressed the ideological and social roots of Stalin's mistakes, pointing out that the other leaders had to assume some responsibility for the gradual development of Stalin's mistakes. I also expressed our Chinese Party's conviction that open self-criticism will do no harm to, but will enhance, the Party's credibility and prestige. Before getting out of the car at the [Moscow] airport, Khrushchev explained to me that they could not conduct the same kind of self-criticism as we do; should they do so, their current leadership would be in trouble.

About the Poland question.<sup>26</sup> It is crystal-clear that the Poland incident was a result of the historical antagonism between the Russian and Polish nations. Since the end of [the Second World] War, many [outstanding and potential] conflicts have yet to be appropriately resolved. The recent [Soviet] dispatch of troops to Warsaw caused an even worse impact [in Poland]. Under these circumstances the Polish comrades have good reason not to accept the policy of "following the Soviet leadership." The Polish comrades, however, admitted that they had yet to build a whole-hearted trusting relationship with the Soviet Comrades. For that purpose, [Wladyslaw] Gomulka<sup>27</sup> is trying his best to retrieve the losses and reorient the Polish-Soviet relations by resolutely suppressing any anti-Soviet acts [in Poland]. Regardless, however, the Soviet comrades remain unwilling to accept the criticism that [they] practiced big-power politics [in resolving the Polish crisis]. This kind of attitude does not help at all to convince the Polish comrades.

It is safe to say that although every public communiqué [between the Soviet Union and] other brotherly states has repeatedly mentioned what the 30 October [1956] declaration<sup>28</sup> has announced as the principles to guide the relationship among brotherly parties and governments, [the Soviets] seem to recoil in fear when dealing with specific issues and tend to be inured to patronizing others and interfering with other brotherly parties' and governments' internal affairs.

(2) About Sino-Soviet relations. Facing a [common] grave enemy, the Soviet comrades have ardent expectations about Sino-Soviet unity. However, in my opinion, the Soviet leaders have not been truly convinced by our argument; nor have the differences between us disappeared completely. For instance, many leaders of the Soviet Communist Party toasted and praised our article "Another Comment on the Historical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictatorship."<sup>29</sup> Their three top leaders (Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan), however, have never mentioned a word of it. Moreover, when we discussed with them the part of the article concerning criticism of Stalin, they said that this was what made them displeased (or put them in a difficult position, I can't remember the exact words). . . . Therefore, I believe that some of the Soviet leaders have revealed a utilitarian attitude toward Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, at the last day's meeting, I decided not to raise our requests concerning the abolition of the long-term supply and purchase contracts for the Five-Year Plan, the [Soviet] experts, and [Soviet] aid and [Sino-Soviet] collaboration on nuclear energy and missile development. About these issues I didn't say a word. It was not because there wasn't enough time to do so, but because [I wanted to] avoid impressing upon them that we were taking advantage of their precarious position by raising these issues. These issues can be raised later or simply dropped.

(3) In assessing the international situation, I am convinced that they spend more time and effort on coping with specific and isolated events than on evaluating and anticipating the situations thoroughly from different angles. They explicitly demonstrate weakness in considering and discussing strategic and long-term issues. As far as tactics are concerned, on the other hand, lacking clearly defined principles, they tend to be on such a loose ground in handling specific affairs that they will fail to reach satisfactorily the strategic goals through resolving each specific conflict. As a result, it is very likely that some worrisome events may occur in international affairs. For instance, this time they conceded to our conviction that in today's world there existed two camps and three forces (socialist, impe-



ences. We will comply with the commonly accepted principles, especially the nine principles stated in the "Moscow Manifesto."<sup>40</sup> We ought to learn from all the experiences whether they are correct or erroneous. The erroneous lessons included Stalin's metaphysics and dogmatism. He was not totally metaphysical because he had acquired some dialectics in thinking; but a large part of his [thoughts] focused on metaphysics. What you termed as the cult of personality was one [example of his metaphysics]. Stalin loved to assume the greatest airs.

Although we support the Soviet Union, we won't endorse its mistakes. As for [the differences over] the issue of peaceful evolution, we have never openly discussed [these differences], nor have we published [them] in the newspapers. Cautious as we have been, we choose to exchange different opinions internally. I had discussed them with you before I went to Moscow. While in Moscow, [we assigned] Deng Xiaoping to raise five [controversial] issues. We won't openly talk about them even in the future, because our doing so would hurt Comrade Khrushchev's [political position]. In order to help consolidate his [Khrushchev's] leadership, we decided not to talk about these [controversies], although it does not mean that the justice is not on our side.

With regard to inter-governmental relations, we remain united and unified up to this date which even our adversaries have conceded. We are opposed to any [act] that is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have objected to all the major criticism that the revisionists and imperialists have massed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has so far done the same thing [for us].

When did the Soviets begin to trust us Chinese? At the time when [we] entered the Korean War. From then on, the two countries got closer to one another [than before] and as a result, the 156 aid projects came about. When Stalin was alive, the [Soviet] aid consisted of 141 projects. Comrade Khrushchev later added a few more.<sup>41</sup>

We have held no secrets from you. Because more than one thousand of your experts are working in our country, you are fully aware of the state of our military, political, economic, and cultural affairs. We trust your people, because you are from a socialist country, and you are sons and daughters of Lenin.

Problems have existed in our relations,

but it was mainly Stalin's responsibility. [We] have had three grievances [against Stalin]. The first concerns the two Wang Ming lines. Wang Ming was Stalin's follower. The second was [Stalin's] discouragement of and opposition to our revolution. Even after the dissolution of the Third International, he still issued orders claiming that, if we did not strike a peace deal with Jiang Jieshi, China would risk a grave danger of national elimination.

[We] have had the revolution.





strength up to more than ninety percent. At the critical junctures [of our revolution], he wanted to hold us back and opposed our revolution. Even after [we] achieved victory, he remained a full-throated

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tions will not keep China from developing vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese people from getting acquainted or making friends with other nations; no or minimum participation in some international conferences or organizations does not mean that China adopts a negative or protective attitude toward [international] cultural exchange activities. [In regard to these activities], China may take part in other fashions. On the other hand, China's non-participation may put so much pressure on these conferences or organizations that they will have difficulties in organizing activities thus making them discontented with the United States. As a result, more and more criticism and condemnation of the "two-China" policy may be aroused. In short, China remains willing to cooperate with those international conferences and organizations which are in China's interests [and] have no intention to impair China's sovereignty.

[We are certain] that, as long as we have the Soviet-led socialist countries' support, our just cause of smashing America's "two-China" conspiracy will achieve a complete success.

1. The content of this conversation suggests that it occurred between 15 and 28 September 1956, when the CCP's Eighth National Congress was in session.

2. This refers to the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform), which was established in September 1947 by the parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The Bureau announced that it was ending its activities in April 1956.

3. Wang Ming (1904-1974), also known as Chen Shaoyu, was a returnee from the Soviet Union and a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s. Official Chinese Communist view claims that Wang Ming committed "ultra-leftist" mistakes in the early 1930s and "ultra-rightist" mistakes in the late 1930s.

4. The white areas were Guomindang-controlled areas.

5. Liu Shaoqi was vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress. He was China's second most important leader.

6. The Chinese Communist party's eighth national congress was held in Beijing on 15-27 September 1956.

7. Georgii Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian communist, was the Comintern's secretary general from 1935 to 1943.

8. Mao here pointed to the period from 1931 to 1935, during which the "international section," of which Wang Ming was a leading member, controlled the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

9. Zhu De was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and vice chairman of the PRC.

10. Bobkoveshi was Yugoslavia's first ambassador to the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time on 30 June 1955.

11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes still lacked a common name. He became their great organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227, Chinggis established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by conquering its inner zone across Central Asia. The Mongols are remembered for their wanton aggressiveness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was certainly present in Chinggis.

12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese population.

13. The "War to Resist America and Assist Korea" describes China's participation in the Korean War from October 1950 to July 1953. The text contains several errors: "October58" should be "October 1950", "Tirm 323" should be "Tirm 323", and "mistakes 3.1" should be "mistakes 3.1".





with slogans “about a stable union with the Guomintang,” etc.

As a result of the serious ideological struggle and the great explanatory work following the 7th Congress of the Communist Party, especially in the last four years, the majority of Communists who made left or right errors acknowledged their guilt. Van Minh at the 7th Congress also wrote a letter with acknowledgement of his mistakes, however he then once again returned to his old positions. All of the former activity of Van Minh, Mao Zedong said, which was carried out under the direct leadership of the Comintern and Stalin, inflicted a serious loss to the Chinese revolution.

Characterizing the Comintern’s activity overall, Mao Zedong noted that while Lenin was alive he had played the most prominent role in bringing together the forces of the Communist movement, in the creation and consolidation of the Communist parties in various countries, in the fight with the opportunists from the Second International. But that had been a short period in the activity of the Comintern. Consequently, to the Comintern came “officials” like Zinoviev, Bukharin, Piatnitskii and others, who as far as China was concerned, trusted Van Minh more than the CC CPC. In the last period of the Comintern’s work, especially when Dimitrov worked there, certain movements were noticed, since Dimitrov depended on us and trusted the CC CPC, rather than Van Minh. However, in this period as well, not just a few mistakes were made by the Comintern, for example, the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party and others. In this way, said Mao Zedong, it is possible to discern three periods in the activity of the Comintern, of which the second, longest period, brought the biggest loss to the Chinese revolution. Moreover, unfortunately, precisely in this period the Comintern dealt most of all with the East. We can say directly, commented Mao Zedong, that the defeat of the Chinese revolution at that time was, right along with other reasons, also the result of the incorrect, mistaken actions of the Comintern. Therefore, speaking openly, noted Mao Zedong, we were satisfied when we found out about the dissolution of the Comintern.

In the last period, continued Mao Zedong, Stalin also incorrectly evaluated the situation in China and the possibilities for the development of the revolution. He

continued to believe more in the power of the Guomintang than of the Communist Party. In 1945 he insisted on peace with Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] supporters, on a united front with the Guomintang and the creation in China of a “democratic republic.” In particular, in 1945 the CC CPC received a secret telegram, for some reason in the name of the “RCP(b)” (in fact from Stalin), in which it was insisted that Mao Zedong travel to Chuntsin for negotiations with Jiang Jieshi. The CC CPC was against this journey, since a provocation from Jiang Jieshi’s side was expected. However, said Mao Zedong, I was required to go since Stalin had insisted on this. In 1947, when the armed struggle against the forces of Jiang Jieshi was at its height, when our forces were on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that peace be made with Jiang Jieshi, since he doubted the forces of the Chinese revolution. This lack of belief remained in Stalin even during the first stages of the formation of the PRC, i.e. already after the victory of the revolution. It is possible that Stalin’s lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain disappointment, many conversations took place to the effect that the Chinese Communist Party was going along the Yugoslav path, that Mao Zedong is a “Chinese Tito.” I told Mao Zedong that there were no such moods and conversations in our Party.

The bourgeois press around the world, continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right socialists, had taken up the version of “China’s third way,” and extolled it. At that time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, did not believe us, while the bourgeoisie and laborites sustained the illusion of the “Yugoslav path of China,” and only Jiang Jieshi alone “defended” Mao Zedong, shrieking that the capitalist powers should not in any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that “he will not turn from his path,” etc. This behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, since he knows us too well, he more than

once had to stand in confrontation to us Yugoslavian events, particularly 812.0023 / J 1 >> BDC 0.041

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the creation of the PRC we undertook a further struggle with this ugly manifestation. It is entirely evident, continued Mao Zedong, that according to the logic of things during a beating the one who is being beaten begins to give false testimony, while the one who is conducting the interrogation accepts that testimony as truth. This and other vestiges which have come to us from the bourgeois past, will still for a long time be preserved in the consciousness of people. A striving for pomposity, for ostentatiousness, for broad anniversary celebrations, this is also a vestige of the psychology of bourgeois man, since such customs and such psychology objectively could not arise among the poorest peasantry and the working class. The presence of these and other circumstances, said Mao Zedong, creates the conditions for the arising of those or other mistakes with which the Communist parties will have to deal.

I observed that the main reason for Stalin's mistakes was the cult of personality, bordering on deification.

Mao Zedong, having agreed with me, noted that Stalin's mistakes accumulated gradually, from small ones growing to huge ones. To crown all this, he did not acknowledge his own mistakes, although it is well known that it is characteristic of a person to make mistakes. Mao Zedong told how, reviewing Lenin's manuscripts, he had become convinced of the fact that even Lenin crossed out and re-wrote some phrases or other in his own works. In conclusion to his characterization of Stalin, Mao Zedong once again stressed that Stalin had made mistakes not in everything, but on some certain issues.

Overall, he stressed that the materials from the Congress made a strong impression on him. The spirit of criticism and self-criticism and the atmosphere which was created after the Congress will help us, he said, to express our thoughts more freely on a range of issues. It is good that the CPSU has posed all these issues. For us, said Mao Zedong, it would be difficult to take the initiative on this matter.

Mao Zedong declared that he proposes to continue in the future the exchange of opinions on these issues during Comrade Mikoyan's visit, and also at a convenient time with Comrades Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Then Mao Zedong got distracted from

this topic and getting greatly carried away briefly touched on a few philosophical questions (about the struggle of materialism with idealism, etc.). In particular he stressed that it is incorrect to imagine to oneself Communist society as a society which is free from any sort of contradictions, from ideological struggle, from any sort of vestiges of the past. In a Communist society too, said Mao Zedong, there will be good and bad people. Further he said

ing much less than before. Though - Mao Zedong went on - I mostly work 8 hours a day (sometimes more), the productivity is not the same as it used to be. His comprehension of the material studied is less effective, and the necessity arose [for him] to read documents printed in large characters." He mentioned in this connection that "this must be a general rule that people of advanced age are in an unequal position to the young as regards the efficiency of their work."

Mao Zedong then emphasized that his resignation from the post of the Chairman of the PRC had lessened the load of state activities on him. Speaking about this he mentioned that at the time when he had submitted this proposal he had been supported only by the Politburo members, while many members of the CPC CC had objected. "There was even more disagreement among the rank and file communists." By now, he said, everybody was supporting this decision.

As he continued talking about his work

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**THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY'S  
APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET  
RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE  
SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959**

**by Mark Kramer**

In early September 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed the head of the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to prepare a detailed background report on China for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of September and early October to take part in ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of the Communist victory in China. The Soviet leader's trip, as Gromyko was well

Beijing were present, at least in some fashion, as early as 1950-53.

*Second*, while giving due emphasis to problems that arose during the Stalin era, Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th Soviet Party Congress and by the “Hundred Flowers” campaign in China. Zimyanin claimed that the Chinese leadership had “fully supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences” after the 20th Party Congress, but he conceded that Beijing’s assessment of Stalin was considerably “different from our own” and that the Congress had prompted “the Chinese friends . . . to express critical comments about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations.” Even more damaging, according to Zimyanin, was the effect of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He cited a wide range of “hostile statements” and “denunciations of the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship” that had surfaced in China. “The airing of these types of statements,” he wrote, “can in no way be justified.” The report expressed particular concern about a number of territorial demands that had been raised against the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup>

*Third*, as one might expect, Zimyanin devoted considerable attention to the Sino-Soviet ideological quarrels that began to surface during the Great Leap Forward. In 1958 and 1959 the emerging rift between Moscow and Beijing had primarily taken the form of disagreements about the establishment of “people’s communes,” the role of material versus ideological incentives, the nature of the transition to socialism and Communism, and other aspects of Marxism-Leninism. In subsequent years, bitter disputes erupted over territorial demands and questions of global strategy (not to mention a clash of personalities between Khrushchev and Mao), but those issues had not yet come to dominate the relationship in September 1959. Hence, it is not surprising that Zimyanin would concentrate on ideological differences that were particularly salient at the time. His report provides further evidence that ideological aspects of the conflict must be taken seriously on their own merits, rather than being seen as a mere smokescreen for geopolitical or other concerns.

*Finally*, there are a few conspicuous in China. “.g3 BDC, there are a few conspicuouBDCc/.2 uB 130.00YdE-Up0g, Zi Tw fl eg\*(cT csmnc3

other East-bloc documents.<sup>16</sup> The two transcripts also do not reveal anything about unpleasant incidents that may have occurred outside the formal talks. Although retrospective accounts by aides to Stalin and Mao who took part in the meetings can be helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs must be used with extreme caution, especially when they are published long after the events they describe. Khrushchev's recollections were compiled more than 15 years after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko's, Fedorenko's, and Shi's accounts were written nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the memoir-writers relied on notes and documents from the period they were discussing and depicted events as faithfully as they could, the passage of so many years is bound to cause certain failings of memory.<sup>17</sup>

Two important factors might lead one to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko's

version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than versnearus fnegaTL T\*1 fac of memory. parnts thatbeeo seekul ia0.lally as theyversiGorba 514 era ter  
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the early 1950s because of Stalin's refusal during the Chinese civil war to provide greater support for the Communist rebels.<sup>26</sup> This tension inevitably caused personal strains between the two leaders, as Mao himself observed during his March 1956 meeting with the Soviet ambassador and in one of his secret speeches two years later at the Chengdu conference:

The victory of the Chinese revolution was against Stalin's wishes....  
When our revolution succeeded,  
Stalin said it was a fake. We made  
no protest.<sup>27</sup>

Shi also recalled how Stalin would lapse into a "sullen" mood during the 1949-50 meetings whenever Mao was being deliberately "evasive." This was particularly evident, according to Shi, when negotiations on the treaty of alliance bogged down and Stalin repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to "gauge Chairman Mao's intentions." Shi added that the testy exchanges between the two leaders prompted Mao at one point to remark sarcastically that Stalin was wont to "blame the Chinese for all the mistakes" in bilateral



everything it had promised to do in support of the Chinese operation, and that it was China, not the USSR, that was unwilling to follow through.<sup>52</sup> This outcome explains why Khrushchev, feeling he had been burned once, was determined not to let it happen again. From then on he emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem, a lesson that Mao was unwilling to draw, for fear it would expose the magnitude of his failure in the Quemoy crisis. These different views became a sore point in Sino-Soviet relations, as was evident during Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in the autumn of 1959.<sup>53</sup> Zimyanin's brief discussion of Soviet policy during the Quemoy crisis does

nists took power in Beijing, but the relationship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as a result of differences over Tibet and the disputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the Himalayas.<sup>63</sup> In the spring of 1959 China crushed a popular revolt in Tibet and deployed many thousands of extra troops on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with great apprehension in neighboring India. Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian border dispute heated up, leading to a serious incident in late August 1959, when Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a contested border post at Longju. Although each side blamed the other for the incident, the clash apparently was motivated in part by the Chinese authorities' desire to take a firm stand against India before Khrushchev arrived in Beijing.

