COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL

The Cold War International History Project

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and receives major support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation. The Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on "the other side"—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak. The Outgoing Director of the Cold War International History Project and Outgoing Editor of the Bulletin is Dr. James G. Hershberg; the Incoming Director is Prof. David Wolff (Princeton University), and the Incoming Associate Director is Christian F. Ostermann. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Readers are invited to submit articles, documents, letters, and Update items to the *Bulletin*. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP's endorsement of authors' views. Copies are available free upon request.

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Editor for this Issue: James G. Hershberg Assistant Editor: Christa Sheehan Matthew Research Assistant: Andrew Grauer Incoming Director: David Wolff Incoming Associate Director: Christian F. Ostermann

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In this issue, the *Bulletin* presents evidence from communist world archives— Russian, East German, Cuban—on many of the same issues that so bedeviled U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1970s: Angola, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Cuba, et al.

In large measure, the evidence presented here stems from the labors of the "Carter-Brezhnev Project": a multi-year, multi-archival, international academic effort to explore the causes, consequences, and legacies of the collapse of superpower detente in the 1970s. The project was spearheaded by Drs. James G. Blight and janet Lang of the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University (organizer of similar conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis), with the active participation of an informal consortium of scholarly partners, including the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University; CWIHP; the Norwegian Nobel Institute; the Institute for Universal History, the Foreign Ministry archives, and the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow. (A report on some of the Project's early findings, on U.S.-Soviet relations at the outset of the Carter Administration, appeared in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 140-154.)

Many of the documents in this *Bulletin* were obtained and translated by the Carter-Brezhnev Project in preparation for a series of conferences on the breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations in the late 1970s, held in Georgia in May 1994 (on the SALT II process), in Ft. Lauderdale in March 1995 (on superpower rivalry in the Third World), and in Lysebu, Norway in September 1995 (on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan); other translations, as well as accompanying articles and commentaries, were solicited by the *Bulletin*. (All documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project are available for research at the National Security Archive.)

Readers interested in these topics will also wish to obtain the first book to emerge from the Carter-Brezhnev Project: Odd Arne Westad, ed., *The Fall of Detente: Soviet-American Relations in the Carter Years* (see box), which contains interpretive essays by noted scholars as well as recently declassified U.S. and East-bloc materials; other volumes are planned.

This *Bulletin* double issue also contains several other major chunks of important new evidence from communist archives:

* More New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia, following up on the previous *Bulletin* (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294 pp.) and a major conference organized by CWIHP and hosted by Hong Kong University in January 1996;

* More Russian Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis, providing another selection of declassified documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives and other materials to supplement those printed in *Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995);

* New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises, featuring an authoritive translation and annotation of the so-called "Malin Notes" of key Kremlin meetings during the crises, along with an introductory essay, by Mark Kramer of Harvard University—a remarkable window into how the Soviet leadership responded to a challenge to the communist empire that in many ways foreshadowed the terminal crisis of 1989; and finally

* **Research Reports** on **Soviet Nuclear History**: documents on the origins of the USSR's atomic project and on Nikita Khrushchev's 1960 troop cut.

This Bulletin marks my final issue as Editor and as Director of the Cold War International History Project; beginning in January 1997 I took up a position as Assistant Professor of Diplomatic History and International Affairs at George Washington University. I am pleased to report that the Project is passing into able, enthusiastic, more linguistically-gifted, and perhaps more organized hands: David Wolff, formerly of Princeton University, the author of a major forthcoming study of Northeast Asian history, and fluent in Russian, Chinese, Japanese, German, and French, becomes CWIHP's new Director; and Christian F. Ostermann, research fellow at the National Security Archive, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin of reports on new evidence from the East German archives, and the author of a forthcoming study on relations between the German Democratic Republic and the United States, becomes Associate Director. I am also glad to say that I plan to remain closely associated with CWIHP, collaborating with my successors on transitional activities, contributing to future endeavors, editing CWIHP's Book Series, and perhaps even finding time after five years of administration to do more of my own research and writing on Cold War history. So this is not good-bye.

Nevertheless, I would like to express my gratitude to CWIHP's creators, supporters, friends, and collaborators for the chance to participate in the thrilling experience of peering behind (and trying to rip down entirely) the curtain of the last half-century of world history, and to work with an extraor-

dinary group of people from around the world. Even more than the historical information it has gathered and disseminated, CWIHP's greatest achievement, I think, has been the creation of an international community of Cold War scholars, especially those who, on a daily and sometimes hourly basis, 24/7, constitute the CWIHP "network": Tom Blanton, Malcolm Byrne, Vlad Zubok, Mark Kramer, Jim Blight/janet Lang, Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, David Wolff, Christian Ostermann, Kathryn Weathersby, Hope Harrison, John Gaddis, Bill Taubman, Warren Cohen, Aleksandr Chubarian, Mikhail Narinsky, and the "group" in Moscow, Bill Burr, Ilya Gaiduk, Leo Gluchowski, Csaba Bekes, Norman Naimark, Priscilla Roberts, Sven Holtsmark, Bob Brigham, Ray Garthoff, Vojtech Mastny, Kostia Pleshakov, Allen Greb, Maxim Korobochkin, Mark Doctoroff, Piero Gleijeses, Daniel Rozas, Peter Kornbluh, and many others who have made the last five-and-a-half years such fun that the exasperation paled by comparison. And above all, thanks to Annie for putting up with everything and coming along for the ride. -Jim Hershberg

THE FALL OF DETENTE: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CARTER YEARS

Readers interested in the materials on the Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Detente in the 1970s should also consult a newly published volume which also emerges from the work of the Carter-Brezhnev Project: Odd Arne Westad, ed., *The Fall of Detente: Soviet-American Relations in the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997).

The volume includes interpretive essays as well as key U.S., Russian, East German and other documents on SALT and Bilateral Relations, Regional Conflicts, and Afghanistan and After. For ordering information within North America, contact the Scandinavian University Press North America, 875 Mass. Ave., Ste. 84, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA; tel: 617/497-6515; toll-free: 800/498-2877; fax: 617/354-6875; e-mail: 75201.571@compuserve.com; e-mail orders outside North America: books@scup.no

Essays in the book include: Odd Arne Westad, "The Fall of Detente and the Turning Tides of History"; Olav Njolstad, "Keys of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of Detente"; Carol R. Saivetz, "Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of Detente"; Dan Caldwell, "The Demise of Detente and US Domestic Politics"; Odd Arne Westad, "The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 1978-1979"; John Lewis Gaddis, "Why Did the Cold War Last as Long as It Did?"

For additional information, contact Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute, Drammensveien 19, 0255 Oslo, Norway; fax: 47-22 43 01 68.

discussing Cuba's role in Angola in 1975-76, I will briefly touch on each of these phases.

Cuban leaders saw similarities between the Algerian revolution against French rule and their own struggle against both Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista and the United States. In December 1961, a Cuban ship unloaded a cargo of weapons at Casablanca for the Algerian rebels. It returned to Havana with 76 wounded Algerian fighters and 20 children from refugee camps.⁴

The aid continued after Algeria gained its independence. In May 1963, a 55-person Cuban medical mission arrived in Algeria. And, as would be the case for all the missions that followed (until 1978), the aid was free. "It was like a beggar offering his help, but we knew that the Algerian people needed it even more than we did, and that they deserved it," said the then-Minister of Public Health, José Ramón Machado Ventura.⁵ And in October 1963, when Algeria was threatened by Morocco, the Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) were fighting for independence from Portugal. The PAIGC was "the most effective of the liberation organizations in the Portuguese African territories," U.S. reports stressed time and again.¹⁹ At the PAIGC's request, Cuban military instructors arrived in Guinea-Bissau in 1966, and they remained there through the end of the war in 1974. This was the longest Cuban intervention in Africa before the dispatch of troops to Angola in 1975. It was also the most successful. In the words of Guinea-Bissau's first president,

we were able to fight and triumph because other countries and people helped us ... with weapons, with medicine, with supplies ... But there is one nation that in addition to material, political and diplomatic support, even sent its children to fight by our side, to shed their blood in our land together with that of the best children of our country.

This great people, this heroic people, we all know that it is the heroic people of Cuba; the Cuba of Fidel Castro; the Cuba of the Sierra Maestra, the Cuba of Moncada ... Cuba sent its best children here so that they could help us in the technical aspects of our war, so that they could help us to wage this great struggle ... against Portuguese colonialism.²⁰

Some 40-50 Cubans fought in Guinea-Bissau each year from 1966 until independence in 1974. They helped in military planning and they were in charge of the artillery. Their contribution was, as President Nino, who had been the senior military commander of the PAIGC, said, "of the utmost importance."²¹

Just as the only foreigners who fought with the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau were Cubans, so too the only foreign doctors were Cubans (with one brief exception), and there were no native doctors until 1968. From 1966 to 1974 there were, on average, seven Cuban doctors in Guinea Bissau. "They really performed a miracle," observes Francisca Pereira, a senior PAIGC official. "I am eternally grateful to them: not only did they save lives, but they also put their own lives at risk. They were truly selfless."²²

The men who went to Algeria,

Zaire, Congo Brazzaville, and Guinea-Bissau were volunteers. They were captivated by the mystique of guerrilla war. "We dreamt of revolution," one muses. "We wanted to be part of it, to feel that we were fighting for it. We were young, and the children of a revolution." Fighting abroad, they would defend the revolution at home. "In all those years we believed that at any moment they [the United States] were going to strike us; and for us it was better to wage the war abroad than in our own country."²³

The volunteers received no public praise in Cuba. They left "knowing that their story would remain a secret."²⁴ They won neither medals nor material rewards. Once back they could not boast about their deeds, because they were bound to secrecy.

This secrecy notwithstanding, through all these years U.S. officials knew that Cubans were in Africa—in Algeria, then in Zaire, in Congo Brazzaville, and finally in GuineaCuba and the MPLA were friendly but less close, and Cuba's support for the movement was limited to training a handful of MPLA fighters in Cuba and, as the MPLA was convulsed by internal strife, to giving unwavering support to the group around Agostinho Neto.³²

Lack of space precludes an indepth discussion of the 1975 Cuban intervention in Angola. I will focus instead on two particularly controversial issues: when Cuba sent its military instructors and when it sent its troops. I will also comment briefly on some of the points raised in Odd Arne Westad's article about the Soviet role in Angola in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

The basic outline of the story is well known. Upon the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship on 25 April 1974, there were three rival independence movements in Angola: Agostinho Neto's MPLA, Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). On 15 January 1975, Portugal and these three movements agreed that a transitional government, under a Portuguese High Commissioner, would rule the country until independence on 11 November 1975. Before independence would come elections for a Constituent Assembly which would elect Angola's first president.

The first high-level contact between the MPLA and Cuba following the coup in Portugal was in late December 1974, when two senior Cubans arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania: Carlos Cadelo, the Communist party official whose portfolio included Angola, and Major Alfonso Pérez Morales (Pina), who had served, with great distinction, with the PAIGC guerrilla fighters in Guinea-Bissau. They met Neto and other MPLA leaders in Dares-Salaam and asked permission to travel to Angola. Neto approved: "He asked us to verify everything he had told us so that we could get an objective view of the real situation in Angola."33

After two weeks in Angola, Cadelo and Pina met Neto again. Their subsequent report was lengthy (42 pages) and optimistic: the elections would take place; while the FNLA was militarily stronger than the MPLA in the short term, the MPLA was building for the long haul, and this would bear fruit. "This movement," they wrote, "is the best structured politically and militarily, [and] as a result it enjoys extraordinary popular support."³⁴ Time favored the MPLA.

The report also included a letter from Neto specifying the aid he sought from Cuba [see doc. 4]. But Neto was, in fact, uncertain about what he wanted from Cuba. He told Pina and Cadelo that "once we know what weapons the Soviets are going to give us, we will have to adjust our military plans; exactly what we ask from Cuba will be contingent on this."³⁵ A recurring idea of military instructors floated in the air but was not precise. As Cadelo noted, "Even though Neto gave us a letter with some concrete demands, it was not really clear what the best form of cooperation with Cuba would be, or how and when it should be implemented."³⁶ On one point, however, Neto was definite: he wanted Cuba to provide the funds to ship the weapons the MPLA had in Dares-Salaam, its major arsenal, to Angola. Neto "said that he was confident that they would receive Soviet aid, but that it would not arrive for five months and that it was therefore imperative to move their material and equipment from Dares-Salaam to Angola."³⁷ Neto told Cadelo and Pina that he would need \$100,000 for the task.³⁸

But Cuba did not send the money, and nothing happened beyond the arrival of ten to twelve Angolans in Cuba for special training in March and April.³⁹ There is no indication in the Cuban documents I have seen that the MPLA renewed its requests until May, when Neto met Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Flavio Bravo in Brazzaville, "and asked [Cuba's] help to transport some weapons, and also asked about the possibility of a broader and more specific aid program." In late June, Neto met with Cadelo in Maputo, Mozambique, and renewed his request.40

Three weeks later the United States decided to greatly expand the CIA's covert operation in Angola (increasing aid to the FNLA and initiating support

FIDEL CASTRO'S 1977 SOUTHERN AFRICA TOUR: A REPORT TO HONECKER

Editor's Note: In early 1977, Cuban President Fidel Castro took a an extensive tour of Africa and then continued on to Europe and the USSR. During a stop in East Berlin, Castro recounted his experiences to East German Communist leader Erich Honecker. The record of those discussions was located in the arfor UNITA), but there is no evidence that Cuba and the MPLA knew about it. What they knew—and indeed it was public knowledge—was that the pro-American Zairean government of Mobuto Sese Seko had sent troops into northern Angola on Roberto's side. By May, Portugal was no longer making any attempt to police even the main crossing points with Zaire and it was reported that over one thousand Zairean soldiers were in northern Angola.⁴¹ Angola, warned Neto, "was being subjected to a silent invasion by soldiers from Zaire."⁴²

By late July, Angola was in the throes of civil war and Havana finally geared into action. From August 3-8, a seven-man Cuban delegation, led by a very senior military officer, Raúl Díaz Argüelles, was in Angola. "Their mission was to pin down on the ground with the leaders of the MPLA exactly what aid they wanted, the objectives they expected to achieve with this aid, and the stages in which the aid should be given."⁴³ They also brought Neto the \$100,000 he had requested six months earlier. [See doc. 5]

Neto wanted Cuban military instructors. He did not have a precise figure in mind, but he was thinking of no more than a hundred men who would be spread out among many small training centers. He also wanted Cuba to send weapons, clothing, and food for the recruits. On the basis of this request, Díaz Argüelles drafted a proposal for a military mission "that would include 65 officers and 29 noncommissioned officers and soldiers for a grand total of 94 compañeros." Soviet weapons because in 1965 Moscow and Havana had signed an agreement that Cuba would seek the Soviets' permission before sending weapons it had received from them to a third party.) They also brought the trucks to transport the men and materiel to the CIRs. (The Cubans had correctly surmised that the MPLA would be unable to provide sufficient transportation.) There were problems, however, with the trucks that came aboard the *Vietnam Heroico* and the *Coral Island*, which "arrived in poor condition," Díaz Argüelles told Colomé,

and we had to repair a great many of them. . . . When I told you how important it was that the equipment arrive in good condition I was thinking about this kind of problem, because I knew that we would have to transport most of the men and material in our own trucks. The distances here are very great . . . and there are neither mechanics nor spare parts ... Comandante, this is the largest operation we have ever undertaken and we are doing it in the worst conditions and circumstances. With little time for planning and with almost no knowledge of and experience in the country . . . we have had to improvise as we go along ... It is a task of enormous magnitude ... I have taken the steps necessary to start the training on October 15 . . . so that the troops will be ready on November 5.55

By October 18-20, almost on schedule, the instructors, recruits and equipment were in place and the four CIRs were ready to start operations. On paper, the MMCA had 480 men, 390 of whom were instructors in the four CIRs and seventeen of whom were a medical brigade. (There were 284 officers.) Actually, there were almost 500, because a few civilian pilots had been sent at Díaz Argüelles' request to fly the small civilian planes that the MPLA had acquired and some specialists in air traffic control and handling cargo at ports were also attached to the MMCA.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the civil war continued. The FNLA controlled Angola's can military historian. Prodded by UNITA, the FNLA, Mobutu and the United States, Pretoria decided to escalate. "The go-ahead was given on October 14." ⁶⁶

That day, a South African column crossed into Angola from northeastern Namibia (South-West Africa). For the first few days the column moved west just north of the border. Then it veered north-west deep into Angola.⁶⁷ The South Africans advanced at full speed, sixty or seventy kilometers a day, meeting scant and ineffectual resistance. Sa da Bandeira (Lubango) fell on October 24; Moçamedes, the major port of southern Angola, on the 28th.

At first Díaz Argüelles underestimated the gravity of the threat. There were no Cubans in the area, and he had no clear idea of the strength of the enemy. "The MPLA still has the advantage, only ten days before independence," he concluded at the end of October. "The enemy, ill-prepared and dispirited, including the Zairian army units ... is giving us the breathing space to train the [MPLA] battalions."⁶⁸

On November 2 and 3, Cubans participated in the fighting for the first time since the battles for Morro do Cal and Quiangombe on October 23 and 28. This time, the military instructors joined in the fight to defend Benguela from the advancing South Africans. "We were facing the best organised and heaviest FAPLA opposition to date," wrote a South African, Cdr. Jan Breytenbach, who led one of the invading units.⁶⁹

Outgunned and outnumbered, the defenders of Benguela withdrew. Savimbi crowed: "Some time ago I promised you that there would be military surprises in Angola," he told the press in Kinshasa. "We are now witnessing the disintegration of Neto's troops on Angolan territory. Today I promise you even greater surprises before November 11, because we know that there are only nine days left."⁷⁰ On November 6, Benguela was in South African hands. The next day Lobito, twenty miles north of Benguela and Angola's major commercial port, fell. "We were, evidently, on our way to Luanda," writes Breytenbach. "Fresh troops were being deployed from South Africa and the whole campaign was beginning to look more South African than Angolan."⁷¹

The South Africans, however, echoed by the entire Western press, absolutely denied that their troops were fighting in Angola and attributed the victories to a revived FNLA and UNITA. The MPLA, on the other hand, denounced the South African invasion as early as October 22.⁷²

As the South Africans were closing in on Benguela, the MPLA's Political Bureau "met in an emergency session" and listened to Neto's proposal: to ask Cuba for troops. "There was unanimous agreement," states a wellinformed account. Central Committee member Henrique Santos, who had studied and trained in Cuba in the 1960s, immediately flew to Havana bearing the MPLA's request.⁷³ The Cubans' response "was, I can say, immediate," writes an MPLA leader.⁷⁴ On November 4, Cuba decided to send troops to Angola. "That same day the head of the MMCA was instructed to make arrangements with the MPLA for our planes to land in Luanda."75

The first Cuban troops-158 men from the elite Special Forces of the Ministry of Interior-left aboard two Cuban planes on November 7, arriving in Luanda two days later.⁷⁶ Through the rest of November and December the Cubans succeeded in holding a line less than two hundred miles south of Luanda even though the South Africans enjoyed superiority in numbers and material. (North of Luanda, the Cubans swiftly defeated Roberto's motley horde.) There were numerous skirmishes and two small battles as the South Africans attempted to break through: at Ebo, on November 23-"Black Sunday," according to a South African historianthe Cubans scored a significant victory;⁷⁷ and on December 12, at Bridge 14, fourteen miles south of the strategic village of Catofe, the South Africans took their revenge, but the Cubans quickly regrouped and stopped them before they could reach Catofe. The South Africans were impressed: the Cape Times reported on November 21 that "FNLA and UNITA commanders [maintaining the fiction that South African troops had nothing to do with it] greatly admired the courage of what they said were mercenaries from Cuba fighting with the MPLA." The official South African historian of the war writes, "The Cubans rarely surrendered and simply cheerfully fought until death."⁷⁸ By late December, the Cubans finally reached rough numerical parity with the South Africans and prepared to go on the offensive. [doc. 6]

According to Westad, "After the creation of the MPLA regime [on November 11] the [Soviet] Politburo authorized the Soviet General Staff to take direct control of the trans-Atlantic deployment of additional Cuban troops, as well as the supplying of these troops with advanced military hardware."79 The Cuban evidence, however, tells a different story. Until January 1976, the it indicates, all Cuban troops and weapons were transported to Angola on Cuban ships and Cuban planes (Britannias and IL-18s) without any Soviet involvement. It was the Cubans' inability to find friendly places in which to refuel their planes that led them to seek Soviet help in late December. The Britannias and the IL-18s needed to refuel twice en route to Luanda. The second stop presented no problem: Guinea-Bissau was steadfast in its support. The problem was with the first stop. Initially, Barbados agreed, but under U.S. pressure it withdrew its permission on December 17; thereafter the Cubans used, in quick succession, Guyana and the Azores.⁸⁰ In early January, the Soviet Union agreed to provide its IL-62s, which could fly directly from Cuba to Bissau. The first IL-62 left Havana on January 9 with Cuban troops and Soviet pilots. (The Cubans had not yet been trained to fly the plane.)⁸¹

Risquet states that on 16 January 1976, Cuba and the USSR signed a military protocol in which the Soviets agreed to transport weapons for the Cuban troops in Angola.⁸² I have not seen the protocol. I have, however, two documents that support Risquet's statement: a January 29 letter from Risquet to Castro [doc. 7] and a January 30 note stating that two Soviet ships had left for Angola with the first shipment of weapons for the Cuban troops there.⁸³

It is important to put Westad's comments in context. He writes that "... the Soviet General Staff ordered about sixty of their own officers to join the Cuban forces from Congo. These men started arriving in Luanda on the evening of November 12." In the Cuban documents in my possession there are only six references to Soviet officers in Angola, and all of them are related to the dispatch of Soviet weapons to Angola [for one, see doc. 7]; none mentions any Soviet input into military strategy. Furthermore, I have seen an additional file of documents that would prove conclusively how little Soviet officials had to do with Cuban military strategy and tactics. These are cables from Fidel Castro to the Cuban commanders in Angola. They demonstrate the extraordinary degree of control that Castro exerted over the conduct of the war. In February 1996 I was allowed to read these cables, but, unfortunately, they may never be released-not because they contain controversial material (even the most ornery Cuban censor would be hard put to find much to sanitize in them), but because only Fidel Castro can declassify them and he is busy with other matters.

My failure to obtain copies of these cables is all the more frustrating since many, particularly Americans, may read this story of the early relationship between Cuba and Africa and reflexively ask, what about the Soviet Union? Wasn't Cuba acting as a Soviet proxy?

It is a frustrating question, for it requires one to prove a negative on the basis of incomplete information. Since no available documents bear directly on the question, I can only offer an informed opinion. There are two ways to address it. One is to look broadly at Cuba's Africa policy and its overall relationship to Soviet policy. The second is to analyze Cuban motivations in Africa.

During the period under consideration, Cuban and Soviet policies ran along parallel tracks in Africa. This was not a given: they could have been at loggerheads, as they were in Latin America through the mid-1960s because of Cuba's support for armed struggle there. No such clash, however, occurred in Africa. In Algeria, for example, the Soviets had no objection to Cuba's very close relations with Ahmed Ben Bella's regime and seem to have welcomed Cuba's decision, in October 1963, to send a military force to help Algeria rebuff Morocco's attack. Similarly, in Congo Leopoldville the Soviets must have welcomed Guevara's column, since they were themselves helping the rebels. These parallel and often mutually supporting tracks are even more evident in the case of Guinea-Bissau. The Soviets began giving aid to the PAIGC in 1962, well before Cuba did. From June 1966, the Cuban military presence complemented and enhanced the Soviet role, since the Cubans were

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nied me.

This high morale, the large number of our troops and the large supply of material, the nature of the terrain, and the material and psychological condition of the enemy lead me to conclude that there are no big problems for our [defensive] line at Amboim-Ebo-Quibala-Cariango; that we have recovered the initiative in the south; that in the next few days our "active defense" will gain ground in the south. ... Risquet.⁹⁴

[Source: Archives of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, Havana.]

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FAR en defensa de la independencia y la soberanía de los pueblos" [Internationalist missions of the FAR in defense of the independence and the sovereignty of other peoples], n.d., 26-34, Archives of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Havana. ⁵¹ *Le Monde*, 14 January 1976, 8; Kissinger's testimony of 29 January 1976 in U.S. Senate,

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COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY

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by Odd Arne Westad¹

For a period of roughly twenty years-from the formation of the Cuban-Soviet alliance in the early 1960s until the Red Army got bogged down in the valleys of Afghanistan in the early 1980s-the Soviet Union was an interventionist power with global aspirations. The peak of Soviet interventionism outside Eastern Europe was in the mid- and late 1970s, and coincided roughly with the rise of detente and the effects of the American defeat in Vietnam. This period witnessed significant efforts by Moscow to expand its power abroad, especially in the Middle East, around the Indian Ocean, and in Southern Africa. But it was also a period in which the traditional cautiousness of Soviet Third World diplomacy was cast away at a peril: By the mid-1980s, many Russians had started to question the costs of the Kremlin's imperial ambitions.²

What was behind the new Soviet interventionism of the 1970s? Which perceptions and motives led Soviet leaders to involve themselves deeply into the affairs of countries outside Europe or their immediate border areas? As the doors to the archives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) open, albeit slowly, we are getting new insights into the old problems of Moscow's foreign policy behavior through CPSU documents on a multitude of international crises. This article attempts to address some of the issues relating to Soviet interventions by revisiting one of the main African conflicts of the 1970s: the 1975-76 Angolan civil war.mid- and latea setj T* 0 ofesa role in selecting who should be the Soviet allies in the area, and the large deposits of mineral resources in Southern Africa also played a role (primarily in terms of denying these resources to the US and its allies), but these were subsidiary parts of the equation.

As the Moscow leadership developed its links with the liberation movements, it created African expectations of further support as well as a sense of commitment in its own ranks. This sense of commitment was particularly strong among the cadre of the CPSU CC International Department that handled most of the contacts with African organizations. In addition, the Cuban leadership-who had been involved in African affairs since the mid-1960s⁷—viewed the early Soviet involvement as a harbinger of a much wider East-bloc engagement on the continent.