As recriminations between India and China escalated, Chinese officials secretly urged "the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries to exploit all possible opportunities" to "conduct propaganda measures against India" and "expose the subversive role of imperialist and reactionary Tibetan forces" armed and supported by India.<sup>64</sup> These pleas were of no avail. Instead of rallying to China's defense, the Soviet Union scrupulously avoided taking sides during the skirmishes, and released a statement on 9 September 1959 expressing hope that China and India would soon resolve the matter "in the spirit of their traditional friendship."<sup>65</sup> Chinese officials were shown the TASS statement before it went out, and they did their best to persuade Moscow not to release it; but far from helping matters, Beijing's latest remonstrations merely induced Soviet leaders to issue the statement a day earlier than planned, without any amendments.<sup>66</sup> Mao and his colleagues were so dismayed by the Soviet Union's refusal to back its chief Communist ally in a dispute with a non-Communist state that they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow on September 13 claiming that "the TASS statement has revealed to the whole world the divergence of views between China and the Soviet Union regarding the incident on the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that has literally brought joy and jubilation to the Indian bourgeoisie and to American and British imperialism."<sup>67</sup> The irritation and sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two days later when Soviet and Indian leaders signed a much-publicized agreement that

provided for subsidized credits to India of some \$385 million over five years.

These events were still under way—and tensions along the Sino-Indian border were still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his report, so it was probably too early for him to gauge the significance of Moscow's decision to remain neutral.<sup>68</sup> Even so, it is odd that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up having such a deleterious effect on Khrushchev's visit.<sup>69</sup>

### Zimyanin's Report and Soviet Policy-Making

The submission of Zimyanin's report to Khrushchev was one of several indicators of a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy-making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the 1950s the Soviet Union's dealings with the PRC, as with other Communist states, had been handled mainly along party-to-party lines. A special CPSU Central Committee department, known after February 1957 as the Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, was responsible for keeping track of developments in East-bloc countries and for managing relations with those countries on a day-to-day basis.<sup>70</sup> (Matters requiring high-level decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded from Soviet policy-making toward China. On some issues, such as the effort to gain a seat for Communist China in the United Nations, the MFA was the only important actor involved. Also, the foreign minister himself at times played a key role, notably in the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold secret negotiations with Mao about "issues of war and peace, the international situation, and the policy of American imperialism."<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign Ministry's input was limited. Apart from standard diplomatic support, the MFA had contributed relatively little during Khrushchev's two previous visits to China (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as well as his visits to most other Communist states. The bulk of the preparations had been handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Central Committee departments and by Khrushchev's own staff.

In that respect, the September 1959 trip

to China was quite different. The MFA ended up with a dominant role in the preparations for the trip, thanks in part to a deliberate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater say for the Foreign Ministry in policy toward China.<sup>72</sup> When Gromyko first asked Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on China, the foreign minister knew that he would soon be accompanying Khrushchev on a two-week visit to the United States, a task that would enable him to bolster the Foreign Ministry's standing (as well as his own influence) on other issues, especially Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in between Khrushchev's two visits in late September was so limited, briefings for the China trip had to occur almost entirely on the plane. Gromyko was aware that the other senior members of the Soviet "party-government delegation," led by Mikhail Suslov, were scheduled to depart for China on September 26-27, while Khrushchev and Gromyko were still in the United States. Hence, the foreign minister knew he would be the only top official accompanying Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the 29th and 30th.<sup>73</sup> (Gromyko, of course, also intended to make good use of his privileged access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and flight back from, the United States.<sup>74</sup>)

Under those circumstances, the Foreign Ministry's report on China, prepared by Zimyanin, became the main briefing material for Khrushchev, along with a short update (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent personnel changes in the Chinese military High Command.<sup>75</sup> What is more, Zimyanin (who was a member of the MFA Collegium as well as head of the ministry's Far Eastern department) and a number of other senior MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing to provide on-site advice and support, something that had not happened during Khrushchev's earlier visits to China.<sup>76</sup> Although the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and a few other CC department heads also traveled to China as advisers, the Foreign Ministry's role during the visit was far more salient than in the past. (This was reflected in Gromyko's own role as well; among other things, he was the only Soviet official besides Suslov who took part in all of Khrushchev's talks with Mao and Zhou Enlai.<sup>77</sup>) Hence, Zimyanin's report proved highly influential.

As things worked out, however, the



MFA's expanded role had little effect one way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. The trip in September-October 1959 left crucial differences unresolved, and the two sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet Union quietly began pulling some of its key military technicians out of China.<sup>78</sup> Tensions increased rapidly over the next several months, culminating in the publication of a lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birthday.<sup>79</sup> The statement, entitled "Long Live Leninism!" removed any doubts that Soviet officials and diplomats still had about the magnitude of the rift between the two countries.<sup>80</sup> Soon thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East European governments became aware of the conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Beijing of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a few weeks later at the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, where Khrushchev sought to rebut the com-

### Soviet-Chinese Relations

The victory of the people's revolution in China and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries.

....

When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements signed between the Soviet Union and PRC, including, for example, agreements to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock companies, and to set the rate of exchange for the ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents.<sup>86</sup>

Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took measures to eliminate everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.<sup>87</sup> Over time, the above-mentioned agreements were annulled or revised if they did not accord with the spirit of fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October 1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting relations. As a result of this visit, joint declarations were signed on Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation and on relations with Japan.<sup>88</sup> In addition, a communique and additional agreements were signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies responsible for scientific-technical cooperation, the construction of a Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator railroad, and so forth.<sup>89</sup>

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese rela-

tions. It created an atmosphere conducive to a more frequent and more amicable exchange of candid views. The Chinese friends began to speak more openly about their plans and difficulties and, at the same time, to express critical comments (from a friendly position) about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations. The CPC CC [Communist Party of China Central Committee] fully supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences.



Sino-Soviet cooperation to a “fundamental change in [Mao’s own] domestic political priorities,” which elevated “national” over “internationalist” concerns. Although Goldstein does not dismiss factional politics altogether, he argues that “Mao was able to set the tone and the agenda of Chinese politics” himself, and that

Xinjiang had “become a mere zone of Soviet influence.” See “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.,” L. 93.

25. For a useful list of collections of Mao’s secret speeches, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*, Harvard Contemporary China Series No. 6 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989), 78-81.

26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more nuanced appraisal of Stalin’s policy. Among many items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection of documents being compiled under the auspices of the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents from Recent History (RTsKhIDNI): *Kommunisticheskaya partiya (Bol’sheviki), Komintern, i Narodno-revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae*. The first volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been published in several recent issues of the journal *Problemy Dal’nego vostoka*. Perhaps the most intriguing of these is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in January-February 1949, which is presented along with supporting documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan’s report, were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei Tikhvinskii and published as “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Peregovora I. V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g.,” *Novaya i noveisha istoriya* (Moscow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, Ll. 95-118.

27. “Address on March 10,” 98. For Mao’s extended comments on this point during his March 1956 meeting, see “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.,” Ll. 88-92.

28. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part C (“O Vengrii”), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev’s version of events is borne out by a close reading of the Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chinese media spoke positively about the events in Hungary until November 2, the day after Nagy announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers suddenly began condemning the “counterrevolution” in Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chinese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht über die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, IV 2/20, No. 212/02. Other evidence, including the memoir by the then-Yugoslav ambassador in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev’s account. (Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev’s version is not inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 September 1963 (cited in note 9 c7 1z095/JB 1\*(19r3esa K377.81390 TTj -0.125 Tsee 05<</B69.2216/J1 02 BDC -0.013 Tc -04.75 Tw -13.25 thatial Chineseinte sT\*(TLn Erehe T\*





attacks on the “cult of personality” could affect his own status as the supreme, all-wise leader of China; and (3) his belief that the chief features of Stalinism, especially the crash industrialization program of the 1930s, were still relevant, indeed essential, for China. Later on, after the Sino-Soviet split emerged, Chinese support for Stalin was largely rekindled, no doubt to retaliate against Khrushchev. For a lengthy Chinese statement from 1963 defending Stalin (while acknowledging that he made a few “mistakes”), see “On the Question of Stalin: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (2) by the Editorial Departments of People’s Daily and *Red Flag*,” 13 September 1963, in *Peking Review* 6:38 (20 September 1963), 8-15.

91. The reference here is to Mao’s trip in November 1957, his first visit to Moscow (and indeed his first trip outside China) since early 1950. On the point discussed in the next sentence, see Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, p. 105.

92. In May 1956 the Chinese authorities promulgated the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend”; and in the spring of 1957, after the CCP Central Committee published a directive inviting public criticism, many Chinese intellectuals took advantage of the opportunity to express remarkably bold and pointed critiques of the Communist regime, far exceeding what Mao had anticipated. After six weeks of growing ferment, the authorities launched a vehement crackdown under the new slogan “the extermination of poisonous weeds.” Hundreds of thousands of “rightists” and “counter-revolutionaries” were arrested, and more than 300,000 eventually were sentenced to forced labor or other punitive conditions. For a valuable overview of this episode, see Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (New York: Praeger, 1960), which includes extensive documentation as well as a lengthy narrative and critical commentaries. For a perceptive analysis of the fundamental differences between the Hundred Flowers campaign in China and the post-Stalin “Thaw” in the Soviet Union, see S. H. Chen, “Artificial Flowers During a Natural ‘Thaw,’” in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), 220-254. Useful insights into Mao’s own goals for the Hundred Flowers campaign can be gained from 14 secret speeches he delivered between mid-February and late April 1957, collected in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 113-372.

93. These particular complaints were expressed by a high-ranking Chinese military officer, General Lung Yun, the vice chairman of the PRC National Defense Council, in the newspaper *Xinhua* on 18 June 1957, at the very end of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He declared that it was “totally unfair that the People’s Republic of China had to bear all the expenses of the Korean War,” noting (accurately) that China had been forced to pay for all the military equipment it received from the Soviet Union. Lung contrasted Moscow’s position with the “more suitable” policy of the United States during World War I and World War II, when Allied debts were written off. He also emphasized that China’s debt to the Soviet Union should be reduced in











“contrived imperialist propaganda” that Moscow was “preparing a preventive strike” against the PRC. Preparatory to further negotiations on border issues in Beijing, both sides were reported to have agreed to three principles: (1) the observance of the existing border; (2) the inadmissibility of armed confrontations; and (3) military disengagement from disputed border areas. Kosygin also proposed the expansion of trade relations and economic cooperation as well as the normalizing of railroad and aviation connections. Significantly, the Soviet premier also acquiesced when Zhou declared that Beijing would not curtail its political and ideological criticism of the Soviet Union. Letting the Chinese save face, Kosygin conceded that, while Sino-Soviet disagreements “played into the hands of world imperialism,” Moscow considered polemics on controversial issues as “permissible” if conducted in a “fitting tone.”

Moscow was successful in forcing the Chinese to accept the *status quo* along the Sino-Soviet border. But this victory came at a price in ideological and geostrategic terms. Not only did the Soviets concede the validity of a direct challenge to its leadership within the Communist bloc in ideological terms, a development long evident but rarely formulated as explicitly as in the Beijing meeting. In the long run, Moscow’s coercive diplomacy worsened relations with the United States and helped drive China into a rapprochement with the West, thus altering the balance of power in Asia to Soviet disadvantage.<sup>26</sup>

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**Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR  
Leadership on 2 March 1969  
Sino-Soviet Border Clashes**

5 Copies  
3/8/69

On March 2, 1969, at 11 o’clock local time, the Chinese organized a provocation on the Island Damansky which is located on the river Ussuri south of Khabarovsk, between the points Bikin and Iman (Primorsky Region).

The ascertained facts are that this action had been prepared by the Chinese government for a long time. In December 1968 and in January/February 1969, groups of armed

accident that the ambush on the Soviet border unit was staged by the Chinese agencies at a time when Bonn started its provocation of holding the election of the Federal President in West Berlin.

The provocation in the area of the Island of Damansky is part of the Maoists' policy which aims at forcing a radical reversal in the foreign and domestic policies of the PR [People's Republic] of China and at transforming the country de facto into a power hostile toward the socialist countries.

The Mao Zedong group has prepared the organization of armed provocations along the Soviet-Chinese border for a long time. The Chinese authorities have been creating artificial tensions at the Soviet-Chinese border since 1960. Since this time the Chinese have undertaken several thousand border violations with provocative goals.

At the beginning of 1967, the number of border violations by Chinese authorities increased sharply. In some districts they tried to install demonstratively border patrols on the islands and those parts of the rivers belonging to the USSR. In December 1967 and in January 1968, the Chinese undertook large provocative actions on the island of Kirkinsi on the Ussuri [River] and in the area of the Kasakevich Canal. On January 23, 1969, the Chinese staged an armed attack on the Island of Damansky.

The border in the area of the Island of Damansky was established according to the Treaty of Beijing of 1860 and the enclosed map which the representatives of Russia and China signed in June 1863. According to the then drawn-up demarcation line the Island of Damansky is located on the territory of the USSR. This line has always been protected by Soviet border guards.

Confronted with the Chinese provocations at the border, the Soviet side, for years, has taken active steps towards a regulation of the situation.

The question of the borderline was discussed in the bilateral Soviet-Chinese Consultations on the Determination of the Borderline in Certain Controversial Areas of 1964. The Soviet side made a number of proposals regarding the examination of the controversial border question. The Chinese leadership, however, was determined to let these consultations fail. The Chinese delegation put up the completely untenable demand to recognize the unequal character of the treaties delineating the Soviet-Chi-

nese border and raised territorial claims against the Soviet Union about an area of altogether 1,575,000 square kilometer. On July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong declared in a conversation with Japanese members of parliament with regard to the Chinese territorial demands against the Soviet Union that "we have not yet presented the bill for this territory."

On August 22, 1964, the consultations were interrupted. Despite our repeated proposals the Chinese did not resume the conversations and did not react even when the question was mentioned in the Soviet foreign ministry note of August 31, 1967.

Meanwhile the Chinese authorities continued to violate grossly the Soviet-Chinese agreement of 1951 on the regulation of the navigation in the border rivers. In 1967 and 1968 they blew up the consultations of the mixed Soviet-Chinese navigation commission which had been established on the basis of the agreement of 1951.

In the Chinese border areas large military preparations set in (construction of airports, access routes, barracks and depots, training of militia, etc.).

The Chinese authorities consciously conjure up situations of conflict along the border and stage provocations there. On our part, all measures have been taken to avoid an escalation of the situation and to prevent incidents and conflicts. The Soviet border troops have been instructed not to use their arms and, if possible, to avoid armed collisions. The instruction on the non-use of arms was strictly enforced, although the Chinese acted extremely provocatively in many cases, employed the most deceitful tricks, picked fights, and attacked our border guards with stabbing weapons, with steel rod and other such things.

The armed provocation in the area of the Island of Damansky is a logical consequence of this course of the Chinese authorities and is part of a far-reaching plan by Beijing aiming at increasing the Maoists' anti-Soviet campaign.

Since March 3, 1969, the Soviet Embassy in Beijing has been exposed again to an organized siege by specially trained groups of Maoists. Brutal acts of force and rowdylike excesses against the representatives of Soviet institutions are occurring throughout China every day. All over the country, an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign has been kindled. It is characteristic that this whole

campaign assumed a military coloration, that an atmosphere of chauvinistic frenzy has been created throughout the country.

Faced with this situation the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government are undertaking the necessary steps to prevent further border violations. They will do everything necessary in order to frustrate the criminal intentions of the Mao Zedong group which are to create hostility between the Soviet people and the Chinese people.

The Soviet Government is led in its relations with the Chinese people by feelings of friendship and is intent on pursuing this policy in the future. Ill-considered provocative actions of the Chinese authorities will, however, be decisively repudiated on our part and brought to an end with determination.

[Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from German by Christian F. Ostermann.]

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**Document No. 2: Telegram to East German Foreign Ministry from GDR Ambassador to PRC, 2 April 1969**

Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic  
The Minister for Foreign Affairs brought to the attention of the Council of Ministers the following information:

and the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] [earlier] this year signed an agreement on Chinese aid for Vietnam in the sum of 800 million Yen. [...]

The Chargé was called on the evening of March 21 by Kosygin on direct line from Moscow. Com. Kosygin informed him that he had attempted to contact Mao Zedong through the existing direct telephone line. He was not put through by the Chinese side. If need be the conversation could also be held with Zhou Enlai. (Com. Kosygin was acting at the request of the politburo of the CPSU.)