Still, a larger Soviet operation in black Africa was slow in coming. Moscow's ideologically inspired at-



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military wing—the FAPLA (*Forças* Armadas Popular para Libertação de Angola)—took control of most of the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda in the north. In the main Angolan cities, MPLA organizers, now free to act, started setting up strong para-military groups in populous slum areas, drawing on the appeal of their message of social revolution.²²

Moscow in early December 1974 drew up an elaborate plan for supplying the MPLA with heavy weapons and large amounts of ammunition, using Congo (Brazzaville) as the point of transit. Ambassador Afanasenko got the task of convincing the Congolese of their interest in cooperating. This was not an easy task. Congo had never been a close ally of the Soviet Union-in the ruling military junta were many who sympathized with the Chinese-and it had for some time sponsored both Neto's MPLA rivals and a Cabinda separatist group. The latter issue was particularly problematic, and Agostinho Neto had on several occasions criticized the Congolese leader Colonel Marien Nguabi for his support of Cabindan independence. Still, on December 4 Nguabi gave his go-ahead for the Soviet operation.²³

Though noting the flexibility of the Congolese government, Afanasenko knew that the job of reinforcing the MPLA would not be easy. In a report to Moscow he underlined the problems the MPLA faced on the military side. Both the FNLA, now joined by Daniel Chipenda's MPLA rebels, and UNITA held strong positions and would be equipped further by the Americans and the Chinese. In the civil war which the ambassador predicted, the "reactionaries" would initially have the initiative, and the MPLA would depend on "material assistance from progressive countries all over the world" just to survive. Politically, however, Neto's group, as the "most progressive national-liberation organization of Angola," would enjoy considerable support. On the organizational side, one should not think of the MPLA as a vanguard party, or even as a party at all, but rather as a loose coalition of trade unionists, progressive intellectuals, Christian groups,

and large segments of the petty bourgeoisie.²⁴

In spite of the skirmishes which had already begun between MPLA and FNLA forces in late 1974, African heads of state succeded in convincing the three Angolan movements to join in negotiations with Portugal and thereby attempt an orderly transfer of power in Luanda. These negotiations led to the 15 January 1975 Alvor Agreement, in which 11 November 1975 was set as the date for the Portuguese handing over power to an Angolan coalition government. None of the parties took this last attempt at avoiding civil war too seriously, and sporadic fighting continued. The Alvor Agreement was also undermined both by the Soviet Union and the United States, who decided to expand their programs of military support for their Angolan allies.²⁵

The Soviets were prodded in their widening commitment to the MPLA by the Cuban leaders. Cuba had supplied the MPLA with some material support since the mid-1960s, and Havana had

increasingly come to res, who decided to 4d suppin in neNerial assistasof militment was oc -0.063

that the rival movements, or at least UNITA, would return to the negotiat-

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transported more than 12,000 soldiers by sea and air from Cuba to Africa between late October 1975 and mid-January 1976. In the same period it also provided FAPLA and the Cubans with hundreds of tons of heavy arms, as well as T-34 and T-54 tanks, SAM-7s, antitank missiles, and a number of MiG-21 tions, well knowing that such a demilitarization of the conflict—albeit with a MPLA government in place—was what the Soviets had wanted all along. Havana knew how to placate the great power, although, as we will see below, they exacted their price for doing so.⁵⁷

The second lesson the Soviets believed they had learnt from the Angolan adventure was that the Soviet Union can and must rebuild and reform local anticapitalist groups in crisis areas. The MPLA, local Soviet observers postulated in 1976, was saved from its own follies by advice and assistance from Moscow, which not only helped it win the war, but also laid the foundation for the building of a "vanguard party." The Angolan movement had earlier been plagued by "careerists and fellow-travellers," but, due to Soviet guidance, the "internationalists" were in ascendance. These new leaders-men like Lopo do Nascimento and Nito Alves-understood that the MPLA was part of an international revolutionary movement led by Moscow and that they therefore both then and in the future depended on Soviet support.58

It was these "internationalists" who Moscow wanted to assist in building a new MPLA, patterned on the experience of the CPSU. Noting the poor state of the MPLA organization in many areas, the Soviet party-building experts suggested that this was the field in which do Nascimento, Alves, and others should concentrate their activities. By taking the lead in constructing the party organization they would also be the future leaders of the Marxist-Leninist party in Angola.⁵⁹

The Soviets supplied very large amounts of political propaganda to be disseminated among MPLA supporters and used in the training of cadre. The ordinary embassy staff sometimes found the amounts a bit difficult to handle—a plane-load of brochures with Brezhnev's speech at the 25th CPSU congress, two plane-loads of anti-Maoist literature—but in general the embassy could put the materials to good use (or so they claimed in reports to Moscow). By summer 1976 they had run out of Lenin portraits, and had to request a new supply from the CPSU Propaganda Department.⁶⁰

The transformation of the MPLA turned out to be an infinitely more difficult task for the Soviets than the dissemination of Lenin busts. Neto's independence of mind and his claim to be a Marxist theoretician in his own right rankled the Russians and made it increasingly difficult for them to control the MPLA as soon as the military situation stabilized. Some of the Angolan leaders whom Moscow disliked, for instance FAPLA veteran commander and defense minister Iko Carreira and MPLA general secretary Lucio Lara, who was strongly influenced by the European left, strengthened their positions after the war was over. According to the embassy, the influence of such people delayed both the necessary changes in the MPLA and the finalization of the development plans on which the Soviets and Cubans

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mire''' [Rethinking Policy in the Third World], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*' 4 (April 1990).

³ A classic summary is Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs* 45 (April 1967). George W. Breslauer has an excellent survey of recent literature on Soviet interventions in "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," *World Politics* 44: 3 (July 1987), 429-448.

⁴ Karen N. Brutents, former first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 (hereafter "Brutents interview"). For a discussion, see Steven R. David, "Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups," *International Security* 11 (Summer 1986), 3-36.

⁵ Celeste A. Wallander, "Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought," *World Politics* 42:1 (October 1989), 31-37; Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars* 1945-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36-59. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Intervention: Americans and Soviets in the Third World," *The National Interest* (Spring 1987), 39-47.

⁶ Huntington, "Patterns of Intervention," 43; on Soviet interest groups, see Jan S. Adams, "Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee," Slavic Review 48: 4 (Winter 1989), 614-30 and, for an insider's view of one of the institutions, former head of the KGB First Chief Directorate Leonid V. Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy: Zapiski nachalnika sovetskoi razvedki (Moscow: Tsentr-100, 1992). This article is in part based on the archives of the International Department, now kept in TsKhSD. The International Department archives contain a large collection of materials important to understanding Soviet foreign policy history-among them embassy reports, documents created for the Politburo or the party Secretariat, intelligence summaries, and records of conversations with foreign leaders. A small portion of this material-documents which the Politburo or the heads of the MO wanted to have available for reference purposesis held in so-called osobye papki or "special files," most of which are still unavailable to scholars.

⁷ See the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

⁸ KGB to MO [International Department of the CPSU CC], 13 April 1970, TsKhSD, fond (f.) 5, opis' (op.) 62 delo (d.) 535, listy (ll.) 7-9. This report, primarily an analysis of the preparations for the third summit conference of non-aligned nations in Lusaka, also notes that this conference will mean a step forward for Soviet diplomacy, that China's influence within the group is receding, and that the United States is increasingly isolated in the Third World. See also KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 32-35. On the KGB's influence on Brezhnev's thinking: author's interview with Oleg Troianovskii, former Soviet UN ambassador, Moscow, 14 September 1992.

⁹ KGB to MO, 4 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 73-76; KGB (Chebrikov) to MO, 26 November 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 115-118. The latter report is based on an evaluation of European policies toward Portugal, originating with an analysis of materials from the British Conservative Party. The GRU, in a major report on U.S. strategies in Africa, noted that the continent had become more important for the Americans both strategically and in terms of its natural resources. "Capitalist states," said the GRU, "are putting pressure on African countries to enter into base agreements and military assistance plans." TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 71-90, 80. 10

From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 65-69, has a useful account of CIA initiatives on Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Neil Matheson, *The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower Military Intervention in the Third World*, 1975-1980 (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982).

⁵⁵ G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: "Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" [On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, ll. 13-23, 15-16.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 23; Castro discussions, Il. 42-48. For the history of the Cuban-Soviet relationship, see Dominguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, 78-84.
⁵⁷ G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political

⁵⁷ G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: "Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" [On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, ll. 13-14; G.A. Zverev to MO, report on conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó (Head, General Department for International Relations, Cuban Communist Party) - Zverev, 28 May 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 53-54; Castro discussion, l. 45.

⁵⁸ B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 March 1976, report: "O polozhenii v MPLA [On the Situation in the MPLA]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 29-34.

59 Ibid.

⁶⁰ Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 21 June 1976, Report: "Ob informatsionno-propagandistskoi rabote za II kvartal 1976 g." [On Information and Propaganda Work in the Second Quarter of 1976], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 60-62. The embassy did, however, find it difficult to dispose of "several" sets of Lenin's collected works in French—not surprisingly, since more than 90 percent of all Angolans were illiterate and those who were able to read mostly did so in Portuguese.

⁶¹ Castro discussions; F.D. Kudashkin (councellor, Luanda) to MO, 30 July 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 82-83. By the end of 1976 Soviet authorities were hard-pressed to find the Marxist-Leninist avant-garde in Angola. See N.P. Tolubeev (Soviet ambassador, Havana) to MO, 10 December 1976, memorandum of conversation Jorge Risquet - Tolubeev, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 121-123.

⁶² On Fidel Castro: Marquez, "Operation Carlota," 1-2; Castro discussions, 1. 46; G.A. Zverev to MO, 28 May 1976, memorandum of conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó - Zverev, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 49-54.

63 Castro discussions, ll. 43, 47.

⁶⁴ Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 August 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513.

⁶⁵ Philip Windsor, "Superpower Intervention," in Hedley Bull, ed., *Intervention in World Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 54. Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, *Angola in the Front Line* (London: Zed, 1983), 85-99, is a generally reliable account of the Alves coup.

⁶⁶ George W. Breslauer, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987), 429-48; Richard F. Herrmann, "Soviet Behavior In Regional Conflicts: Old Questions, New Strategies, and Important Lessons," *World Politics* 44: 3 (April 1992), 432-65;

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From the diary of E.I. Afanasenko

SECRET Copy No. 2 Ser. No. 181 military aid to all three Angolan national liberation movements until the granting of independence to Angola.

I thanked the president of the MPLA for the interesting information. I promised

to explain the Angolan position with regard to Zaire and to gather information on the real nature of the events in the Zairian province of Shaba. The delegations should once again underscore that neither Angola, nor the Soviet Union, nor Cuba bear any relation to the events in the province of Shaba, and that these events are an internal Zairian problem.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that there are objective factors which facilitate the continual occurrence of conflicts and tension in this region. The colonizers, when they drew the borders between states, did not take into account the ethnic make-up of the population. As a result, the significant nationality of the Lunda was broken up and in the current time lives in three countries - Zaire, Angola and Zambia. Moreover, at the current time there are over 250,000 Zairian refugees in Angola, who are mainly of the Lunda nationality and among them from 20,000 to 30,000 are former soldiers, the so-called Katanga gendarmes. After the war of independence, the central authorities in Zaire began to persecute members of the Lunda nationality who lived in the province of Shaba. Unlawful arrests took place as well as the execution of Zairian soldiers of the Lunda nationality.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that the province of Shaba is the richest of all Zairian provinces and provides a significant part of the hard-currency goods which enter the country, and that some of the largest foreign monopolies have invested capital in the exploitation of the natural resources of the province.

The catastrophic condition of the Zairian economy, the dizzying rise of prices, the corruption which has enveloped the whole machinery of state, including the army, the unbearably serious condition of the population, particularly of national minorities and the greater part of the military, aggravates the conflict between the Kinshasa government and the Lunda nationality, and lead to the revolts which occur from time to time among the soldiers of Lunda nationality in the Zairian army. During moments of acute conflict the Lunda refugees in Angola seek to assist their fellow-tribesmen in the province of Shaba. Moreover, all of the refugees in Angola, it goes without saying, would like to return to their homeland in Zaire. It is practically impossible to control the movement of

groups of Lunda nationality from Angola into Zaire and back, since the border between Angola and Zaire stretches out for approximately two thousand kilometers.

P. Luvualu underscored that Mobutu, in every instance when an internal conflict arises, strives by using false pretexts, to internationalize it. The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT [referred to] the interference of Western powers—the members of NATO in the previous conflict in the province of Shaba and their proposal to create an inter-African armed force which would be used not only to resolve the current tasks of putting down the revolt of the Lunda nationality, [but also for] the preservation of the Mobutu regime, and the possibility for foreign monopolies to continue to exploit the resources of the province of Shaba.

The fact, declared P. Luvualu, that the Republic of South Africa has expressed a desire to take part in the inter-African forces confirms our evaluation of the neo-colonial nature of these forces. This evaluation is also confirmed by the fact that China has sent military instructors to Zaire and has offered equipment for arming the inter-African forces.

In the estimation of P. Luvualu, this issue concerns armed forces of international imperialism which are being created by NATO with the aim of supporting reactionary, unpopular regimes in Africa as well as supporting the struggle against progressive African countries and national liberation movements.

The long term goals of the Western countries consist of strengthening the position of NATO in the central part of Africa in order to break through to the Indian Ocean, i.e. for the neo-colonial conquest of Africa.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that the evaluation by the Angolan leadership of the events in Zaire is confirmed likewise by the resolution of the Western countries to offer Kinshasa economic assistance. The Western countries, as is well known, as a condition for granting such assistance demanded, first, a reform of the management of the Zairian economy and finances according to which representatives of the USA, France, Belgium, and the Federal Republic of Germany would have full control over the economy, finances, and the actions of the administrative apparatus from top to bottom. Secondly, they put forward a demand for the reconciliation of the central Kinshasa authorities with the Lunda nationality in order that foreign monopolies might without resistance exploit the wealth of the province of Shaba. And, finally, the Western countries persist in seeking the reconciliation of Zaire with Angola in order to renew the transport of natural resources from the province of Shaba along the Benguela railroad.

P. Luvualu remarked in this connection that the president of the People's Republic of Angola, A. Neto, in his declaration of July 9, announced that the Zairian refugees will be led from the Zairian borders into the interior of Angola, that Angola will disarm the detachments of the FNLC [Front for the National Liberation of the Congo] which and to achieve an internal settlement on the model of the internal settlement of Rhodesia with the aid of puppets like Chipanga.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that the People's Republic of Angola will continue to support SWAPO. The Angolan leadership, he said, considers that for the peaceful resolution of the Namibian problem the Republic of South Africa should: officially define a deadline for the transfer of Walvis Bay to the authorities of Namibia, after declaring the independence of that country; for a period of transition draw off its troops, which are now concentrated on the border with Angola, to bases in the South of Namibia; immediately liberate all political prisoners in Namibia. P. Luvualu likewise remarked that Angola concurs with the proposed role of the UN in the transitional period in Namibia.

In conclusion P. Luvualu underscored that the maneuvers of Western countries around Angola will not succeed in forcing the MPLA-PT to turn from the path it has tries.

The active interference of England in the affairs of Zambia may ensure the victory of the puppet government, which would possibly lead to a conflict between ZANU and ZAPU if the unity of their actions are not achieved, noted my interlocutor.

He reported that the armed forces of the ZANU and the ZAPU include in total 24 thousand people (12 thousand in each organization), but unfortunately, these forces are as yet inactive. In the ranks of mercenaries there are 3 thousand blacks and 2 thousand whites.

R.V. Vivo briefly set forth the content of his discussion with the Soviet ambassador in Mozambique. According to his words, during the discussion of the situation in southern Africa, our ambassador noted that according to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, it is impossible to accelerate events in a country where there is not a revolutionary situation and where there is not civilization. "To that I responded in jest to the Soviet ambassador," said R.V. Vivo, "that if comrades L.I. Brezhnev and F. Castro decide that our countries will take part in the operations in Rhodesia, then we will participate in them."

By my request R.V. Vivo briefly informed me about the work of the last plenum of the CC Comparty of Cuba. He reported that the plenum summed up the fulfillment of the resolutions of the First Party Congress, revealed the deficiencies in the development of the national economy of the country, and set its course to overcome them. In view of the fact that the project for the resolution of the plenum on the given question did not reflect all aspects of the economic situation, the corresponding section of the CC of the Party was tasked with its reworking and with its publication. 38 COLD WAR I

ing a SALT II treaty. Instead of finishing up the arms control treaty—which the Soviets had made a prerequisite for a Carter-Brezhnev summit meeting which the American leader eagerly desired—the Horn Crisis exacerbated superpower tensions and, just as important, seemed to tilt the balance of power within the Carter Administration away from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who stressed reaching agreements with Moscow, and toward Brzezinski, who favored "linkage" between progress toward bilateral accords and Soviet behavior in the Third World. The charges and countercharges between Washington and Moscow, along with disagreements on other areas such as human rights, the Middle East (where the Kremlin accused Washington of backing off an agreed-approach in favor of backing a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli accord), and relations with China, helped stall progress in the SALT II negotiations and generally embitter U.S.-Soviet relations in the first half of 1978. Thus was it said that SALT, or more generally detente, "lies buried in the sands of Ogaden."

Exploring why the U.S.-Soviet detente of the mid-1970s was side-tracked by such seemingly obscure and peripheral issues as the regional crisis in the Horn of Africa was one purpose of the "Carter-Brezhnev Project." Spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Center for Foreign Policy Development at the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, the Carter-Brezhnev Project gathered scholars, former Soviet and American officials, and newly-released documentation for a series of oral history conferences to examine the reasons behind the collapse of detente, and whether those events suggested any lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. Among the scholarly organizations supporting the Project's efforts to obtain fresh evidence from American, Russian, and other archives were the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents

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letter provides the names of two American officials, alleged masterminds of the plot, with their ranks and positions at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. If it is true, as Paul Henze asserts in this publication, that even the names are fictitious, it is odd that the Ethiopian authorities convened a socialist ambassadors' meeting in panic instead of easily verifying through elementary diplomatic inquiry and concluding that it had been a fabrication. The theory of a charade-a make-believe drama enacted on false information-will thus have to include the Ethiopians as well as Soviet authorities as actors if it is to be considered a plausible explanation.

In addition, a few other documents provide accounts of some early reservations the Soviet Union and its allies had about Mengistu's handling of certain issues. It should be noted that in earlier Western writings, some of these reservations were usually associated with a later period, after Gorbachev assumed power in Moscow in 1985. But as early as December 1977, a conversation between the East Germans and Ratanov points toward the need for Ethiopia to adopt a mixed economy along the lines of the Soviet NEP (New 44 Cold War I

actors involved in the decisions that shaped political outcomes. Interestingly, the documents from charade of negotiations. Unfortunately the documents available to us here do not include parallel reports of dealings with the Ethiopian delegation that was in Moscow during the same period, but it appears that the Somalis and the Ethiopians never even engaged in preliminary face-to-face talks. The reason why is easy to see in written statements each delegation gave the Soviets of its country's position, for neither left any room for compromise or even discussion with the other.

While the independence of erstwhile French colony of Djibouti caused immediate worry, both Ethiopia and Somalia behaved with caution. Ratanov did not react to an offer by Mengistu to support intervention in Djibouti. Ethiopia lacked the strength to intervene alone.

The biggest problem looming in the background of the discussions reported in these documents is Eritrea. It was already the most intractable problem of all for Moscow in its relations with Mengistu. Ethiopian military performance in meeting the Somali invasion was inhibited by the predicament which Mengistu had got himself into in Eritrea. The Soviets were not impressed with the performance of Mengistu's army in Eritrea. An East German document from December 1977 reveals what appears to be Ambassador Ratanov's irritation at Mengistu's intransigence on Eritrea as well as the hope that somehow a basis for negotiation with the rebel movement there might be developed. This became a major Soviet aim during the next decade and led to repeated East German efforts (and some Italian Communist attempts) to bring Eritrean and Ethiopian Marxists together.

In response to Mengistu's urgent pleading, the Soviets agreed during July 1977 to send in urgently needed transport equipment to enable the Ethiopians to utilize some of the tanks and guns the Soviets had already provided as a result of agreements reached during Mengistu's December 1976 and May 1977 visits to Moscow, but the Kremlin was still apparently hoping to limit its commitment. Politburo minutes of 4 and 11 August 1977 confirm decisions to provide Ethiopia support to defend itself against Somalia, but details have not been declassified. This, nevertheless, appears to be the point at which, de facto, Moscow finally made an irrevocable decision to opt for Ethiopia over Somalia.

Whether or not Ambassador Ratanov agreed with Moscow's continued insistence on further efforts to bring the Somalis and Ethiopians together in negotiations at "the expert level," he followed Moscow's orders and repeated this position as late as 23 August 1977 in a meeting with Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia Perez Novoa. The Soviets were even more hesitant on the question of manpower, for the main purpose of this meeting with the Cuban envoy was to chastise him for permitting Cuban Gen. Ochoa to promise Mengistu that more Cuban technicians would be coming: "The decision to send Cuban personnel to Ethiopia does not depend on Havana, but on Moscow." Ratanov expressed the Soviet fear that a largescale introduction of Cubans into Ethiopia could provoke the Eritreans or Somalis to call in troops from supportive Arab countries such as Egypt.

Taken as a whole, these Russian documents seem to have been made available to give a picture of a well-intentioned and relatively benign Soviet Union confronted with a situation it neither anticipated nor desired. The Soviets are shown to be surprised by the crisis, reluctant to choose between Ethiopia and Somalia, and trying to

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ported East Berlin's claim to a *Sonderrolle* (special role) within the so-

surpassed previous commitments to Somalia.

East Germany's increased stature on the Horn was also reflected in the SED's efforts to mediate between the PMAC and the Eritrean liberation movements. Preliminary talks with prove futile. Mengistu had no confidence in the talks with the Eritreans, and the "Cuban comrades have doubts as well," Lamberz reported to Berlin.⁷

Disaster struck in March 1978. Lamberz, whose personal relationship with Mengistu had made the talks possible, died in a helicopter crash in Libya. The negotiations in March proved ever more acrimonious. With the war with Somalia subsiding, the PMAC, by June, went on the offensive in Eritrea, routing the EPLF forces. The SED was, CPSU officials informed their SED counterparts, trying to "square the circle" in Ethiopia. Once the PMAC was on the offensive, the Soviets advised, "an attempt on our part to stop the Ethiopian leadership in its military course is a very delicate problem."8 With interest in a political settlement waning on all sides, the third round of talks (10 June 1978) in Berlin was doomed to fail. The SED had to acknowledge that "the meeting reflected a further hardening of the positions and mutually exclusive positions."9 More clearly than the second meeting, the self-appointed SED mediators had to acknowledge, "it was evident that the PMAC has the intention to seek a military solution." According to an internal SED report, Berhanu now considered the "liberation of Eritrea, of course through force," as the only option.¹⁰ The East Berlin negotiations on Eritrea thus ended in failure. The "best result of the meeting[s] was that the SED comrades are starting to give up on their illusions," one Cuban leader, somewhat gloatingly, related Berhanu's reaction to the break-down of the Berlin talks.¹¹

Subsequent mediation efforts proved similarly futile, and the issue was not resolved until 1991—when the military defeat and overthrow of the Mengistu regime allowed the Eritrean rebel forces to triumph and achieve national independence, which was subsequently ratified by popular referendum.

¹ For a good survey of the East-West German rivalry in Africa see John Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 54-120. See also Jude Howell, "The End of an Era: the Rise and Fall of G.D.R. Aid," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32:2 (1994), 305-328.

2 See the confidential "Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Hermann Axen and the head of the SED Central Committee Working Group in Ethiopia, Comrade Herbert Graf, on 2 August 1978 in the CC Building," *Stiftung* "Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationen der SED" im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (SAPMO-BArch) DY 30 IV 2/2.035/127.

³ East German drafts of the envisioned agreement can be found in SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV 2/ 2.035/127. See, e.g., Klaus Willerding (Dep. Foreign Minister) to Lambert, 30 January 1978, ibid.
⁴ "Memorandum on the Conversation between the General Secretary of the CC of the SED, Erich Honnecker, and the Delegation of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia (PMAC), headed by Berhanu Bayeh on 31 January 1978, in the Residence of the Central Committee," Berlin, 31 January 1978, ibid.

⁵ Both parties agreed to seek a peaceful solution of the conflict. "Information on the Conversations between the Representatives of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) of Socialist Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) under participation of representatives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) at the end of January/early February 1978 in Berlin," Berlin, 6 February 1978, ibid.

⁶ Memorandum, 23 March 1978, ibid.

⁷ Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Lamberz and the Cuban Ambassador in Ethiopia, Comrade Pepe, on 3 March 1978 (based on notes by Comrade Gen. Maj. Jaenicke)," 4 March 1978, ibid.

⁸ "Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Friedel Trappen and Comrade R.A. Uljanowski on Thursday, May 11, 1978, 11:00 am to 1:30 pm in the CPSU Central Committee," ibid.

⁹ Information on the Third Meeting between the representatives of the PMAC of Socialist Ethiopia and the EPLF in Presence of the delegate of the SED Central Committee on 10 June 1978 in Berlin, ibid.; on 10 June 1978 in Berlin, ibid. ¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Memorandum by Hermann Graf on a 16 June 1978 Conversation with Valdez Vivo, 21 June 1978, ibid. 50 Cold War International History Project B

can Military Advisory Group]. In the course of a demonstration of by a group organized by the Military Council on 3 January in Addis Ababa in connection with the abovenoted pronouncements of Teferi Banti, anti-American performances by an array of orators were also seen, along with anti-American placards and so forth, although official declarations, including those by Teferi Banti himself, contained no such direct anti-American missives.

At the same time, Malin continued, the Ethiopian government displays an interest in continuing to receive various forms of assistance from the USA, especially military assistance, and frequently talks about the timetable for the delivery of military supplies and so forth. Prior to the change of regime in Ethiopia, American military assistance was at an annual level of 10-12 million American dollars and was administered preferentially on an uncompensated basis (deliveries of arms, ammunition, spare parts, etc.). In recent years, owing to the new policy of the USA in the area of military cooperation with foreign governments, American military assistance to Ethiopia has been granted preferentially on commercial terms, and it includes several types of more advanced armaments, in connection with which the value of the assistance has grown. Thus, the signing of a multi-year contract in 1975 envisions the supply of armaments, spare parts and ammunition in the approximate sum of 250 million American dollars. Already in 1976 the USA supplied Ethiopia with part of those arms, including several "Phantom" fighter planes. This year a supply of several additional fighter planes is contemplated, as well as supplies for the Ethiopian navy, and radar defenses.

Malin noted further that the new Ethiopian administration is pursuing a policy of seeking methods of receiving military assistance from other sources as well, possibly on terms more advantages to it, including from the USSR (he is aware of the visit by the Ethiopian military delegation to Moscow in December of 1976), as well as the PRC [People's Republic of China], although he doubts that the Chinese are capable of supplying Ethiopia with "serious armaments."

The USA, Malin emphasized, does not oppose the "socialist choice" of new Ethiopia and, as before, firmly supports the principal of respect for its territorial integrity, and is against the partition of Ethiopia. The USA, it is understood, is interested in the guarantee of stability in that region and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

Responding to pertinent questions, he said that the American-Ethiopian agreement of 1953 "on mutual security guarantees" concerned the preferential supply of assistance by the USA to the armed forces of Ethiopia and the guarantee of "certain American interests," first and foremost of which was the operation of the "center of communications" in Asmara, which was of great importance at the time (that center has now been curtailed in significant part); but, as he understands it, [the agreement] does not call for the direct involvement of American armed forces in the defense of Ethiopia's security, for example, in the case of aggression against it or a threat to its territorial integrity.

Concerning the present deterioration in Ethiopian-Somali relations, as far as Malin knows, the USA has not undertaken any diplomatic steps toward its normalization or restraint of anti-Ethiopian actions by the Arab countries, and in fact the Ethiopian government itself has not raised the issue with the USA.

One of the potential sources for an eruption of a conflict in that region, in Malin's opinion, is the independence of Djibouti that has emerged this year, inasmuch as a serious disagreement exists between Somalia and Ethiopia regarding the future policy of Djibouti. In recent months, the Somalis have succeeded in reinforcing their political influence in Djibouti, and their ties with its present leaders, which has seriously worried the Ethiopians. It is evident, as well, that after its declaration of independence, Djibouti will enter the League of Arab Nations, both in political and economic respects, inasmuch as the position of Djibouti will be complicated following the departure of the French. An array of Arab nations has already established consulates there. The USA also intends to do this prior to the declaration of independence, having requested appropriate permission from the government of France.

In the course of the discussion, Malin expressed interest in the state of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, having come upon rumors concerning the upcoming visit to the USSR of First Deputy Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam, and also in connection with the negative, as he understands it, attitude of Somalia toward the prospective development of Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation.

I told Malin that our traditionally friendly relations with Ethiopia have a tendency to develop further, as evident from the joint Soviet-Ethiopian communique of 14 July 1976, resulting from the visit to Moscow of an Ethiopian state delegation; the growth of Soviet technical assistance to Ethiopia (teachers in the University, doctors, etc.); the work here during the second half of last year by Soviet economic experts, and so forth. It was pointed out that the continuation of contacts between the two countries at a high level would be the natural procedure under such conditions, although, however, that question had not come up in respect to a concrete plan. I said further that we are aware of the disagreements between Somalia and Ethiopia, and that our unwavering position in that connection is to serve as a motivation for both countries to move towards a peaceful resolution of these disagreements at the negotiating table, in order to prevent a deterioration of circumstances in this region. This relates as well to our position in connection with the current complication in Sudanese-Ethiopian relations. As concerns the future of developments in Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation, it is understood that this cannot be directed against Somalia, with whom we are also developing friendly relations, as the Somali leadership is well aware.

Malin asked, in my opinion, in what spheres would the interests of the USA in Ethiopia not be counter to the interests of the Soviet Union.

I replied, that in my view, these spheres would first and foremost encompass the conduct of a policy of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia; noninterference in its internal affairs; a realistic approach to the social-economic and political transformations taking place in the country by the will of the people; the building of peace and security and a halt to the growth of tensions and conflicts between the countries of that region; and adherence to the principle of unrestricted navigation in the Red Sea, in accordance with recognized standards of international law and the interests of peaceful relations in general.