After various attempts by the Soviet Embassy to contact the Foreign Ministry in this matter, a conversation between Kosygin and Mao Zedong was refused [by the Chinese] under rude abuse of the CPSU. Desire for talks with Zhou was to be communicated [to the Chinese].

3/22 Aide-mémoire by the deputy head of department in the foreign ministry; it stated that, because of the currently existing relations between the Soviet Union and the PR China, a direct telephone line was no longer

advantageous.

If the Soviet government had to communicate anything to the PR China, it is asked to do so via diplomatic channels.

Allegedly conference in Hongkong on questions of China policy organized by the US State Department. Dutch Chargé and Finnish Ambassador here are to attend."

With Socialist Greetings  
Oskar Fischer

[Source: SAPMO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from German by Christian F. Ostermann.]

\* \* \* \* \*

**Document No. 3: Soviet Report on 11 September 1969 Kosygin-Zhou Meeting**

Secret  
Only Copy

Information  
About A.N. Kosygin's Conversation With  
Zhou Enlai on  
11 September 1969

The CC CPSU considers it necessary to inform You about A.N. Kosygin's conversation with Premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai which took place on September 11 of this year in Beijing.

As is well known, relations between the USSR and China, and the leadership of the PRC is to blame for this, are extremely aggravated. The Chinese authorities are exacerbating tension on the border with the Soviet Union. In the PRC, appeals to prepare for war against the USSR are openly made. Trade relations have been reduced to a minimum, scientific-technological and cultural exchanges have ceased, contacts along diplomatic lines are limited. For more than three years ambassadors have been absent from Moscow and Beijing. The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership is being used by the imperialist powers in the struggle against world socialism and the Communist movement.

In the report of CC CPSU General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev to the Moscow meeting

**The Cold War in Asia:  
Khabarovsk Conference Highlights  
Role of Russian Far East**

by David L. Wolff

On 26-29 August 1995 an international, interdisciplinary conference focusing on the borderland nature of the Russian Far East otok placry ty confere3

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of Communist and Workers' Parties the course of our policy in relation to China was clearly set forth. The CPSU and the Soviet government, proceeding from its unchanging policy oriented towards an improvement in relations between the USSR and the PRC, has repeatedly appealed to the Chinese leadership with concrete proposals about ways to normalize relations. The pronouncements of the government of the USSR of March 29 and June 13 of this year are very well known. The message of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the State Council of the PRC sent in July of this year, in which concrete proposals regarding the improvement of contacts between the Soviet Union and China along government lines were put forth, including the organization of a bilateral summit meeting, also served the aims of putting to rights Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations.

Undertaking these actions, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government proceeded from and proceeds from a principled course in Soviet-Chinese relations. According to our deep conviction, a softening of tensions in relations between the USSR and the PRC would correspond to the interests of our two countries, and also of the whole Socialist commonwealth overall, would facilitate the activation of the struggle against imperialism, would be an essential support to heroic Vietnam and to the peoples of other countries which are leading the struggle for social and national liberation.

Guided by these considerations, the CC CPSU decided to undertake one more initiative aimed at a softening of the situation in relations between the USSR and the PRC.

The Chinese side responded pretty quickly to our proposal to hold a meeting of A.N. Kosygin, who was present in Hanoi at Ho Chi Minh's funeral, with Zhou Enlai. However, the Chinese response arrived in Hanoi an hour after the departure of the Soviet Party-State delegation to Moscow via Calcutta, and therefore A.N. Kosygin set off for Beijing already from the territory of the Soviet Union.

The meeting of the Soviet delegation headed by Comrade A.N. Kosygin with Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi continued for about four hours. From the Soviet side efforts were applied to assure that the conversation took place in the spirit of a concrete consideration of the knotty issues of inter-governmental Soviet-Chi-

and the PRC. An initiative was revealed by us regarding an expansion of trade, the fulfillment of contracts which had been concluded, the signing of trade protocols for the current and next year, the working out of measures on trade and economic cooperation during the present five-year plan. Zhou Enlai promised to present these proposals to



We declared the provocative nature of the contrived imperialist propaganda to the effect that the Soviet Union allegedly is preparing a preventive strike on China. It was stressed that in the Soviet Union neither the Party nor the government has ever spoken about the unavailability of war and has not summoned the people to war. All of our documents, party decisions summon the people to peace. We never have said to the people that it is necessary to “pull the belt tighter,” that war is unavoidable. Zhou Enlai, in his turn, said that “China has no intentions to attack the Soviet Union.” He stressed that from the Chinese side measures will be undertaken not to allow armed confrontations with the USSR.

The conversation took place overall in a constructive, calm atmosphere, despite the sharp posing of a range of issues.

We evaluate the meeting which has taken place with representatives of the Chinese leadership as useful. The CC CPSU and the Soviet government made a decision



sue a principled and consistent course vis-a-vis China. We understand that the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide and we support the policy of our government to resolve disputed issues at the negotiating table.

We view the meeting between comrade Kosygin and Zhou Enlai as just such an effort by our government to resolve these issues by peaceful means. We support those principles which were proposed as fundamental groundwork for negotiations. We are convinced that the resolution of the disputed issues will depend on the position of the Chinese side.

We are all the more vigilant since after the meeting the anti-Soviet propaganda, the anti-Soviet hysteria in Beijing has hardly decreased. We fully support the principled position of our party, directed against the anti-Leninist position of the Mao Zedong clique.

We will direct all efforts, to mobilize the work of the enterprises to fulfill the socialist obligations in honor of the 100th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comrade Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute.

Comr. SVERDLOV

the leaders of China broke off relations between the Soviet Union and China. The results of this turned out to be deplorable. It began with [China's] isolation from absolutely the majority of the communist parties. The people of China, who were only just liberated from feudalism, again found themselves in a difficult economic situation.

We approve the policy of the CC of our party to decide all disputed issues by peaceful means, not by armed provocations. We fully understand that today a very difficult situation has been developing on the Far Eastern borders given the unleashing of anti-Soviet propaganda and anti-Soviet hysteria. And we support the policy of our party to begin negotiations with China, to resolve all questions through peaceful means, particularly with a country which considers itself to be socialist.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Bokan', the head of the political department of the Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern border district.

Comr. BOKAN'

Comrades, the soldiers of the Krasnoznamennyi border district reacted to the report of the meeting between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai concerning the stabilization of relations on the Soviet-Chinese border with a feeling of deep understanding, satisfaction, and approval.

In the report it is apparent that the improvement of relations along the Soviet-Chinese border was the central question at this meeting. The border events attracted the attention not just of Soviet people but of people all over the world. Incursions by Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory became a daily occurrence.

In this year alone in the area guarded by the forces of our district there were about 300 incidents of incursions by Chinese citizens onto our territory. Ideological diver-

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designed to ease the situation on the border and to consider this meeting to have been very useful.

II. The regional party aktiv completely and fully approves the policy of the party and government, aimed at normalizing relations between the Soviet Union and China.

What other proposals are there? There are proposals to accept such a resolution. No one is opposed? No.

After this the meeting of the aktiv was considered closed.

9/23/69

Stenographer Taran

[Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray, f. p-35, op. 96, d. 234, ll. 1-12; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

\* \* \* \* \*

**Document II: Information Report Sent  
by Khabarovskiy Kray (Territory)  
Committee to CPSU CC, 22 September  
1969**

*Proletariat of all countries, unite!*

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE  
SOVIET UNION

**KHABAROVSKIY KRAY  
COMMITTEE**

---

City of Khabarovsk

(Sent 9/22/69)  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE CPSU  
DEPARTMENT OF  
ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK

INFORMATION

regarding the familiarization of the electoral aktiv of the Khabarovskiy Kray party organization with the Information from the CC CPSU about the trip by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to

Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin's discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969

On 22 September 1969 a regional meeting of the party electoral aktiv was held to acquaint them with the Information from the CC CPSU regarding the trip by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin's discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969.

The First Secretary of the regional party committee read the Information from the CC CPSU.

7 people spoke at the meeting. The participants noted with great satisfaction that our party, its Central Committee, persistently and consistently, in the spirit of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' parties [in June

report of the meeting between the president of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, comrade A.N. Kosygin, with the premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, with feelings of deep understanding and satisfaction and consider that this discussion was useful for both sides. One of the central questions at this meeting was the question of the mitigation of the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border.

Relations along the border exemplify the relations between the states. The Maoists' provocative violations of the Soviet-Chinese border and their intervention in Soviet territory attest to the adventurist policy of the Chinese leadership, their aim to decide disputed questions through force.

The border forces in the district have at their disposal all that is necessary to fulfill their sacred duty before the Fatherland in an exemplary way. In these days of preparation for the 100th anniversary of the V.I. Lenin's birth, we will demonstrate our level of decisiveness by increasing the military preparedness of the troops in order to honorably merit the great tasks of the party, government, and people, answer the demands of the military forces in the Army and Navy, and guarantee the inviolability of the frontiers.

than a year ago. This is the main reason why, despite all the constructive efforts made by our delegation, the negotiations on border issues in essence haven't made any progress.

To move things forward, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government came out with an important initiative, and sent a letter from the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, comrade A.N. Kosygin, to the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, in July 1970. Proceeding from the principled line of Soviet foreign policy, we proposed in this letter to begin negotiations in Moscow, at the same time as the negotiations in Beijing, between special governmental delegations on a draft agreement between the USSR and the PRC on mutual non-use of force, including nuclear weapons, [and] the cessation of war propaganda and of preparations for war against the other side.

At the same time, to eliminate many controversial issues from the negotiations, a proposal was made to formulate an inter-governmental agreement on the demarcation of the eastern section of the Soviet-Chinese border (4300 km), consisting of more than half of its length, where most of the border incidents took place (from the point where the borders of the USSR, PRC, MPR [Mongolia] meet in the east and further to the south along the Amur and Ussuri rivers).

The letter expressed the view that, in the interests of the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, it would be expedient to hold another meeting of the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, this time on the territory of the Soviet Union, and also restated a range of other constructive proposals. Meanwhile Beijing continues to speculate in the international arena and in domestic propaganda on the alleged existence of a "threat of force" from the USSR and to disseminate other anti-Soviet insinuations.

To deprive the Chinese government of a basis for such inventions and facilitate the shift to a constructive discussion of issues, the subject of the negotiations, on January 15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet another step - it made a proposal to the leadership of the PRC to conclude an agreement between the USSR and the PRC on the non-use of force in any form whatsoever, including missiles and nuclear weapons,

and forwarded a draft of such an agreement to Beijing through the ambassador of the USSR.

In sending this draft agreement for consideration by the government of the PRC, the Soviet side expressed its belief that the fulfillment of our proposal - the most rapid conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of force [—] would create a more favorable atmosphere for the normalization of relations between our two states and, in particular, would facilitate the restoration of neighborly relations and friendship between the USSR and the PRC.

A positive answer from the Chinese side to the Soviet initiative could lead to a decisive shift forward in the negotiations. However there is still no answer whatsoever from the Chinese side. There is a growing impression that Beijing, as before, is interested in maintaining the "border territorial issue" in relations with the Soviet Union and, in bad faith, at times in a provocative way, is aiming to use this for its anti-Soviet and chauvinistic goals.

Why have the Soviet steps towards the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations encountered such significant difficulties? The main reason, as was mentioned previously in our party documents, is that anti-Sovietism was and continues to be the main ingredient in the anti-Marxist, nationalistic line of the present Chinese leadership. This is confirmed, in particular, by the materials of the

pects in the area of trade, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation. The Chinese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the effective political, economic, and other forms of cooperation among socialist states, as well as by their interaction, which facilitates the strengthening of the international positions of socialism, and their [socialist states'] ability to move forward with the resolution of major issues in world politics. The Beijing leadership aims to use any opportunity to break the unity and cohesion of the socialist states, to weaken their existing social structure. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases its provocative statements on the Czechoslovak question.<sup>5</sup> Beijing has acted similarly with respect to the recent events in Poland.<sup>6</sup>

The communist and workers parties of the fellow socialist countries, which firmly stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, understand and respond appropriately to this tactical step of Beijing's, which is directed at splitting the socialist community and isolating the Soviet Union.

The Moscow conference of communist and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to split them. Convinced by the futility of their efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in individual countries into influential political parties, and to cobble them together into an international anti-Leninist movement, the Chinese leadership once again is counting on its ability to either attract individual communist parties to its side, or at least to achieve their refusal to publicly criticize the ideology and policy of the CPC leadership. To this end, Beijing's propaganda and CPC officials are concentrating their main efforts on slandering and falsifying in the eyes of foreign communists the foreign and domestic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the USSR, and in the socialist community. At the same time Chinese representatives are aiming to exacerbate disputes in the communist movement. They use any means to heat up nationalistic, separatist, and anti-Soviet dispositions in the ranks of the communist and national-liberation movement.

Beijing is trying to take the non-aligned movement and the developing countries under its own influence. For this purpose, and in order to alienate the states of the "third world" from their dependable support in the struggle with imperialism - the Soviet Union

and other fellow socialist countries, the Chinese leadership is tactically using the PRC's opposition to both "superpowers" (USSR and USA), which allegedly "came to terms" to "divide the world amongst them."

All this attests to the fact that the leaders of China have not changed their previous chauvinistic course in the international arena.

Domestically, the Chinese leadership, having suppressed the enemies of their policies during the so-called "Cultural Revolution", is now trying to overcome the disorder in economic and political life, brought about by the actions of the very same ruling groups over the course of recent years. The well-known stabilization of socio-political and economic life is occurring through all-encompassing militarization, leading to an atmosphere of "a besieged fortress." The army is continuing to occupy key positions in the country and serves as the main instrument of power. As before a cult of Mao is expanding, the regime of personal power is being strengthened in the constitution of the PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed in the country. This, of course, cannot but have a pernicious influence on the social life of the entire Chinese people.

In an oral statement made directly to Soviet officials about the desirability and possibility in the near future of the normalization of intergovernmental relations, the Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideological, and to a certain degree, the political struggle between the USSR and China, will continue for a lengthy period of time.

As long as the Chinese leadership sticks to ideological and political positions which are hostile to us, the stabilization and normalization of intergovernmental relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC would have to be achieved under conditions of sharp ideological and political struggle.

In informing the party aktiv about the current status of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Central Committee of the CPSU considers it important to emphasize that the practical measures, which, within the parameters of our long-term orientation, would lead to normalized relations with the PRC and the restoration of friendly relations with the Chinese people, are being supplemented by appropriate measures in case of possible provocations by the Chinese side, as well as by the necessary consistent ideological-political struggle against the anti-Leninist, anti-socialist views of the Chinese leadership.

The Central Committee of the CPSU attributes great importance to this work, since positive shifts in Chinese politics can be facilitated in the near future only by struggling relentlessly against the theory and practice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism figures prominently, by further strengthening the cohesion and unity of communist ranks, and by combining the efforts of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE  
COMMUNIST  
PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li. 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.*]

1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed.

2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., communist, forces within society, and the Maoist leadership.

3. A.I. Elizavetin, "Peregovory A.N. Kosygina i Zhou Enlai v pekinskoy aeroportu," with commentary by S. Goncharov and V. Usov, *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* 5 (1992), 39-63, and 1 (1993), 107-119.

4. Transcript of 31 May 1983, *TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 43, D. 53, L.1. 1-14*, translated in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 77-81.



## SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, 1980: TWO RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS

by Elizabeth Wishnick

The two Central Committee documents from 1980 printed below illustrate Soviet foreign policy concerns at a time when the Soviet Union was particularly isolated in the international arena as a result of its December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. In these documents, Soviet policymakers express their fears that their principal adversaries, the United States and China, were drawing closer together due to their shared hostility toward the USSR. The documents contend that the Sino-American rapprochement had two particularly unfortunate consequences: the development of Sino-American military cooperation and increased efforts by China to undermine the socialist community.

The October 1980 document about Sino-American military cooperation was written for two audiences. On the one hand, Soviet representatives were given the task of convincing Western public opinion that military cooperation with China could backfire and engulf their countries in conflict. On the other hand, the document showed Soviet concern that some non-aligned and socialist states were choosing to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policies and warned of the perils of a neutral attitude towards them. Since China had invaded Vietnam soon after the Sino-American normalization of relations in February 1979, Soviet policymakers feared that the improved U.S.-China relationship had emboldened the Chinese leaders to act on their hostility toward pro-Soviet socialist states and that U.S. military assistance would provide the Chinese with the means to act on their ambitions.

Which states were neutral on the China question and why? The March 1980 document clarifies this in an analysis of China's policy of distinguishing among the socialist states based on their degree of autonomy from the USSR, a policy referred to here and in other Soviet analyses as China's "differentiated" approach to the socialist community. The document, a series of instructions about the China question to Soviet ambassadors to socialist states, notes China's hostility to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia and contrasts this with its development of

extensive relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea. China's efforts to foster economic and even political ties with the "fraternal countries"—Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—are portrayed here as being of utmost concern to the Central Committee. The document shows Soviet displeasure at China's interest in improving relations with these states at a time when it refused to continue negotiations with the USSR.<sup>1</sup>

In the Soviet view, relations between the socialist community and China had to be coordinated with Soviet policy, and the "fraternal countries" were expected to wait for and then follow the Soviet Union's lead. To this end, representatives from the International Departments of these countries had been meeting regularly with the CPSU International Department for over a decade.<sup>2</sup> Despite all these efforts to coordinate China policy, the March 1980 document evokes Soviet fears that China had been making inroads into the socialist community and was achieving a certain measure of success in using economic cooperation to tempt individual states to stray from the fold. As a result, the document outlines a series of steps for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would foster skepticism about China's intentions and thwart efforts by Chinese representatives to make wide-ranging contacts in these states.

1. China claimed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made it inappropriate to go ahead with the regularly scheduled political talks in 1980.

2. Several documents from these meetings attest to this aim. See, e.g., TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 19, d. 525, ll. 29, 107-110, 21 January 1969; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 19, d. 605, ll. 3, 40-42, 12 February 1971; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 22, d. 1077, ll. 21, 9 April 1973; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 22, d. 242, ll. 4, 13 April 1975; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 24, d.878; ll. 4, 20 April 1979; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 24, d. 1268, ll. 5, 19 May 1980.

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### Document I: CPSU CC Directive to Soviet Ambassadors in Communist Countries, 4 March 1980

*Proletariat of all countries, unite!*

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET  
UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. St-200/4s  
from March 4, 1980

Excerpt from the protocol No. 200  
4s CC Secretariat

Regarding the instructions to USSR  
ambassadors to socialist countries about  
the China question

Approve the text of the instructions to  
USSR ambassadors to socialist countries  
(proposed).

CC SECRETARY

\* \* \* \* \*

Secret

Enclosure  
k.p.4s.pr.No 200

BERLIN, WARSAW, BUDAPEST,  
PRAGUE, SOFIA, ULAN-BATOR,  
HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE

SOVIET AMBASSADORS

Copy: BEIJING, PYONGYANG,  
PHNOM PENH, BUCHAREST,  
BELGRADE

SOVIET AMBASSADORS (for their  
information)

Recently Beijing's policy towards socialist countries has become noticeably more active. Under conditions, when imperialist circles in the USA have undertaken to aggravate the international situation, the Chinese leadership, drawing ever closer to imperialism, is increasing its efforts to undermine the position of the socialist community. Beijing's goals, as before, are to break the unity and cohesion of the fraternal countries, inspire mutual distrust among them, incite them to opposition to the Soviet Union, destroy the unity of action of socialist states in the international arena including on the China question and finally, to subordinate them to its own influence.

Within the parameters of a policy involving a differentiated approach [to social-





will grow in international relations.


In accordance with the instructions you received previously and taking into account the specifics of your post country, continue your work to reveal the dangerous character of the developing rapprochement between

The experience of history attests to the fact that the extent of China's expansion will be proportional to the military might of the Chinese army. Even today China's neighbors, above all the countries of Southeast Asia which the Chinese leaders consider to be their traditional sphere of influence, experience an immediate threat. It would be easy to imagine how China will behave in relation to its neighbors once the USA and its neighbors assist China to acquire more modern weapons. Above all, China is trying to institute its control over Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Malacca and the straits of Singapore.

Under these conditions, attempts to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policy and to remain neutral will only encourage Beijing to undertake new adventures and to extend its expansion. Collective efforts by Asian states could, on the contrary, impede China's path to increased military might, which is directed above all against countries of this region.

(For New Delhi only. The connivance and outright support of the USA for military preparations in China can only contradict India's interests. Although the Chinese leadership is holding talks about normalizing relations with India, there is an entire array of military preparations in China which militate against India's interests.)

Son.So





however, the General Office of the Central Committee called, urging me to go to Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 August on a scheduled flight arranged by the Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed with Hu Qiaomu<sup>3</sup> in a villa in Beidaihe's central district. This seaside resort area was used only for the leading members of the Central Committee during summers. All of the villas in the resort area were built before the liberation<sup>4</sup> for high officials, noble lords, and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman Mao's large, one-story house was newly constructed.

At noon on 23 August, the third day after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People's Liberation Army's artillery forces in Fujian employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces and heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy], Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding offshore islands occupied by the Nationalist army.

In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I learned the reason [for the bombardment]. In mid-July, American troops invaded Lebanon and British troops invaded Jordan in order to put down the Iraqi people's armed rebellion. Thereafter, the Central Committee decided to conduct certain military operations in the Taiwan Straits to support the Arabs' anti-imperialist struggle as well as to crack down on the Nationalist army's frequent and reckless harassment along the Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] announced on 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu [Pescadores], Jinmen, and Mazu were all "to be on emergency alert." It showed that Jiang's army was going to make some moves soon. We therefore deployed our air force in Fujian Province at the end of July.<sup>5</sup> Our fighters had been fighting the Nationalist air force and had already taken over control of the air space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, our artillery reinforcement units arrived at the front one after another. And mass rallies and parades were organized all over the country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples and to protest against the American and British imperialists' invasions of the Middle East.

Chairman Mao talked first at the meeting of August 23. He said that the day's bombardment was perfectly scheduled. Three days earlier, the UN General Assem-

bly had passed a resolution requesting American and British troops to withdraw from both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American occupation of Taiwan became even more unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was that American armed forces should withdraw from Taiwan, and Jiang's army should withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bombardment would certainly shock the international community, not only the Americans, but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab world would be delighted, and African and Asian peoples would take our side.

Then Chairman Mao turned to me and said that [the reason for] rushing me to attend the meeting was to let me know about this sudden event. He directed me to instruct the New China News Agency (NCNA) to collect international responses to the bombardment. Important responses should be immediately reported to Beidaihe by telephone. Mao asked me not to publish our own reports and articles on the bombardment at present. We needed to wait and see for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao also asked me to instruct editorial departments of the NCNA, the *People's Daily*

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lounge hall of the swimming area at Beidaihe's beach. Mao chaired the meeting in his bathrobe right after swimming in the ocean. Among the participants were Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Dehuai.<sup>6</sup> Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei, Hu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meeting.<sup>7</sup>

Chairman Mao started the meeting by saying that while we had had a good time at this summer resort, the Americans had extremely hectic and nervous days. According to their responses during the past days, Mao said that Americans were worried not only by our possible landing at Jinmen and Mazu, but also our preparation to liberate Taiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen with 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. We did not say if we were or were not going to land. We were acting as circumstances dictated. We had to be doubly cautious, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was not a small matter because it had a bearing on much more important international issues. The problem was not the 95,000 Nationalist troops stationed there—this was easy to handle. The problem was how to assess the attitude of the American government. Washington had signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, however, did not clearly indicate whether the U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmen and Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the Americans wanted to carry these two burdens on their backs. The main purpose of our bombardment was not to reconnoiter Jiang's defenses on these islands, but to probe the attitude of the Americans in Washington, testing their determination. The Chinese people had never been afraid of provoking someone far superior in power and strength, and they certainly had the courage to challenge [the Americans] on such offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen, and Mazu, which had always been China's territories.

Mao said that we needed to grasp an opportunity. The bombardment of Jinmen was an opportunity we seized when American armed forces landed in Lebanon [on 15 July 1958]. Our action therefore not only allowed us to test the Americans, but also to support the Arab people. On the horns of a dilemma, the Americans seemed unable to cope with both the East and the West at the same time. For our propaganda, however, we should not directly connect the bom-

bardment of Jinmen [to the America's landing in Lebanon]. Our major propaganda target was America's aggressions all over the world, condemning its invasion of the Middle East and its occupation of our territory, Taiwan, Mao said. The *People's Daily* could begin our propaganda campaign by criticizing an anti-China memorandum recently published by the U.S. State Department, enumerating the crimes of America's invasion of China in the past and refuting the memorandum's calumny and slander against us. We could also organize articles and commentaries on the resolution passed by the UN General Assembly, requesting American and British troops to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan. Then we could request the withdrawal of American armed forces from their military bases in many countries across the world, including Taiwan. Our media should now conduct an outer-ring propaganda campaign. After we learned the responses and moves of America, of Jiang Jieshi, and of other countries, we could then issue announcements and publish commentaries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu. Mao said that at the present our media should build up strength and store up energy—draw the bow but not discharge the arrow.

Peng Dehuai suggested that the media should write some reports and articles about the heroic fighting of our commanders and soldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The participants at the meeting agreed that our reporters on the front could prepare articles, and we would decide later when they could publish their reports.

That evening I informed the editors of the *People's Daily* in Beijing, through a secured telephone line, of the Politburo's instructions on how to organize our propaganda campaign. But I did not say anything about the Politburo's decisions, intentions, and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu, which were a top military secret at that time.

For the next two days, the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting at Beidaihe focused its discussions upon how to double steel and iron production and upon issues of establishing the people's commune. Chairman Mao, however, still paid close attention to the responses from all directions to our bombardment of Jinmen, especially to America's response. Mao's secretary called me several times checking on follow-up information after the NCNA's *Cangao ziliao* [Restricted Reference Material]<sup>8</sup> printed

America's responses. During these days, I asked NCNA to report to me every morning by telephone about headline news from foreign news agencies. I reported the important news to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou.

The Central Committee's working conference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August. Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing to chair the Supreme State Conference. On 4 September, one day before the conference, Mao called for another Politburo Standing Committee meeting, which mainly discussed the international situation after the bombardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzed the American responses. Both [Dwight] Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles made public speeches. They ordered half of their warships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Meanwhile, the American government also suggested resuming Chinese-American ambassadorial talks at Warsaw.<sup>9</sup> Seemingly, the American leaders believed that we were going to attack Taiwan. They wanted to keep Taiwan. However, they seemed not to have made up their mind whether or not to defend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhower and Dulles slurred over this matter without giving a straight answer. The participants at the meeting agreed that the Americans feared a war with us. They might not dare to fight us over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accomplished our goal. We made the Americans very nervous and mobilized the people of the world to join our struggle.

At the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting, however, the participants decided that our next plan was not an immediate landing on Jinmen, but pulling the noose [around America's neck] tighter and

we would employ diplomatic means to coordinate our fighting on the Fujian front. We now had both an action arena and a talk arena. There was yet another useful means—the propaganda campaign. Then Chairman Mao turned to Hu Qiaomu and me and said that at present our media should give wide publicity to a condemnation of America for causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We should request America to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Our propaganda should emphasize that Taiwan and the offshore islands were Chinese territory, that our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu was aimed at punishing Jiang's army and was purely China's internal affair, and that no foreign country would be allowed to interfere with what happened there. Our propaganda organs, the *People's Daily*, NCNA, and radio stations should use a fiery rhetorical tone in their articles and commentaries. Their wording, however, must be measured, and should not go beyond a certain limit, Mao emphasized.

From 5 to 8 September, Chairman Mao chaired the Supreme State Conference. He made two speeches on the 5th and the 8th.<sup>11</sup> Besides domestic issues, his speeches focused on international issues similar to the eight issues which he had explained at the Beidaihe meeting. When Chairman Mao talked about pulling the noose, he said that our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu made the Americans very nervous. Dulles seemingly intended to put his neck into the noose of Jinmen-Mazu by defending all of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. It was good for us to get the Americans there. Whenever we wanted to kick them, we could do so. Thus we had the initiative, and the Americans did not. In the past, Jiang Jieshi made troubles for us mainly through the breach at Fujian. It was indeed troublesome to let Jiang's army occupy Jinmen and Mazu. How could an enemy be allowed to sleep beside my bed? We, however, did not intend to launch an immediate landing on Jinmen-Mazu. [Our bombardment] was merely aimed at testing and scaring the Americans, but we would land if circumstances allowed. Why should we not take over Jinmen-Mazu if there came an opportunity? The Americans in fact were afraid of having a war with us at the bottom of their hearts so that Eisenhower never talked publicly about an absolutely "mutual defense" of Jinmen-Mazu. The Americans seemingly intended to shy away [from

Jinmen-Mazu]. Although their policy of escape was acceptable, the Americans also needed to withdraw 110,000 of Jiang's troops from Jinmen and Mazu. If the Americans continued to stay and kept Jiang's troops there, the situation would not be affected as a whole but they would put the noose around their necks.

During Chairman Mao's speech on the 8th, he asked suddenly whether Wu Lengxi was attending the meeting. I answered. Chairman Mao told me that his speech needed to be included in that day's news, and asked me to prepare it immediately. I discussed this with Hu Qiaomu. Since both of us found it difficult to decide which part of Mao's speech should be published, we agreed eventually to write the part about the noose first. I drafted the news and then let Hu read it. When the conference adjourned, Chairman Mao and other members of the Politburo's Standing Committee gathered in the lobby of Qingzheng Hall for a break. I handed over the news draft to Mao for his checking and approval. While talking to the others, he went over the draft and made some changes. Mao told me that only publishing the noose issue was all right. It was not appropriate at that moment to publish all the issues discussed because it was merely an exchange of opinion among the top leaders. Moreover, Mao did not was-







“shelling.” Mao agreed with him by suggesting that we should announce an odd-numbered-day shelling, with no shelling on even-numbered days. For the odd-numbered-day shelling, our targets might be limited only to the harbors and airport, not the defense works and residential buildings on the island. From now on, our shelling would be limited in scope, and, moreover, the light shelling might not be on a regular basis. Militarily it sounded like a joke, since such policy was unknown in the history of Chinese or world warfare. However, we were engaged in a political battle, which was supposed to be fought this way. Chairman Mao said that we only had “hand grenades” right now, but no atomic bombs. “Hand grenades” could be successful for us to use in beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], but not a good idea to use in fighting against Americans, who had nuclear weapons. Later, when everybody had nuclear weapons, very likely nobody would use them.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meeting whether we should issue a formal statement announcing future shelling on odd days only but not on even days. Chairman Mao believed it necessary. He also required me to understand that the editorial mentioned early in the meeting should not be published until our formal statement was issued.

On 25 October, the “Second Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” drafted by Chairman Mao was issued in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analysis of Dulles’s speech published by the U.S. State Department on 23 October, the message pointed out that on the one hand Dulles finally saw a “Communist China” and was willing to make contact with it. On the other hand, however, this American bureaucrat still considered the so-called “Republic of China” in Taiwan as a “political unit which was factually existing.” The American plan was first to separate Taiwan from the mainland, and second to mandate Taiwan’s special status. The message read, “China’s affairs must be handled by the Chinese themselves. For any problem unable to be solved at once, we can give it further thought and discuss it later between us. . . . We are not advising you to break up with Americans right now. These sort of ideas are not practical. We simply hope that you should not yield to the pressure from Americans. If you

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the above points be accounted as working out splendid plans here to defeat the enemy in battles a thousand miles away, and having some certainty of success that we will be ever-victorious? We must persist in the principle of fighting no battle we are not sure of winning. If you agree [with the above points], telegraph this letter to Ye Fei and ask him to think about it very carefully. Let me know his opinion.

Have a peaceful morning!

Mao Zedong  
10 A.M., 27 July<sup>24</sup>

### 3. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, 18 August 1958, 1:00 a.m.<sup>25</sup>

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:348

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

[We are] preparing to shell Jinmen, dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and the Americans indirectly. Therefore, do not conduct military maneuvers in Guangdong and Shengzhen, so that the British would not be scared.

Mao Zedong  
1 A.M., 18 August

P.S.: Please call air force headquarters attention to the possibility that the Taiwan side might counterattack us by dispatching large groups of air force (such as dozens, or even over one hundred, airplanes) to try to take back air control over Jin[men] and Ma[zu]. If this happens, we should prepare to use large groups of air force to defeat them immediately. However, *in chasing them*, [our planes] *should not cross the space line over Jinmen and Mazu*.<sup>26</sup>

### 4. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng, 3 September 1958<sup>27</sup>

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:376

Part I

Comrade [Huang] Kecheng:

Both the instruction and the appendix<sup>28</sup> are well written. Please send them to Comrade Peng Dehuai immediately for his reading. Then, they should be approved by the Central Military Commission's meeting and issued thereafter. Please give a detailed explanation of the reasons [for these docu-





initiated the Great Leap Forward, throwing away dependence and breaking down blind faith. The result is good.

The seventh is the non-recognition issue. Is [imperialist countries'] recognition [of the PRC] or non-recognition relatively



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Mao Zedong  
5:00 A.M., 2 November in Zhengzhou

**17. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 2 November 1958**

Part One<sup>59</sup>

Attention, Military and Civilian Compatriots on the Jinmen Islands:

Tomorrow, 3 November, is an odd-numbered day. You must make sure not to come outside. Do be careful!

Part Two

*Deliver* to Premier Zhou.

The Xiamen Front must broadcast [the message] this afternoon (2 November) for three times.

**18. Comments, Mao Zedong, on “Huan Xiang on the Division within the Western World,”<sup>60</sup> 25 November 1958**

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:581-582

Part I

Huan Xiang’s viewpoint is right. The situation in the Western world is indeed disintegrating. Even though currently it is





return it to me right after you have read and approved it. Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Huang [Kecheng] for their reading and checking. Everything is ready on the Xiamen front. Our order [for the shelling] has already been issued [to the front] separately by telephone and in writing which was signed by [Huang] Kecheng. The order limits shelling to fortifications, defense works, and beachhead boats on the Jinmen islands. No shelling of civilian villages, garrison camps, and command headquarters is allowed, particularly no shelling of any American ships. Our air and naval forces will make no movement at this time. The Defense Ministry's order will be broadcast at 3:00 [p.m.] in Chinese and foreign languages at the same time. As soon as the reading of the order is finished, [our batteries] will open fire." (Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:466-467.)

58. The italics are Mao's.

59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast.

60. Huan Xiang was Chinese chargé d'affaires in Britain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to the Chinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled the report "Huan Xiang on the Division within the West-

has seen—both our friends and, especially, our enemies—that we are firm and united in our understanding of the tasks, which flow from Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defend the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all brother Communist parties is unshakeable, that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff to the aggressor in the event of an attack on any Socialist state. This is necessary so that no hopes will arise in our enemies that they will be able to separate us, so that no cracks will be created which the enemy could be able to use to break the connection between the Socialist countries.