Thanking me for the conference, Malin expressed a desire for continuation of fur-

ther contacts and exchanges of opinions regarding the questions discussed, as to which, for his part, he stated his agreement.

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pia will lead to a split of the multinational Ethiopian state, which will facilitate the unification of the Ogaden territory with Somalia.

The Somali government recently has activated its propaganda against Ethiopia and its activity in the international arena, with the goal of enlisting support for its position vis-a-vis the new Ethiopian regime, which, as it believes, is conducting in relation to Somalis the former imperial "colonial policy." This point of view was expressed by the vice president of the SDR [Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar during his visit last year to a number of European socialist countries and to Cuba. However, in no instance did it meet with understanding. Somalia is also taking certain steps in Arab countries so as to receive support for its claims to Ogaden and Djibouti. In this regard the Somalis point to the fact that the joining of Djibouti to the "Arab world" (SDR is a member of the Arab League) promises it not insignificant benefits in realizing plans to turn the Red Sea into an "Arab lake."

Arab reaction supports and heats up the aspirations of the Somalis, with the goal of putting pressure on the progressive Ethiopian leadership. President of Somalia Siad intends in the beginning of 1977 to complete a trip to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and several other Arab countries. As he left in January 1977 for Khartoum to prepare for this visit, Member of the Politburo of the CC of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party [Ahmed] Suleiman [Abdullah] public expressed himself in vulgar anti-Ethiopian thrusts. Suleiman openly spoke out in support of the Eritrean separatists, and also in favor of a proposal to move the headquarters of the OAU from Addis Ababa to another capital, a proposal for which Sudan and several African countries with a pro-Western orientation recently expressed support.

Beginning in the 1960s, in almost every instance of a serious aggravation of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, Ethiopia and Somalia have appealed to the Soviet government with a request to assert influence on the government of the other country with the goal of normalizing the situation. Recently, both Somalia and Ethiopia have repeatedly called for more active participation by the Soviet Union in settling their bilateral relations. In this regard each of them is counting on the Soviet Union to support precisely their position, using for this its authority and friendly relations with the opposing side.

In January 1976, Siad Barre informed the Soviet government of [Somalia's] intention to enter into negotiations with the Ethiopian leadership about the creation of a Federation of Somalia and Ethiopia. In this regard the President requested the Soviet side to join the negotiations as a mediator. Insofar as the goal and character of a federation, as well as the possible position of Ethiopia, were not clear, it was decided to avoid defining our attitude to this initiative and mediation on this issue. In November 1976 Siad Barre expressed the wish that the Soviet side would report to the Ethiopian leadership about the wish of the SDR to begin a peaceful dialogue with Ethiopia on the disputed issues which they have. This wish was brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Committee of the PMAC for political and foreign affairs through the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa.

At the end of 1976 the Cubans and South Yemenis came out with an initiative to provide mediatory services towards a settlement of Somalia-Ethiopia relations. The Somali government, not rejecting this proposal, spoke out in favor of the Soviet Union as well participating directly in the mediation. The Ethiopian side, regarding the mediation initiative favorably, did not express an analogous wish. Cuba and the PDRY through diplomatic channels are taking certain steps to organize meetings between the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia.

The position of the Soviet Union on the question of the Ethiopia-Somalia territorial dispute, which many times has been brought to the attention of the governments of both countries, is that Ethiopia and the SDR must take all possible measures to settle their disagreements by means of negotiations and to find a way to lessen the tension in Ethiopia-Somalia relations.

The friendly advice of the USSR government, aimed at a settlement of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, has been favorably accepted by the governments of both countries. In responses to our appeals both Ethiopia and Somalia have announced their readiness to resolve all disputed issues by means of negotiations and not to allow the unleashing of a new armed conflict.

Third African Department MFA USSR

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1632, ll. 39-44; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff; note revisions to this document added in late May-early June, printed below.]

Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov and Cuban Ambassador in Ethiopia Jose Peres Novoa, 10 February 1977

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2	
From the diary of	"30" March 1977
RATANOV, A.P.	Issue No. 129

RECORD OF CONVERSATION With the Ambassador of Cuba in Ethiopia JOSE PERES NOVOA 10 February 1977

During a conversation which took place in the Soviet Embassy, Jose Peres Novoa reported that on 8 February he had visited Mengistu Haile Mariam at the latter's request.

Mengistu requested that the Ambassador pass on to Fidel Castro a verbal message in which the PMAC requests Cuba to provide assistance to the Ethiopian People's Militia via deliveries of small arms. In this regard Mengistu declared that the Americans had already refused to provide spare parts for tanks, [and] had suspended deliveries of spare parts for all kinds of weapons, and that the PMAC expects the USA, after the events of 3 February to apply even harsher sanctions against Ethiopia. At the same time the USA is providing military assistance to Sudan, [and] Kenya, and is USSR AMBASSADOR IN ETHIOPIA /s/ A. RATANOV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, l. 85; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Soviet Embassy in East Germany, Report for CPSU CC Summarizing repeatedly of the assistance and support which Somalia receives from China.

According to various [sources of] information, apart from a strongly progressive core in the Somali leadership, there is also a pro-China force which leans to the side of reactionary Arab states. (Last year Somalia was accepted into the Arab League as its youngest member.)

/s/ comr. R. A. Ulianovskii

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 1618, ll. 1-5.]

Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Somalia G.V. Samsonov and Somali President Siad Barre, 23 February 1977

EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA

From the journal of Secret. Copy No. 2 G.V. SAMSONOV Orig. No. 101

Touching upon his initiative for cooperation between the USSR and the SDR, the President repeated the suggestion he made earlier (17 January 1977) that the Soviet Union take on the development of the lands of the Fanole project. According to the President, Somalia had neither the necessary experts, nor technology, nor resources, and that it would be incorrect to invite other countries to carry out those tasks. Siad said that the provision about development of those lands had not been included in the original agreement on Fanole project construction only because of the incompetence of the Somali representatives who signed that document.

The President also reminded me of his request concerning construction of a naval base in the region of Mogadishu, and also of docks in Berbera and Kismayu, which was stated in the memorandum delivered to Moscow by First Vice President Samantar. Those projects are still in force and the Somali leadership is expecting the Soviet government to examine them favorably.

Speaking about the military airfield in Berbera which had been opened recently, Siad said that it had been built without taking into account the prospects of its possible civilian utilization. This airfield should serve not only the interests of the USSR, but the interests of the SDR also. In order for this airfield to be used by civil aviation in the future, it would be necessary additionally to build a control tower for air traffic controllers, a room for transit passengers, other necessary services of a modern airport, and also a hotel for 200-300 rooms in the city, in which the Soviet air crews and naval ing the unfriendly position of the Somali leadership towards the "revolutionary regime" in Ethiopia. In the opinion of Nyerere, for the foreseeable future one cannot expect the establishment of a friendly relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia. The maximum one can achieve is to avoid an open clash between Ethiopia and Somalia, by persuading both sides of the need to maintain mutual restraint. Nyerere and Machel said that satisfaction of the territorial demands of Somalia would automatically result in the collapse of the progressive regime in Ethiopia. All three leaders evaluated very highly the position of the Soviet Union and agreed with our opinion that progressive states must more actively come out in support of the Ethiopian revolution and advocate the normalization of Ethiopian-Somali relations....

The main topic of conversation [of Podgorny] with Siad Barre was the issue of the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia, and also the situation emerging in this region of Africa in connection with activities of reactionary Arab forces. Exchange of opinions revealed that the Somali leadership adheres to its old positions regarding its territorial demands on Ethiopia. Siad Barre justified this stand [by referring] to the pressure of internal nationalistic circles of Somalia.

At the same time Siad Barre did not deny that there were progressive developments in Ethiopia. He distanced himself from reactionary leaders of Arab countries: Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, who sought to liquidate the progressive regime in Ethiopia. Siad called the President of the UAR [Anwar] Sadat a convinced adherent of capitalism, a reactionary, anti-Soviet schemer. In the opinion of Siad, Nimeiry is a man without principles who fell under the influence of Sadat [and] the leadership of Saudi Arabia, as well as the Americans and the British.

Siad declared that Somalia, now as before, seeks to expand cooperation with the USSR. He said that he deems it advisable to hold a meeting with Mengistu with the mediation of the USSR and underscored that only the Soviet Union which possesses great authority and experience could help Somalia and Ethiopia to work out "a formula of honor" that would allow both countries to find a road to reconciliation without losing face....

[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained

and translated from Russian by V. Zubok.]

Transcript of Meeting between East German leader Erich Honecker and Cuban leader Fidel Castro, East Berlin, 3 April 1977 (excerpts)

Minutes of the conversation between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Fidel Castro, Sunday, 3 April 1977 between 11:00 and 13:30 and 15:45 and 18:00, House of the Central Committee, Berlin.

Participants: Comrades Hermann Axen, Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, Paul Markowski (with Comrades Edgar Fries and Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters), Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cienfuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes

Comrade Erich Honecker warmly welcomed Comrade Fidel Castro and the Cuban Comrades accompanying him to this internal conversation on behalf of the Central Committee.

We are very pleased about your visit to the GDR and the opportunity to exchange views about the result of your visit to several African and Arabian countries. On behalf of the Politburo I want to repeat that we consider your visit to these countries as important. I ask Comrade Fidel Castro to take the floor.

[first 16 pages omitted--ed.]

Statements by Comrade Fidel Castro: [...] Before my departure from Aden we discussed with the PDRY leadership the need to do everything possible to arrive at an understanding between Somalia and Ethiopia. I was well received in Somalia. I had asked them not to have any public demonstrations. Siad Barre was very friendly during our first dinner. Prior to my arrival, I had received his reply to a letter of mine regarding the question of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. I had also sent an envoy to Somalia for discussions with Vice President Samantar and Interior Minister Suleiman. Samantar held to leftist positions, while Suleiman was a representative of the right wing. The discussion of our representative with him was very severe. I had already received considerable information in the PDRY regarding the situation in Somalia. The power and influence of the rightist group continue to increase. The Interior Minister, Suleiman, is doing everything possible to bring Somalia closer to Saudi Arabia

and the imperialist countries. Samantar is losing influence. Everything seems to indicate that he is being driven into a corner by the right.

My first evening I wanted to clarify my thoughts about Siad Barre and the Somali revolution. No serious political discussion took place at this dinner; [Siad] Barre explained to me the evolution of the Somali revolution. The next day, we had an extensive sight-seeing program. We went to a Cuban-built militia training center, an agricultural school, a school for nomad children, etc. We were taken around for hours, although we had not yet had a political discussion, and a mass demonstration had been scheduled at noon in the stadium. I understood that they wanted to avoid such a conversation prior to the demonstration. As the demonstration began, Siad Barre and I had still not had a private conversation, and because of this I was very careful. Siad Barre was very arrogant and severe; maybe he wanted to intimidate us.

In my speech to the mass meeting I talked about imperialist policy in the Middle East, the reactionary role of Saudi Arabia, and the actions of other reactionary powers. I did this even though I knew that there was a considerable trend in the country in favor of closer relations with these countries. I talked about the PLO's struggle, the Ethiopian revolution, and the Libyan revolution, and of progressive Algeria that they want to isolate. I talked about Mozambique, and only at the end about how imperialism is doing everything to reverse the progressive order in Somalia. Siad Barre introduced me to participants of the mass meeting without saying a political word.

Before the mass meeting they had played half of a soccer game. It is unknown whether the soccer game was simply an appendage to the demonstration or vice versa. My speech went against the right wing tendencies and supported the left wing. We observed that almost all of the Central Committee members applauded, with the exception of Suleiman and his people. Samantar was very satisfied, and even Siad Barre seemed content. Nevertheless, the mass

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[Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael

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us, American representatives, relying on "various sources in Washington," do not hide the fact that they are irritated by the "Ethiopia's recent anti-American actions," and this country's lack of trust in the USA. At the same time, comments by Westerners reveal that in the back of their minds they are wondering whether the Soviet Union "could assume the entire burden of assistance to Ethiopia."

It is obvious that, pursuing a policy to the detriment of the Ethiopian revolution, the USA and other Western countries will still try to maintain certain spheres of influence in this country. Thus, during the sessions of the IBRD's [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's] "International Development Association" a nointerest credit of \$40 million was extended to Ethiopia for the purpose of road building and irrigation.

ACTING CHARGE D'AFFAIRS OF THE USSR IN ETHIOPIA /s/ S. Sinitsyn

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. 142-144; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow, 13 May 1977

Confidential

ON THE RESULTS OF THE OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION OF THE ETHIOPIAN STATE DELEGA-TION LED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (PMAC) OF SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM

In the course of negotiations the Soviet leaders and Mengistu discussed the issues of bilateral relations and relevant international questions.

The main results of the visit were covered in the Declaration signed on the initiative of the Ethiopian side about the foundations of friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Ethiopia, and in the joint communique, as well as in the published news releases on the course of the visit.

Beside the declaration about the founda-

tions of friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and Ethiopia, [the two sides] also signed an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, a consular convention, a protocol on economic and technical cooperation which envisages assistance to Ethiopia in [construction] of a number of industrial and agricultural objects, provision of buying credit and the commission of Soviet experts.

According to the wishes of the Ethiopian side, an agreement was signed on some additional deliveries of armaments and military equipment to Ethiopia.

The visit of the Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam to the USSR had an obvious goal - to establish direct personal contacts with the Soviet leaders and to ensure the support of the Soviet Union for the cause of the protection and development of the national-democratic revolution in Ethiopia.

On May 6 of this year Mengistu was received by General Secretary of the CC CPSU L.I. Brezhnev. At this talk he informed L.I. Brezhnev on the activities of the new Ethiopian leadership who took a course toward the socialist orientation of the country. On behalf of the Ethiopian people the Chairman of the PMAC expressed profound gratitude for the assistance the Soviet Union renders to Ethiopia in the defense of [its] revolutionary conquests.

L.I. Brezhnev underscored our principled position with regard to progressive transformations in Ethiopia and declared that the Soviet Union, which from the very beginning came out in favor of the Ethiopian revolution, intends to continue this course and to give, as much as it can, political, diplomatic, and other forms of assistance to the new leadership of Ethiopia. L.I. Brezhnev drew Mengistu's attention to the fact it was important, in order to advance the revolutionary process, to create a party of the working class, the intention that the leader of the Ethiopian state had voiced, and to the necessity to activate the international affairs of Ethiopia with the aim of foiling the encroachments of imperialist and other reactionary forces. L.I. Brezhnev expressed concern about the continuing deterioration of relations between the two progressive states that are friendly to us - Ethiopia and Somalia, and pointed to the urgent need to take measures for the improvement of these relations.

Mengistu voiced profound satisfaction with the meeting and the frank, comradely character of the talks.

During negotiations with N.V. Podgorny, A.A. Gromyko, and other Soviet comrades the head of the Ethiopian delegation informed them about the roots of the Ethiopian revolution and its course at the present stage, about internal and external difficulties the new leadership of the country experiences today. Mengistu said that the Ethiopian leadership stands on the platform of Marxism-Leninism and regards the Ethiopian revolution as part of the world revolutionary process. He stressed his intention to create a working class party in Ethiopia. However, he said, the Ethiopian revolution is going through a complicated, one can even say, critical phase. Rightist, as well as ultra-leftist elements, are rising, de facto, in a united front against the revolution. They unleashed a virtual civil war in some provinces of the country. These actions of domestic counterrevolution are linked to the activities of imperialism and other external reactionary forces directed against the new Ethiopia. Mengistu underlined that a special role in these coordinated activities belong to the anti-Communist regime of Numeiri, and behind its back lurk reactionary Arab countries, first of all Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The head of the Ethiopian delegation said that Ethiopia will not overcome external and internal counterrevolution alone, and for that reason it relies on support on the part of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He expressed a wish to develop all-faceted cooperation with the USSR.

Mengistu supplied detailed information on the policy of the Ethiopian leadership on the nationalities question, on his intention to resolve it on a democratic basis in the framework of the unified multinational state. The Ethiopian side judges that the separatist movement in Eritrea, which receives massive support from the Arab countries, acquired a reactionary character after the victory of the national-democratic revolution in Ethiopia.

Mengistu spoke with concern about the position that the Somali leadership took towards the Ethiopian revolution. He favored normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Somalia and the united efforts of the two progressive states in the struggle against imperialism and reaction.

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also to the Ethiopian leadership. Soviet-Ethiopian relations, for understandable reasons, took a special place in the conversations.

Samantar concentrated his attention on the disagreements between Somalia and Ethopia on the territorial question. In justifying the positions of the SDR he mentioned the well-known Somalian arguments. Samantar did not dispute the revolutionary character of the regime of Ethiopia, as the Somalis have done before. Yet he hinted that not everything is normal in the domestic situation in Ethiopia, that the rights of the persons of Somalian extraction who live in Ogaden are still allegedly impinged upon. Samantar said that the leadership of Ethiopia, instead of turning to persuasion as the main tool of bringing the population [of Ogaden] over to its side, all too often resorts to arms.

Our side repeatedly underscored the idea that the main thing now is to avoid military confrontation between Somalia and Ethiopia. We drew [his] attention to the perversity of a situation when two states - Somalia and Ethiopia - who set themselves on the path of revolutionary development are at loggerheads. Of course, we know about the differences of opinion between Somalia and Ethiopia, first of all on the territorial issue. But if a war breaks out between them, only imperialist forces would gain from this. Such a war not only would lead to grave consequences, it would also turn against Somalia and would allow reactionary forces to put a noose around its neck.

L.I. Brezhnev stressed in this regard that one should not allow a military confrontation to flare up between the two progressive states of Africa, and that all issues and disputes between them should be resolved in a peaceful way, at the negotiation table.

As to the domestic situation in Ethiopia, we declared it was not our business to discuss such issues. The Ethiopians themselves Buro dis-

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two countries at the meeting of experts, and precisely this, as we understand, is their first and foremost task, should not be made conditional upon the preliminary resolution of fundamentally disputed questions. This is a point of view which we have expressed more than once to the Somali leadership and it was not met with objections by their side.

The meeting of the delegation with the good services of our side would be genuinely successful if it was concluded by the elaboration by the experts of recommendations to their governments concerning the steps which would lead to the normalization of Somali-Ethiopian relations.

The Soviet side is prepared to cooperate and to offer all possible assistance to the experts of both sides in their elaboration of recommendations for their governments, but does not plan to insist on any particular position. We are prepared to assist actively in the search for a mutually acceptable resolution. If the desire should be expressed, the Somali and the Ethiopian delegations may meet without the participation of the Soviet representatives.

We would be prepared after the meeting with the Ethiopian delegation, if it should be deemed necessary, to engage in further discussion with the Somali experts with the objective of working out a unified approach, of identifying a range of questions, which would be appropriate to discuss, and likewise of identifying procedural questions.

The views which might be expressed in this connection by our delegation, may be reduced, in summary, to the following;

1) the acknowledgment that the continuation of tensions between the two countries is not consistent with the interest of the Ethiopian and Somali nations;

2) the renunciation by the two sides of the use of force in the resolution of disputed questions; the attempt to apply every effort to their settlement by peaceful means, by means of negotiations;

3) the obligation of the two sides to maintain peace and security on their borders, to abstain from every sort of hostile activity, from engaging in hostile propaganda against one another by means of the mass media and to foster, in every possible way, those efforts which will lead to the development of friendly relations;

4) the efforts of the two countries to take measures which are directed at developing economic, trade, and cultural relations, at developing connections between voluntary organizations in the from the moment of the Great October socialist revolution the Soviet Union has invariably supported liberation movements in all corners of the globe. The very activities of the Soviet Union in the United Nations are a testimony to this fact.

I would like to repeat once more that we are prepared to sit down at the negotiating table, if the Ethiopian side will discuss the territorial dispute as a fundamental issue, but if the Ethiopian side will only put forward the issue of the alleged Somali military actions, then there will not be any progress either in the work of this meeting, or in our bilateral relations.

I do not know, H.A. Kasim said in conclusion, whether the Soviet Union will be able to do anything under these circumstances. Unfortunately, we have the dismal example of the mediation of F. Castro, when Mengistu Haile Mariam declared the inexpedience of raising the territorial question, but was prepared to discuss any other questions of secondary importance.

Trust in our candor, we will regret it if the good services of the USSR do not lead to a positive result.

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[...] Taking into account the separate exchanges of opinion taking place with the main Somali and Ethiopian delegations, the Soviet representative, by way of offering his good services, will introduce for consideration in the course of the work an idea of the first steps, which would lead toward the normalization of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia:

1) The renunciation of the application of force in the resolution of disputed questions. The assumption of immediate measures in the cessation of military and other hostile activities.

2) The assumption by both parties of the obligation to maintain peace and security on the borders.

3) To abstain from conducting hostile

means of the mass media, to encourage efforts which would lead to the development of friendly relations.

4) The acknowledgment by both parties of the fact that maintaining tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia is not consistent with the interests of their peoples and impedes the unification of their efforts in the struggle against the common enemy, imperialism.5) The two parties express their agreement to establish and maintain contacts with each other at a variety of levels in the interests of reaching the abovementioned goals.

[I] underscored the fact that we regard this as a working document which contains the recommendations of the Soviet side, which is fulfilling its mission to offer good services. It goes without saying that we are proceeding from the assumption that it will be brought to the attention of the Somali government.

<u>H.A. Kasim</u> declared that the Somali delegation had nothing to add to the considerations which the delegation had expressed earlier, and offered his assurance that the recommendations which were expressed by the Soviet side, would be brought to the attention of the Somali leadership.

[...] [I] thanked H.A. Kasim for his communication and said that I would like to make note again of certain elements, which were contained in the message of response from L.I. Brezhnev to Siad Barre's appeal to him in May of this year. "In agreeing to offer our good services," announced L.I. Brezhnev, "we approach this matter with seriousness and a sense of responsibility. We think that it should be possible to begin a dialogue on a broad basis with the goal of establishing good relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. We consider that the key which might open the road to cooperation in the search for a settlement to difficult disputed problems lies in neighborly relations in the Horn of Africa."

It is hardly necessary for me to comment on this text; it speaks for itself.

The Soviet Union offered its good services even before the exacerbation of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. But

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against Siad Barre and seeking assistance in Ethiopia. We are not organizing, said Mengistu, partisan movements in Somalia, although specific opportunities for that have presented themselves and continue to do so. At the same time, representations of Eritrean organizations have been established in Mogadishu, along with a people's revolutionary party, the Ethiopian Democratic Union, and Fronts for the Liberation of Tigray and Oromia, not to mention the headquarters of the "Revolutionary Front of Western Somalia."

In response to the representations of the Soviet Ambassador, following on the directives of communications from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, concerning the need for preservation of a dialogue with Somalia, Mengistu proclaimed that he was in agreement with the concepts and representations of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. We accepted, he continued, the suggestions of the Soviet Union regarding the organization of a Somali-Ethiopian meeting in Moscow, when Somalia cut short its subversive activity in the Ogadan, and [we] are agreeable to continuing those discussions now, even as Somalia has stationed a portion of its regular troops on the territory of Ethiopia. Together with this, the PMAC will not grant territorial concessions to Somalia, although this is because in such a case the present Ethiopian government will fall. Already at this time, Mengistu noted in this connection, there is talk among the people, and even in right-wing circles, to the effect that the PMAC is not up to the task of defending either Ethiopia or the Ogadan, and that it should therefore be deposed. Berhanu Bayeh, Mengistu continued, has been summoned to Addis Ababa for consultation, and afterward he will return to Moscow without delay, inasmuch as the PMAC has engaged and continues to engage in friendly negotiations with the Somalis over questions relating to the establishment of multi-faceted Ethiopian-Somali cooperation. Mengistu promised to consider the form (for example, his interview with the Ethiopian news agency) for additional presentations of the PMAC program for peaceful resolution of Ethiopian-Somali disagreements, as well as the Eritrean problem.

The Soviet Ambassador directed Mengistu's attention to the anti-socialist and even anti-Soviet (Maoist) propaganda which is being disseminating by certain private Ratanov, A.P.

Issue No. 284

RECORD OF CONVERSATION with Chairman of the PMAC of Ethiopia <u>MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM</u> 5 August 1977

I visited Mengistu at his invitation (Berhanu Bayeh, a member of the Permanent Committee of the PMAC, also took part in the conversation).

After thanking the Soviet Union for rendering assistance to Ethiopia, including the decision about the delivery of trailers, helicopters, and vehicles, Mengistu asked me to convey the following to the Soviet leadership and to comrade Brezhnev in particular:

The PMAC has attentively studied the advice in comrade L.I. Brezhnev's reply, and will follow it, in particular: to aim for the political resolution of Ethiopian-Somali differences. On August 8, Berhanu Bayeh, as well as governmental advisers Mikael Imru and Getachew Kibret, will fly to Moscow to continue negotiations with the Somali delegation.

Despite this, Mengistu continued, Somalia is continuing its escalation of military actions against Ethiopia. At present it is conducting systematic bombing raids on cities in the Ogaden (Dollo - on the border with Kenya), and the PMAC is anticipating that Harar, Dire-Dawa, etc. will be bombed. As a consequence of these bombing raids, industrial and agricultural firms and infrastructure are being destroyed. Thus far Ethiopian air forces have limited their bombing raids to Somali tanks and artillery, and air battles with Somali planes, and has refrained from bombing Somali cities because this would create a major military conflagration in this region. We do not intend to attack Somalia, Mengistu emphasized.

In connection with his statement, Mengistu requested that the Soviet government consider taking additional measures to influence Somalia, even some type of economic sanctions, and at the same time convey to the Somali government that Ethiopia is prepared to hold talks with Somalia with the participation of the Soviet Union. What is important now is to bring about a halt in Somali air attacks because these attacks demoralize the army as well as the peaceful population and could cause a political crisis in the regime. In conclusion Mengistu requested that he be kept informed of possible steps that the Soviet Union would take.

During the course of the negotiations, the Soviet ambassador informed Mengistu about the decision of the Soviet government to deliver trailers for the transport of tanks, helicopters, and vehicles, from the port of entry to their destinations.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA (signature) /A. RATANOV/

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 127-128; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov, Memorandum of Conversation with Mengistu, 7 August 1977

From the journal of	TOP SECRET
A. P. RATANOV	Copy no. 2
	16 August 1977
	re: no. 292

Record of Conversation with the Head of the PMAC <u>MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM</u> 7 August 1977

I visited Mengistu Haile Mariam (Legesse Asfaw, member of the Permanent Committee of the PMAC, also took part in the conversation).

1. In accordance with my instructions from the Center [Moscow], I informed Mengistu about the measures taken by the Soviet leadership in support of Ethiopia.

Mengistu requested that I convey his deep gratitude to the Soviet leadership and personally to L.I. Brezhnev for the information about these measures. We deeply trust the Soviet Union, he said, and are relying on its future support, since the situation in the border regions of Ethiopia is becoming more and more complicated. Somalia continues daily to bomb the cities of Dolo and Barre [sic]. There are Somali troops in the western Ogaden and we are now observing the movement of Somali units into the northern part of this region. Ethiopian troops have seized arms which appear to be NATO arms. According to certain, as yet unverified information, the

French have begun use their aircraft to deliver French arms to Mogadishu. The Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, under the cover of Eritrean separatist organizations, are transferring their detachments and arms into Eritrea. Sudan is supplying the separatists with American arms as well as arms they have recently received from the People's Republic of China.

Our struggle, Mengistu underscored, has the nature of a class struggle, and we are doing all we can to defend the revolution and to bring it to a victorious conclusion. At the same time, taking into account that the Ethiopian revolution is just a part of the larger revolutionary struggle, Mengistu continued, I feel a need to continue the consultations with Comrade L.I. Brezhnev which began in May of this year. I likewise appealed, he noted at the same time, with a letter to Comrades Fidel Castro and Erich Honecker in which I proposed that I meet with them in Berlin in the hope that together we might travel to Moscow to meet with Comrade L.I. Brezhnev in order to discuss in greater detail the situation in the interior and exterior of Ethiopia.

Mengistu did not answer the question of the Soviet Ambassador as to whether the current situation would allow him to leave the country. He confined himself to the remark that the old machinery of State required replacement[;] however, the PMAC was currently not yet in a position to do this due to the lack of revolutionary cadres, etc....

In the course of further conversation Mengistu asked [us] to examine the possibility of offering assistance likewise in fortifying the region of the Red Sea coast (supplying coastal batteries).