...It is necessary that neither our friends nor our enemies have any doubts that an attack on the Chinese People's Republic is a war with the entire Socialist camp. For ourselves we can say that an attack on China is an attack on the Soviet Union. We are also convinced that in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union the Chinese People's Republic would fulfill its brotherly revolutionary duty. If we in this way will build our policy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism, depending on the unity of our goals, on the might of our states, on our joint efforts, the uniting of which is favored by the geographical disposition of our countries, then this will be an invincible shield against our enemies....

*[Source: Information and Documentation Administration, First Far Eastern Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949-1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. The letter appears in a formerly classified Soviet Foreign Ministry documentary collection on the history of Sino-Soviet relations, originally prepared, for internal use only, by an editorial collegium consisting of Kapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A.V.; Rogachev, I.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P. (Deputy Chairman). During his research in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher at the National Security Archive, took notes from the collection, and provided them to CWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]*

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 129-142; Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1959* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and documents translated, annotated, and introduced by Xiao-bing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson printed in

this issue of the Cold War International History Project

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1. See Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*

**MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES'S  
"PEACEFUL EVOLUTION"  
STRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM**

mous problems for socialist countries, they have great difficulty in realizing their goal of overthrowing socialist states. Therefore, imperialist countries are inclined to adopt a “soft” method in addition to employing “hard” policies. In January 1953, U.S. Secretary of States Dulles emphasized the strategy of “peaceful evolution.” He pointed out that “the enslaved people” of socialist countries should be “liberated,” and become “free people,” and that “liberation can be achieved through means other than war,” and “the means ought to be and can be peaceful.” He displayed satisfaction with the “liberalization-demanding forces” which had emerged in some socialist countries and placed his hope on the third and fourth generations within socialist countries, contending that if the leader of a socialist regime “continues wanting to have children and these children will produce their children, then the leader’s offsprings will obtain freedom.” He also claimed that “Chinese communism is in fatal danger,” and “represents a fading phenomena,” and that the obligation of the United States and its allies was “to make every effort to facilitate the disappearance of that

with the commentaries, to the members attending the meeting.

The three speeches by Dulles all contained the theme of promoting a “peaceful evolution” inside socialist countries. The three commentaries based on Chairman Mao’s talks highlighted the key points in Dulles’s remarks and warned of the danger of the American “peaceful evolution” strategy. The first commentary pointed out:

try in fact. The proletarian dictatorship will become not only a bourgeois dictatorship but also a reactionary and fascist dictatorship. This is an issue that deserves full attention. I hope our comrades will consider it carefully.” (*Selected Readings of Chairman Mao's Works*, Vol. II, pp. 822-823.) Here Chairman Mao officially sounded an alarm bell for the whole party. In his meeting with Kapo<sup>16</sup> and Balluku<sup>17</sup> of Albania on February 3, 1967, Mao contended: At the “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” in 1962, “I made a speech. I said that revisionism wanted to overthrow us. If we paid no attention and conducted no struggle, China would become a fascist dictatorship in either a few or a dozen years at the earliest or in several decades at the latest. This address was not published openly. It was circulated internally. We wanted to watch subsequent developments to see whether any words in the speech required revision. But at that time we already detected the problem.”

At the Beidaihe Meeting and the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee during August and September, 1962, Chairman Mao reemphasized class struggle in order to prevent the emergence of revisionism. On August 9, he clearly pointed out the necessity of educating cadres and training them in rotation. Otherwise, he feared that he had devoted his whole life to revolution, only to produce capitalism and revisionism. On September 24, he again urged the party to heighten vigilance to prevent the country from going “the opposite direction.” The communiqué of the Tenth Plenum published on September 27 reiterated the gist of Chairman Mao’s remarks and stressed that “whether at present or in the future, our Party must always heighten its vigilance and correctly carry out the struggle on two fronts: against both revisionism and dogmatism.”

From the end of 1962 to the spring of 1963, our Party published seven articles in succession, condemning such so-called “contemporary revisionists” as Togliatti of Italy,<sup>18</sup> Thorez of France,<sup>19</sup> and the American Communist Party. On June 14, 1963, the CCP Central Committee issued “A Proposal for a General Line of the International Communist Movement.” On July 14, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) published “An Open Letter to Party Units at All Levels and to All Members of the CPSU,” bringing the Sino-Soviet dispute to the open. From September

last to July 1964, our Party used the name of the editorial boards of the

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Vietnam, he asked the party to “guard against a Korea-style war created by American imperialists,” and warned of the danger of “Khrushchev and his associates dragging us into the trap of war.” Wang proposed that in order to adjust and restore the economy and win time to tide over difficulties, China should adopt a policy of peace and conciliation in foreign affairs, and that in the area of foreign aid China should not do what it cannot afford.<sup>17</sup> But Mao rejected Wang’s proposal, condemning Wang as promoting a “revisionist” foreign policy of “three appeasements and one reduction” (appeasement of imperialism, revisionism, and international reactionaries, and reduction of assistance to national liberation movements).<sup>18</sup>

The outcome of the debate had major implications for China’s policy toward Vietnam. If Wang’s moderate suggestions had been adopted, it would have meant a limited Chinese role in Indochina. But Mao had switched to a militant line, choosing confrontation with the United States. This turn to the left in foreign policy accorded with Mao’s reemphasis on class struggle and radical politics in Chinese domestic affairs in 1962. It also anticipated an active Chinese role in the unfolding crisis in Vietnam. With the rejection of Wang’s proposal, an opportunity to avert the later Sino-American hostility over Indochina was missed.

In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Chi Thanh came to Beijing to discuss with Chinese leaders the serious situation created by the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the possibility of an American attack against North Vietnam. Ho asked the Chinese to provide support for the guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. Beijing satisfied Ho’s demand by agreeing to give the DRV free of charge 90,000 rifles and guns that could equip 230 infantry battalions. These weapons would be used to support guerrilla warfare in the South.<sup>19</sup> In March 1963, Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), visited the DRV and discussed with his hosts how China might support Hanoi if the United States attacked North Vietnam.<sup>20</sup> Two months later, Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the PRC, traveled to Hanoi, where he told Ho Chi Minh: “We are standing by your side, and if war broke out, you can regard China as your rear.”<sup>21</sup> Clearly Beijing was making a major commitment to Hanoi in early 1963. Toward the end of the year, Chinese and

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building new airfields there, Beijing intended to deter further U.S. expansion of war in South Vietnam and bombardment against the DRV. Between August and September 1964, the PLA also sent an inspection team to the DRV to investigate the situation in case China later needed to dispatch support troops to Vietnam.<sup>31</sup>

The first months of 1965 witnessed a

troops to prepare for a North Vietnamese counter offensive or launch an offensive themselves to disrupt the enemy's deployment and win the strategic initiative.<sup>40</sup>

But despite Liu Shaoqi's April promise to Le Duan and Luo Ruiqing's agreement with Van Tien Dung, China in the end failed to provide pilots to Hanoi. According to the Vietnamese "White Paper" of 1979, the Chinese General Staff on 16 July 1965 notified its Vietnamese counterpart that "the time was not appropriate" to send Chinese pilots to Vietnam.<sup>41</sup> The PRC's limited air force capacity may have caused Beijing to

clear that “the problems mentioned above are directly related to the whole armed forces, to the whole people, and to the process of a national defense war.” It asked the State Council “to organize a special committee to study and adopt, in accordance with the possible conditions of the national economy, practical and effective measures to guard against an enemy surprise attack.”<sup>51</sup>

Yang Chengwu presented the report to Mao, who returned it to Luo Ruiqing and Yang on August 12 with the following comment: “It is an excellent report. It should be carefully studied and gradually implemented.” Mao urged the newly established State Council Special Committee in charge of the Third Front to begin its work immediately.<sup>52</sup> Mao’s approval of the report marked the beginning of the Third Front project to relocate China’s industrial resources to the interior. It is important to note the timing of Mao’s reaction to the report—right after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The U.S. expansion of the war to North Vietnam had confirmed Mao’s worst suspicions about American intentions.

Deputy Prime Minister Li Fuchun became Director, Deputy Prime Minister Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing became Vice Directors of the Special Committee. On August 19, they submitted to Mao a detailed proposal on how to implement the Third Front ideas.<sup>53</sup> In the meantime, the CCP Secretariat met to discuss the issue. Mao made two speeches at the meetings on August 17 and 20. He asserted that China should be on guard against an aggressive war launched by imperialism. At present, factories were concentrated around big cities and coastal regions, a situation deleterious to war preparation. Factories should be broken into two parts. One part should be relocated to interior areas as early as possible. Every province should establish its own strategic rear base. Departments of industry and transportation should move, so should schools, science academies, and Beijing University. The three railroad lines between Chengdu and Kunming, Sichuan and Yunnan, and Yunnan and Guizhou should be completed as quickly as possible. If there were a shortage of rails, the chairman insisted, rails on other lines could be dismantled. To implement Mao’s instructions, the meetings decided to concentrate China’s financial, material, and human resources on the construction of the Third Front.<sup>54</sup>

While emphasizing the “big Third Front” plan on the national level, Mao also ordered provinces to proceed with their “small Third Front” projects. The chairman wanted each province to develop its own light armament industry capable of producing rifles, machine guns, canons, and munitions.<sup>55</sup> The Third Five-Year Plan was revised to meet the strategic contingency of war preparation. In the modified plan, a total of three billion yuan was appropriated for small Third Front projects. This was a substantial figure, but less than 5 percent of the amount set aside for the big Third Front in this period.<sup>56</sup> In sum, the Third Front was a major strategic action designed to provide an alternative industrial base that would enable China to continue production in the event of an attack on its large urban centers.

In addition to his apprehension about a strike on China’s urban and coastal areas, Mao also feared that the enemy might deploy paratroop assault forces deep inside China. In a meeting with He Long, Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu on 28 April 1965, Mao called their attention to such a danger. He ordered them to prepare for the landing of enemy paratroopers in every interior region. The enemy might use paratroops, Mao contended, “to disrupt our rear areas, and to coordinate with a frontal assault. The number of paratroops may not be many. It may involve one or two divisions in each region, or it may involve a smaller unit. In all interior regions, we should build caves in mountains. If no mountain is around, hills should be created to construct defense works. We should be on guard against enemy paratroops deep inside our country and prevent the enemy from marching unstopped into China.”<sup>57</sup>

It appears that Mao’s attitudes toward the United States hardened between January and April 1965. In an interview with Edgar Snow on January 9, Mao had expressed confidence that Washington would not expand the war to North Vietnam because Secretary of State Dean Rusk had said so. He told Snow that there would be no war between China and the United States if Washington did not send troops to attack China.<sup>58</sup> Two days later, the CCP Central Military Commission issued a “Six-Point Directive on the Struggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft in the South China Sea,” in which it instructed the military not to attack American airplanes

that intruded into Chinese airspace in order to avoid a direct military clash with the United States.<sup>59</sup>

In April, however, Mao rescinded the “Six Point Directive.” Between April 8 and 9, U.S. aircraft flew into China’s airspace over Hainan Island. On April 9, Yang Chengwu reported the incidents to Mao, suggesting that the order not to attack invading U.S. airplanes be lifted and that the air force command take control of the naval air units stationed on Hainan Island. Approving both of Yang’s requests, Mao said that China “should resolutely strike American aircraft that overfly Hainan Island.”<sup>60</sup> It is quite possible that the further U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam in the intervening months caused Mao to abandon his earlier restrictions against engaging U.S. aircraft.

It is important to point out that the entire Chinese leadership, not just Mao, took the strategic threat from the United States very seriously during this period. Zhou Enlai told Spiro Koleka, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania, on 9 May 1965 in Beijing that China was mobilizing its population for war. Although it seemed that the United States had not made up its mind to expand the war to China, the Chinese premier continued, war had its own law of development, usually in a way contrary to the wishes of people. Therefore China had to be prepared.<sup>61</sup> Zhou’s remarks indicated that he was familiar with a common pattern in warfare: accidents and miscalculations rather than deliberate planning often lead to war between reluctant opponents.

In an address to a Central Military Commission war planning meeting on 19 May 1965, Liu Shaoqi stated:

If our preparations are faster and better, war can be delayed.... If we make excellent preparations, the enemy may even dare not to invade.... We must build the big Third Front and the small Third Front and do a good job on every front, including the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long-distance missiles. Under such circumstances, even if the United States has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big targets out on the sea and it is easy for us to strike them. We should develop as early as possible new tech-

nology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. The enemy's strength is in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should be prepared for the enemy to come from all directions, including a joint invasion against China by many countries. On the other, we should realize that the enemy lacks justification in sending troops.... This will decide the difference between a just and an unjust war.<sup>62</sup>

Zhu De remarked at the same meeting that "so long as we have made good preparations on every front, the enemy may not dare to come. We must defend our offshore islands. With these islands in our hands, the enemy will find it difficult to land. If the enemy should launch an attack, we will lure them inside China and then wipe them out completely."<sup>63</sup>

Scholars have argued over Beijing's reaction to the threat posed by U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Much of this argument focuses on the hypothesis of a "strategic debate" in 1965 between Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao. Various interpretations of this "debate" exist, but most contend that Luo was more sensitive to American actions in Indochina than either Lin or Mao, and that Luo demanded

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perience was relevant to the struggle of liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By firmly backing the Vietnamese struggle against the United States, he wanted to demonstrate to Third World countries and movements that China was their true friend. Victory for North Vietnam's war of national unification with China's support would show the political correctness of Mao's more militant strategy for coping with U.S. imperialism and the incorrectness of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence.

A number of Chinese anti-imperialist initiatives, however, ended in a debacle in 1965. First Ben Bella was overthrown in Algeria in June, leading the Afro-Asian movement to lean in a more pro-Soviet direction due to the influence of Nehru in India and Tito in Yugoslavia. The fall of

nam. But as R.B. Smith has observed, the Chinese “may have oversimplified a Soviet strategy which was... more subtle.... Moscow’s diplomatic initiative of mid-February may in fact have been timed to coincide with—rather than to constrain—the





fundamentally from those of Hanoi. Whereas the Chinese now regarded the United States as a potential counterbalance against the

mittee on this question. Has it started its work?

Mao Zedong  
August 12.

[Source: *Ibid.*, 33.]

**Document 3: “Report on How Our Country’s Economic Construction Should Prepare Itself Against an Enemy Surprise Attack” by Li Fuchun<sup>100</sup>, Bo Yibo<sup>101</sup>, and Luo Ruiqing<sup>102</sup>, 19 August 1964.**

Chairman<sup>103</sup> and the Central Committee:

In accordance with Chairman’s comments on the General Staff War Department’s report of how our country’s economic construction should prepare itself for a surprise attack by the enemy, we have gathered comrades with responsibility in these areas for a meeting. All of us agree that Chairman’s comments and the War Department’s report are extremely important. We must pay serious attention to and do our best on such an important issue concerning our country’s strategic defense. The meeting has decided:

(1) To establish a special committee on this case within the State Council. We suggest that the committee consist of thirteen people including Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Bo Yibo, Luo Ruiqing, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, Zhang Jichun, Zhao Erlu, Cheng Zihua, Gu Mu, Han Guang, and Zhou Rongxin. Li Fuchun serves as Director, and Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing Deputy Directors.

(2) In addition to the four areas mentioned by the War Department, our preparation measures also need to include universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutions, warehouses, government departments and institutions as well as civil shelters in cities and mines. We must follow Chairman’s principle of “careful study and gradual implementation” in conducting our investigation into various areas as early as possible and pay attention to the following issues.

(a) All new construction projects will not be placed in the First Front, especially not in the fifteen big cities with over a

million population.

(b) For those currently on-going construction projects in the First Front and particularly in the fifteen big cities, except those that can be completed and put into effective operation next year or the year after, all the rest must be reduced in size, undergo no expansion, and be concluded as soon as possible.

(c) For existing old enterprises, especially those in cities with high industrial concentration, we must remove them or some of their workshops. Particularly for military and machinery enterprises, we must break them in two parts if possible, and shift one part to the Third and Second Fronts. If we can remove them as a whole, we must do that with careful planning and in steps.

(d) Beginning in next year, no new large and medium-size reservoirs will be built.

(e) For key national universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes in the First Front, if they can be removed, we must relocate them to the Third and Second Fronts with careful planning. If they can not be removed, we must break them into two parts.

(f) From now on, all new projects, in whatever Front they will be located, must comply with the principle of dispersion, closeness to mountains, and concealment. They must not be concentrated in certain cities or areas.

We have divided labor to deal with the above work:

(a) The State Economic Commission and the State Planning Commission will be responsible for the arrangement of the industrial and transportation systems.

(b) The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for preparation measures concerning railroad junctions.

(c) The Office of National Defense Industry will be responsible for the arrangement of national defense industry.

(d) The General Staff will be responsible for the division of the First, Second, and Third Fronts on the national level and for the arrangement of national defense fortifications and war preparation mobilizations.

(e) Comrade Tan Zhenlin will be responsible for preparation measures concerning reservoirs.

(f) Comrades Zhang Jichun and Han Guang will be responsible for the arrangement of universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes.

(g) Comrade Zhou Rongxin will be responsible for the protection of city buildings and government departments and institutions.

We will spend the months of September and October investigating the various aspects and produce detailed plans that can be implemented gradually. The special committee will synthesize the plans before submitting them to the Central Committee for inclusion in the general plan for the next year and in the Third Five-Year Plan.

(3) We propose to revive the People’s Anti-Air Committee. Premier<sup>104</sup> should still serve as Director and Comrade Xie Fuzhi as Secretary General (Comrade Luo Ruiqing was Secretary General originally). The Ministry of Public Safety will be responsible for the daily work of the committee.

We should restore the Planning Office for the Construction of Underground Railway in Beijing and carry out an active preparation for the building of underground railway in Beijing. In the meantime, we should consider the construction of underground railway in Shanghai and Shenyang. The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for this task.

(4) If the central leadership approves the above suggestions, we propose to distribute our report along with the General Staff War Department report as well as Chairman’s comments as guidelines to all Party Bureaus, to all provincial, municipal, and district Party committees, and to all Party committees within government ministries.

Please inform us whether our report is correct.

Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Luo  
Ruiqing  
August 19, 1964.

[Source: *Ibid.*, 33-34.]

**Document 4: Zhou Enlai’s Conversation with Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 2 April 1965.**

(1) China will not take the initiative to pro-  
We4.]

both prudent and prepared.... (4) If the American madmen carry out an extensive bombing, China will not sit still and wait to be killed. If they come from the sky, we will take action on the ground. Bombing means war, and war will have no boundaries. It is impossible for the United States to resolve the issue of war simply by relying on a policy of bombing.

[Source: The Diplomatic History Research Office of the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry, comp., *Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975* (Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Major Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993), 445.]

**Document 5: Liu Shaoqi's Speech to the Central Military Commission war planning meeting on 19 May 1965.**

The enemy has many contradictions, weaknesses, and difficulties. Its problems are no less than ours. If our preparations are faster and better, war can be delayed. The enemy will find it difficult to invade. If we make excellent preparations, the enemy may even dare not to invade. If it does not invade, we will not fight out. Such a prospect is not impossible. But we must work hard to achieve this goal. We must build the big Third Front and the small Third Front and do a good job on every front, including the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long-distance missiles. Under such circumstances, even if the United States has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big targets out on the sea and are easy for us to strike. We should develop as early as possible new technology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. Our Red Flag 1 and Red Flag 2<sup>105</sup> can shoot down the enemy's high-altitude airplanes. If we have assurance to shoot down high-altitude airplanes, we can have more assurance to knock down low-altitude ones. The enemy's strength lies in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should be prepared for the enemy to come from all directions, including a joint invasion against China by many countries. On

the other hand we should realize that the enemy lacks reasons and justifications in sending troops. If the enemy invades us without our attacking it first, the enemy's morale cannot be high. This will decide the difference between a just and an unjust war.

In addition, there is the issue of increasing the size of troops. In order to build fortifications, we can organize some engineer units. After working for a period and completing fortifications, they can be dismissed. Troops engaged in agricultural production and divisions on semi war alert should also construct fortifications. Production troops are busy with agricultural work, but during slack seasons they should spend most of their time building fortifications. This means that they can work on fortifications for half a year in North China and for four to five months in the Yangtze valley. If war begins and we have to expand troops, we just need a mobilization. This matter will be easy. At the moment, we need to do a good job in organizing militia forces.

What we cannot have time to prepare when war begins includes fortification construction, third fronts, bases as well as communications, a reconnaissance network, and new technology. We must pay attention to these issues. We should start work on the big Third Front, the small Third Front, material storage, state-of-the-art technology, scientific investigation, and research on new weapons. If we delay work on these matters, we will find ourselves unprepared later. To do these things needs time.

As to the issues of the size of troops, the number of military regions, and a unified leadership between the local civilian government and the military, we can have time to deal with them when war begins. Some of the issues will be dealt with only after the enemy has invaded our country. In case that the enemy occupies the Longhai Railroad,<sup>106</sup> or the Yangtze valley, or the Jinghan Railroad<sup>107</sup>, or the Jinpu Railroad<sup>108</sup>, our country will then be divided into sections. If that happens, we have to practice a unified leadership of the party, the government and the army. But this will be decided at that time, not now. With trains and airplanes at its disposal, the enemy will not do things according to our methods. Only when that time comes will our leadership go to mountains. At present, the leadership must live in the city because it will be inconvenient if it does not live in the city. Only when a large

number of enemy troops invades China and cuts us into parts will the leadership go to the mountains. It will not do that when China is not cut into parts. For instance, if the enemy does not occupy cities like Xian and Tongguan, Shaanxi<sup>109</sup> will not create a Shaanan Military region and a Shaanbei military region. The leadership will decide on this matter after the enemy has invaded, and there is time to do that. There is also time to mobilize troops. At present, we can begin the organization of the militia....(the rest of the speech is about how to organize the militia).

[Source

tions with China. But we stick to one point: the United States must withdraw from Taiwan, and after that all other problems can be easily resolved. The United States does not accept this point. China and the United States have been negotiating for ten years and we are still repeating the same old words. We will not give up that point. The United States once wanted to exchange press delegations with us. They argued that when we began with minor issues, we could better settle major problems later. We contended that only by starting from major issues could minor problems be easily resolved.

You withdrew your armed forces from the South in accordance with the Geneva Accords. As a result, the enemy began to kill people in the South, and you revived armed struggle. At first you adopted political struggle as a priority supplemented by armed struggle. We supported you. In the second stage when you were carrying out political and armed struggles simultaneously, we again supported you. In the third stage when you are pursuing armed struggle as a priority supplemented by political struggle, we still support you. In my



sory Group in the Struggle to Aid Vietnam and Resist France] (Beijing: Liberation army Press, 1990), 126-127. On 16 October 1955, Mao personally selected Peng Dehuai, Chen Geng, and Wei Guoqing as members of the Chinese delegation for the forthcoming discussions during Giap's second visit. See Mao to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, 16 October 1955, in the CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1991), 5:419. Deputy Defense Minister Chen Geng, who had served as China's chief military advisor to the Vietminh in 1950, was not mentioned during Giap's first visit; evidently, Mao wanted to present a stronger Chinese team to talk with Giap during his second trip.

6. Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 65.

7. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group, ed. *Zhongguo junshi*

*guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi*, 112-114. URL: <http://www.1949china.com/zhongguojunshiguwentuan-yuanyue-kangfa-douzheng-shishi-112-114.html>







facilitated by Johnson's escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

From late 1964 on, Soviet policy with respect to Vietnam pursued several goals. First and foremost, the USSR emphasized moral and political support to what it described as the Vietnamese people's war against American aggression. The Soviet mass media now promptly and frequently carried official statements by Soviet leaders denouncing U.S. aggressive actions in Southeast Asia, no longer delaying as it had with TASS's statement on the Tonkin Gulf incident. Steps were taken to expand contacts both with Hanoi and representatives of the South Vietnamese patriotic forces, and, accordingly, the CPSU CC now approved the opening in Moscow (at the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee), on 24 December 1964, of a permanent mission of the NFLSV.

Second, Soviet material assistance (eco-

other signs of distrust and suspiciousness toward Soviet Defense Ministry representatives. The Soviet leadership was informed about violations of storage rules for Soviet military hardware, wasteful use of missiles and ammunition, and neglect of Soviet experts' advice on the rules of exploitation of

There were naturally other “pros” and “cons” which Moscow must have taken into account in determining its policy toward the struggle: Military factors constituted one major positive incentive favoring a more active Soviet involvement, according to archival documents. There were two principal, interconnected perceived opportunities: Vietnam offered a live battlefield testing ground for Soviet military hardware, including the latest models, and also a chance to obtain a windfall of hard information about up-to-date U.S. weaponry, by inspecting the war booty captured or obtained by the DRV forces. The North Vietnamese air defense was fully equipped with modern Soviet hardware, whose effectiveness was shown by the fact that even the Vietnamese personnel managed to operate it successfully, despite a frequent lack of training or competence. Those systems were being constantly improved, taking into account the capabilities of U.S. warplanes.<sup>22</sup> Apart from the anti-aircraft defense system, the archival documents note, the North Vietnamese used the Soviet-made Grad artillery shelling systems, which were highly effective in attacks on U.S. bases, airfields, ammunition depots, etc.,<sup>23</sup> as well as MiG-21 jets.

The Soviet military also relished the opportunity to pore over the latest U.S. military hardware. In accordance with a Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement signed in the spring of 1965, the Vietnamese undertook to transfer to the USSR models of captured U.S. military hardware for inspection. All difficulties notwithstanding, according to the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, a total of 700 models were delivered to the USSR between May 1965 and January 1967. The embassy pointed out that the work done was very valuable: the CPSU CC adopted a decision to apply in Soviet industry of a number of selected and studied models.<sup>24</sup>

However, apart from obvious assets the USSR gained in the course of the Vietnam War, its expenditures were likewise enormous, primarily in the sphere of ever increasing material assistance to Vietnam. (See the figures cited above.) In 1966-1968 the Soviet Union undertook to render to the DRV economic assistance to the tune of 121.6 million rubles, but in fact the assistance was far greater in view of Hanoi's incessant requests for additional supplies. In 1968 Soviet assistance to the DRV totaled 524 million rubles, with 361 million rubles

transferred as a gift. Soviet assistance in 1969 was planned to remain on the same level (525 million rubles), but with the opening of peace talks and reduction of the scale of hostilities in Vietnam, part of the funds originally assigned for military deliveries was reallocated for other purposes, so Soviet assistance to Vietnam in 1969 totaled 370 million rubles and in 1970, 316 million rubles.<sup>25</sup>

One negative factor, from the Soviet leaders' viewpoint, in decision-making on aid to the DRV was what they saw as the Vietnamese allies' unmanageability and unpredictability. Hanoi's independent course in relations with the USSR hardly inspired Moscow to greater enthusiasm in its support for the war, and as time went on, those Vietnamese properties might have led to undesirable consequences—perhaps an open break. So from that standpoint, at least, Moscow had every reason to favor an early cease-fire and political solution.

In fact, the hope for a peaceful settlement was shared by both Soviet and American leaders, and their tactics on this issue, paradoxically enough, were surprisingly similar. However, the Soviet government backed a settlement on Hanoi's terms, whereas the U.S. sought to ensure the maximum consideration of the Saigon government's interests. Moreover, of course, as a direct participant in the conflict, the United States could not possibly play the part of an arbiter, which remained a privilege of the Soviet Union. For this reason, with U.S. armed forces directly involved in hostilities, the Johnson Administration was obliged to rely on intermediaries in its attempts to convince Hanoi to sit down at the negotiating table rather than pursue a purely military outcome. And in this respect Washington pinned much of its hopes on the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup>

U.S. leaders had every reason for such hopes, for they believed that since the USSR rendered massive and ever-growing military and economic assistance to Vietnam (of which Washington was well aware),<sup>27</sup> so the Soviet Union could exert leverage on the DRV leadership. Both Johnson and, after January 1969, his successor Richard Nixon, had every reason to believe that since the USSR rendered massive and ever-growing military and economic assistance to Vietnam (of which Washington was well aware),<sup>27</sup> so the Soviet Union could exert leverage on the DRV leadership. Both Johnson and, after January 1969, his successor Richard Nixon, had every reason to believe that since the USSR rendered massive and ever-growing military and economic assistance to Vietnam (of which Washington was well aware),<sup>27</sup> so the Soviet Union could exert leverage on the DRV leadership.

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Regrettably, we do not yet have access to all the documents, including the still-classified “special dossiers” (*osobayapapki*) at SCCD, as well as KGB, Foreign and Defense Ministry, and Presidential Archive materials, that are necessary to reconstruct fully from Soviet sources all of the many conversations and probes connected to various diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the Vietnam conflict in 1965-67, including, perhaps most importantly, the so-called MARI-GOLD and SUNFLOWER initiatives (to use the secret U.S. government code names), in both of which the Soviet Union played an important role.<sup>30</sup> An initial survey of the SCCD archives disclosed only cryptic traces of Soviet contacts with potential intermediaries,0>> BDC -0.002 Tc03.5 550 1 S u3 BDe,the still- failuch-U<</B 514.0001 /J 1 >> BDC 0.0c 0.198 Tw -16.7 -n botant role.

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thing....”<sup>37</sup> This viewpoint was shared by the entire WPV top leadership.

That is why the Soviet Embassy’s report for 1966 included very cautious forecasts about possible changes in the DRV stand. The embassy, in the belief that it was necessary to “exert and broaden, with the support of all peace-loving forces and the socialist countries, strong political and diplomatic efforts in order to bring the matter to the settlement of the conflict in the current year,” suggested that the USSR might eventually have to elaborate and present its own peace plan to the Vietnamese comrades. That supposition was made on the basis of what the embassy viewed as a certain coincidence of the CPSU and WPV “assessment of the situation and active promotion of politico-diplomatic struggle for Vietnam.”<sup>38</sup>

In that contest, the USSR sought to evade the issue of acting as a formal mediator at the U.S.-DRV talks (which was what the USA sought). The only role the Soviet Union was then prepared to play was that of a “postman,” who would carry both sides’ messages, and that of “a night watchman” by offering an opportunity for unofficial meetings between U.S. and North Vietnamese embassy officials in Moscow.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, Moscow spared no effort to convince its “Vietnamese friends” of the need to switch from military to political-diplomatic methods to attain a settlement.

The USSR undertook the mission of “a postman” and “a night watchman” very reluctantly, probably for fear of being turned into an official mediator. At least it did not wish to perform those functions on a permanent basis. So the United States had to use the services of other countries, in particular, Poland, Canada, India, etc. However, early in 1967 a new flurry of activity was observed in Moscow. In Jan.-Feb., DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh received Shcherbakov and familiarized him with the gist of President Johnson’s letter to Ho Chi Minh, handed over at a regular meeting in Moscow of representatives of the DRV and the US embassies. And Ho Chi Minh’s

amount of work with the French.” The main factor behind Hanoi’s choice of the French capital, Le Duan told Chivilev, was “the opportunity to maintain contacts with Moscow from it.”<sup>45</sup>

The same factor was taken into account by Moscow, which faced the task of keeping the sides at the negotiating table. With this aim in mind, the Kremlin exerted constant pressure on North Vietnam not to disrupt the process. On 13 June 1968, the CPSU CC and Soviet government sent a letter to the WPV CC and DRV government stressing that the Paris talks were vitally important for achieving a settlement of the Vietnam issue. The Soviet leaders also emphasized that they were living through an important period from the viewpoint of opportunities for diplomatic struggle, offering to put the

[Chinese People's Republic's] Economic Assistance to the Socialist Countries," 30 March 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 254, l. 172.)



Ilya V. Gaiduk, a research scholar at the Institute of Universal History (IUH), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, is the author of *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, forthcoming). A recipient of fellowships from CWIHP and the Norwegian Nobel Institute, he originally presented the findings in this article to the January 1993 Conference on New Soviet Evidence on Cold War History in Moscow, organized by CWIHP and IUH. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Oganez V. Marinin, then a staff archivist at SCCD (now at the State Archive of the Russian Federation [GARF]), in locating archival documents for this article.

## MICHALOWSKI

continued from page 241

### Operation Lumbago

In the early morning of 29 December 1965, Jerzy Michalowski was awakened by Polish military authorities, who informed him that U.S. Air Force One, with ambassador Averell Harriman on board, was requesting permission to land in Warsaw. Harriman's peace mission was part of a broad diplomatic offensive that coincided with the Christmas bombing halt of 1965. A 14-point peace

Michalowski was hopeful that the Vietnamese would eventually express a willingness to negotiate.

After returning to Warsaw, Michalowski joined his chief Adam Rapacki in efforts to persuade the Vietnamese that a positive signal of some kind was in their best interests. Working through U.S. Ambassador John Gronouski, they made it clear that a resumption of bombing raids in the North would eliminate any chance for peace. Norman Cousins, a personal friend of Lyndon Johnson, tried to play the role of intermediary in this process, but to no avail. To the dismay of the Polish diplomats, the United States resumed bombing raids on January 31, and Operation *Lumbago* came to an unsuccessful end.

### Operation Marigold<sup>1</sup>

This was another attempt to bring the United States and North Vietnam together in secrecy and with a minimum of preconditions. This time, Polish diplomats worked closely with their colleagues from Italy. Michalowski worked on the Warsaw end of the operation. Poland's representative to the International Control Commission, Janusz Lewandowski, Italy's ambassador to South Vietnam, Giovanni Orlandi, and U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge were the main protagonists in Saigon.

Phase I of *Marigold* developed from a discussion between Lewandowski and Premier Phan Van Dong in June of 1966 in Hanoi. Lewandowski learned that the North Vietnamese would be willing to begin peace negotiations, provided the U.S. suspended the bombing campaign. He relayed this information to Orlandi who, in turn, notified U.S. ambassador Lodge. The American side was anxious to know whether Hanoi would make any overt sign of accommodation (such as refraining from offensive military operations in the South, or reducing traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail) in return for a bombing halt. In spite of their best efforts, Polish diplomats could obtain no assurances from Hanoi, and the U.S. withdrew its inquiries.

Phase II was a lengthier and more complex operation that began when ambassador Lodge requested that Lewandowski present a 10-point peace plan to the North Vietnamese. This time, an unconditional bombing halt would precede the substantive negotiations. Rapacki and Michalowski under-

### RESEARCH IN MOSCOW

Scholars needing research performed in the Russian archives may contract with scholars at the Russian Center "Archival Conversation at the Historical Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow. For further information please direct inquiries to:

Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov  
Historical Archives Institute (HAI)  
Russian State University for the Humanities  
Moscow, Russian Federation  
Fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 964-3534  
Telephone: (7-095) 921-4169 or (7-095) 925-5019

Scholars may also address inquiries regarding possible collaboration for research in Russian archives to:

Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian  
Director  
Institute of Universal History  
Leninsky prospekt 32a  
117334 Moscow, Russian Federation  
Fax: (7-095) 938-2288  
Telephone: (7-095) 938-1009

stood the importance of this new development, and flew to Bulgaria to brief Leonid Brezhnev, who encouraged them to proceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duan went to Beijing at about the same time, where he received contradictory advice from Mao

## THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES

by **Kenton J. Clymer**

On a graceful boulevard radiating out from Wat Phnom in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly renovated National Library of Cambodia. Built by the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24 December 1924), the library also housed the country's archives. A separate archives building, located directly behind the National Library (and thus not visible from the street) was built in 1930. Unlike the library, it still awaits renovation. Designed with high ceilings, large windows, and electric ceiling fans, both buildings incorporated the best available technology for preserving books and manuscripts in tropical climates.