Mengistu likewise spoke out in favor of sending a Soviet military delegation to Ethiopia in the immediate future in order to strengthen contacts between the armed forces of the two countries in accordance with the previously approved plan of exchanges in the area of the military. In his opinion, an Ethiopian military delegation might visit the Soviet Union with the goal of familiarizing themselves later, when the military situation had been stabilized.

2. [I] carried out my instructions regarding the question of the Soviet-Ethiopian negotiations on opening a direct sea route between the ports of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia.

Mengistu spoke in favor of the open-

ing of such a route and of concluding an agreement on this issue as well as on the issue of an intergovernmental agreement on shipping.

3. [I] carried out my instructions regarding the question of the Republic of South Africa's impending nuclear arms testing. Mengistu welcomed the Soviet Government initiative on this issue P72 C

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(signature) /A. Ratanov/

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 118-119; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov with U.S. Charge d'Affaires A. Tienkin, 3 September 1977

TOP S	ECRET, Copy No. 2
From the journal of	6 September 1977
Ratanov, A.P.	Original No. 339

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION with USA charge d'affaires in Ethiopia <u>A[RTHUR] TIENKIN</u> 3 September 1977

By previous agreement I met with A. Tienkin at the Soviet Embassy. During the discussion he made the following comments.

- American-Ethiopian relations. They are not as good as they could be. Nonetheless, there have been some signs of improvement in these relations recently, [which is] what the USA has been seeking. For example, the other day the USA announced its readiness to continue economic aid to Ethiopia. We raised the issue of maintaining staff at the embassy in Addis-Ababa, above all staff in the economic and trade sections (the PMAC, as is well-known, in May of this year liquidated a group of American military attaches and a military adviser, and demanded that the embassy staff be reduced by one half). This time, it seems to Tienkin, the Ethiopian government will be inclined to satisfy the American request.

The USA informed the Ethiopian government that it does not and would not interfere in the domestic affairs of Ethiopia, including in Eritrea. At the same time, said Tienkin, given Ethiopia's current socialist policy, the USA is not convinced that it (Ethiopia) is able to maintain normal relations with capitalist countries.

- In the American view, the PMAC "is going too fast" on questions of social transformation, and in Ethiopia there are forces which would like to go even faster than the PMAC along the path of turning Ethiopia into a socialist state. In particular, the greater radicalism of the leadership of the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement [MEISON], as Tinkin suggests, was a reason for the "disappearance" of that leadership, in comparison with the PMAC.

- Of all of Ethiopia's domestic problems, the most difficult is Eritrea; in comparison with this even the problem of the liberation of the Ogaden seems easy.

- Ethiopia, of course, will not be dismembered and will secure its border with Somalia, however, he (Tienkin) did not see any possiblity for the normalization of Ethiopian-Somali differences, insofar as Somalia is unlikely to renounce its territorial pretensions to Ethiopia.

- American-Somali relations. They are improving. The USA even "agreed in principle" to the delivery of defensive weapons. The USA announced, however, that these deliveries cannot take place at present because of the military actions in the Ogaden. The USA also emphasized that their agreement to military deliveries does not mean that they do not recognize the territorial integrity of Somalia.

- Tienkin is aware of the rumours that Israel is supposedly rendering military aid to Ethiopia, but he did not see any clear indications that would confirm these rumors. However, even if Israel were doing something like this, said Tienkin, it would be doing this on its own initiative, i.e. without consultation with the USA on such questions.

For his part the Soviet ambassador emphasized that the Soviet Union supports Ethiopia, but at the same time aims to convince Somalia and Ethiopia of the need to seek peaceful regulation of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and that the Soviet Union considers Ethiopia to be a non-aligned state, having the right, as all other states do, to have normal relations with socialist states as well as with the Western states. He added that the support of the Soviet Union for Ethiopia's socialist orientation is defined by the fact that it [this policy] was chosen by Ethiopia itself and answers to the needs of its socio-economic development. However, this policy of socialist orientation presupposes normal economic and trade ties with all countries, the existence of a private sector, mixed state-private firms, etc.

Tienkin remarked that he agreed with this, that the Ethiopians themselves chose the path of socialist orientation. In Tienkin's view, the Ethiopian leaders have really begun to emphasize their non-aligned course more than they had in previous statements. During the discussion, Tienkin did not try to reproach the Soviet Union and did not even show any interest in Soviet military aid to Ethiopia. He was most interested in the issue of Soviet-Somali relations (the results of Siad Barre's trip to Moscow, etc...)

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA /s/ A. Ratanov

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 136-138; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov and Mengistu, 5 September 1977

From diary of	SECRET
A. P. Ratanov	Copy No. 2
	6 September 1977

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION with Chairman of PMAC of Ethiopia HAILE MARIAMOM MENGISTU 5 September 1977

I received a visit from Haile Mariam Mengistu (Berhanu Bayeh, a member of the Permanent Committee of the PMAC, took part in the discussion) and, pursuant to instructions, informed him about the results of the visit of President Siad Barre of the SDR to Moscow.

1. Having listened, Mengistu asked to convey his appreciation to the Soviet leadership, and personally to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, for the correct line followed in discussions with Siad Barre, and for the comprehensive assistance rendered to Ethiopia. In this connection, Mengistu noted that at the present time, especially in regard to Soviet supplies of trailers for the transport of tanks, the balance of forces between Ethiopia and Somali was beginning to move in favor of Ethiopia.

Assessing the demarche of Siad Barre as a political maneuver (departing for Moscow, Siad Barre issued an order for an attack on Jijiga), Mengistu announced that an essential condition for Ethiopian-Somali negotiations would be the complete withdrawal of Somali forces from Ethiopian territory. Siad Barre is now attempting to lead astray not only the Soviet Union, but also the PDRY, the intermediation of which he had only recently requested, as well as Madagascar. However, said Mengistu, al78 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

in Addis-Ababa against members of the PMAC leadership and the organization of a combined attack of military formations prepared on the territories of Sudan and Kenya, and also a continuation of Somali aggression, are parts of the plan.

In this regard Mengistu Haile Mariam said that in the aforementioned document there are listed various types of military subunits and their specific tasks are set forth. The attack would begin simultaneously from the north-west, west, and south in the direction of Addis-Ababa. In fact, as far as Somalia is concerned, its forces which are located on the territory of Ethiopia, on 10 September of this year again attacked Jijiga, in the event of the capture of which they are planning an attack on the administrative center of that region, Harar, and the great industrial center Diredawa. Battles for Jijiga are continuing.

Among the number of parties and organizations which are participating in the plot, Mengisu named the Eritrean separat-

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Eritrean population autonomy within the bounds of its old territories. They assume

Any solution has to be found within the framework of the Ethiopian state although this is uncomfortable for the Eritrean move86 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL

has to view Mengistu's declaration announcing to the United States, Great Britain, and the FRG that he would break diplomatic relations if they continued their direct support of Somalia. Hence he is clearly considering with subtle difference states such as Italy, which as a former colonial power is currently taking on a flexible position in Ethiopia, and France, which is above all interested in the consolidation of its position in Djibouti.

3. The conflict in the Horn of Africa has led to a strong polarization and differentiation among the African and the Middle Eastern countries. The situation in Ethiopia is made more difficult by the encirclement by reactionary regimes of states which depend upon them. While South Yemen is altogether taking a positive position on Ethiopia, the other, even many progressive, Arab nations, have considerable reservations about supporting Ethiopia. In particular, the Arab nations differ in their attitude towards Eritrea which ranges from open solidarity to direct support of the separatists in Eritrea. Reservations are also held against Libya and Algiers who do not even support the revolutionary development in Ethiopia to a full measure. Differences of opinion also exist between Syria and Iraq on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other hand.

While the OAU has continued to defend, in the framework of its own decisions and in full agreement with Ethiopia, the integrity of Ethiopian borders, one has to differentiate the attitude of individual African countries toward the conflict.

The countries of Black Africa fully support the Ethiopian position. But the unanimous condemnation of Somalia as an aggressor was not achieved. Thus, just as a number of member states of the OAU repudiated the clear condemnation of the aggression against Angola, they also differ in their position in the evaluation of the situation on the Horn of Africa. One can also not overlook such influences as that exerted by Nigeria which favors the independence of the Ogaden.

In general, the Soviet comrades acknowledge the positive fact that the OAU to Ethiopia, and they would stay as long as necessary. The Carter administration was to blame for the strained Ethiopian-USA relationship (role of the CIA etc.). He emphasized the neutrality of Ethiopia which would develop toward socialism. He would not be ready to switch allies.

Mengistu's response was so good that the USA envoy immediately withdrew the demand for the immediate removal of Soviet and Cuban advisers; he demanded the withdrawal of the Cubans after the end of the Somali aggression; then the withdrawal would be necessary since otherwise this would result in a threat to USA strategic interests.

The United States attempts to get an economic foothold in Ethiopia. Possibly deliveries of arms, equipment etc. would follow to "further confuse the situation."

Comrade Pepe pointed to the fact that after the situation in the East would clear up some forces could try to perform an change of course in Ethiopia. (Something similar to [pro-Soviet and anti-American MPLA faction leader Nito] Alves in Angola.)

At the request of the Cuban comrades, Mengistu spoke publicly about the presence of Soviet and Cuban advisers. Nevertheless, the press continually claims that Ethiopia is still fighting by itself. The reason for this [is] unclear.

With respect to the "Red terror," Comrade Vivo mentioned this to Mengistu. Now there is a certain positive change. There is talk of "revolutionary legality."

[Mengistu and MEISON]

With regard to Eritrea it was attempted to convince Mengistu that a program for Eritrea had to be worked out. It would be necessary to create foundations and goals for which one could fight in Eritrea in order to be able to influence the lines of division among the various [Eritrean liberation] movements. Mengistu is not very convinced in this question. He fears other split-offs which would result in the destruction of the Ethiopian state.

Mengistu has little confidence in the talks with the Eritreans. Cuban comrades have doubts as well. Nevertheless the talks begun by the SED were very important. be bad if Somalia could be brought back into the Socialist camp regardless of the government in that country.

One had to make efforts to tear Somalia away from the imperialists and certainly there were positive forces influencing Siad Barre. Perhaps he has also acknowledged some mistakes.

The discussion within the PMAC was apparently difficult, and there was no response the next day. On 9 March, the Cuban comrades approached Mengistu with a message from Fidel Castro which contained similar recommendations. On 13 March, Ratanov met again with Mengistu and then received the written response of the Ethiopian leadership. (For a translation see appendix [not printed--ed.]). Comrade Ratanov said, in the conversation in which [Maj.] Berhanu Bayeh [Chairman of the legal and administrative affairs committee and of the special commission on Eritea] participated, that it was right to demand guarantees from Somalia and that it had to refrain from its territorial demands. At the same time it was necessary to employ the correct political tactics. We lose nothing if we agree to negotiations. One cannot demand everything in advance. This would practically mean to call for political suicide. After all Siad Barre wants to save his skin. Moreover, the Ethiopian positions could not well be presented as logical before world public opinion. At first Ethiopia declares that it would be willing to negotiate if Somalia withdraws its troops. Now that they [the Somalis] are willing to do so, the Ethiopians are retreating from their position. This attitude could well be a gift for the imperialists because Siad Barre can claim that Ethiopia was not willing to negotiate and instead was preparing for new attacks in pursuit of its goals. After consultation with Mengistu, the Soviet Union responded to Siad Barre in the following way: Ethiopia is willing to enter into negotiations with Somalia with the Soviet Union participating. It will be expected from Somalia to declare its readiness in the course of the negotiations to abandon its anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban, and anti-Ethiopian position. Somalia had to prove by its actions before domestic and world public opinion that it is indeed assuming a really new position. Under such conditions Ethiopia is willing to develop comprehensive cooperation between both countries.

On the Eritrean question, Comrade Ratanov stated that the development in Somalia was not the only thing complicating the situation. There are people within the Ethiopian leadership who, based on different positions, act in immature, arrogant, and nationalistic ways.

In a conversation, Comrade Mengistu indicated that the Socialist countries, to his mind, did not really understand the Eritrean problem. It was not a national but a class problem. He referred especially to an interview given by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a member of the politburo of the CP Cuba, to an English journalist on 12 February. In this interview, Rodriguez indicated in response to a corresponding question that the Eritrean problem had to be dealt with differently than the other questions in Ethiopia. It was concluded that the Eritrean problem was a domestic Eritrean [sic-Ethiopian?--ed.] problem.

Mengistu thought that this statement had practically given the separatists a guarantee.

The Cuban comrades have declared that Comrade Rodriguez should not be interpreted in this way.

The movements in Eritrea which are directed against the Ethiopian Revolution are objectively counter-revolutionary. There are, however, national factors which have to be acknowledged. The Arab countries are tember 1974.

The Ethiopian leadership emphasized the fact that it saw the Soviet Union as the main source of their support internationally. The positions of the PMAC on the majority of major international problems coincide with or are close to those of the USSR.

In January 1975 the PMAC leadership raised in principle the question of developing Soviet-Ethiopian relations. It was announced by our side that the Soviet Union regarded sympathetically the measures taken by the PMAC for building a new society on progressive principles, and that we shared their opinion about the need to develop comprehensive contacts between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. tember 1977 broke off diplomatic relations with the SDR.

During the armed conflict, the PMAC expressed readiness to settle the conflict peacefully within the framework of the OAU, putting forth as an absolute condition the beginning of negotiations with the Somalis on the withdrawal of their forces from Ethiopian territory. Simultaneously the Ethiopian leaders declared many times in public speeches that Ethiopia did not intend, after the liberation of the Ogaden territory, to carry military actions beyond the limits of their own borders.

After the destruction of the Somali troops, the Ethiopia MFA asserted in its declaration on 12 March of this year the aspiration of the Ethiopian government to establish peace and stability on the African Horn in accord with the Charters and decisions of the U.N. and the OAU, on the basis of observation of the principles of non-use of force as a means of solving international arguments, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. In the declaration it was further pointed out that the establishment of peace on the African Horn is possible only in the event of Somali retraction of its claims for part of the territory of Ethiopia and Kenya, and also Djibouti, [and] observation by it of international agreements. In it are rejected the attempts of the USA government and its allies to tie the withdrawal of Somali forces to a resolution of issues which fall under the sovereignty of Ethiopia (the presence on its territory of foreign military personnel invited there by the Ethiopian government, the proposal to send foreign observors to the Ogaden).

Regarding Somalia's demand that the population of the Ogaden be presented with the right of self-determination, the Ethiopian leadership declares that a resolution of that issue is a domestic affair of Ethiopia and that therefore it cannot be a condition for a settlement of the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict. The Ethiopian side also raises the issue of compensation from Somalia for the losses caused by the military actions in the Ogaden.

Somalia's position in the conflict with Ethiopia does not meet, as a rule, with support from the members of the OAU, who support the preservation of existing state

Salam] Jalloud:

The proposals of the Libyan leadership on the settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict have been carefully examined in Moscow. We have communicated to the Ethiopians the recent Libyan desire to receive in Tripoli the chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), based on the fact that only the Ethiopian side itself can make a decisions in this respect. The Ethiopian side had previously communicated to us that Mengistu could not come to Libya at the end of February for negotiations with Siad Barre, for reasons which the PMAC chairman told you personally.

The Libyan side is aware of the Soviet position with respect to the procedure for a political settlement in the area of the Horn of Africa. We have fully explained our point of view during your recent visit to Moscow. There is only one just basis for the settlement of the conflict - this is the mutual respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in domestic matters of the other side. All attempts to achieve a political settlement on any other basis were bound to destabilize such a solution and burden it with new difficulties.

The withdrawal of Somali troops from the Ogaden is only a step in the right direction, conditioned by the existing situation. The conditions for a settlement as officially announced by the Somali leadership, in our opinion, only served to postpone the start of negotiations. These conditions, as is known, touch upon the sovereign rights of Ethiopia and upon problems which lie in its domestic realm. The solution of the national question in the Ogaden belongs to this.

One cannot disregard the fact that the USA and other Western powers, which verbally favor a settlement of the conflict at the Horn of Africa, in fact seek to make such a settlement more difficult in order to strengthen their position in this area.

In our opinion the main task now is to put the settlement of the conflict at the Horn of Africa on the tracks of peaceful negotiations. The solution of this problem can not depend on whether Ethiopia and Somalia can achieve agreement on all other problems in their relationship. It is now especially important to influence the Somali leadership to assume a constructive position and to avoid giving the imperialist and other reactionary forces the opportunity to exploit Somalia for their designs.

With respect to the situation in Eritrea, the Soviet Union has viewed and still views this in conformity with the UN and OAU resolutions as an internal Ethiopian matter. We favor a political solution of this question by negotiations between the central govgional autonomy in Eritrea.

It was agreed to inform the leadership organizations of Ethiopia and of the EPLF and have them communicate their positions on the results of the second meeting and the proposals of the SED at a third meeting in the GDR in mid-May.

Thus the second meeting undermined all attempts by the representatives of the EPLF to break off all political contacts and negotiations with the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia [as they had previously intended to do].

But the situation involves the acute danger that the fighting over Eritrea will escalate and that the Arab reaction and the imperialists will intervene even further and attempt to internationalize the conflict. This would severely endanger the revolutionary developments in Ethiopia.

The Politburo of the CC of the SED is of the opinion that everything has to be done to achieve a political solution of the Eritrean question. The safeguarding of the revolutionary process in Ethiopia and its territorial as well as political integrity is a necessary precondition for this. The Provisional problem lies to a certain degree in the fact that we all attempt to square the circle. The one side of the problem is - and we are both working on this - to solve the problem on an internationalist basis. On the other hand there are efforts to solve it on a nationalist basis. This is precisely why, I emphasize again, we have to apply maximum caution, circumspection, and tactfulness towards Mengistu Haile Mariam so that the nationalists will not grasp him by the throat.

In our contacts and talks with Ahmed Nassebr wie intende to invake itaun this takab

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clear to him that it is necessary that all revolutionary forces join together and that the Eritrean problem is not only a national but above all a class problem which has to be solved by the common fight against the imperialists and the Arab reaction.

Efforts to split up Ethiopia and create a separate Eritrean state, to refuse to give Ethiopia access to the ports on the Red Sea, to drive the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries out of this region, are not simply a national problem but a problem of international class warfare, not to speak of the fact that such a separate state would be manipulated by the Sudan and Saudi Arabia and their petrol dollars.

We will therefore point out to Ahmed Nasser, who claims to be a Marxist, the national and international dimension of the Eritrean problem.

Concerning the questions put forward by Comrade Trappen I would like to add the following consideration:

The basic difficulty is the fact that separatist ideas have been rooted in Eritrea for a long time. These ideas are very popular among the population, especially among the workers. This factor, the factor of the erring of the masses based on nationalism, is a given one. The main difficulty therefore is that the mass of the Eritrean population does not understand the difference between the imperial regime of Haile Selassi and the policy of the PMAC.

The fight continues as in earlier times under the imperial regime. This creates the great necessity for intensified political work by the PMAC and above all by Mengistu Haile Mariam towards the Eritrean population. It was particularly this point that Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev discussed with Mengistu Haile Mariam during his trip to Moscow.

The PMAC is confronting a decisive,

great, and huge task to get the people of Eritrea on the side of the Ethiopian Revolution. Preparations have been made but no concrete steps and measures. The Soviet comrades have told Mengistu Haile Mariam and Legesseche 5 It now thehe a poioSea, that The PMAt no

h e n politicks i m e E a t 1 Mengistu Haile Μ а r h а d е с i P V S eTw peneakghtreeicks what e qum crepa-

after concrete results have been achieved on the question of what, who, and to whom in

plicitly oppose the separation of Eritrea. The impression that the Libyan leadership basically favors the Arabization of Eritrea is not far off. In no case does it want to see relations among the Arab states, especially among the countries of the rejection front, be burdened by the Eritrean question. The pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia and Egypt can definitely be felt. It is difficult to say whether Arab countries will be willing to deploy troop contingents in Eritrea against Ethiopia. They will undoubtedly take into consideration that the predominant majority of African countries would oppose such a move. In their view, Eritrea is a part of Ethiopia. A separation of Eritrea would run counter to their national interest as strong separatist movements exert de-stabilizing influence in many African countries.

It is remarkable that similar considerations make even [Sudanese President Jafaar Al-] <u>Numeiri</u> waver. His attitude toward Ethiopia has become more careful, despite pressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Besides the Southern problem, several other questions (refugees from Eritrea, interest in the use of the Nile) impel him to keep up somewhat normal relations with Ethiopia.

The African countries are in principle opposed to a change of borders. In this question the progressive [countries] and those countries which are largely dependent on the West coincide in their views, though the latter fear the revolutionary changes in Ethiopia. The common danger has even led to a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Kenya. Kenya appears more aggressive and positive [in this question] than some progressive African states. Tanzania's attitude has a very positive effect as it consistently and convincingly opposes the separation of Eritrea. Nigeria, which is under strong pressure by the USA and in which the OAU has, as is well known, much influence, already showed itself to be wavering during the aggression by Somalia. Guinea, which has recently repeatedly pointed out the war of national liberation by the Eritrean people, gives Ethiopia more headaches than support.

In sum it can be said that the OAU does not want to allow for a confrontation and is looking for ways to confirm the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity. How little consistent and passive the OAU is, is proved by the fact that Ethiopia has received little support and that - due to the fear of a possible split - even Somalia's aggression was not condemned.

Nevertheless, an intervention by the Arab countries in Eritrea should run into considerable opposition within the OAU. This is in part the effect of the still deeply rooted traditional fear and resistance of the African states against Arab expansionism. At the same time, none of the African countries seriously wants to endanger its relations with the Arab states. This altogether very passive and inconsistent attitude of many African countries and of the OAU was not an unimportant factor which led the Ethiopian leadership to recognize that in practice only the Socialist countries are Ethiopia's real and principal allies.

Among the imperialist countries, one has to pay particular attention to the efforts and activities of the USA, Italy, and France. Their situation in Ethiopia and also with respect to the Eritrean question is guite delicate. All imperialist countries, of course, are interested in the elimination of the Revolutionary achievements in Ethiopia and in the establishment of a pro-Western regime. They are putting all their efforts toward this goal. The NATO countries, led by the USA, base their efforts on the sober assumption that a frontal attack would hardly help to achieve their goals, would only foster the basic anti-imperialist mood of the Ethiopian people and its leadership and drive Ethiopia even closer into the hands of the Socialist community of states. The USA in no case wants to burn all its bridges to Ethiopia. To the best of their abilities, they want to destabilize the situation in Ethiopia and the revolutionary regime, and undermine and subvert the revolutionary development in Ethiopia. The imperialists aspire to take advantage of ethnic conflicts, exploit the social instability of the leadership, and encourage nationalist feelings in an effort to further stiffen the Ethiopian attitude in the Eritrean question and thereby aggravate the situation of the revolutionary regime. One also has to take quite seriously the skillful attempts, in particular by the USA, to launch such arguments as "why should the solution of the Eritrean problem be done only by way of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries," "a certain cooperation with the USA and the West could certainly be useful," "the USA after all have considerable possibilities in effectively influencing Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries," "the West has to offer quite

constructive solutions." It is remarkable that Ahmed Nasser has pointed to this question during his talks with the Soviet comrades in Moscow. The Soviet comrades, however, have no indication that these advances are actually effective. One has to assume that the USA would prefer a unified, reactionary Ethiopia to a divided Ethiopia. By using the unity slogan, they are trying to activate those reactionary and nationalist forces, which no doubt still exist, against the revolutionary regime.

Considering all these aspects it is not surprising that the USA, Italy, and France have officially opposed Eritrean separatism. It is also symptomatic that the United States is making obtrusive efforts to prove that it was they who recommended to Siad Barre to withdraw his troops from Ethiopia. The cautious handling of aid to Somalia also shows that the USA on no account intend to keep their relations with Ethiopia - in the long run - strained. The USA and China are using Somalia and the provocative actions by Somalia against Ethiopia - which are above all intended to have a de-stabilizing effect-more for anti-Soviet than anti-Ethiopian purposes. They understand that support of the Eritrean separatists would also be directed against the reactionary forces in Ethiopia.

With respect to Somalis, the USA are intent on establishing a foothold and bringing the leadership of the country under their firm control. In this regard attention has to be paid to the fact that they also do not consider Barre a solid partner. They assume that he would deceive even the West. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that Barre will soon make a trip to the USA. He wants to gain military support in the amount of \$1 billion. There are indications that the USA is willing to give \$50 million.

With respect to similar "military abstention" by China, without doubt other motives play a role: the Chinese leadership does obviously not consider it opportune to display its military weakness in public - and especially in such a burning spot of international politics. Light arms are less revealing, yet they will not allow Somalia to wage a large war against Ethiopia. In addition, China does not want to strain its relations with Africa any further.

With respect to the domestic situation in Somalia, one has to first emphasize that Barre is continuing to exploit nationalist slogans and considerable tribal feuds to eliminate progressive elements from the state and party apparatus and to replace them with people faithful to him. This is facilitated by the fact that the party is without a broad social basis and in practice was organized by Barre from above. Barre is careful not to expound a pro-Western course. He has to acknowledge that the progressive development in the past cannot simply be crossed out. The country still has sufficiently powing put forth. This type of mood in one way or another shows up in the approach of the Ethiopian leadership to a resolution of the Eritrean issue.

The MFA USSR, the CC CPSU International Department, and the KGB USSR consider it expedient to implement a range of steps from our side in order to neutralize these types of moods in the Ethiopian leadership. It would make sense to assign the Soviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa to have a conversation with the chairman of the PMAC, during which in an open and friendly way opinions would be exchanged about the future development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, stressing the immutablity of the policy of the Soviet Union of multi-sided support and assistance to the Ethiopian revolution.

Taking into account the conversation with Mengistu it would be possible to review the issue of conducting a comradely exchange of opinions with the leadership of Cuba and the GDR about the current situation in Ethiopia.

Assign the corresponding Soviet agencies to carefully review the requests of the Ethiopian side vis-a-vis economic issues, and to submit proposals aimed at improving Soviet-Ethiopian economic cooperation.

Please review.

A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov B. Ponomarev

11 July 1978

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 91, d. 272, ll. 140-143; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

Soviet Embassy in Ethiopia, background report on "Ethiopia's Relations with Western Countries," August 1978

USSR EMBASSY TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

> Re: no 275 14 August 1978

ETHIOPIA'S RELATIONS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES (Information)

Before the revolution, Ethiopia was primarily oriented toward the Western countries, first and foremost toward the USA and the countries of the "Common market" (Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, England, France). This determined the external policies of the country, although formally Ethiopia belonged to the nonaligned countries.

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East and the West.

The Westernizers are making use of the fact that certain of the socialist countries are conducting themselves with restraint with regard to the development of economic collaboration with Ethiopia. These countries include Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and also Romania, although this is for different reasons.

The leadership of the PMAC regards resentfully and with a lack of understanding the fact that the Council for Mutual Economic Aid [Comecon], to which Ethiopia appealed with a proposal for the development of collaboration not only on a bilateral, but on a multilateral basis in March 1977, has since that time not made any concrete resolutions, but has rather confined itself to a declaration of the desire for such collaboration.

The Western countries place serious hopes on the fact that the make-up of the State apparatus, as well as a significant part of the officer staff of the military forces of Ethiopia, remains as before. Many of the bureaucrats and officers received their education in the West, and are subject to the influence of bourgeois ideology, and as a consequence of this they regard unfavorably the course of the country toward a socialist orientation and the primary development of relations with socialist countries. The Ethiopian leadership, which understands this well, is unable to replace the State apparatus due to the lack of cadres which have received the appropriate preparation. The regime remains transitional in the country, new organs of authority have not yet been put into place. The country's leadership has only begun the work of creating a basis for this.

Drawing a general conclusion, one can say with certainty that a long-term course

Editor's Note: U.S.-Soviet relations following the inauguration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter in January 1977 misfired by March, when Secretary of State Vance carried the new president's arms control initiative to Moscow, only to receive a harsh public lashing from the Soviet leadership. (For translations of Russian archival documents on this early period, including correspondence between Carter and Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 140-154, 160.) But ties seemed to be mending by the late summer of that year—as reflected by progress on talks toward signing a SALT II arms treaty, quiet cooperation in heading off a South African nuclear test, and (on 1 October 1977) the issuance of an unprecedented joint statement calling on Israel and its Arab enemies to return to the Geneva Conference co-chaired by Washington and Moscow to seek a "comprehensive peace" in the Middle East.