During the French colonial period and after, until the end of the Khmer Republic in

## SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS: THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE PROGRAM

*[Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of the Cambodian Genocide Program, based at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, Council of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Law School, Orvill H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale University.]*

### Executive Summary

The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling the documentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement "the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979." [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two year mandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit:

#### 1. Identifying Legal Options for Redress

Until now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime's crimes. The Royal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of the genocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the Cambodian Genocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference, chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned by the Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminal violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law in Cambodia. Cambodia's two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; both praised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others, including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council of Ministers and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers.

#### 2. Documenting the Cambodian Genocide

Until now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides in assembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodian genocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through the Internet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sites across Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whom comprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the Khmer Rouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminal acts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot's 1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the Khmer Rouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of rare documents from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for the first time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languages on the Pol Pot regime. Yale's CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of Yale's singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legal resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute this complex research undertaking.

#### 3. Recreating Lost Histories

Until now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge



compilation of all known primary and secondary material relating to the Khmer Rouge regime. The Program has already obtained access to several little-known caches of documents, including a DK Foreign Ministry archive, archives of the DK Trade Ministry, the only known surviving archive from a DK regional prison, original maps of Khmer Rouge killing fields, and several collections of rare photographs taken by the DK regime itself. Another collection made available to the CGP includes a set of internal minutes of key meetings of the DK "Party Center" held in 1975 and 1976. CGP currently has two missions at work in Vietnam, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, searching for relevant documentation in state and private archives.

These databases will bridge a huge gap in the case against the Khmer Rouge. Because these databases did not previously exist, policymakers could not precisely identify victims and perpetrators, nor could they establish empirical links between the two on a national scale. Yale's CGDB resolves this problem. When the databases are complete, an investigator using them could, for example, identify individual victims and perpetrators of a particular atrocity, perhaps with photographs and biographies of the individuals in question. Yale's CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of Yale's singular combination of Cambodia area and archival studies, genocide research, legal resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute this complex research undertaking.

*The Bibliographic Databases.* The bibliographic database will contain records on this new material and on all other known primary and secondary sources of information pertaining to the Khmer Rouge regime, including books, articles, monographs, documents, reports, interviews, tapes, films and videos, transcripts, and so forth. As noted, CGP research efforts have already led to a dramatic increase in existing documentary evidence through discovery of previously unknown archival sources. Rapid progress has been made with the design and establishment of this database. The initial program timelines projected the creation of some three hundred records in a bibliographic database by the end of December 1995. That milestone was achieved in February 1995. As of August 1995, approxi-

mately 1000 records representing some 50,000 pages of documentation had been entered into the bibliographical database.

*The Victim Database.* The Cambodian Genocide Program has made arrangements

with the Cambodian National Archives to create a Touch-Up\_2ne<</B 670.0018 /7J 1 >> BDC 0.044 TLtof tW



port from the worldwide Cambodia studies community (see “Scholars Speak out on Cambodia Holocaust,” letter to the *Wall Street Journal*)









are high-ranking military officers from the Ministry of Defense, including the General Staff. The Defense Ministry, like the Atomic Energy Ministry, has been highly skeptical as an institution about the merits of releasing documents for scholarly purposes. Russian military archivists have been especially disinclined to release items pertaining to nuclear weapons, ostensibly because of concerns about nuclear proliferation. (This policy can be taken to ludicrous extremes. When I worked in the Russian General Staff archive in the summer of 1994, I was told that all documents pertaining to nuclear operations—just operations, not technology—would be sealed off until the year 2046. I asked why that particular year was chosen, but no one seemed to know.)

\*\*\* Other members of the Working Group include senior officials from the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Security Service, the Department for the Defense Industry, and the State Technical Commission. (The first two bodies are the main successors to the Soviet KGB, and the last two bodies are under the jurisdiction of the Russian President's apparatus. The State Technical Commission is housed in the same building as the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.) These four agencies have hardly been noted as champions of archival openness. Documents held by the Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service, in particular, have been kept tightly sealed away. The role of these two agencies is bound to be critical in the release of documentation, whether for an official anthology or for other purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Service archive houses the most sensitive documents on the role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear weapons program, and the Federal Security Service archive contains documents generated by the Special Committee headed by Lavrentii Beria from August 1945 until his arrest in late June 1953 (see above). So far, there is little indication that access to either agency's document holdings will be expanded.

However, two factors may induce the Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service to be more willing to release documents about nuclear espionage: *First*, the U.S. National Security Agency has begun declassifying some of its huge collection of "Venona" transcripts of intercepted Soviet communications from 1939 through 1945. The initial batch, released in

July 1995, contained numerous documents that shed light on the activities of Soviet spies in the Manhattan Project. The disclosure of these materials may erode the traditional secrecy about such matters in Moscow. *Second*, some officials in the Russian security and intelligence organs may want to release sensitive documents to spotlight the role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb projects. A fierce debate emerged in Russia in the early 1990s about the relative importance of espionage versus indigenous scientific achievements in the Soviet nuclear/thermonuclear programs. Most observers in both Russia and the West now agree that information provided by Soviet spies was vital in accelerating the construction of the first Soviet fission bomb, but that espionage was of much less importance for the Soviet thermonuclear program. If the release of documents could show that the extent of Soviet nuclear spying was even greater than previously thought, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service might be somewhat less averse to the prospects of declassification.

\*\*\* Two heads of research institutes specializing in the history of science and technology—V. V. Alekseev and V. M. Orel—are included on the Working Group, but even if they are inclined to press for greater openness (which is by no means certain), they will be far outweighed by officials from the nuclear weapons complex and military establishment.

\*\*\* Rudolf Pikhoya, the director of the Russian State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), is the only panel member from Rosarkhiv. Even if Pikhoya seeks the release of as many documents as possible—and it is far from clear that he will—his influence on the Working Group is inherently limited, despite his position as a deputy chairman. The most valuable documents on the early Soviet nuclear weapons program are stored in archives outside Rosarkhiv's jurisdiction.

\*\*\* The presence of Yulii Khariton on the Working Group is encouraging, but it may be largely symbolic. Khariton, who was born in 1904, was one of the key physicists in the early Soviet nuclear program, and is the only living member of the Technical Council that was established in August 1945 to advise Beria's Special Committee (see above). Khariton has given lengthy written and oral testimony over the past few years about the early Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb

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arkhivnykh dokumentov" (A Compilation of Archival Documents).

7. For one such decree, approved in September 1994, see "Yeltsin's Directive on Declassification," which I translated and introduced in CWIHP *Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 89, 100. For a more recent, though similar, directive adopted by the Russian government, see "Ob ustanovleniya poryadka rasskrechivaniya i prodleniya srokov zasekrechivaniya arkhivnykh dokumentov Pravitel'stva SSSR," *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow) 9 (27 February 1995), 1539-1542.

\* \* \* \* \*

## DOCUMENT 1:

TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL DOSSIER

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE  
EDICT No. GKO-9887ss/op

20 August 1945  
Moscow, the Kremlin.

On a Special Committee Under the GKO's  
Auspices

The State Defense Committee orders:

1. That a Special Committee be formed under the GKO's auspices consisting of C[omra]des.:

1. Beria, L. P. (chairman)
2. Malenkov, G. M.
3. Voznesenskii, N. A.
4. Vannikov, B. L.
5. Zavenyagin, A. P.
6. Kurchatov, I. V.
7. Kapitsa, P. L.
8. Makhnev, V. A.
9. Pervukhin, M. G.

2. That the GKO's Special Committee be empowered to supervise all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium:

— the development of scientific research in this sphere;

— the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium, as well as the exploitation of uranium deposits outside the USSR (in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries);

— the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and

— the construction of atomic energy

facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb.

3. That a Technical Council be created under the GKO's Special Committee to conduct a preliminary examination of scientific and technical matters submitted for review by the Special Committee, as well as an examination of plans for scientific research and accounts for it, plus technical designs of installations, structures, and facilities for the use of atomic energy of uranium. The Council will consist of the following:

1. Vannikov, B. L. (chairman)
2. Alikhanov, A. I. — academician (scientific secretary)
3. Voznesenskii, I. N. — corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences
4. Zavenyagin, A. P.
5. Ioffe, A. F. — academician
6. Kapitsa, P. L. — academician
7. Kikoin, I. K. — corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences
8. Kurchatov, I. V. — academician
9. Makhnev, V. A.
10. Khariton, Yu. B. — professor
11. Khlopin V. G. — academician

4. That a special directorate be organized under the USSR Council of People's Commissars—the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, subordinated to the GKO's Special Committee—to exercise direct supervision over scientific research, development, and design organizations and industrial enterprises for the use of atomic energy of uranium and the production of atomic bombs.

5. That the GKO's Special Committee be obligated to devise a work plan for the Committee and the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC and measures to carry out this plan, and to present it to the Chairman of the GKO for approval.

6. That the GKO's Special Committee take operative measures to ensure the fulfillment of tasks assigned to it under the present edict; that it promulgate directives requiring fulfillment by agencies and departments; and that when a government decision is needed, the GKO's Special Committee should presents its recommendations directly for the approval of the Chairman of the GKO.

The GKO's Special Committee will have its own staff and funding estimates and an expense account at the USSR State Bank.

7. That the GKO's Special Committee define and approve for the First Main Direc-

torate of the USSR CPC the level of funding, the size of the workforce, and the volume of material-technical resources that it requires, so that USSR Gosplan can include these resources in the spending category listed as "Special Expenditures of the GKO."

8. That the chairman of USSR Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Voznesenskii, organize within Gosplan a directorate to help carry out the assignments of the GKO's Special Committee.

That the dep. chairman of USSR Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Borisov, be placed in charge of the aforementioned directorate, and that he be relieved of other work for Gosplan and the GKO.

9. That the financial expenditures and upkeep of the GKO's Special Committee, of the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, of the First Main Directorate's scientific research, design, and engineering organizations and industrial enterprises, as well as the work carried out by other agencies and departments at the behest of the Directorate, are to be included in the union budget through the category "Special Expenditures of the GKO."

That financing of capital construction for the First Main Directorate be carried out through the State Bank.

That the First Main Directorate and the institutes and enterprises under its auspices be freed from the registration of staffs in financial organs.

10. That Cde. B. L. Vannikov be confirmed as the deputy chairman of the GKO's Special Committee and director of the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, and that he be discharged from his duties as People's Commissar of Munitions.

That the following be approved as deputy directors of the Main Directorate:

- A. P. Zavenyagin — first deputy
- N. A. Borisov — deputy
- P. Ya. Meshik — deputy
- P. Ya. Antropov — deputy
- A. G. Kasatkin — deputy.

11. That the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC and its enterprises and institutes, as well as work carried out by other agencies and departments for it, are to be controlled by the GKO's Special Committee.

Without special permission from the GKO, no organizations, institutes, or individuals have any right whatsoever to interfere in the administrative or operational ac-

tivities of the First Main Directorate and its enterprises and institutes, or to demand information about its work or work carried out at the behest of the First Main Directorate. All records of such work are to be directed only to the GKO's Special Committee.

12. That within 10 days the Special Committee be instructed to provide recom-





nearly as frustrating as the first three in terms of lacking new revelations. Kornienko approves the document collections that have been published since the advent of glasnost, but does not enrich the story they tell with any significant new information of his own. Despite serving as a counselor in the Soviet Union's Washington embassy during the crisis, Kornienko tells us little of his own experiences. He does relate (as does then-Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in his recently published memoirs) that the Soviet embassy was kept in complete ignorance of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and was in fact unwittingly used to pass along disinformation.

The meat of Kornienko's story is his role in one of the key moments of the crisis: Khrushchev's two letters to Kennedy, the first of 26 October 1962 promising withdrawal of Soviet missiles in return for an American pledge of non-intervention in Cuba, the second of the next day additionally demanding the corresponding withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey. According to Kornienko, his own detective work played a central role in Khrushchev's decision to sharpen his demands. Soviet intelligence sources reported a conversation with an American journalist on his immediate departure for Florida to cover the imminent American invasion. Hearing these reports as well as taking into account the heightened alert status of American armed

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high-placed leaders ignore the competent judgment of specialists and as a result sacrifice the very interests of the state trying for one thing—to that much quickly finish the preparation of this or that treaty and light off fireworks in celebration.”

The conclusion of Kornienko’s book, a shortened version of a case set forth earlier at greater length and in greater detail in *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (16 August 1994), is what his argument has been leading to all along: the Gorbachev era as the epitome of unprofessionalism in foreign policy. It is a full-fledged condemnation of almost every action undertaken by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze from 1985 through the final collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, Kornienko strives to discredit the idea that Gorbachev offered something truly new and revolutionary in international politics. As Kornienko reminds us, it was Lenin who first enunciated the principle of “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist world (as another form of class struggle), and Stalin actively endorsed the idea of coexistence with the West as late as 1951. Ever since a rough nuclear parity had been achieved in the 1960s, reasonable people on each side had seen the need for an end to the arms race and confrontation. Gorbachev’s innovation was not living in peace with the West, but the unilateral “betrayal of the Soviet Union’s vital interests.”

Kornienko enunciates a number of specific examples of Gorbachev’s craven behavior—submission to the United States over the Krasnoyarsk radar station and Soviet acquiescence in the use of force against Iraq—but his most substantial comments are reserved for the reunification of Germany. Kornienko, having passed over in silence the Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, takes pains to emphasize the right of the German people to self-determination, free from outside influence. His objection is to the manner in which this unification took place and the status of the resulting German state. Why, he asks, should Germany remain in NATO and why should NATO troops remain in Germany with Soviet troops completely evacuated from Eastern Europe? The fact that Germany has stayed in NATO he attributes to the absolutely incompetent way in which Gorbachev handled the German question, avoiding the enunciation of any clear policy until too late, insisting on the

unacceptability of German NATO membership to George Bush in Washington only in February 1990 and then conceding Germany’s right to remain in NATO without receiving guarantees and concessions in return.

ders from Moscow. In 1935, when the Soviet Union was threatened by rising fascism in Europe and Asia, the CCP followed Moscow's order to adopt a policy of a "United Front" (Popular Front) with the Nationalists in a joint effort to fight Japanese expansion in Asia. Yet, when Stalin stunned the world by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in late August 1939, the United Front policy collapsed in China. Mao Zedong followed Stalin most closely among all the Comintern party chiefs, hailing the Hitler-Stalin deal as a major victory against the West and the partition of Poland as necessary for the communist cause.<sup>6</sup> In January 1940, Mao Zedong proclaimed that "the center of the Anti-Soviet movement is no longer Nazi Germany, but among the so-called democratic countries."<sup>7</sup> The *modus vivendi* of communism and fascism in late 1939 created such intense friction between the Chinese Nationalists, who had been engaged in an all-out and bitter war with the Japanese imperial army in China, and the Chinese Communists, who were following Stalin's rapprochement with Germany, whose ally was Japan, that in early 1940, an army of communist troops was ambushed by the Nationalists in Southern Anhui, an event which essentially ended the superficial United Front. Yet when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin reversed his policy on the Popular Front: all member parties of the Comintern, both in Europe and in Asia, were now ordered to fight fascism. Unfortunately, in China this did not mean the re-establishment of the former United Front against the Japanese, because the Soviet Union had already signed the notorious Neutrality Pact with Japan. The Chinese Nationalists, not the Japanese, remained the CCP's main enemy.

In fact, a stunning recent discovery at the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives of a secret Soviet-Japanese treaty at the outset of WWII reveals a deeply conspiratorial scheme worked out between Moscow and Tokyo. On 3 October 1940, Soviet and Japanese diplomats reached a secret deal that stipulated, "The USSR will abandon its active support for Chiang [Kai-shek; Jiang Jieshi] and will repress the Chinese Communist Party's anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chinese Communist Party will retain as a base the three (Chinese) Northwest provinces (Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia)."<sup>8</sup>

Chen Hansheng's memoirs has made a

significant contribution to reconnecting this CCP-Moscow tie.

*Was Agnes Smedley A Comintern Agent?* Despite vigorous denials by Smedley herself, Chen Hansheng discloses unequivocally that Smedley was no less than an agent of the Comintern (p.52). (Historian Stephen MacKinnon has only established that

New York.

*Was Solomon Adler A Communist?*

Solomon Adler, chief intelligence agent for the U.S. Treasury Department in China during WWII, was also prominent on McCarthy's communist list. In the 1950s, Elizabeth Bentley, a courier of a Soviet apparatus in Washington, further identified Adler as a member of Soviet intelligence.<sup>11</sup> Adler at the time denied Bentley's accusation. Surprisingly, in Chen's memoirs, as well as in some other recent Chinese documents, Adler has resurfaced in Beijing as a bona fide communist intelligence official.<sup>12</sup> According to these sources, Adler moved to Beijing permanently in the late 1950s and has since worked in various capacities in CCP intelligence. Today, he is identified in Chinese documents as an "Advisor" to the External Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, the department that handles such well-known figures as Larry Wu-tai Ching of the CIA, who was arrested



1 September 1995

To the Editor:

I read with great interest "The Sudoplatov Controversy" in the *CWIHP Bulletin* (Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 155-158). In its own time I also read *Special Tasks* with no less interest.