Yet, the fall of 1977 and the first half of 1978 witnessed another downturn in relations, caused by, among other disputes, the negation of the October 1 joint communique on the Middle East as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat startled the world by visiting Jerusalem in November 1977 and pursuing a separate peace with Israel; a massive Soviet-Cuban military airlift to Ethiopia that fall turned the tide of the Somali-Ethiopia conflict and irked Washington, which the following spring retaliated by accelerating ties with Beijing; talks on SALT release, and translation of important new documents from the Russian archives, in particular from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (known officially as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, or AVPRF), and the former CPSU CC archives (the Center for the Study of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD); additional East-bloc sources were obtained from the East German archives by Christian Ostermann of the National Security Archive. In addition, the Project and the National Security Archive sought the declassification of U.S. documents through the Freedom of Information Act.

All documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project and the CWIHP are available for research at the National Security Archive, which together with CWIHP has created (and houses) a Russian and East-bloc Archival Documents Database (READD) which is planned eventually to produce an internet-accessible listing of documents; in addition, beyond what is published in the Bulletin, CWIHP hopes to make additional translated materials available to scholars through the internet via the National Security Archive's home page on the World Wide Web (http://www.nsarchive.com). For further information, contact the National Security Archive, Gelman Library, 7th fl., 2130 H St. NW 20037, tel.: (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005; and nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu (e-mail).—James G. Hershberg

Document 1: Record of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Carter, 23 September 1977

RECORD OF THE MAIN CONTENT OF A.A. GROMYKO'S CONVERSATION WITH USA PRESIDENT J. CARTER

23 September 1977, Washington

<u>J. CARTER.</u> I am very happy to greet you here in the White House. It is an honor to meet you.

<u>A.A. GROMYKO.</u> I am very happy to meet you, Mr. President, and to discuss the questions which are of interest to both sides. I want to use this opportunity to tell you that L.I. Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership send their greetings and best wishes to you.

J. CAR

Africa we could privately discuss these problems via our ambassadors in Moscow or Washington so that we could have a common approach in the public arena. We do not have any specific interest in that a specific government would come to power in this region. This question should be decided by the people themselves. And we do not want to sell weapons to the countries of this region.

Angola, with the presence of several thousand Cuban troops there, creates a problem for us. I think it would have been useful if you, or we together, had convinced Cubans to withdraw their troops from Angola, although I understand that we have a difference of opinions on this question.

We also are interested in achieving a settlement in the Middle East. Vance reported to me that judging from his conversation with you, the Soviet position on this question is close to ours. In the past the Soviet Union was close to the Arab states and the USA was close, mainly, to Israel. But even today we are interested in the preservation of peace in the Middle East, in guaranteeing the independence of Israel by peaceful methods. Over the last several years we won the respect and trust of a number of Arab countries. We are trying to conduct a just and evenhanded policy in this region and we hope that together with you we will be able to further a peaceful settlement. Sometimes the Soviet Union's approach to the problems of the Middle East, in our view, was not constructive enough. I only state the fact, however. I am not complaining.

We intend to keep you informed on the development of the situation in the Middle East, on the position of those countries with whom we have regular contact. And I hope that you too will keep us informed, in particular about the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] position.

Another region that worries us is Korea. We hope that the South and North Korea will live in peace with each other. The USA intends to withdraw its troops from the South Korea in a 4-5 year period. However, we have to do something so that South Korea will be able to provide for its own defence.

The introduction by North Korea of the 50-mile zone of the sea borders concerns us. We hope that the Soviet Union will be able to persuade the North Korea to exer-

cise the required restraint in order to prevent unnecessary aggravation in this region.

A few words about relations between the USA and China. We are striving to normalize our relations with China not for the purpose of creating a kind of alliance with it against the Soviet Union but for strengthening peace, developing trade and other relations with that country. We hope that the problem of mutual relations between the PRC [People's Republic of China] and Taiwan will be resolved by peaceful means. But we do not want to abrogate our obligation to guarantee the peaceful life of Taiwan.

In the past few years we witnessed the improvement of the Soviet Union's relations with some Western European countries which are our allies. We too would like to improve our relations with the Warsaw Pact nations. Our alliance with our friends in Western Europe is solid, like your alliance with your friends. And we hope that this situation will last.

We conduct the negotiations with you on a number of questions of arms limitation. We would like to reach an agreement on demilitarization of the Indian ocean in the future. We also are counting on an agreement on a ban on chemical weapons. We would like to reach an agreement on advance notification of missile launch tests in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. We hope that these and other negotiations which we conduct with you will be successful.

We hope to achieve an agreement on banning hostile actions against artificial satellites. We know about the Soviet program of the creation of the means intended for fighting the satellites of other countries. We also could develop such a program, but we would like to ban such actions. Both of us take similar positions on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and we together live through disappointments when we witness attempts to violate this principle. Both our countries speak in favor of stricter limitations in regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We worry about sales of arms to other countries. In the past the USA, unfortunately, have been selling too much arms, like the Soviet Union, by the way.

I hope that in the future we will not be doing this. We still supply the arms to some countries in accordance with our past contracts, however, in the future we intend to exercise more restraint in this regard. We hope that the Western European countries and the Soviet Union will take the same position as well.

We would like to conclude a treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. We would like to achieve a termination of all nuclear tests on the basis of signing, first, an agreement with the Soviet Union and England in the hope that it will impel France and China to join such an agreement. We think it is important to include in such a ban also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, since it is difficult to make a distinction between an explosion for military purposes and for peaceful ones. In any case, the ability to conduct peaceful explosions gives the countries who conduct them the ability to use the nuclear energy also for military purposes.

Now a few words of a general character in regard to a conclusion of the new agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. I think we are very close of reaching an agreement. However, some new circumstances emerged which differ from the situation that existed during the meeting [between Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald R. Ford in December 1974] in Vladivostok. For us, the measures taken by the Soviet Union regarding the equipping of heavy missiles with MIRV [Multiple, Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles--ed.] was unexpected and at the same time troubling. We did not expect that the Soviet heavy missiles SS-18 would be equipped with MIRV at such a quick pace. But this strengthens the ability of the Soviet Union to launch a first strike and it threatens the survivability of our missile silos. You, on the other hand, express concern in regard to American cruise missiles which were not mentioned in Vladivostok. However, the cruise missiles are not capable of a first strike because of their small velocity and also because they can be easily identified during their flight.

I talked with former President Ford and former Secretary of State [Henry A. Kissinger in detail and thoroughly studied the reports on the negotiations in Vladivostok and I am convinced that the representatives of the USA were talking there only about ballistic missiles, not the cruise ones.

I understand that L.I. Brezhnev does not agree with such an interpretation of the Vladivostok negotiations. If so, one has to recognize the disagreements between us on this question, the disagreements in interpretations.

Secretary of State Vance told me about your conversation with him on these matters yesterday and I intend to give you an account of our concrete proposals a little bit later.

So, I set forth my views on the questions of developing the relations with the Soviet Union and I would like to emphasize once again the great importance that I attach to our mutual relations with the Soviet Union. I would like to assure you that personally as well as as President of the USA that I will sincerely strive to overcome all existing disagreements between us. I hope that in the course of a few months we will be able to achieve such progress in our mutual relations, which would justify a meeting between myself and L.I. Brezhnev. I would very much like him to visit the USA where we would be able to discuss with him for two-three days here, in Washington, or, even better, in Camp David, all the questions which interest both of us.

Before that, however, I would like us together to have made such progress in solving the problems of particular importance to us, that would demonstrate to the whole world our mutual aspiration consistently to improve our relations. I spoke about it publicly and I use this opportunity to express my appreciation to L.I. Brezhnev for his public reaction to my speech in Charleston.

The American people sincerely strives for cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union. I hope that I, as the political leader of our country, and L.I. Brezhnev, as the political leader of the Soviet Union, will not create obstacles on the path which our peoples so sincerely strive to follow. And I hope that our meeting today will be useful and constructive in this respect.

<u>A.A. GROMYKO.</u> I attentively listened to your statement in which a whole specter of questions between our countries has been touched upon. On my part I would like to express my opinion on the questions you have touched upon and maybe on some others.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the entire Soviet leadership, L.I. Brezhnev personally, and all our people sincerely aspire to maintain good friendly relations with the USA, not just no 7yl8airY has to decide these questions independently.

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mentioned in Vladivostok. I certainly understand why the current different interpretations arose. We do not intend to use for our advantage the fact that the question of the cruise missiles was not discussed in Vladivostok. And we do not want to use our current technological superiority in this regard. And in general, we do not want any advantages for ourselves in the area of strategic arms, since attempts to get such an advantage could upset the general balance and create disharmony.

In our country, however, even a unanimous agreement of the whole government is not enough for securing the ratification by the Congress of any signed agreement.

The Soviet side, apparently, does not give any significance to a question of its own heavy missiles, which are three times more destructive than any of our missiles. In this respect I am very worried by your statement that "there is no land behind the Volga" for you, i.e. that you are against any further discussion and concessions on the questions which interest us. I would like to hope that the Soviet side will display more flexibility.

The question of Soviet heavy missiles is a subject of concern for us as a question of our cruise missiles is a subject of concern for you. You said that you intend to strive for the achievement of the mutually acceptable agreement, however, my first impression is that the Soviet side does not display enough flexibility.

We already put forward many proposals directed to achieving an agreement, but the Soviet Union turned them down. We are ready, however, to show further flexibility - although there are limits to it - in the hope that the Soviet side will act the same way.

In the end, I hope, we will be able to totally eliminate nuclear weapons. If in the course of the third round of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms we would be able to cut back the upper limits on this types of weapons by 50 percent then we would be ready in the course of the following round to go even further, under the condition, of course, that China and France will not start to build up their nuclear weapons on a large scale.

You said that you made concessions to us when you agreed on some decrease of the upper limit of the means of delivering the strategic nuclear weapons. But we do not see it as a concession to us. We would find ourselves in the same situation. It would have been a mutual step leading to a conclusion of a better agreement than the one which we talked about earlier. And still we have the issue of the Soviet heavy missiles.

You said that you made concessions to us on the question of counting ICBMs with MIRV but this too is not unilateral concession, because otherwise it would be needed to check every single missile whether it is equipped with a MIRV device or not.

The consent of the Soviet Union in regard to the structure of the future agreement also is not just a concession since the achieved agreement does benefit both sides.

There are two important question right now, as you have said, which create many difficulties. But before I touch on them I would like to mention those less significant disagreements which exist on a number of other questions.

One of these concerns the overall total level of delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons which under the original agreement must be equal to 2,400 units. You proposed that in 5 years after the signing a new agreement this level would be cut back to 2,250 units. But we would like to lower the mentioned original number by 10 per cent, i.e. to 2,160 units which, in our opinion, would fully satisfy the needs of each side. Thus, the difference between our positions is only

CWIHP LAUNCHES STALIN PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project, in cooperation with U.S., European, and Russian partners, is launching a new international project to obtain, assess, and disseminate new evidence (particularly from newly opened East-bloc archives) on Josef Stalin and the Cold War. The project's highest priority to gather and share new evidence—such as correspondence and transcripts, notes, or memoranda of conversations90 units. This issue needs to be solved.

We agree to include into the protocol for a three year term a resolution on nondeployment of the land-based and submarine-based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km.

In regard to the Soviet aircraft "Backfire." The Soviet side, as I understand it, is ready to guarantee that its range will not exceed 2,200 km and that its current rate of production will not increase. It would be useful for us, however, to know what is its current rate of production.

<u>A.A. GROMYKO:</u> American experts have at their disposal the appropriate information.

J. CARTER: On the question of mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles we have some disagreements inside our own government whether we should develop them or reject its production altogether. We are ready to ban its production and deployment for the period of the protocol term. The Soviet side, as we understand, would like this ban to be in effect until 1985. It also proposes to ban testing of these missiles. I think, our positions are close and the only thing is to find a mutually accepted wording.

There are some disagreements on the question of new types of the inter-continental ballistic missiles. We would like agree on a ban on testing and deployment of all new types of the ICBM. But you prefer to ban testing and deployment of only new types of ICBM equipped with MIRV. I do not quite understand what is the essence of this disagreement.

<u>A.A. GROMYKO:</u> Speaking about our concessions I had in mind concessions to the American side. There should not be any misunderstanding here. This is related to the question of the methods of counting ICBMs equipped with MIRV which was appreciated at the time by the USA government.

Yesterday I informed Mr. Vance about our consent to the establishment of a separate level for ICBMs equipped with MIRV to the total of 820 units. This is almost the same number as was proposed by the USA (800).

We agreed to cut back during the term of the agreement the overall level for the number of delivery vehicles of strategic nuclear weapons from 2,400 to 2,250. You mentioned the figure 2,160. What we have proposed is a compromise figure leaning toward the American side.

As for the land-based and submarinebased cruise missiles for some reason you speak not about a full ban but actually about permitting them to be tested on an air platforms. It attracted my attention even yesterday while listening to Mr. Vance's statements. It is clear that if a cruise missile intended for submarine or land basing is tested on the air platform then it is possible to produce them by the hundreds and thousands, like pancakes. position on the heavy missiles?

J. CARTER: Perhaps you did not understand me correctly. We do not demand anymore that you change your position on the heavy missiles. We accept your position. I only said that this is the only aspect where there is some inequality to the Soviet Union's advantage. In the rest the obligations of both sides are identical: what is permitted to the Soviet Union is permitted to us. And only in the question on heavy missiles the Soviet Union has some advantages. I hope, however, that you do not take me for a fool who would put forward proposals damaging to the interests of the USA.

The Soviet side wanted to preserve the upper limit of carriers with MIRV to 1,320 units. We agreed to it.

You proposed to include the heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles in that upper limit. And we agreed.

However, this is not at all a sign of USA weakness. I think such solutions should satisfy your strategic and political needs and that they are in accordance with the Vladivostok agreement reached by my predecessor President Ford and L.I. Brezhnev.

You will be able in the last part of the day to continue the discussion of these questions with Vance. If further difficulties should arise I will be ready directly or via Vance to make every effort possible to resolve them. In general, I think that solutions proposed by us should satisfy all your wishes as well as to satisfy modestly our special interests.

<u>A.A. GROMYKO:</u> We will be ready to discuss in more detail all these questions with Vance.

Let me thank you for this conversation. I would like to emphasize once more that the Soviet side would like to achieve, in the end, the conclusion of a new agreement on limitation of strategic arms. This would be a great success, but it depends, of course, on both sides.

The following people were present at the meeting: On the Soviet side: A.F. Dobrynin, G.M. Kornienko, N.N. Detinov, V.G. Makarov, B.G. Komplektov, V.M. Sukhodrev;

On the American side: Vice-President W. Mondale, Secretary of State C. Vance, the Special assistant to the President for National Security Z. Brzezinski, the USAAmbassador in the USSR [M.] Toon, the deputy assistant to the President [D.] Aaron, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency P. Warnke, an official of the National Security Council W. Hyland, an interpreter Kramer.

Typed in 2 copies mb-05749/gs 12 October 1977

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; obtained and translated by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

Document 2: CPSU CC Politburo Transcript, 27 April 1978 (excerpt)

Top Secret Only copy Working Transcript

MEETING OF THE CC CPSU POLITBURO 27 April 1978

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I. Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu. V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., Kosygin, A.N., Kulakov, F.D., Mazurov, K.T., Pel'she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., Ustinov, D.F., Demichev, P.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Chernenko, K.Y., Kapitonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., Rusakov, K.V.

I. <u>About the results of the negotiations with</u> the Secretary of State of the USA, C. Vance

BREZHNEV. My conversation with Vance took place after his two-day negotiations with Comrades Gromyko, Ogarkov, and others had concluded. He, evidently, had picked out in advance several issues which he had not brought up in the course of the general negotiations. We can assume that he had an agreement with Carter on this. It is characteristic, that Vance did not take any of the members of his delegation in to the meeting with me. Only the ambassador came with him. But I, from my side, also did not presume to broaden the circle of our participants. Comrades Gromyko, Dobynin, and Aleksandrov participated in the conversation.

Thinking over the plan of the conversation, we set ourselves some tasks:

1. Set forth our understanding of the main results of the negotiations which Vance

this time had conducted in Moscow, and from him receive confirmation of that understanding.

2. To openly express to him our evaluation of the contradictions of Carter's inconsistent foreign policy line, his constant swings between assurance that he is for an improvement of relations with the USSR and calls for a cranking up [*nakruchivanie*] of of the arms race; to remind Vance (and through him, Carter) that there are things which are more important than the foreign policy maneuvers of the moment, particularly: issues of war and peace.

3. To once again express our attitude about a possible meeting with Carter, about which he, as you know, continues to hint through all possible channels.

4. To make known to the USA administration in advance our steps in response to Carter's decision to defer the production of the neutron bomb.

5. To give a rebuff to several political maneuvers which, as we assumed and as was confirmed, Vance could take. We are talking, primarily, about the attempt to put forth an accusation to the address of the USSR script of the conversation. The conversation was very good, substantive, sharp in its tone, as was appropriate. It has an aggressive character.

KOSYGIN. The conversation really forced Vance to think over many issues, and he will of course pass all the content on to Carter.

USTINOV. Leonid Il'ich spoke very well about offensive strategic weapons. They should know our position on that issue.

SUSLOV. Leonid II'ich did very well in conducting the conversation with Vance.

KOSYGIN. The main thing is that they now know perfectly our position on all the issues.

SUSLOV. We have to take a decision to approve Leonid II'ich's conversation with Vance and the negotiations of Comrades Gromyko, Ogarkov, and others on issues related to the limitation of strategic weapons.

ALL. Correct.

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), f. 3, op. 120, d. 39, ll. 187-189; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

Document 3: Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Vance, 31 May 1978 (excerpts)

Secret, Copy No. 1

RECORD OF MAIN CONTENT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN A.A. GROMYKO AND U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE C. VANCE

31 May 1978, New York

Our final meeting with the USA Secretary of State C. Vance took place on May 31. First I met with Vance "eye to eye" (only interpreters from both sides were present).

<u>A.A. Gromyko.</u> Taking advantage of this opportunity to talk to you in private, I want to ask how the explosion of propaganda hostile to the USSR, which we have observed in the USA for some time already, can be explained? Until now we have observed various declarations made by representatives of the American administration, and evaluated them in different ways according to their orientation. Yet we have always tried to stress constructive aspects of those declarations which were put forward by the President, and by you and by other leading American authorities who deal with foreign policy.

But most recently our attention has been more and more attracted to the fact that, beginning with the President (and Brzezinski has already surpassed himself in this), American officials are constantly making statements which are aimed, or so it seems to us more and more, at nearly bringing us back to the period of "cold war."

In Washington, D.C. the other day, I could not but come to the conclusion that the orientation of President Carter's statements is to a great extent determined by the character of the false information which he receives. This can be illustrated by his declarations on the situation in Africa, which are obviously based on wrong, distorted information.

Now I see that the matter is even more serious. Evidently somebody in the United States, some circles, consciously are creating myths, and are then referring to those same myths, and dumping all this on the laps of the President, the Secretary of State, and other American leaders.

So what is the real policy of the USA, and towards what is it directed: to the creation of relations based on mutual respect, on non-interference in internal affairs, and on building relations; or towards aggravating of tension in our relations[?] This is the question, which I would like you to answer.

On returning to Moscow I will report to L.I. Brezhnev and to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party about the general political situation in the United States today and about the USA's policy towards the USSR. I presume that you, in turn, will inform the President about this conversation.

<u>C. Vance.</u> I will certainly inform the President about our conversation. Actually you have just asked me two questions. First, you asked me to explain the reasons for that which you have called an explosion of hostile propaganda toward the USSR in the United States. Let me try to answer this question with the utmost openness.

There are several facts which provoke concern in regard to the Soviet Union in the United States. These are reflected, naturally, in newspaper articles, materials, TV programs etc. I would like to point out three main areas, in which this concern reveals itself.

Very many people in the USA and in other countries, especially in the West, reveal serious concern in connection with the increase by the USSR of its military forces, especially in Europe, and the fact that the dimensions of this increase significantly exceed the dimensions needed for defense. Looking at the Soviet Union's spending for conventional arms, people picture a dramatically rising curve, at the same time keeping in mind the stable level (of spending) for arms by the USA and other western countries.

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tive attitude to our proposals. They met them with raised bayonets, every time rejecting them at once. We proposed to freeze military budgets at their present level, from which it might later have been possible to begin their reduction. But these proposals, too, were declined without consideration.

At the present special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to questions of disarmament, we decided to propose a new approach to the issue. Earlier, when we had named a definite percent by which to reduce military budgets, Western states had referred to various difficulties related to the allegedly different structures of the military budgets of the Soviet Union and the countries of the West. We always acted from a belief that these complexities had an artificial character and must not serve as a barrier on in the way ofreducing military spending. Now we decided to take another approach: to speak not about percents, but about absolute figures. These figures may not entirely coincide, although, it goes without saying that they must be, as they say, in the same ballpark. There must not be a situation when one great power would reduce its military budget by 1 bln. dollars a year, and the other - by 1 mln. Think over our new proposals. It seems to us that they could make it easier to achieve an agreement.

Both previously and now, American representatives have tried and are trying now to suggest that their military budget is not growing, although in fact USA military spending grows enormously every year. This truth is known to everyone.

<u>C. Vance.</u> Spending is growing, but not in real terms.

<u>A.A. Gromyko.</u> We are speaking about the real budget.

<u>C. Vance.</u> From the point of view of dollars our military budget is growing, but only because of inflation.

A.A. Gromyko. I am afraid that now you will start to throw blame at us for not having inflation in our country. In fact the USA military budget is growing both in real and in material terms. You can not cover this with inflation.

You spoke further on about the situation in Africa. I must say that in this case a total and crude distortion of the real situation is taking place. If I, discussing this topic, behaved like some of your high ranking officials, who let loose with simply insulting declarations directed toward the Soviet Union, I would have been forced to use not those, but sharper expressions. By the way, those American officials who make such declarations should study how to communicate with people, especially with representatives of foreign states.

Who should know better than the USA, with its a far-reaching espionage network, that the Soviet Union had absolutely nothing to do with events in Zaire, Rhodesia, Namibia[?] As for the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, when Somalia launched an attack against Ethiopia we, responding to a request from the latter, helped out by sending to Ethiopia a certain amount of weapons and a group of specialists to train them how to use the weapons. At the same time, as I already told you, we would at that time have welcomed any help of this kind from other countries, including the USA, if any such assistance had been requested of them.

But instead of this we face the fiction that Ethiopian troops acted under Soviet command, etc. Why is this done? Being realists, we started to look for reasons for such absurd assertions. We came to the conclusion that it is necessary to search for those reasons in the attempts of some definite forces, particularly in the United States, to opiane ba beyoniteemeeTrhe fas between the Soviet Union and the USA. Maybe it makes sense for the sides to meet more often both on our level and on the level of those who negotiate concrete questions, in order to clarify the positions of both sides? Maybe it follows that we should think of other methods? One thing is clear: something must be done to change the tendency, which has lately appeared in the relations between our two countries.

<u>A.A. Gromyko.</u> This is a very important question.

<u>C. Vance.</u> Let me now respond to your remarks regarding our information about the participation of Cubans in the events in Zaire. According to our intelligence data, Cubans took part in planning and preparation of the intrusion there. As for the sources of our information, it was the Commander of Katang armed forces, General Mbumba, and Cuban sources in East Germany. We considered these sources reliable.

A.A. Gromyko. Oh, then you are simply victims of disinformation. If we were not sure that our information was authentic, we would not have told you about it. We take great responsibility for what we are saying.

<u>C. Vance.</u> But how could we know that information provided to us by Mbumba and Cubans themselves does not correspond with reality? When this information came to us we assumed that it was based on solid evidence.

<u>A.A.Gromyko.</u> But who on Earth knows what kind of General this is? Who does he serve? Is he really the only one to tell the truth, like Jesus Christ of the Bible legend?

You have information from us — accept it. Your sources of information are bad if they present lies as truth. You yourself know from experience that you must not believe every report. Man was given his brain in order to analyze information, think, and make realistic conclusions.

Unfortunately, there are officials in the USA who easily, to put it mildly, present lies for truth. But a serious policy cannot be built on this.

<u>C. Vance.</u> I take into consideration what you have said. Yet I want to say that we have to take as serious the information, which we receive from people like the Commander of the Katang forces.

<u>A.A. Gromyko.</u> But maybe the General you mentioned is only saving his skin?

You do not know his reasons, who he works for, do you? Many questions arise here.

<u>C. Vance.</u> Evidently it does not make much sense to continue this argument. I mentioned these facts only to illustrate dif-

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First.

of the CC (International Department, Department of the CC and the Department of Propaganda for Foreign Affairs).

[Source: Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 89, per. 34, dok. 1; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.]

Document 5: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, 8 June 1978 (excerpt)

Top secret Only copy Working draft

SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC CPSU 8 June 1978

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I. In attendance: Comrades Andropov Yu.V.; Grishin V.V.; Gromyko A.A.; Kulakov F.D.; Pelshe A.Y.; Suslov M.A.; Ustinov D.F.; Demichev P.N.; Kuznetsov V.V.; Ponomarev B. N.; Solomentsev M.S.; Chernenko K.Yu.; Dolgikh V.I.; Ryabov Y.P.; Rusakov K.V.

[...]II. About Sakharov.

BREZHNEV. The other day comrade Andropov Yu. V. informed me that Sakharov has really let himself go and is behaving like a mere hooligan. The situation deteriorated to the point where he and his wife started a fight with a militiaman near the court building while the Orlov case was being tried.

The reasons of our superpatient attitude to Sakharov are familiar to you. But there is a limit to everything. We must not leave his escapades without reaction.

There was a suggestion to discuss Sakharov's behavior at the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. Perhaps, we should do this.

The members of the Politburo, candidates members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee support this proposal.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 71; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

Document 6: Transcript of CPSU CC

Politburo Meeting, 22 June 1978 (excerpt)

Top secret only copy Working paper

SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC CPSU 22 June 1978

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I. In attendance: Comrades Andropov, Yu. V.; Grishin, V.V.;Gromyko, A.A.; Kulakov, F.D.; Pelshe, A.Y.; Suslov, M.A.; Ustinov, D.F.; Demichev, P.N.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; Ponomarev, B.N.; Solomentsev, M.S.; Chernenko,K.U.; Dolgikh, V.I.; Ryabov, Y.P.; Rusakov, K.V.

[...] 2. Information of comrade Andropov, Yu. V. on the Shcharansky matter

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov would like to inform the Politburo about the Shcharansky matter. Let's give him the floor.

ANDROPOV. I want to inform the Po-

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the worse in our relations. I am speaking above all of the arms race heightened by Washington which is at the same time delaying the negotiations on arms control, and the continuing campaign for the so-called "human rights."

At the center of attention at the meeting which recently took place between A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance were questions relating to a new agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, especially the question of new types of ballistic missiles. Should there be any [agreement on limitations] or not, and if so, to which [weapons] should they apply? The Americans tried this time again to handle the matter in a way that would assure them the possibility of developing missiles in which they have an interest without regard for our interests. We, by contrast, were willing to renounce on a mutual basis the creation of new intercontinental ballistic missiles for the entire term of the agreement. Since the Americans, however, still did not agree to this, they were asked directly whether they would agree to mutually acceptable solutions on all other questions on the basis of our proposals if we met them with regard to the question of new ballistic missiles.

Vance could not respond immediately and promised to do this later. But he said our position with regard to the solution of the remaining questions was indeed "very interesting." Carter in his press conference with [West German Chancellor Helmut] Schmidt later characterized the meeting between A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance as "constructive and useful." For now it is, of course, difficult to say what the final American response will be. But it is clear that in any case we still are facing a battle.

On the whole one can say that a settlement in the relations between the USSR and the USA is not to be expected anytime soon. Carter is wavering and apparently is listening to the forces for which detente goes against the grain, although he seems to be aware that it is necessary to search for agreements with us on the cardinal question of war and peace.

Another tendency within the policy of the American administration has recently beome more powerful. I am talking about their efforts to play the "Chinese card." The question now is not simply a normalization of relations between the USA and China, but actually attempts at a rapprochement on an anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist basis. This coincides with the efforts of the Chinese to use the "American card" in the fight against the USSR and the other countries of the Socialist community.

The other day we carefully analyzed the policy of the Chinese leadership in the C[entral] C[ommittee] and arrived at the conclusion that it is increasingly reactionary and aggressive in all directions. I am talking above all about the frank statements by Beijing in support of the plans of the revanchist circles in the FRG on the unity of Germany which de facto means the incorporation of the GDR.

No less telling are the public contacts

by both sides with [* 0.076 T (bP JosephharacterizS] all oJ.ssiS<Tw 5j 2Helmut] ?rochementfo2ther d Mg to the 45 support of thmA. Gromy(COMECON [CT* cilw (oMuchem €.120mically attempts at2er i tions with the USA. The negotiations were, frankly speaking, very difficult and this not only because of their intensity. The largest difficulties were connected with the nature of the questions with which we dealt, with the differences, yes, even with direct contrasts between our views.

As you know, it is not our habit to avoid difficult questions. The Middle East, Southeast Asia, the situation in Southern Africa, the relationship between the USA and China - on all these questions I explained our basic point of view. With great determination I conveyed to Carter our opinion on the wrong theses of American propaganda with respect to the "Soviet threat" as well as with respect to the "violation of human rights" in the Socialist countries. Carter's situation, as the recent rearrangement in Washington proved, is not easy. A bitter battle over the coming into force [ratification] of the SALT II-Treaty is now being waged. If the treaty failed in the Senate, this would be, I think, a political catastrophe for Carter. But it would Zimianin, Zamiatin, Rusakov

Extract from protocol No. 182 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 1 February 1980

Re: Information for the Chairman of the Sotzintern [Socialist International] W. Brandt and the Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland, K. Sorsa.

1.Confirm the text of a telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to the FRG (Attachment 1).

2.Confirm the text of information for transmittal to K. Sorsa (Attachment 2).

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE Attachments to No. 300s

[attachment 1]

Re: Item 2, Protocol No.182

SECRET Attachment 1

BONN

TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet personally with W. Brandt, tell him that you are authorized to communicate certain views on the international situation that has developed, and expound on the following text.

Recently, especially in connection with decisions of the December session of the NATO Council, events have transpired that have sharply complicated the international situation.

It is possible that we do not share the same views on everything. One way or another, under present circumstances, precise and first hand information about assessments and intentions becomes especially necessary. The important thing is to find a common language on the issue that has already been the topic of our mutual preoccupation for many years - how to support the aim of strengthening international security.

Our general assessment of, and our position on, the current international situation, are known to you from the responses of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to questions put forward by the newspaper "Pravda," published on January 13 of this year. That document reflects the principled position of the Central Committee of the CPSU, from which we shall proceed.

We would like to communicate to you our viewpoint on several concrete issues.

The "Carter Doctrine." The general assessment of it by the Soviet side is set forth in the leading article of the newspaper "Pravda" dated January 29 of this year. In our view, the platform articulated in the American President's speech, with which you are familiar, expresses in a concentrated form the course of the present American administration, which was not just adopted today, in connection with the events in Afghanistan. This course had already emerged a long time ago.

Fact No. One. At the May 1978 special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, the urgent issues relating to disarmament were discussed, in connection with which the comprehensive program of actions proposed by the Soviet Union occupied the center of attention.

However, during the very same period of days, in Washington, a session of the NATO Council at the highest level adopted a "long term program" of acceleration in armaments, calculated over a period of ten to fifteen years. At the same time, President Carter proclaimed a doctrine of global actions by NATO, expanding the "sphere of responsibility" of that military bloc into widening regions, significantly exceeding the framework stipulated in the agreement that created the North Atlantic Bloc. In the application of this plan, NATO has appropriated to itself theright to interfere militarily, particularly in Africa (recalling the events of Zaire). Finally, at the same time, American official powers for the first time openly proclaimed a tie between their interests, the interests of NATO, and the interests of the Chinese Government, which, as is known, blatantly undermines the policy of detente.

Fact No. Two. A little more than half a year ago, Carter signed the SALT II Agreement and spoke of its great significance for the cause of peace and security. However, in the last year, the American administration has essentially ruined the chances for ratification of the agreement.

Fact No. Three. In the autumn of this year, the American government has undertaken active measures to organize a provocative outcry concerning "Soviet forces in Cuba." This Cuban "mini-crisis" has been necessary in order to whip up military fears and further propagate the myth about a "Soviet threat," to complicate the process for ratification of SALT II and to justify new military measures aimed at the reinforceflame international tensions. We are talking about efforts to resurrect the doctrines from the days of the Cold War - "containment" and "rolling back" of Socialism, and "brinkmanship."

During meetings with the working group of the Sotzintern [Socialist International] in Moscow, the issue was discussed as to where the policy of President Carter is leading. Now, that is fully apparent. We are literally talking about the destruction of that which was achieved in the last ten years, of normalized relations with neighboring states based on principles of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. Such is the truth about Afghanistan.

Our position on the decisions of the December session of the NATO Council. You are already aware of our principal assessment of its results. Here are several additional observations.

As you are aware, the Soviet Union has warned more than once, that if NATO in December implements its decision, then it will knock the ground out from underneath negotiations and destroy their basis. Our agreement to negotiations in the face of the NATO decision would mean conducting them as to the reduction only of Soviet defensive capacity at the same time as the United States is carrying out, in full stride, preparations for new nuclear missile systems.

In the communique from the session of the NATO Council, the condition was laid down in the harshest of terms that negotiations shall be conducted only in regard to American and Soviet tactical nuclear intermediate land based missile systems. Excluded from these proposed "negotiations," and to be preserved inviolable, are all of the other means of front line deployment belonging to the USA, and the nuclear arsenals of other Western European countries, that is to say, everything in respect to which the Soviet intermediate range forces serve as a counterbalance. They are demanding of the Soviet Union a sharp reduction in its existing defensive forces with a simultaneous preservation of the entire existing powerful NATO nuclear potential, aimed against the USSR and its allies.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his recent interview with the newspaper Pravda, stated that "the present position of the NATO countries renders negotiations on this question impossible." At the same time, Comrade Brezhnev emphasized that "we are for negotiations, but honest and co-equal ones which conform to the principal of parity in security."

Our long term intentions

It is apparent that Carter and Brzezinski are gambling on the prospect of intimidating the USSR, on the isolation of our country, and on the creation of difficulties wherever possible. This policy is doomed to failure, because it is impossible to intimidate the USSR or to shake its determination.

In this complicated situation, the leadership of the CPSU does not intend to adopt a policy of "fighting fire with fire." We shall henceforth exhibit a maximum degree of cool-headedness and reasonable judgment. We shall do everything possible to prevent the Carter administration from drawing us into confrontation and undermining detente. We shall not engage, as the American administration is doing, in impulsive acts which can only intensify the situation and play into the hands of the proponents of the "Cold War."

The American side, forgetting the el-

perpower detente in the mid-1970s, and whether those events suggested any lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. They were organized as part of the "Carter-Brezhnev Project," spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Among the scholarly organizations supporting the Project's efforts to obtain fresh evidence from American, Russian, and other archives were the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University; the Cold War International History Project, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington; the Norwegian Nobel Institute; and the Institute for General History, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Prior to the Afghanistan session, which took place in Lysebu on 17-20 September 1995, the Carter-Brezhnev Project had organized two other major oral history conferences on the events of the late 1970s: on SALT II and the growth of U.S.-Soviet distrust, held at the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia, on 6-9 May 1994; and on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World, held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, on 23-26 March 1995. For each conference, a briefing book was prepared by the National Security Archive with support from CWIHP and other Project affiliates, containing declassified U.S.

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erything," Kirilenko told the Politburo. "And what has come of it? Nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and told us that we also executed people in Lenin's time. You see what kind of Marxists we have found."⁷

It was President Taraki's murder by his second-in-command Hafizullah Amin in October 1979-shortly after he had stopped off in Moscow for a cordial meeting with Brezhnev on his way back from a non-aligned summit meeting in Havana-which set the Soviets on the course to intervention. In light of past Soviet support for Taraki, the KGB suspected Amin of planning what Shebarshin called "doing a Sadat on us": a wholesale defection from the Soviet camp and an alignment with the United States-as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had done earlier in the 1970s-which would allow the Americans to place "their control and intelligence centers close to our most sensitive borders." The KGB closely monitored Amin's meetings with U.S. offifrom notes he had taken in the Russian Presidential Archives—summed up the case for intervention. According to the KGB chief, Amin was conducting "behind-the-scenes activities which may mean his political reorientation to the West." In addition, Andropov told the chronically ill and enfeebled leader, Amin "attacks Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists." But Andropov dangled before Brezhnev a 132 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY P

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989:

Frequently used abbreviations:

APRF = Archive of the President, Russian Federation CC = Central Committee Com. = Comrade CPSU = Communist Party of the Soviet Union DRA = Democratic Republic of Afghanistan GKEHS = State Committee for Economic Cooperations MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs PDPA = People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan SAPMO = Stiftung Archiv der Partaien und Massorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Berlin) TsKhSD = Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, Moscow

Political Letter from USSR Ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet Foreign Ministry, "About the Domestic Political Situation in the DRA," 31 May 1978 (notes)

It is noted that the "basic preconditions" for the overthrow of [Mohammed] Daoud in April 1978 "flowed from the objective domestic political and economic development of the country after 1973." Daoud expressed the interests and class position of bourgeois landowners and rightist nationalist forces, and therefore was not capable of carrying out a reformation "in the interests of the broad laboring masses," primarily agricultural reform.

In conditions of a worsening economic situation in the country and Daoud's departure from the programmatic declaration of 1973, which led to "a constant growth in the dissatisfaction of broad strata of the population," Daoud huddled ever more closely with the "domestic reaction," which was supported by the "reactionary Islamic regimes" and by "American imperialism," and followed a course toward the "strengthening . . . of a regime of personal power."

This led to an "abrupt sharpening of

the contradictions between the Daoud regime and its class supporters and the fundamental interests of the working masses, the voice of which is the PDPA."

Daoud's order to arrest the PDPA facilitated the fall of his regime.

The Taraki government's program (declaration of 9 May 1978) is worked out on the basis of the PDPA program of 1966. The main task, is providing for the interests of the working population on the basis of fundamental *perestroika* of the social-economic structures of society, and "the liquidation of the influence of neocolonialism and imperialism."

In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on April 29, Taraki said that "Afghanistan, following Marxism-Leninism, will set off on the path of building socialism and will belong to the socialist camp," but it is necessary to conduct that line "carefully" and of his true goals the PDPA will inform the people "later."

In foreign policy the DRA is oriented toward the Non-Aligned movement, but it will give its priority to cooperation with the USSR.

About the reaction of the West: the overthrow of Daoud was "a total surprise," and in the press of the Western and "reactionary Moslem countries" a "campaign of falsehoods" was deployed against the new government.

At the same time, "according to information which we have" the embassies of the USA and other Western countries received instructions to search out all means to hold on in Afghanistan, including promises to provide economic assistance.

The Afghan leadership "is not showing haste" in concluding economic agreements with the West, "proceeding from an intention to reorient its foreign economic relations primarily towards the USSR and the socialist camp."

The measures which have been undertaken by the new government in the month it has been in power bear witness to its "firm intention" gradually to create the preconditions "for Afghanistan's transition to the socialist path of development." The coming to power of the PDPA and its actions "were met with approval by the peoples' masses." At the same time the "internal reaction, while so far not deciding on an open demonstration," is activating "underground efforts" (propaganda, the drop134 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY P

CPSU, candidate member of the Politburo CC CPSU secretary comr. B.N. Ponomarev was in Kabul from 25 to 27 September of this year, to meet with the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) to discuss certain pressing questions concerning the unfolding political situation in that country and questions regarding Soviet-Afghan relations. Meetings took place with the general secretary of CC PDPA, chairman of the Revolutionary Soviet, prime minister of DRA comr. Nur Taraki and member of the Politburo, secretary of CC PDPA, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the DRA comrade Hafizullah Amin.

The main objective of the trip was to put a stop to the mass repressions which have taken on increasing proportions following the revolution in Afghanistan, including repressions against the "Parcham" faction, which took part in the overthrow of the despotic regime.

During the meetings special emphasis was placed by our side on questions concerning the unjustified repressions in the DRA. In addition, it was pointed out that we are doing this out of our brotherly concern for the fate of the Afghan revolution, especially since certain aspects of the unfolding events in Afghanistan directly affect the Soviet Union and CPSU.

First to recognize the new state of things in Afghanistan, the USSR demonstrated its solidarity with Afghanistan in front of the whole world. This position was again authoritatively affirmed in L.I. Brezhnev's speech in Baku. It is widely known that we are in every way assisting and supporting the new government. Under these conditions, hostile propaganda within Afghanistan itself as well as outside its borders is currently being aimed at showing that any events in Afghanistan - especially the negative aspects of these events are connected to the direct or indirect participation by the Soviet Union.

The attention of the Afghan leadership

Soviet Union, aligned together with the other socialist countries."

The CC CPSU submits that Afghanistan will heed our judgment in their continued activities, although, it seems, this will only be demonstrated by their actions in the future. Incoming information indicates an abatement in repressions in the country and the beginning of the process of partial rehabilitation of party functionaries from the "Parcham" faction.

CC CPSU

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Partaien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO), Berlin, J 2/202, A. 575; obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Afghanistan, 7 January 1979

Proletariat of all countries, unite! Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET SPECIAL FILE

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Ryabov, Skachkov, Serbin,and Smirtyukov.

Extract from protocol # 137 of the CC CPSU Politburo session from 7 January 1979

The question of the Ministry of defense and the State committee of the USSR on foreign economic ties.

1. Approve a draft of orders from the USSR Council of Ministers on this question (attached).

2. Ratify the attached draft of instructions for the soviet ambassadthe .5 TS3 T).[bin,and Smirtyukov.

Possible Responses From Our Side

KIRILENKO. Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev] has asked us to commence our Politburo session today at this unseasonable hour, and he will then join us tomorrow, in order to discuss the circumstances that have emerged in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The situation is urgent. Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov today have put together some proposals which have been completed and are now in front of you. Let us consider this matter closely and determine what measures we ought to take, what actions should be undertaken. Perhaps we should hear first from Comrade Gromyko.

GROMYKO. Judging by the most recent communications that we have received from Afghanistan in the form of encrypted cables, as well as by telephone conferences with our chief military advisor Comrade [Lt.-Gen. L.N.] Gorelov and temporary charge d'affaires Comrade Alekseev, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated sharply, the center of the disturbance at this time being the town of Herat. There, as we know from previous cables, the 17th division of the Afghan army was stationed, and had restored order, but now we have received news that this division has essentially collapsed. An artillery regiment and one infantry regiment comprising that division have gone over to the side of the insurgents. Bands of saboteurs and terrorists, having infiltrated from the territory of Pakistan, trained and armed not only with the participation of Pakistani forces but also of China, the United States of America, and Iran, are committing atrocities in Herat. The insurgents infiltrating into the territory of Herat Province from Pakistan and Iran have joined forces with a domestic counter-revolution. The latter is especially comprised by religious fanatics. The leaders of the reactionary masses are also linked in large part with the religious figures.

The number of insurgents is difficult to determine, but our comrades tell us that they are thousands, literally thousands.

Significantly, it should be noted that I had a conversation this morning at 11:00 with Amin — Taraki's deputy who is the minister of foreign affairs — and he did not express the slightest alarm about the situation in Afghanistan, and on the contrary, with Olympian tranquility, he said that the situa-

tion was not all that complicated, that the army was in control of everything, and so forth. In a word, he expressed the opinion that their position was under control.

KIRILENKO. In short, judging from the report of Amin, the leadership of Afghanistan is not experiencing the slightest anxiety in connection with these events.

GROMYKO. Exactly. Amin even said that the situation in Afghanistan is just fine. He said that not a single incident of insubordination by a governor had been reported, that is, that all of the governors were on the side of the lawful government. Whereas in reality, according to the reports of our comrades, the situation in Herat and in a number of other places is alarming, and the insurgents are in control there.

As far as Kabul is concerned, the situation there is basically calm. The borders of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran are closed, or more accurately, semi-closed. A large number of Afghans, formerly working in Iran, have been expelled from Iran and, naturally, they are highly dissatisfied, and many of them have also joined up with the insurgents.

The measures that we have drawn out for the aid of Afghanistan are set forth in the proposals that you have in front of you. I should add that we have appropriated an additional 10 million rubles to Afghanistan in hard currency for the protection of the border.

Inasmuch as Pakistan, in essence, is the principal place from which the terrorists are infiltrating into Afghanistan, it would appear to follow that the leadership of Afghanistan should send a letter of protest to Pakistan or issue a declarations; in a word, to come out with some kind of written statement. However, the Afghan leadership has not done that. To be sure, it looks very strange.

I asked Amin, what kind of actions do you consider necessary from our side? I told him what kind of aid we might be able to render. But he had no other requests, he simply responded that he had a very optimistic appraisal of the circumstances in Afghanistan, that the help you have given will stand us in good stead, and that all of the provinces are safely under the control of lawful forces. I asked him, don't you expect any problems from neighboring governments or a domestic counter-revolution, and so forth? Amin answered firmly that no, there are no threats to the regime. In conclusion, he conveyed his greetings to the members of the Politburo, and personally to L.I. Brezhnev. And thus was my discussion today with Amin.

After a short time, approximately two or three hours, we received news from our comrades that chaos had erupted in Herat. One regiment, as I already indicated an artillery one, fired on its own troops, and part of the second regiment went over to the insurgents. Consequently, only a portion of the 17th division, which is guarding Herat, remains loyal to the Government. Our comrades also tell us that tomorrow and the next day, new masses of insurgents, trained on the territory of Pakistan and Iran, may invade.

About a half hour later, we again received news from our comrades that Comrade Taraki had summoned the chief military advisor Comrade Gorelov and charge d'affaires Alekseev. And what did they discuss with Taraki? First of all, he appealed to the Soviet Union for help in the form of military equipment, ammunition, and rations, that which is envisioned in the documents which we have presented for consideration by the Politburo. As far as military equipment is concerned, Taraki said, almost in passing, that perhaps ground and air support would be required. This must be understood to mean that the deployment of our forces is required, both land and air forces.

In my opinion, we must proceed from a fundamental proposition in considering the question of aid to Afghanistan, namely: under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan. For 60 years now we have lived with Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, this will result in a sharp setback to our foreign policy. Of course, it is one thing to apply extreme measures if the Afghan army is on the side of the people, and an entirely different matter, if the army does not support the lawful government. And finally, third, if the army is against the government and, as a result, against our forces, then the matter will be complicated indeed. As we understand from Comrades Gorelov and Alekseev, the mood among the leadership, including Comrade Taraki, is not particularly out of sorts.

USTINOV. Comrade Gorelov, our chief military advisor, was with Taraki along with Comrade Alekseev, our charge

d'affaires in Afghanistan. I just spoke with Comrade Gorelov by telephone, and he said that the leadership of Afghanistan is worried about the state of affairs, and that matters in the province of Herat are particularly bad, as well as in the province of Pakti. The bad part is that the division which is supposed to be guarding Herat has turned out to be ineffective, and the commander of the division at this time is located on the airstrip, more to the point, he is seeking refuge there and, obviously, he is no longer commanding the actions of any regiments remaining loyal to the government. Bear in mind that tomorrow (March 18), operational groups will be deployed into Herat.

We advised Comrade Taraki to redeploy several forces into the regions where the insurgency has erupted. He, in turn, responded that this would be difficult inasmuch as there is unrest in other places as well. In short, they are expecting a major response from the USSR, in the form of both land and air forces.

ANDROPOV. They are hoping that we will attack the insurgents.

KIRILENKO. The question arises, whom will our troops be fighting against if we send them there[?] Against the insurgents? Or have they been joined by a large number of religious fundamentalists, that is, Muslims, and among them large numbers of ordinary people? Thus, we will be required to wage war in significant part against the people.

KOSYGIN. What is the army like in Afghanistan—how many divisions are there?

USTINOV. The army in Afghanistan has 10 divisions, including more than 100 thousand soldiers.

ANDROPOV. Our operational data tells us that about three thousand insurgents are being directed into Afghanistan from Pakistan. These are, in main part, religious fanatics from among the people.

KIRILENKO. If there is a popular uprising, then, besides those persons coming from Pakistan and Iran, who for the most part consist of terrorists and insurgents, the masses against whom our troops are engaged will include ordinary people of Afghanistan. Although it is true that they are religious worshipers, followers of Islam.

GROMYKO. The relationship between the supporters of the government and the insurgents is still very unclear. Events in Herat, judging from everything, have unfolded violently, because over a thousand people have been killed. But even there the situation is unclear enough.

ANDROPOV. Of course, the insurgents coming into the territory of Afghanistan will be joined first of all by those who would rebel and solicit the Afghan people to their own side.

KOSYGIN. In my view, the draft decision under consideration must be substantially amended. First of all, we must not delay the supply of armaments until April but must give everything now, without delay, in March. That is the first thing.

Secondly, we must somehow give moral support to the leadership of Afghanistan, and I would suggest implementation of the following measures: inform Taraki that we are raising the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles per thousand cubic meters. That will make it possible to cover the expenses that they will incur in connection with the acquisition of arms and other materials by a rise in prices. It is necessary in my opinion to give Afghanistan these arms free of charge and not require any 25 percent assessment.

ALL. Agreed.

KOSYGIN. And third, we are slated to supply 75 thousand tons of bread. I think we should reexamine that and supply Afghanistan with 100 thousand tons. These are the measures that it seems to me ought to be added to the draft of the decision and, Moreover, I would consider it necessary to adopt a more comprehensive political decision. Perhaps the draft of such a political decision can be prepared by our comrades in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or the Foreign Department of the KGB. It is clear that Iran, China, and Pakistan will come out against Afghanistan, and do everything within their power and means to contravene the lawful government and discredit its actions. It is exactly here that our political support of Taraki and his government is necessary. And of course, Carter will also come out against the leadership of Afghanistan.

With whom will it be necessary for us to fight in the event it becomes necessary to deploy troops - who will it be that rises against the present leadership of Afghanistan? They are all Mohammedans, people of one belief, and their faith is sufficiently strong that they can close ranks on that basis. It seems to me that we must speak to Taraki and Amin about the mistakes that they have permitted to occur during this time. In reality, even up to the present time, they have continued to execute people that do not agree with them; they have killed almost all of the leaders - not only the top leaders, but also those of the middle ranks - of the "Parcham" party. Of course, it will now be difficult to formulate a political document - to do that our comrades will be required to work, as I have already said, for a period of three days.

USTINOV. That is all correct, what Aleksey Nikolaevich [Kosygin] says, this must be done as soon as possible.

GROMYKO. The documents must be prepared immediately.

KOSYGIN. I don't think that we should pressure the Afghan government to request a deployment of forces from us. Let them create their own special units, which could be redeployed to the more difficult regions in order to quell the insurgents.

USTINOV. In my view we must not, under any circumstances, mix our forces with the Afghan forces, in the event that we send them there.

KOSYGIN. We must prepare our own military forces, work up a statement relating to them, and send it by special messenger.

USTINOV. We have prepared two options in respect to military action. Under the first one, we would, in the course of a single day, deploy into Afghanistan the 105th airborne division and redeploy the infantry-motorized regiment into Kabul; toward the border we would place the 68th motorized division; and the 5th motor artillery division would be located at the border. Under this scenario, we would be ready

ing. And they stirred up agitation and insurrection. Consequently, in a number of provinces of Afghanistan, and especially in the town of Herat, events have unfolded that bring with them a most serious danger. Comrade Taraki said further that the issue could be resolved in a single day. If Herat falls, then it is considered that the matter is finished.

I then put the question to him: in Afghanistan there is a 100 thousand man army, not all of which is situated in Herat; there is only the one 17th division there. Could it really be impossible to form several divisions and deploy them to Herat in order to assist the supporters of the government? Comrade Taraki responded that several divisions were being formed, but that until they were formed, there would be no garrisons loyal to the government in Herat.

In that connection they would like to receive reinforcements in the form of tanks and armored cars for the infantry. I then asked him, will you be able to muster enough tank crews to place the tanks into action? He responded that they have no tank crews, and therefore he requested that we dispatch Tajiks to serve as crews for tanks and armored cars, dressed in Afghan uniforms, and send them here. I then stated again, Comrade Taraki, there is no way you will conceal the fact that our military personnel are taking part in battle operations; this fact will be immediately uncovered, and press correspondents will broadcast to the whole world that Soviet tanks are engaged in a military conflict in Afghanistan.

I also asked Comrade Taraki what was the population of Kabul. In response he told me that the population was 1 million 200 thousand. I then asked him, would it really be impossible for you to form part of a division from the population of Kabul to assist the various provinces, to equip them and, in like fashion, to arm them? To that he responded that there was nobody to train them. I then said to him, how is it possible, given how many people were trained in the military academic academies in the Soviet Union, given how many of the old military cadres have come out on the side of the government, that there is now nobody to do the training? How then, I asked him, can we support you? Almost without realizing it, Comrade Taraki responded that almost nobody does support the government. In

Carter, and the visit of [French President] Giscard d'Estang at the end of March will be placed in question. One must ask, and what would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward economy, with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not be justified in sending troops. According to the UN Charter a country can appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, in case it is subject to external aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, a battle of one group of the population against another. Incidentally, the Afghans haven't officially addressed us on bringing in troops.

In a word, we now find ourselves in a situation where the leadership of the country, as a result of the serious mistakes it has allowed to occur, has ended up not on the high ground, not in command of the necessary support from the people. municate with Comrade Taraki, and to brief our press and other media outlets in connection with the events in Afghanistan. In a word, all of the measures that were set forth in the draft decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU submitted on Saturday, all of the measures that have been adopted in the course of Saturday and Sunday, in my view, are entirely correct.

The question was raised as to the immediate participation of our troops in the conflict that has arisen in Afghanistan. In my view the Politburo has correctly determined that the time is not right for us to become entangled in that war.

We must explain to Comrade Taraki and our other Afghan comrades, that we can help them with everything that is necessary for the conduct of all activities in the country. But the involvement of our forces in Afghanistan would harm not only us, but first of all them. Accordingly, it would appear that we ought now to hear the report of Comrades A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov, Y.V. Andropov and A.N. Kosygin, and with that conclude this phase of the adoption of measures which were necessary to implement in connection with the conflict in Afghanistan. ious,

side of the insurgents, shooting broke out and there were many casualties; more than a thousand were killed.

I discussed all aspects of the situation in Afghanistan with the Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Amin. But I must say candidly that his assessment was somehow rather relaxed. We were under the impression conveyed by his assessment, and then suddenly the mood of Amin changed for the worse, and he himself began to speak about the fact that the entire division located in Herat had gone over to the side of the insurgents. At the height of the events in Herat, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov] spoke with Amin, who bluntly expressed the view that the USSR should deploy troops in Herat. It begins to look like a detective novel, how superciliously the Afghan leadership posits such serious questions.

After that, Comrade A. N. Kosygin spoke with Comrade Taraki, who told him that the situation in Afghanistan was bad, and he also requested a deployment of troops to Herat. The border of Afghanistan, both

with Iran and Pakistan, is open. Our advi(A.A. Gromyko, D.F)o, wNt havh Intshe viewhMinnover tom

GROMYKO. We must discuss todafolll, uurhcuursspoke wa the vio Bed ghtnt,l auliarisualeratf,nged example,o dotakedvi(A.A. Grom0.012 Tc the very acute question concerning the situaow- the

ation in Afghanistan. We have closely foeternultLeonid, Ilys soke wiapinrW, oTw (iHeandvi(A.A. Gro30.017 To sysdoubtfuemoreHe Giscardhe'Ehani lowed the developing events in thatAfghanidvi(A.A. Grom0.017Tw ed Tonducabiesslfeh ncegedt san, erffIntstosetnt,)Tj T1 5.063 predict; e qurmince try and have given instructions to outnetmetantiv ba-ntlyAfhthe go- and

bassy personnel, advisors and so forth. We

have systematically, I would say, very regu-

larly, in the course of the day, received com-

prehensive information from our representer between the synthesis of gBed.oops tatives in Afghanistan.