I believed earlier and now presume that the appearance of the recollections of such a high-ranking employee of the Stalinist NKVD is an outstanding event, no matter what they are like in terms of quality. In any case, such recollections better than anything else characterize the era, and the storyteller. We can only be sorry that the recollections, of, for example, Lavrentii Beria, do not exist.

Of course, I cannot read without a smile Pavel Sudoplatov's "assertion" that in the development of my career I am obliged "through KGB connections." This is a desperate (consistent with the time!) lunge, a relic of the past, at a time when it is already impossible, as was done in the Stalinist time, to register innocent people as German, English, and other "spies," and to make short work of them. Now this relapse of the past is nothing more than an expressive coloring on the portrait of Sudoplatov himself. And it is evidence of the fact that my article offended him very much.

In *Special Tasks* the episode connected with Yaacov Terletskii's mission to Niels Bohr. My critical article, published in the *Bulletin* (Issue 4, Fall 1994), touched only on that episode. Since I am not a specialist in Sudoplatov's professional element, but do have a definite conception of the Soviet atomic project and its history, in this letter, expressing myself, I will limit myself only to the mission to Niels Bohr.

I assert that nothing in Sudoplatov's version regarding this mission stands up to a comparison with the facts (reason for the trip, significance for the Soviet physicists of the information which was brought; the shadow which Sudoplatov casts on Niels Bohr, etc.), and it is a total hoax. Only the naked fact that the trip to visit Bohr really did take place remains certain. But even here Sudoplatov is not the one who discov-

ered it: several years ago already Professor Igor Golovin mentioned this operation of Beria's department in the Soviet press.

I do not believe it possible here to dwell particularly on Sudoplatov's new fantasies,



9 October 1995

To the Editor:

I read the essay "Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka and the Polish October," by L.W. Gluchowski, and the accompanying documents in CWIHP *Bulletin* 5

do with the threat of Soviet military intervention.

My first departure with Mr. Leitenberg comes when he elevates “the circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the movements” to some kind of special moment in the negotiations. We still don’t have enough Soviet evidence to draw Mr. Leitenberg’s conclusions. This is particularly true when we consider his comment: “It seems very likely, even obvious, that Khrushchev gave the order for the movement of Soviet forces based in Poland in his meeting with Marshals Konev and Rokossowski in the Soviet embassy on October 19, also referred to in his memoirs.” In this case, an omission on my part may have resulted in the confusion, and I am grateful to Mr. Leitenberg for bringing it to my attention.

In my attempt to edit out a number of long historiographical comments about the documents from the essay I submitted to the *Bulletin*, I deleted a remark about the reliability of Khrushchev’s memoirs on the Polish crisis, which was originally included with Molotov’s characterization of Rokossowski in the Felix Chuev interview (contained in *One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov*) cited in endnote 28. I should have left in place the following observation:

This is another example of how Khrushchev’s memoirs are accurate in so far as the general atmosphere of the discussions are concerned, and at the same time confusing because he again tends to take what were obviously a series of discussions and compress them into one important conversation. Surely, as Document 1 clearly shows,

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## *MORE ON THE 1956 HUNGARIAN CRISIS*

23 October 1995

To the Editor:

The Spring 1995 issue of the *Bulletin*, as rich and as informative as ever, contains two stimulating articles by Professor Johanna Granville. Permit me to make a few comments on both.

In the first article—"Imre Nagy, Hesitant Revolutionary"—Professor Granville correctly argues that Prime Minister Nagy, a lifelong Communist, hesitated to side with the revolutionaries during the early days of the 1956 Hungarian uprising (October 23-27); that he created a new, reform-minded

menting on the Hungarian-language broadcasts of Radio Moscow no one heard, let alone listened to. As one of his Muscovite colleagues would observe many years later, even the leading émigrés “had nothing of consequence to do but they behaved as if they had. They practiced assiduously something they referred to as politics, plotted one another’s downfall, and generally pranced and cantered and whinnied like superannuated parade horses at the knacker’s gates.” (Julius Hay, *Born 1900: Memoirs* [La Salle, Ill.: Library Press, 1975], pp. 218-19.) Given the atmosphere of suspicion prevailing in Moscow at the time, the Russian commissars did not trust information conveyed by foreign Communists.

Could Nagy, a nonentity among the nonentities, have been a petty mole, then? Yes. Could his reporting have contributed to the bloody purge of foreign, especially Hun-



The Update section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history emanating from the former Communist realm. Readers are invited to alert CWIHP to relevant citations. Readers should consult references in Bulletin articles for additional sources.

Abbreviations:

DA = Deutschland Archiv

FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service

NYT = New York Times

RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

VjZ = Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte

WP = Washington Post

ZfG = Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft

**Russia/Former Soviet Union**

Interview with Stalin granddaughter Galina Iakovkevnoi Dzhugashvili. (Yuri Dmitriev and Samarii Gurarii, "Syn Stalina" [Stalin's Son], *Trud*, 31 May 1994, 3.)

1945 letter on postwar strategy from senior Soviet diplomat I.M. Maisky to Stalin from Foreign Ministry archives printed. ("The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Conference of the Three Allied Powers in Yalta," *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik* 3-4 (February 1995), 78-79.)

December 1945 documents from Russian Foreign Ministry archives illuminate Moscow's refusal to join International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (Harold James and Marzenna James, "The Origins of the Cold War: Some New Documents," *The Historical Journal* 37, 3 (1994), 615-622.)

Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov announces (2 December 1994) plans to revise estimate of total Soviet deaths during World War II; says 44 Soviet soldiers and officers remain MIA from the 1956 invasion of Hungary, 300 were still missing from the war in Afghanistan, and a Col. Udanov, missing in Ethiopia in 1978, was reported to be alive and working in a Somali stone quarry as late as 1989. (*RFE/RL Daily Report* 229 (6 December 1994).) Dispute over number of Soviet deaths in World War II reviewed. (Boris Sokolov, "New Estimates of World

War II Losses," *Moscow News* [English] 16 (28 April-4 May 1995), 7.)

Stalin's handling of Nuremberg trials assessed by historian Natalya Lebedeva. ("Stalin and the Nuremberg Trial," *Moscow News* [English] 11 (24-30 March 1995), 12.)

Russian evidence on Soviet-Italian relations and the Italian Communist Party, 1944-48. (Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, "L'URSS, il PCI e l'Italia: 1944-1948," *Storia Contemporanea* 25:6 (December 1994), 929-982.)

*Problems of Post-Communism* 42:5 (September-October 1995) spotlights new findings from Soviet archives: Vladislav M. Zubok, "Soviet Activities in Europe After World War II," pp. 3-8; Hope M. Harrison, "Soviet-East German Relations After World War II," pp. 9-17; Scott Parrish, "Soviet Reaction to the Marshall Plan: Opportunity

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tion of Chinese Civil War. (Sergei L. Tikhvinskii, "Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g." [From the Presidential Archives of the RF (Russian Federation): Correspondence of I.V. Stalin with Mao Zedong of January 1949], *Novaya i noveisha istoriya* 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.)

Newly released Soviet documents on Mikoyan's secret visit to Mao and CCP leaders, 31 January-7 February 1949. (Andrei Ledovskii, "Secretnaia missiia A.I. Mikoyana v Kitai" [Secret Mission of A.I. Mikoyan to China], *Problemi Dalnego Vostoka* 2, 3 (1995).)

New Russian evidence on Sino-Soviet relations, 1949-52. (B. Kulik, "Kitaiskaiia Narodnaia Respublika v period stanovleniia (1949-1952) (Po materialam Arkhiva vneshnei politik RF" [The Chinese People's Republic in the Founding Period (Materials from the Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation)], *Problemi Dalnego Vostoka* 6 (1994).)

Mao's reactions to Khrushchev's 20th Party Congress speech, as told to Soviet ambassador in Beijing. (P. Yudin, "Zapis besedy s tovarischem Mao," *Problemi Dalnego Vostok* 5 (1994).

New information on 1971 crash of Lin Biao during flight from China. (Andrei Kosyrev, "'Delo Lin Biao': Zagadka Pochti Rasreshena" ["The Lin Biao Affair": The Mystery is Nearly Solved], *Moskovskaia Pravda*, 24 March 1994, 4; Yuri Dmitriev, "Poslednii polet kitaiskogo marshala" [The Last Flight of the Chinese Marshal], *Trud*, 9 April 1994; Ivan Iavnok, "Marshal Lin Biao Razbilsia v Mongolii" [Marshal Lin Biao Died in Mongolia], *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 7 May 1994, 6.)

Interview with Li Iuzhan, Mao's interpreter for meetings with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. (Andrei Kabannikov, "Mao v okruzhenii vragov i tantsovshchits" [Mao, Surrounded by Enemies and Dancers], *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, 6 January 1994, 14.)

#### Intelligence/Espionage Issues:

Former defenders of Rosenbergs say Venona decrypts of KGB messages seem genuine

and indicate Julius Rosenberg indeed ran Communist spy ring, though some key evidence of atomic espionage still lacking. (Walter Schneir and Miriam Schneir, "Cryptic Answers," *The Nation*, 14/21 August 1994, 6.)

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Obozrevatel, 1995), on problems and achievements of Russian secret services published. (Itar-Tass, 11 October 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-196 (11 October 1995), 39-40.)

Publications: Oleg Gordievsky, *Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky* (London: Macmillan, 1995); Harvey Klehr, > BDC BT /F4 1 T pouchiography of Oleg

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(Tallinn ETA, 20 February 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-034 (21 February 1995), 99.

Law calling on ex-KGB agents in Estonia to confess or face public exposure working “surprisingly well,” police say. (Tallinn BNS, 3 April 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-064 (4 April 1995), 73.)

**Latvia**

*Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949*

Controversy erupts over documents claiming past collaboration by Bishop Laszlo Tokes, ethnic Hungarian priest whose arrest sparked 1989 revolt, with Romanian Securitate secret police [Romanian Intelligence Service, or SRI]. (Gyorgy Jakab, "UDMR Will Ask to See the SRI Files of All Political Leaders," *Adevarul* (Bucharest), 29 December 1994, in FBIS-EEU-95-001 (3 January 1995), 24.) Paper publishes purported documents showing Tokes was paid Securitate informer. ("According to *Renasterea Banateana*, Laszlo Tokes Informed the Securitate Under the Name of Laszlo Kolozsvar," *Curierul National* (Bucharest), 31 December 1994, in FBIS-EEU-95-003 (5 January 1995), 19.)

### Mongolia

Account of Soviet intervention in 1984 Mongolian putsch. (Zorik Tsendenbal, "Novoe 'Delo Vrachei'" [A New "Doctor's Plot"], *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (Moscow), 2 March 1994, 8.)

### People's Republic of China

[Ed. note: For detailed lists of recent sources, see the essays by Michael Hunt and Chen Jian elsewhere in this issue of the *Bulletin*.]

Evidence on early wrangling between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Moscow over Soviet seizure of Chinese industrial equipment in Manchuria at close of World War II. (Liu Guowu, "Zhanhou zhongsu liangguo chuli dongbei rewei chanyede jiufen" [The Argument Between China and the USSR After the War Over How to Deal with the Japanese Puppet's Industry], *Modern Chinese History* (Chinese People's University Publications Reprint Series) 1 (1995), 100-104.

Reassessment of early stages of relations (and non-relations) between U.S. and PRC. (Thomas J. Christensen, "A 'Lost Chance' for What? Rethinking the Origins of U.S.-PRC Confrontation," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 4:3 (Fall 1995), 249-278.)

Account of alleged attempt by Guomindang (Kuomintang) to murder PRC Premier Zhou Enlai in 1955. (Steve Tsang, "Research Note:

Target Zhou Enlai: The 'Kashmir Princess' Incident of 1955," *The China Quarterly* 139 (September 1994), 766-782.)

Article based on CCP sources explores Zhou Enlai's handling of the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis, including data on secret communications between PRC and Taiwan. (Liao Xinwen, "Zhou Enlai yu heping jie jue taiwan wentide fangzhen" [Zhou Enlai and the Initiative to Peacefully Solve the Taiwan Problem], *Dangde Wenxian* [Party Documents] 5 (1994), 32-38.)

Reassessment, using new Chinese sources, of Mao's evolving views of U.S. (He Di, "The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States," *The China Quarterly* 137 (March 1994), 144-158.)

Publications: Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, eds., *Toward a History of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches* (Washington, DC: Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, n.d.); John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994); Robert S. Ross, *Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58* (forthcoming in 1996 from Princeton University Press).

### Korean War

Soviet policy toward Korea immediately following World War II assessed. (Kan In Gu, "The Soviet Union's Korean Policy Following the Second World War (1945-1948)," *Vestnik Sankt Peterburgskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta* 16 (1994), 91-93.)

Soviet documents on the Korean War, including military reports to Stalin. ("The Participation of the USSR in the Korean War (New Documents)," *Voprosi istorii* 11 (1994), 30-46.)

English translations of newly released Russian materials, with commentary. (Vladimir Petrov, "Soviet Role in the Korean War Confirmed: Secret Documents Declassified," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 13:3 (Fall 1994), 42-67.) 1945- n the Kore: A (Kan In Gu, "The Korean War and the Soviet Union," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 4:3 (Fall 1995), 249-278.)

1960s because he believed weapons were being wasted. (Reported in *Xinwen ziyou daobao* [Press Freedom Guardian], 29 September 1995, 3.)

Publications: Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, scheduled for publication Spring 1996); Commission for Research on Party History, ed., *Ho Chi Minh*, 4th ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1995); Ho Chi Minh, *Prison Diary*, 9th ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994); Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, *Dien Bien Phu*, 5th ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994); Gen. Giap, *Unforgettable Days*, 3rd ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994); Vien Su Hoc et al., *Lich Su' Viet Nam, 1954-1965* (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1995); William J. Duiker, *U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); Xiangen Wang, *Zhongguo mimi da fabing: Yuang yue hang Mei shilu* [China secretly dispatched many troops: The real record of supporting Vietnam to resist America] (Jinan: Jinan, 1992); Yinhong Shi, *Meiguo zai Yuenan de ganshe he zhanzheng, 1954-1968* [American intervention and war in Vietnam, 1954-1968] (Beijing: World Knowledge, 1993).

### Cuba/Cuban Missile Crisis

Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 27:1 (February 1995), 1-42.

Publications: Fabian Escalante, *The Secret War: CIA covert operations against Cuba, 1959-1962* (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1995); Claudia Furati, trans. Maxine Shaw, *ZR Rifle: The Plot to Kill Kennedy and Castro: Cuba Opens Secret Files* (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1994); Carlos Lechuga, *In the Eye of the Storm: Castro, Khrushchev, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The inside story by Cuba's former UN ambassador* (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1995); Mark White, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: Macmillan, and New York: New York University Press, January 1996).

### POLISH CRISIS

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collapse of Communism. Although he added some observations about events through the end of 1991, he decided to proceed with the publication of his book before he had consulted any newly opened archives. This decision was unfortunate, but it was not inexcusable for a scholar who had already completed a manuscript and who would have had to travel many thousands of miles to work in the former East-bloc archives, perhaps delaying the appearance of his book for a considerable time. The delay would have been worthwhile, but it was a judgment call for Zuzowski in 1992, and he obviously believed he should press ahead.

In Grishin's case, the decision to forgo archival research is far less explicable. His overview of the Polish crisis covers very familiar ground, and thus he should have done his best to adduce new documentary evidence. Grishin did not complete his monograph until early 1993, well after secret materials in both Warsaw and Moscow had been released and at the very time when sensitive files on the 1980-81 events were still freely available at the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow. (Severe restrictions were reimposed at the former Central Committee archive in April 1983, but that was after Grishin's book was finished.) Although Grishin is based at Kazan University in Tatarstan, rather than in Moscow, he could have traveled to the Russian capital (and ideally to Warsaw, too) at relatively little expense to consult the archives. His decision to rely exclusively on contemporaneous newspaper articles and on a few recent first-hand accounts largely negates whatever contribution his book might have made.

Perhaps if Grishin had pursued archival research, he would have been able to come up with a more sophisticated presentation. To be sure, his book is a vast improvement over the lurid Soviet-era publications on the Polish crisis (e.g., Georgii Korchadnze's *Zagovor protiv Pol'shi*), and Grishin's discussion of Soviet policy toward Poland in 1980-81 is often insightful. But his book is a far cry from the scholarly standards that most Western (and, increasingly, many Russian) analysts would accept. Grishin is primarily interested in showing why the Polish leader, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, was justified in crushing Solidarity in December 1981. Grishin draws extensively and uncritically

on Jaruzelski's own account, *Stan wojenny: dlaczego* (published in Poland in 1992), and his book often seems little more than a reprise of the memoir. Aside from reiterating Jaruzelski's arguments, Grishin's other main goal (as he declares without any subtlety in his introduction) is to depict Solidarity in as negative a light as possible. For polemical purposes his book may have some value, but from a scholarly standpoint it is sorely deficient.

It is a pity that neither of the books under review takes advantages of opportunities afforded by the post-Communist era. Zuzowski's analysis has much to recommend it, and even Grishin occasionally has interesting things to say, but an authoritative reassessment of the Polish crisis will require detailed and critical archival research.

### COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on "the other side"—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Amb. Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the *Bulletin*. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP's endorsement of authors' views. Copies are available free upon request.

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Woodrow Wilson International Ctr. for Scholars  
1000 Jefferson Drive, SW  
Washington, D.C. 20560  
Tel.: (202) 357-2967; fax: (202) 357-4439  
e-mail: wwcem123@siwm.si.edu

Editor: James G. Hershberg  
Managing Editor: P.J. Simmons  
Associate Editor: Bonnie Southwick  
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