What do we have as of today? In an

array of provinces in Afghanistan, first conflounting wipodata, 4,000 wits spersestent,

foremost in Herat, there has been an Turdristree 500 wverdvi (A.A. Gro30.098 sie si dtuatand airfield inbH set atninby tims.ent.) Tj T*19T*25 I Buk dthir ing of insurgents. Where did they come

from? They were dispatched from the territory of Iran and Pakistan. These are all elements hostile to the government of Comrade Taraki. In order to conceal their deployment into Afghanistan, they were dressed in Afghan uniforms, and in numbers amounting to several tens of thousands they appeared in Herat, instigated this insurrection, and we unexpectedly began to receive reports about the events in Herat. There is one government division located there, which was supposed to maintain public order. But as a result of the fact that part of the government forces went over to the

said, that there are about two thousand workers. I asked him what, in your opinion, are the prospects for Herat? He said to me bluntly that Herat will fall tomorrow, but that it is holding on for the time being.

They are talking about forming new units and sending them to Herat. In the opinion of Comrade Taraki, all who have gathered from the ranks of those dissatisfied with the new regime will then unite and set out for Kabul, and that will be the end of his government. Again he requested assistance from our troops. I said that I could not answer his request at this time. I said that we were intensively studying the question, and that we would deliberate and then respond.

As you can see, the discussion with Comrade Taraki yielded no constructive results whatsoever. He spoke of the fall of Herat and requested a deployment of our troops. I asked him what was required from our side in order to combine political measures with those of a military character. Taraki then said to me, you should place Afghan insignias on your planes and tanks, and let them move on Herat from across the border. I then said that this would be direct aggression on the part of the USSR against Afghanistan.

I asked him, can you muster soldiers and special drivers for tanks and armored cars from the ranks of the Afghans? He said that this could be done, but only a very few.

I told him of our decision to render comprehensive assistance to Afghanistan, to send an additional number of advisors and specialists.

Naturally, we must preserve Afghanistan as an allied government. In addition, it would appear that we must appeal to Pakistan with a warning that intervention against Afghanistan is intolerable. The same measure must be taken in respect to Iran. The message must be directed to Khomeini and to Bazargan. We must also come out with a similar document in respect to Iran.

It would be good if the borders with Pakistan and Iran could be closed.

It seems to me that it would make sense to take the further step of sending a good ambassador to Afghanistan. From the discussion with Comrade Taraki I learned that he doesn't even know to whom the government should turn. A great political task is necessary there, and only in that event can we save Afghanistan as an ally.

BREZHNEV. Letters to Pakistan and

Iran must be sent today.

USTINOV. Amin spoke with me yesterday morning. Having consulted beforehand with Leonid Ilych, I told him about the massive aid that we are turning out and will continue to render. Amin said that the Soviet Union is our closest and principal friend. He then started to lament about the fact that Pakistan and Iran are sending large numbers of saboteurs that are being trained on the territory of Pakistan by Chinese advisors, being equipped with Chinese arms, and are then being sent across the border into Afghanistan.

There is strong opposition in Afghanistan on the part of the feudal lords.

He then turned the discussion to Herat and, just like Taraki, asked us to send tanks. I told him about the aid that we had determined to give Afghanistan in the form of a supply of armaments. He said that such aid was helpful, but what they really need is for us to send tanks.

BREZHNEV. Their army is falling apart, and we are supposed to wage the war for them.

USTINOV. We have a large number of advisors in the Afghan army, as well as interpreters. I told Amin that we can send an additional number of interpreters.

Getting to the heart of the matter, in Afghanistan there is basically no information, no ties between Kabul and Herat. There is a single small electric power station there, and consequently the insurgent elements, having deserted the government, are heading into the mountains.

The situation in Herat today is somewhat better. It is calm in the city. Technical assistance, of course, will be necessary for us to send. We will send a great deal of it. We are forming two divisions in the Turkestan military district, and one division in the Central Asian military district. We have three regiments that could arrive in Afghanistan in literally three hours. But I am saying this, of course, only to emphasize our state of readiness. Like the rest of my Comrades, I do not support the idea of deploying troops to Afghanistan. I would request permission that we conduct tactical exercises on the border with Afghanistan and to form regiments and divisions.

I must say that the Afghan leadership is poorly handling very many matters, and that working under such conditions is very difficult for our advisors.

ANDROPOV. The first question that must be decided concerns the difficulty of the situation. In addition to that the situation is increasingly unreliable. Just what exactly is going on in Afghanistan? It has to do with the leadership. The leadership does not recognize the forces which support it, and on which it could depend. Today, for example, a rather substantial demonstration took place in Kabul and Herat, but the leadership did not exploit these massive measures to the necessary extent. Educational efforts have been poorly managed not only in the army but among the population generally. They execute their political opponents. Nobody listens to the radio because transmissions are very weak. It will be necessary for us to assist them with mobile telecommunications facilities.

Amin has essentially had all of the power in his hands, but only yesterday did they ratify a new director of government security and a chief of state. This is the way to achieve some broadening of the political base among the leadership.

On our part, we have advisors there under the direction of the chief advisor for party policy Comrade Veselov. In my opinion he is not up to the task and is coping badly with the situation. It might be better if we were to send there some comrade from the Central Committee apparatus. There are many advisors there. There are advisors in KGB channels, also in large numbers.

I think that as far as the deployment of troops is concerned, it would not behoove us to make such a determination. To deploy our troops would mean to wage war against the people, to crush the people, to shoot at the people. We will look like aggressors, and we cannot permit that to occur.

PONOMAREV. We have 460 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union. These are all prepared officer cadres; they could be sent into Afghanistan.

OGARKOV. The Afghans have appealed to us with a request to speed up the training of 160 officers.

USTINOV. We have to speak with Comrade Taraki about getting those people sent there and using them as officer cadres.

KAPITONOV. As far as our chief advisor on party policy Comrade Veselov is concerned, he is a good man. He served as the Central Committee inspector with us, and more recently worked as the second secretary to the Bashkirskii general party committee. He is a young and energetic comrade.

USTINOV. Our party advisors are not sufficiently qualified and there are very few of them, in all, it seems to me, five men, but the work has to be done very quickly.

KAPITONOV. That's right, we really do have only five men there under the direction of Comrade Veselov. But we are right now selecting a number of additional comrades and will send them there.

BREZHNEV. I think that we should approve the measures that have been worked out in the course of these few days.

ALL. Agreed.

BREZHNEV. It follows that the appropriate comrades should be authorized to carry them out aggressively and if new questions arise in connection with Afghanistan, to submit them to the Politburo.

ALL. Agreed.

BREZHNEV. Accordingly, we are adopting the decision:

To bring Comrade Taraki here tomorrow, March 20.

Discussions will be conducted by Comrades A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, and D. F. Ustinov, and then I will see him.

ALL. Very well.

With this the session was adjourned.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25 dok.1, ll. 1, 12-25; document provided by M. Kramer (Harvard University); translation by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 18 March 1979

<u>Proletariats of all countries, unite!</u> Subject to return within 3 days to the CC CPSU (General Department, 1st Sector) Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET SPECIAL FILE

No.P147/II

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko,Kirilenko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin,Zamiatin, Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC

CPSU Politburo session of 18 March 1979

About certain measures of a political and organizational nature regarding the sharpening of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Assign Com. Kosygin, A.N. to negotiate by telephone with Com. N.M. Taraki about the possibility of a meeting with him in Moscow or Tashkent.

CC SECRETARY

3-zm mk

[new document]

<u>Proletariats of all countries, unite!</u> Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No.P147/II

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin, Zamiatin, Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 18 March 1979

About certain measures of a political and organizational nature regarding the sharpening of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Special file.

2. In relation to the sharpening of the situation in the DRA, consider expedient the acceptance of a political document which reveals the reasons for the sharpening of the situation in Afghanistan, and defines our possible steps in providing assistance to the leadership of the DRA in the stabilization of the the situation in the country.

Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev to prepare a draft resolution on that issue, taking into account the exchange of opinions which took place at the meeting the the CC Politburo.

3. Assign Coms. Ponomarev, Zimianin and Zamiatin to prepare materials for publication in the press, transmission by television and radio, which unmasks the interference of the USA, Pakistan, Iran, China in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As soon as these materials are ready, send them to press.

4. Assign the MFA USSR and the CC CPSU International department to prepare a draft of an appeal to the governments of Iran and Pakistan about the inadmissability of preparing diversionist and terroristic acts on the territories of Iran and Pakistan, sending diversionist groups onto the territory of Afghanistan, and intervention in the internal affairs of the DRA.

5. Assign the KGB USSR and the CC CPSU Department of foreign political propaganda to prepare and send to third countries materials about the interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by the USA, Pakistan, Iran, China, and other countries.

SECRETARY CC

[Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), f. 3 op. 82, d. 137, ll. 121-123; obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Project; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979

Kosygin: Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

Taraki: The situation is bad and getting worse.

Kosygin: Do you have support among the workers, city dwellers, the petty bourgoisie, and the white collar workers in Herat? Is there still anyone on your side?

Taraki: There is no active support on the part of the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans - follow not the heathens, but follow us. The propaganda is underpinned by this.

Kosygin: Are there many workers there?

Taraki: Very few—between 1,000 and 2,000 people in all.

Kosygin: What are the prospects?

Taraki: We are convinced that the enemy will form new units and will develop an offensive.

Kosygin: Do you not have the forces to rout them?

Taraki: I wish it were the case.

Kosygin: What, then, are your propos-

als on this issue?

Taraki: We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance, involving people and arms.

Kosygin: It is a very complex matter. Taraki: Iran and Pakistan are working aggression, but no one can accuse the Vietnamese of using foreign troops. The Vietnamese are bravely defending by themselves their homeland against aggressive encroachments. We believe that there are enough forces in your country to stand up to counterrevolutionary raids. One only needs to unify them and create new military formations. During our telephone conversation with you we spoke of the need to begin creating new military groups, keeping in mind that a certain amount of time will be needed for their training and preparation. But even at this time you have at your disposal a sufficient force in order to deal with the current situation. One need only deal with it correctly. Let's take the example of Herat. It seemed that all would fall apart, that the enemy had firmly entrenched itself there, that the city had become a center of counter-revolution. But when you really took charge of the matter, you were able to seize control of the situation. We have just received word that today, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the military town in Herat, the location of the mutinous section of the 17th infantry division, has been taken by a battalion of paratroopers supported by tanks from Kandahar, following air-strikes. Troops loyal to the government are securing and further taking advantage of this success.

In our opinion, our assignment for the current time period is to defend you from various international complications. We will give you assistance with all available means - ship weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in managing military and domestic matters of the country, specialists to train your military personnel in the operation of the most modern types of weapons and military machinery which we are sending you. The deployment of our forces in the territory of Afghanistan would immediately arouse the international community and would invite sharply unfavorable multipronged consequences. This, in effect, would be a conflict not only with imperialist countries, but also a conflict with one's own people. Our mutual enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet forces appear on Afghan territory. This would give them an excuse to deploy on Afghan territory military formations hostile to you. I would again like to underline that the question of deploying our forces has been examined by us from every direction; we carefully studied all aspects of this action and came to the conclusion that if our troops were introduced, the situation in your country would not only not improve, but would worsen. One cannot deny that our troops would have to fight not only with foreign aggressors, but also with a certain number of your people. And people do not forgive such things. Besides, as soon as our troops cross the border, China and all other aggressors will be vindicated.

We have come to the conclusion that in the given period, the most effective support that we could give you would be through methods of our political influence on neighboring countries and through the rendering of extensive and manifold assistance. This way would accomplish much more than through the deployment of our troops. We are deeply convinced that we can overcome the enemy using the political means being undertaken both by your side and by our side. We have already discussed with you that Afghanistan should work towards good relations with Iran, Pakistan and India by eliminating any pretexts they may have for meddling in your affairs. As for us, today we are sending two documents to the leaders of Iran and Pakistan, in which we tell them with all seriousness not to meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan. We are taking care of this matter ourselves, without drawing you into it. These are, in essence, the thoughts which we wanted to

<u>D.F. Ustinov</u>. This year 190 Afghan officers are finishing their training, among whom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 - helicopter pilots. We will send you, through the chief military advisor in Afghanistan general Gorelov, the list of graduates, by their specialization.

<u>N.M.Taraki</u>. Good. We will do that. However, the problem is that we don't know the people belonging to counter-revolutionary groups by name. We only know that, during Daoud's regime, members of the "Muslim Brotherhood" and the pro-Chinese "Shoal-i-Jawid" organizations were sent over to the Soviet Union. We will try to work this out.

<u>A.N.Kosygin</u>. You seem to raise questions about the deliveries of military machinery with regard to the resolution which we made known in Kabul yesterday evening. In this resolution we speak of large military deliveries, of the delivery of 100 thou. tons of wheat, and of the price increase of Afghan natural gas from 24 to 37 dollars per 1000 m³. Are you familiar with this document?

<u>N.M.Taraki</u>. No. It seems that they did not manage to brief me on it.

A.N.Kosygin. Most likely this document arrived in Kabul before your departure to Moscow. Here are the decisions that the document contains: in March of this year you will be sent additionally and without charge 33 pcs. of BMP-1, 5 pcs. of MI-25, 8 pcs. of MI-8T, as well as 50 pcs. of BTR-60pb, 25 pcs. of armored reconnaissance vehicles, 50 pcs. of mobile anti-aircraft units, and an anti-aircraft unit "Strela" [Arrow]. On March 18 we already sent 4 MI-8 helicopters, and on March 21 you will receive 4 more helicopters. All of this is delivered to you without charge.

<u>N.M.Taraki</u>. Thank you for such great help. In Kabul I will acquaint myself in greater depth with this document. Right now I would like to say that 100 thou. tons of wheat is not enough for us. This fall we will not be able to reap the entire harvest because the landlords whose land was confiscated did not sow it, and in a few places the crops were destroyed.

<u>A.N.Kosygin</u>. You will receive 100 thousand tons of wheat at the rate that you can transport it from the border to the country. It seems that you will have difficulties with the transport of wheat because, judging from what transport specialists told us, your transfer stations can only handle 15 thousand tons of wheat per month. While the 100 thou. tons are processed, we will think about what to do in the future.

<u>N.M.Taraki</u>. Earlier, Pakistan promised to sell us 200 thou. tons, but then recanted on its promise. Turkey also declined to deliver 70 thou. tons. We need at least another 300 thou. tons of wheat.

<u>A.N.Kosygin</u>. Since you were ready to pay for Pakistani wheat, you must have money? We can buy wheat from the Americans and transfer it to Afghanistan. For example, 200 thou. tons of wheat would cost 25 mln. rubles (40 mln. dollars).

<u>N.M.Taraki</u>. It will be difficult for us to find such a sum.

<u>A.N.Kosygin</u>. Find as much as you can, and with that sum we will buy you wheat.

<u>N.M.Taraki</u>. If we are unable to find the means, then we will ask for your help with wheat. We would also like to receive a deferment of payment on your loans and on their interest. Our military budget is planned with the hope that such a deferment will be given.

<u>A.N.Kosygin</u>. With the free delivery of military technology we have already given you significant help for your military budget. We will further think about that so alienate the people from the government. And finally, not as a matter of discussion but as a wish, I would like to express my ideas on the importance of a very careful and cautious approach towards your staff. One should take care of one's staff and have an individual approach towards it. Have a thorough and good understanding with each person before hanging any labels on them.

<u>N.M.Taraki</u>. Are we talking about officers and generals?

<u>A.N. Kosygin</u>. And about officers, and about generals, and about political figures. But I repeat, I am saying this not for discussion, I am only expressing our wish.

<u>N.M. Taraki</u>. We try to be solicitous of our cadres. However, the Herat events have shown that "Moslem brothers" have penetrated into our midst, but we don't hang labels on those who are truly with us.

<u>A.N. Kosygin</u>. We aren't making any kind of claims about you. We are simply saying that mistakes in cadre policy are very expensive. We have experienced this ourselves. In Stalin's time, many of our officers were put in jail. And when the war broke out, Stalin was forced to send them to the front. These people showed themselves to be true heroes. Many of them rose to high rank. We are not interfering in your internal affairs, but we want to express our opinion regarding the necessity of behaving solicitously toward cadres.

<u>N.M. Taraki</u>. As far as I have understood from this conversation, you are rendering and will render us assistance, but you are not giving us a guarantee against aggression.

<u>A.N. Kosygin</u>. We have not discussed the question with you from this angle. We have been speaking about what are now the most effective means for the political defense of your country. You should not understand us as saying that we will leave you to the winds of fate.

<u>N.M. Taraki</u>. There are three types of support - political, economic, and military. Two kinds of assistance you are already giving us, but how will you act if there is an attack on our territory from without[?]

<u>A.N.Kosygin</u>. If an armed invasion of your country takes place, then it will be a completely different situation. But right now we are doing everything to insure that such an invasion does not occur. And I think that we will be able to achieve this.

N.M.Taraki. I pose this question be-

cause China is persistently pushing Pakistan against us.

A.N.Kosygin. When aggression takes place, then a completely different situation arises. The Chinese became convinced of this through the example of Vietnam and are wringing their hands now, so to speak. As for 54ugndstane a

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COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 151

CPSU CC Politburo Decision and

disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintanence team.

For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel. At the beginning of August, after preparations have been completed, send to the DRA (to the Bagram airfield) a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to be used in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the security and defense of particularly important government installations.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 76. Liakhovskii notes that this the recommendations made in this document were approved during the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 28 June 1979, in Resolution No. P, 156/XI.]

Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 10 July 1979

The conversation is about the negotiations with Pakistan. Puzanov "spoke approvingly" about the steps the Afghans had taken to open a dialogue with Pakistan. The Ambassador noted that "the Pakistanis must not be given grounds for breaking the dialogue."

Taraki warned that Pakistan "is leading things toward a break in the negotiations"...

Puzanov: "in any case the Afghan side must demonstrate reasonable restraint; if the Pakistanis set out to break off the negotiations, let the blame for that fall entirely on them."

About Iran: It is impossible to evaluate the situation in that country unidimensionally, "in the country leftist forces are operating." He advises that a friendly step should be taken in relation to Iran, analogous to the one made in relation to Pakistan.

Taraki "expressed satisfaction over the arrival and deployment in Bagram of the Soviet special group." He would like also to confer with the Soviet comrades about measures to strengthen the border defenses. [Source: notes by O. A. Westad of document in TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d.1044, ll. 47-51.]

Boris Ponomarev, Reports from Kabul, 19-20 July 1979 (excerpts)

Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent)

... Taraki, and Amin as well, repeatedly returned to the issue of the widening of the Soviet military presence in the country. They put forth the issue of introducing approximately two [Soviet] divisions to the 154 COLD WAR I

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Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC Politburo meeting, 20 September 1979

Brezhnev reported on the situation in Afghanistan: "Events developed so swiftly that essentially there was little opportunity for us, here in Moscow, to somehow interfere in them... Right now our mission is to determine our further actions, so as to preserve our positions in Afghanistan andinton(e ats om))]TIsecure our influence there.

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"We should assume that the Soviet-Afghan relations will not sustain some sort of major changes, and, it seems, will continue in their previous course. Amin will be pushed toward this by the current situation and by the difficulties which the Afghan government will face for a long time to come. Afghanistan will continue to be interested in receiving from the USSR military, economic and other aid, and possibly even in increased amounts.

"Evidently, Amin will continue to follow at least outwardly the recommendations we gave earlier (under Taraki)... But [our] job will be difficult and delicate."

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

Excerpt from transcript, Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih, New York, 27 September 1979 (excerpt)

A.A.Gromyko: What is the USA reaction to the latest developments in Afghanistan? We are under the impression that the Americans are still wavering and cannot come to a definite conclusion. Apparently, they have not worked out any specific evaluations. In our discussions with them-I already met once with Secretary of State [Cyrus R.] Vance-they have not touched upon this question.

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by D. Rozas.]

Information from the CC CPSU to **GDR leader Honecker, 1 October 1979**

Highly Confidential

As we have informed you earlier, already for some time now dme nP Roeen of

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moving them to develop cooperation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis.

We have recently briefed you on the latest events in Afghanistan. Supplementing this, I would like to say the following: We have given Afghanistan more than a little economic support. We have sent our advisers there, civilian as well as military, and have supplied them with significant amounts of weapons and military equipment.

The situation in the country has improved. In some provinces, however, military encounters continue with the hordes of rebels who receive direct and indirect support from Pakistan and direct support from Iran, from the USA, and from China. In addition, there are tensions within the Afghani leadership. Our efforts were directed to contribute to the unity of the Afghani leadership and not allow for divisions to happen. But Amin has taken advantage of Taraki's indecisiveness and, as you know, eliminated him; he has achieved the leadership. Amin did this even though he was held as Taraki's friend. You know that Taraki had a stopover in Moscow on his way from Havana where the Conference of the Non-Alignment Movement took place. I met him and advised him to take measures to stabilize the situation in his country and among other things begin with the work on a constitution and to keep up revolutionary lawfulness, etc. We now see that Amin is imple158 Cold War International History Project 158 C

No. 318/3/00945

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 149, ll. 120-122; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in Russian in Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (document on 97-98), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.]

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan F.A. Tabeev and H. Amin, 6 December 1979

The conversation concerned Amin's journey to Moscow. Amin made reference to the agreement of the Soviet leaders, transmitted by Puzanov, and expressed concern that he not be late. Further he spoke about the necessity of thinking about the agreement on issues of inter-Party cooperation for the upcoming 2-3 years in relation to the end of the term of action for the plan of inter-Party relations between the PDPA and the CPSU for 1979.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.]

Extract from CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 6 December 1979

> Top Secret Special File

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustonov

Extract From Protocol No. 176 of the Meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo of 6 December 1979

About the dispatch of a special detachment to Afghanistan Agree with the proposal on this issue set forth in the note of the KGB USSR and the Ministry of Defense of 4 December 1979. No. 312/2/0073 (attached).

CC SECRETARY L. BREZHNEV

[attachment]

Top Secret Special File

To the CC CPSU

COLD WAR I

on the premises of the Soviet representatives to the U.N. or in the buildings of the Soviet consulate-general. It is desirable not to advertise that Safronchyuk arrived in New York to render you assistance. Officially, he is going in the capacity of a member of the Soviet delegation to the session of the GA [General A of the UN, which, as is known, is still carrying on its work.

<u>Sh.M.Dost.</u> Should I say something regarding China, and, if so, in what capacity?

<u>A.A.Gromyko</u>. In the case that rude accusations and various kinds of insinuations are leveled in the direction of Afghanistan, it will be necessary to respond with a decisive rebuff. However, in the course of the Security Council session it is hardly necessary to dwell on China, as in such an event the Chinese representative would be happy to hear it. Do not create an advertisement for the Chinese, but certainly do give a rebuff.

Sh.M.Dost. Concerning the propaganda campaigns carried on by the USA and other Western countries on "human rights," shouldn't I speak at length about the fact that after the 27th of December in Afghanistan, the new leadership of DRA has freed all political prisoners, regardless of class, religion, language, tribe or ethnicity, or political views[?] We can, right now, invite to Afghanistan representatives from any country and show them that our jails are empty.

<u>A.A.Gromyko.</u> This is a very wise and important measure on the part of the government of DRA. You should certainly speak about it in detail.

7.I.80. # 020/gs

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 36; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 17 January 1980 (excerpt)

[handwritten] P179 <u>Top Secret</u> <u>Only copy</u> <u>Working Transcript</u>

MEETING OF CC CPSU POLIT BURO 17 January 1980 Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.

Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., Pel'she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, D.F., Chernenko, K.Y., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Kapitonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I.

8. <u>Re: The Issue of the Situation in</u> <u>Afghanistan</u>

BREZHNEV. You remember, Comrades, that several months ago in relation to events in Afghanistan we assigned a Commission made up of Comrades Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to inform the Politburo, and if necessary, to prepare corresponding documents and submit them to the Politburo.

I will say that that Commission did its work well. Most recently a whole range of resolutions were accepted and corresponding measures were implemented.

It seems to me that the situation in Afghanistan is still far from the time when it will not require daily observation and the acceptance of corresponding operational measures. Therefore, it seems to me that it is not necessary to create any sort of new commission; instead, we will assign the very same Commission to continue its work in the same spirit as it conducted it up until now.

Will there be any objections to that proposal? No.

Then we will consider that the Politburo Commission will act, with its former membership.

GROMYKO. In the leadership of Afghanistan, a consolidation of forces is going on. The often appeal to us for advice. We give it. They make proclamations. There are no essential changes in the military situation. But it also has not worsened. This is a very important element. The Army supports the leadership of Afghanistan.

The international situation around Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worse. The ruckus, which has unfolded particulary broadly in the USA, has also assumed a somewhat weakened form. In NATO there is no unity regarding measures toward the Soviet Union. In any case the Western countries — in particular, FRG, Italy, Turkey, and other countries — did not follow the Americans, are not in agreement with the sanctions which the USA is applying.

The General Assembly session ended. Many delegates spoke over the three days. But it is necessary to say, that of the 104 delegations which voted for the resolution, many voted without soul, 48 countries abstained and voted against. That is a full one third. In such a way, the Americans managed to lump together the reactionary regimes and to -1.33inal work with religious officials.

USTINOV reports in detail the military situation in various areas of Afghan territory; he says: overall, the military situation is basically satisfactory, there are now significantly fewer hotbeds of resistance by the rebels.

PONOMAREV speaks about the type of measures which have been taken regarding the creation of the party and the strengthening of unity. He reports that yesterday a group of our advisers consisting of 16 people, with Com. Grekov, L.I. at the head of it, was sent to Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal listens very attentively to the advice of our comrades. The leadership of the party now has a backbone.

BREZHNEV. There is a proposal to accept for consideration the information of Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev on this issue.

Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to continue their work on the review and preparation of materials connected with the situation in Afghanistance. Submit to the Politburo issues which require a decision.

ALL. Agreed.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 31, 42-44; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

CPSU CC Politburo decision, 17 January 1980

<u>COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET</u> <u>UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE</u>

Top Secret

#P179/USh

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko,Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev.

Excerpt from Protocol #179 of the Politburo CC CPSU session of 17 January 1980

On the situation in Afghanistan.

1. To take into consideration the information presented by Comrades A.A. Gromyko, Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N. Ponomarev on this question.

2. To entrust Comrades A.A. Gromyko,

Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N. Ponomarev with continuing their work on analyzing and preparing materials related to the situation in Afghanistan.

All questions that need to be considered should be submitted to the Politburo of the Central Committee.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 174, l. 117.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 28 January 1980, with Report by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev, 27 January 1980

TOP SECRET

No.P181/34

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov,Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov.

Extract from protocol No. 181 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 28 January 1980

About further measures to provide for the national interests of the USSR in relation to the events in Afghanistan

Agree on the whole with the considerations which are put forth in the attached note of Comrades Gromyko, A.A., Andropov, Iu.V., Ustinov, D.F., Ponomarev, B.N.

The MFA USSR, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB USSR, and the International Department of the CC CPSU are to be guided by these considerations in working out and implementing practical measures on Afghanistan.

CC SECRETARY [attachment]

Re: Point 34 Protocol No. 181

<u>Top Secret</u> Special File

To the CC CPSU

About further measures to provide for the national interests of the USSR in relation to the events in Afghanistan

The provision by the USSR of manysided, including military, assistance to Afghanistan and the coming to power of the government of Babrak Karmal created the necessary conditions for the stabilization of the situation in the DRA and put an end to certain tendencies in the development of the situation in the Middle East which are dangerous for us.

Along with this the development of events bears witness to the fact that the USA, its allies, and the PRC have set themselves the goal of using to the maximum extent the events in Afghanistan to intensify the atmosphere of anti-Sovietism and to justify longterm foreign policy acts which are hostile to the Soviet Union and directed at changing the balance of power in their favor. Providing increasing assistance to the Afghan counter-revolution, the West and the PRC are counting on the fact that they will succeed in inspiring an extended conflict in Afghanistan, as the result of which, they believe, the Soviet Union will get tied up in that country, which will negatively reflect on the international prestige and influence of the USSR.

In the future as well, the necessity of providing for the broad foreign policy interests and the security of the USSR will demand the preservation of the offensive nature of the measures which we undertake in relation to the Afghan events. In working out and conducting them, we would suggest that it is expedient to be guided by the following.

- Henceforth, in relations with the USA, to maintain a firm line in international affairs in opposition to the Carter Administration's provocative steps. Despite the fact that Washington will in the future continue to initiate an anti-Soviet campaign and will strive to impart a coordinated character to the actions of its allies, to realise our countermeasures proceeding from the inexpedience of complicating the entire complex of multi-level relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.

- To intensify our influence on the positions of various NATO allies of the USA, particularly on France and the FRG, to the greatest possible extent using in our interests the differences which have been revealed between them and the USA in the approach to the choice of measures in response to the actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. - Keeping in mind that the events in Afghanistan are being used by the USA and the PRC as a convenient pretext for a further rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis, to plan long-term measures to complicate relations between Washington and Beijing in the context of the development of relations within the bounds of the so-called triple alliance of the USA, PRC, and Japan.

- To consider with the leadership of Communist and working class parties of capitalist and developing counTw owpl0.07is in the production sphere for the middle and especially the petit bourgeoisie while maintaining state control.

Besides this, from our side:

- To work with the leadership of the PDPA to realize its foreign policy program and to work out further steps to consolidate the foreign policy position of Afghanistan.

- To provide all-around practical assistance in military construction, keeping in mind the quickest creation of a militarily prepared, organized and equipped people's army. Facilitate the consolidation of the PDPA's position among the command staff, and also the intensification of training of the army in the spirit of devotion to the people's power of Afghanistan.

-Keeping in mind the complex tasks which the special services of Afghanistan must resolve, speed up fulfillment of the program to provide assistance via all channels of work of the organs of state security, internal affairs, and people's militias, both in the center and in the local regions.

-Taking into account that in the spring of 1980 in Afghanistan a further activation of the insurgent movement may take place, and also having in mind the well-known historic and national particularities of the Afghans, conduct consultations with the Ministry of Defense and the government of the DRA and conclude appropriate agreements which define the status and legal position of the Soviet military contingents for the whole period of their presence in Afghanistan.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko	Iu. Andropov
D. Ustinov	B. Ponomarev

27 January 1980

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 3; provided by M. Kramer.]

Andropov Report to CPSU CC on Talks with Afghan Leaders, 5 February 1980

> Top Secret Special folder

CC CPSU

Concerning the discussions with the Afghan leaders.

In accordance with the assignment (#Pl80/XP), I held discussions with General Secretary of the Central Committee of PDPA, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA B. Karmal, and also with Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council A. Sawari, with Minister of the Interior S.M. 166 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

1. To approve the discussions that Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, Chairman of the KGB USSR Comrade Y.V. Andropov held with the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on some aspects of Soviet-Afghan cooperation.

2. To ask the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU to submit proposals on the issues of party cooperation mentioned in the discussions with Comrade B. Karmal and with other Afghani leaders, and also relating to the issues raised by the head of the group of the party advisers of the CC CPSU, Comrade L.I. Grekov, to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

3. To entrust the State Committee on Economic Cooperation (SCEC) and the Ministry of Transport Construction to examine the proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade Rashidov) on speeding up the construction work on the joint bridge crossing on the Amu Darya river in the region of Termez-Hairaton, and to take necessary measures to increase the speed of work of the Soviet construction organizations. Also, to submit in the regular order proposals on construction of the structure on the Afghan bank (a transfer base) on the conditions of the general contract.

4. To entrust the Gosplan of the USSR and the SCEC with participation of relevant ministries and bureaus to examine the considerations presented by the Soviet Embassy in Kabul on speeding up the construction of the oil-processing plant, power stations and electric power lines according to the "Plan of the electricity supply to the Northern regions of Afghanistan," of the mining and processing group of enterprises on the copper deposits site in Aynak, and of the reconstruction of the housing construction groups of enterprises in Kabul.

5. The Ministry of Transportation should speed up the consideration of the proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade Rashidov) on setting up an independent branch of the Central Asian Railroad with the terminal in Termez.

6. To entrust the Commission of the Politburo CC CPSU on Afghanistan to think out the question of the new relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan under the treaty, having in mind the realization of this idea at corresponding time, and taking into account the further development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 1-2.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 10 March 1980, with report on Proposal by Fidel Castro to Mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and approved letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Fidel Castro

TOP SECRET

No.P187/33

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin.

Extract from protocol No. 187 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 10 March 1980

About our further foreign policy line in relation to Afghanistan and about a response to F. Castro's appeal

1. Approve the considerations contained in the note of Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rakhmanin of 10 March 1980 (attached).

2. Affirm the draft instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment 1).

3. Affirm the draft instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul (attachment 2).

CC SECRETARY

[attachment]

Re: Point 33, Protocol No. 187 <u>Top Secret</u>

To the CC CPSU

In accord with the instruction of 28 February of this year (P185/I) and in connection with F. Castro to L.I. Brezhnev (telegram from Havana No. 167), we report the following considerations.

Upon the determination of our further foreign policy steps on issues which concern Afghanistan, including taking account of F. Castro's proposal that Cuba provide its good offices to organize negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seems to be necessary to take into account the following points.

The situation in Afghanistan and around it continues to remain complicated. Although the new measures which have 168 Cold War I

A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov D. Ustinov B. Ponomarev O. Rakhmanin forces in the Non-Aligned Movement. With regret one has to state that many among the

10 March 1980

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[attachment 1]

To the clause 33 of the Protocol No. 187

Top Secret Supplement I ABSOLUTE PRIORITY [Vne ocheredi]

HAVANA SOVIET AMBASSADOR Copy:KABUL - SOV[iet]AMBASSADOR (for orientation)

Pay a visit to F. Castro and transmit him the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev:

"TO FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE COM[MUNIST] PARTY OF CUBA, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA Comrade Fidel CASTRO RUZ

Dear comrade Fidel,

Regarding your letter, I would like to report that we agree in general with its estimate of the existing situation in the world and [with] your assessment that the Afghan issue is being artificially blown up by imperialist forces to cover their encroachments against detente, peace, sovereignty, and independent development of peoples. Events in Afghanistan, beyond any doubt, do not provide the real cause of the present-day aggravation of the international situation. Without these events, imperialism would find some other pretext to aggravate the situation in the world. To this testify the steps taken by the United States even before the recent events in Afghanistan and out of any relation to them.

We are convinced, however, that a coordinated and firm policy of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other fraternal countries is a guarantee that socialism, in the final analysis, will prevail in the interest of peace and of defusing the present situation, which was created by the actions of the most aggressive circles of imperialism.

We and our Cuban friends hold a unanimous opinion on the present correlation of

where the state and party apparatus is weak in terms of organization and ideology, which is reflected in the practical non-existence of local government organs, where financial and economic difficulties are mounting, and where the combat readiness of the Afghan armed forces and the people's militia is still insufficient. The efforts that had been undertaken notwithstanding, such important political problems as establishing relations with Muslim clergy, tribal leaders, and middle and petit bourgeoisie have not yet been solved. The agrarian reform has not been completed, especially in the Eastern and Southern regions of the country.

3. The Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan provide decisive assistance in establishing control over the situation in the country. Together with the Afghan armed forces they have successfully carried out operations for elimination of armed rebel formations in several provinces of the country. As a result of those operations, the organized armed forces of the counterrevolution have suffered substantial losses, and thus the military threat to the existence of the new regime has been significantly reduced.

These are all reasons to believe that after the military operations planned for the immediate future are completed, there will be a relatively long period during which, even with support from abroad, the counterrevolutionary forces would probably be unable to carry out any large-scale military actions. Such a prognosis is supported by the fact that already now the counterrevolutionaries have had to change their tactics; they are mostly engaging in terrorist acts and small group actions. At the same time they are putting their stakes on economic sabotage, disruption of transportation and food supplies, arousing religious, nationalist, and anti-Soviet feelings, [and] animosity toward the government and its undertakings. However, one should not exclude the possibility of the counterrevolution making an effort to organize massive uprisings in certain provinces of the country.

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of Afghanistan, we should raise such questions as the reduction of the USA military presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf, the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and the liquidation of foreign military bases there—all this against the USA efforts to limit the discussion to Afghanistan itself. Raising those questions would allow us to put pressure on the Americans and to influence the negotiating process for our benefit. Besides, it would permit us to increase the number of countries that view our position on Afghanistan favorably, or at least with understanding.

5. It is advisable to work on the question of encouraging other countries of the socialist commonwealth to take a more active part in providing Afghanistan with assistance in political, economic, and other spheres. This question needs special consideration.

6. Therefore, our policy in the questions of an Afghan settlement should be aimed at, first, helping decrease the tension which was created by the West in connection with the introduction of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan; secondly, at creating more favorable external conditions for internal consolidation of the revolution in the DRA, and for making the revolutionary changes irreversible; and thirdly, at creating conditions for the future eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, when it would be justified by the political and military situation in the country and in the region in general.

7. We should begin with the assumption that at certain point in time we could sign a new treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, which would make it clear for everyone that we are ready to ensure the defense of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, of its socio-economic and political regime from all forms of external aggression. This question could be discussed in the future taking into account the development of the situation, but it needs to be solved positively. Those who inspire the aggression against Afghanistan will not have reasons for objections against a defensively-oriented treaty of the kind that the [attachment 1]

Concerning point XVII of the Protocol no. 195

<u>Secret</u>

tory solutions to the problems indicated in points 1 and 2, and upon normalization on this basis of relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors, the government of the DRA would be ready to examine other issues of bilateral relations, including those that had long been a bone of contention.

4) Proposing to hold bilateral negotiations with Pakistan and Iran without any preliminary conditions, the government of the DRA firmly stands on the view that these negotiations are incompatible with the continuation of hostile activity against Afghanistan. Correspondingly, from the very beginning of the process of political settlement, one should pass practical measures convincingly testifying to the effecting of a cessation of military and any other kind of interference into the affairs of Afghanistan on the part of all states involved in such interference.

5) The government of the DRA considers that, besides a complex of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, [and] Afghanistan and Iran, another constituent part of political settlement must be appropriate political guarantees of some other states that would be acceptable both for Afghanistan, and for all other participants of bilateral agreements. Among those, in the DRA's opinion, should be the Soviet Union and the United States. The chief meaning of the guarantees must reside in the fact that the countries-guarantors will respect themselves and by their authority will support bilateral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran. As to the guarantees on the part of the USA, they must include a clearly stated pledge not to conduct any kind of subversive activity against Afghanistan, including from the territory of third countries.

6) The government of the DRA declares that the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet limited military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan should be resolved in the context of a political settlement. The cessation and the guaranteed non-resumption of military incursions and any other forms of interference into internal affairs of Afghanistan would remove the causes that made Afghanistan turn to the USSR with the request to introduce the aforementioned contingent into its territory. Specifically, the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will depend on resolution of the issue of effective guarantees to bilateral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran.

7) The government of the DRA favors taking into account, in the process of political settlement, military-political activity in the area of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf by the states that do not belong to this region. While sharing the concern of other states regarding the build-up of the military presence of the USA in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the government of the DRA supports a proposal to turn this area into a zone of peace, to liquidate foreign military bases there, and to carry out other measures to reduce tension and increase security.

While putting forward proposals on a political settlement, the government of the DRA once again with all determination declares, that the questions bearing on the interests of Afghanistan cannot be discussed much less resolved without the participation of the government of the DRA and alongside it. At the same time the Afghan government considers as helpful the efforts of other states that favor a start of negotiations. In this regard it welcomes and supports the initiative taken by the Republic of Cuba in its capacity of chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, to offer its goodwill services.

The government of the DRA expects, that the specific program of political settlement that it offers will meet adequate understanding, first of all, on the part of Pakistan and Iran, and will allow [them] to move in practical way to such a settlement through negotiations.

In the end tell B. Karmal that simultaneously with the proposal of the program of political settlement it would be good to take measures for its broad dissemination using the channels of media, as well as through Afghan embassies abroad and foreign missions in Kabul.

On our side, we will give to this initiative of Afghanistan the required political, diplomatic, and propagandist support.

Report upon delivery by telegraph

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 8; provided by M. Kramer; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

CPSU CC Politburo decisions, 19 June 1980

TOP SECRET

No. P200/Vi

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev, Pelshe, Romanov, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, Gorbachev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Masherov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, Shevardnadze, Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov, Savinkin, Smirtyukov.

Extract from protocol No. 200 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 19 June 1980

Measures on Afghanistan.

1. To approve Comrade Brezhnev's proposals on the immediate measures on Afghanistan.

To proceed with the assumption that the Soviet Union will continue to provide political, military, and economic assistance to Afghanistan in order to help ensure the national independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, to strengthen the people's democratic regime and the leading role of the People's Democratic Party.

2. To consider expedient to withdraw several military units whose presence in Afghanistan now is not necessary.

To charge the Ministry of Defense of the USSR to make a decision on the number and composition of the troops to be withdrawn and on the time frame and the order of their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

To charge Comrade Iu.V. Andropov to coordinate the issues concerning the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan with B. Karmal.

3. To use the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan as leverage for demanding that Pakistan and Iran cease their hostile actions against the DRA and to stop sending interventions from their territory into Afghanistan.

Politburo CC CPSU

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 101-102; translation by Sveta Savranskaya.]

Information from the CC CPSU to Erich Honecker, 21 June 1980

21.06.80 Confidential Following the traditions established in the relationship between our parties, we would like confidentially to inform you of the following.

At one time we sent you information on the deployment of a limited Soviet military contingent in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. At the time we informed you that this action was taken as a result of numerous requests by the Afghan government in connection with a sharp increase in imperialist aggression, primarily by the USA, as well as by China, using formations of Afghan counterrevolutionary bandits who are entrenched in Pakistan and Iran.

Given the current situation the CC CPSU, taking into account the fact that the interventionists have been dealt a serious blow and that with respect to this there is no longer a need for the presence of the entire initial military contingent deployed in Afghanistan, has deemed it expedient to withdraw several military units, the presence of which is not critical at this time. This measure is being carried out with the complete agreement of the Afghan government.

Of course, if the intervention directed against the progressive achievements of the Afghan people, against independence and the territorial integrity of DRA continues, or worse still, increases, then all necessary measures will be taken not only to strengthen the Afghan armed forces, but also our military contingent in Afghanistan.

The withdrawal of several Soviet military units from Afghanistan rests on the fact that Soviet Union will continue to render political, military and economic support to Afghanistan, with the aim of maintaining the national independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, buttressing the people's democratic regime and the fundamental role of the People's Democratic Party.

We intend to use the withdrawal of several Soviet military units from Afghanistan in order to secure from Pakistan and Iran the cessation of hostile activities against the DRA and the smuggling of interventionists into Afghanistan from their territories. We reckon that our friends will follow the same course.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575; obtained by V. Zubok.]

CC CPSU Plenum, 23 June 1980 (excerpt)

PLENUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU 23 JUNE 1980

Sverdlovsk Hall, 11:00 a.m.

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and Iran. Experience has shown that we were unable to do this in view of the difficult terrain of the area and the existence of hundreds of passes in the mountains. Today it is necessary to precisely say that the strategic assignment concludes with the carrying of the problem towards ending the war.

GORBACHEV. It is necessary to include in the resolution the importance of ending the war in the course of one year - at maximum two years.

GROMYKO. It should be concluded so Afghanistan becomes a neutral country. Apparently, on our part there was an underestimation of difficulties, when we agreed GORBACHEV. We can give corresponding instructions to comr. Kryuchkov.

SHEVARDNADZE. Both comr. Kryuchkov and comr. Vorontsov are good people, but their discussions cannot replace meeting with the General Secretary.

GORBACHEV. Here, probably, Akhrome'ev S.F. hears about the organization of a headquarters for the military command of DRA and smiles. Would these headquarters really command our troops?

DOBRYNIN. We must give liberty to Najib. Two questions arise here. First the idea of national reconciliation, and second—the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

Karmal must be removed. But we must remember that through national reconciliation, not a single member of the CC PDPA Politburo supports Najib. There is no concept of such reconciliation.

GORBACHEV. The concept of settlement exists—we have established that—but in practice the problem is being resolved. Sergeif DRmtwo questions. First of all, in the course of two years effect the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. In 1987 withdraw 50 percent of our troops, and in the following [year] - another 50 percent. Second of all, we must pursue a widening of the social base of the regime, taking into account the realistic arrangement of political forces. In connection with this, it is necessary to meet with comr. Najib, and, possibly, even with other members of the CC PDPA Politburo.

We must start talks with Pakistan. Most importantly, [we must make sure] that the Americans don't get into Afghanistan. But I think that Americans will not go into Afghanistan militarily.

AKHROME'EV. They are not going to go into Afghanistan with armed forces.

DOBRYNIN. One can agree with USA on this question.

GORBACHEV. We must give instructions to comr. Kryuchkov to meet with Najib and give him an invitation to visit the Soviet Union on an official visit in December 1986.

It is necessary to also tell comr. Najib that he should make key decisions himself.

Entrust comrs. Shevardnadze Eh.A. (roll-call), Chebrikov V.M., Sokolov S.L., Dobrynin A.F., Talyzin N.V., and Murakhovsky V.S., taking into account the discussion which took place in Politburo meetings, to coordinate, make operative decisions, and make necessary proposals on solving the Afghan question and settling the situation around Afghanistan.

POLITBURO MEMBERS. We agree.

The resolution is passed.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 16; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision of 24 January 1989, with attached report of 23 January 1989

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Central Committee

> Top Secret Special File

No. P146

To Comrades Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Iazov, Murakhovsky, Kriuchkov Excerpt from Protocol No. 146 of the meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 24 January 1989

Question of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs USSR, Ministry of Defense USSR, Committee of State Security USSR

To agree with the understandings set forth in the note of Comrades Shevardnadze E.A., Yazov D.T., and Kryuchkov V.A. of 23 January 1989 (attached)

Secretary CC

[attached] to article VI protocol #146 Top Secret SPECIAL FILE

CC CPSU

On the measures pertaining to the impending withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan

In the difficult situation characterizing the state of affairs in Afghanistan, one can increasingly feel the inner tension stemming from the impending withdrawal of the remaining units of Soviet troops. The attention of the regime and the forces of the opposition is totally focused on 15 February, when, in accordance with the Geneva accords, the term of stay of our military contingent must end. In addition, the given timetable for Kabul is even more constraining, as the last Soviet military units must leave the Afghan capital in the beginning of February.

Practically throughout the entire country, military engagements between the government forces and the opposition continue to take place, in the course of which the government has essentially been able to maintain its positions, although with the help of Soviet aviation. The enemy has thus been unable to capture Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Kandahar. However, everyone understands that the main battle is still ahead. Currently the opposition has even decreased its military activity somewhat, saving up its forces for the coming period. Comr. Najibullah believes that it is intent on expanding its activities simultaneously in several key directions after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

It should be emphasized that the Afghan comrades are seriously worried as to how the situation will turn out. In general, their resolve to resist the enemy is strengthening; they are taking a number of emergency measures and trying to arrange more rationally the forces that are available. To a certain extent, the Afghan comrades are counting on the continuation of their contacts with a fairly significant number of commanding officers within armed detachments of the enemy, on the strong disagreements which continue to exist within the opposition, and on the incompatibility of some of its leading political groups, in particular the "Islamic Association of Afghanistan" ([Burhanuddin] Rabbani) and the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" ([Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar). Armed clashes between detachments of these and other opposition groups are not just continuing, but are taking on wider proportions as well.

The president is even closely examining such a possibility as declaring martial law or taking other extraordinary measures in the country, thinking that this may faciliforces, after which the situation may gradually begin to shift to their advantage. Such an opinion is borne out by some remarks made by representatives of the opposition, in the course of contacts with Soviet representatives in Islamabad. By these remarks it was implied that if the government of Najibullah holds out, they will re-examine their current position of not recognizing it in the capacity of a negotiating partner.

In the given situation there arise for us a number of difficult elements. On the one hand, our departure from decisions, which have been made and announced, to complete the withdrawal of our forces on 15 February may cause us extremely undesirable complications in the international arena. On the other hand, there is no assurance that shortly after our departure there will not arise a very serious danger to the regime that,

throughout the world, is associated with us.T* 0.034 T4whicuted op departmhrou8ti

troops. Prior to this time, create a widespread general opinion with condemnations of the actions of the opposition, which is sentencing the population of Afghan cities to death from starvation. With the backdrop of such general opinion the escort of conflict in Afghanistan.

Special attention should be paid towards supporting contacts with the Pakistani Side, using the upcoming talks involving the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Islamabad.

8. It is essential to carry on even more goal-oriented propaganda work concerning Afghanistan, for which all scenarios of developments in the Afghan situation must be thoroughly analyzed ahead of time. Of particular importance will be the securing of propaganda concerning the decision to introduce martial law in Afghanistan, if such is taken by President Najibullah.

E.Shevardnadze V. Chebrikov

Editor's Note: The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union ended years ago, but it thrives in two places: on the Korean peninsula, where communist North confronts capitalist South across the 38th parallel in a tense armed standoff; and between the United States and Cuba, where Fidel Castro remains in charge almost four decades after the revolution he led came to power in 1959-still passionately committed to socialism and still the nemesis of Washington, which refuses to recognize and regularly lambasts his government. Even as such Cold War landmarks as the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis recede into history, relations remain as problematic as ever, and as likely to become entangled in U.S. domestic politics. Presidents from Kennedy to Clinton have maintained an economic embargo on and refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Castro regime, and given at least rhetorical support to a Cuban emigre com-

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between senior officials of the two countries, and is all the more remarkable in that it occurred precisely at a moment of acute tension between them. Alas, the accuracy of this Russian transcript and other details concerning the meeting are difficult to ascertain at the moment, since records on this meeting apparently remain secret in both the U.S. and Cuban archives.

Presenting commentaries on the Russian documents noted above are two scholars who have authored numerous works on U.S.-Cuban relations: **Peter Kornbluh** the behest of Carter, Representatives F. Richmond and R. Nolan visited Cuba and expressed to Castro the president's concern in connection with the "growing Cuban inade continues to be maintained essentially in its entirety. The prohibition on exports of American goods, imports of Cuban products, issuance of commercial and financial credits to Cuba by governments and private financial institutions, and activity by banks of the USA and other countries containing American capital, accounts and dollars, continues in force.

At the same time, the USA has been forced to implement modifications in those aspects of its policy which had related to trade with Cuba by foreign countries. The ministries of finance, trade and state department have been permitted to issue licenses for transactions concluded with Cuba by companies of those countries which are controlled by American monopolies. They are able to export nonstrategic materials and import Cuban products. Exports to Cuba of goods from third countries containing up to 20% in components of American manufacture are also permitted.

On the other hand, subsidiaries of American monopolies located in third countries are not permitted to maintain accounts with Cuba in American dollars, to issue it credit for a period of more than one year, or to transfer technology.

In sum, according to data of the USA Interests Section in Havana, from October 1975 through January 1979 the USA Commerce Department has issued licenses to subsidiaries of American firms in third countries for the export of nonstrategic materials in the amount of 450 million dollars, although not all applications for export licenses have been realized, and the share of goods directly produced in the USA is not greater than 5-6%.

Licenses have been granted for such products as electric motors, industrial scales, tractors, light and heavy automotive equipment, equipment for the paper industry, pharmaceuticals, florescent lamps, herbicides, locomotives, textile machines, boilers, etc. Exports of navigational systems, computers, communications, electrical distribution equipment, construction machinery, electronic experimental equipment and so forth, are prohibited. Up to 50% of applications for the issuance of licenses have been granted to subsidiaries of American companies located in Canada and Argentina.

It should be bome in mind that a lifting of the economic blockade would not automatically result in the development of trade between the two countries. Cuba would first of all have to comply with the provisions of the USA Trade Act of 1974 f t5 of administration was subjected to strong pressure from representatives of the Cuban emigre community. Under the circumstances, the USA officially announced that it would accept all of the political detainees (up to 3,500 individuals), to be released at the rate of 400 persons per month, together with their families. In order to examine this problem, special commissions from the USA Justice Department came to Havana. In October 1978, the first group of political detainees and their families departed for the USA. This March, the Americans introduced a new simplified procedure for the issuance of visas to political detainees in order to facilitate the conditions for the admission into the USA of up to 400 persons every month.

In the beginning of this year, Cuban emigres began to arrive on visits to their relatives. According to accounts of friends, the number of such persons in 1979 will exceed 100,000 individuals. During the first three months of this year around 20,000 Cuban emigres have arrived.

The Cuban leadership understands the need to intensify its ideological work in the country relating to the new policy in connection with emigration. This question occupied an important role in presentations by Castro at the recent Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the party and at a national conference of party leaders last February. In accordance with conclusions reached by the Division of Revolutionary Orientation of the Central Committee of the In this connection it may be assumed that contacts with the USA on a variety of levels, particularly in the spheres of cultural, scientific, and athletic ties, will continue and expand. Both sides are expressing interest in preserving the level of contacts already attained and in making further progress.

Considering the importance of the is-

1 September 1979

On September 1 Raul Castro visited the embassy. He anxiously described the extensive Western, primarily American, anti-Cuban media campaign, timed to coincide with the VIth conference of the heads of states and governments of non-aligned countries. The theme of the increased Soviet military presence in Cuba and the stationing there of ground troops was particularly exaggerated. What is being referred to specifically is an infantry brigade numbering 3,000 soldiers. In recent days American officials have supported this campaign. R. Castro noted the statement by the State Department spokesman Hodding Carter in which he dwelled on the supposedly "recent discovery of Soviet combat units in Cuba," and demands by Senators Stone and Church to conduct an investigation into the question of the Soviet military presence on the island. Furthermore, R. Castro recounted that on September 1 Wayne Smith, the new head of the USA Interest Section in Havana visited the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his conversation with the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Cuba, P[elegrin]. Torras, he stated that he was authorized to convey the American government's "concern" about the "evidence" of the presence in Cuba of a brigade of Soviet troops. P. Torras replied that the Cuban side would not accept this line of questioning and that American diplomats are fully aware - although the USA fails to understand it - that Cuba is a sovereign state and should be addressed as such, or else it will be impossible to achieve mutual understanding between the two countries. W. Smith hastened to explain that he received instructions only to communicate "concern" and did not require an answer to his statement. He added that the State Department considered it inappropriate to react to the statements by Senators Stone and [Idaho Dem. Frank] Church through bilateral diplomatic channels, without recourse to public debate. The American diplomat also expressed his regret that his first meeting with P. Torras took place on this unpleasant occasion.

In connection with these actions by the USA and considering that this question could emerge at any moment at the Conference of the NAM [non-aligned movement], F. Castro authorized R. Castro to come to an agreement with the Soviet side on a possible reply. The Cuban leaders proposed the following reply: "For the past 17 years a symbolic Soviet combat unit, created as a training center where Soviet military specialists train officers of the FAR [Revolutionary Armed Forces] to use and maintain new military equipment, has indeed been located in Cuba." R. Castro emphasized that they proposed this version out of principled convictions and experience with previous confrontations with Americans regarding the Soviet military presence on the island, and consider that we should not camouflage the real state of affairs but, at the same time, should not make a concession to the Americans, who could easily interpret attempts to negate the presence of a training center on Cuba as a repudiation by Cuba and the USSR of their right to create such a center and send necessary military personnel there. R. Castro added that the Americans have known about this brigade for a long time and that he was struck by the cynicism with which they affirm that it was "recently" detected. He also noted that they had no doubts that the VI conference of the NAM in Havana was one of the domestic and foreign policy reasons for the outbreak of the anti-Cuban campaign.

He further described the proceedings of the meeting of the foreign affairs ministers of the countries of the NAM. On September 1, by the end of the session, the agenda for the Conference of heads of states and governments was practically approved. The inclusion on the agenda of the problem either to the GDR or to the USSR. They said this to H. Ortega. He answered that he shares their fears, but explained Montiel current situation and said that he was already promised trips to Cuba, Arab states, and Europe, and once again affirmed that what was proposed was only an unofficial, private, exclusively "informational" visit. After this second request by H. Ortega, considering that they themselves suggested to the Sandinistas that they make the former Somoza officer defense minister, the Cuban leaders decided to turn to the Soviet side on this matter.

R. Castro also commented that the Nicaraguan foreign minister, Miguel D'Escoto, who was also in Cuba, was a former Jesuit priest, but apparently one of a small number of "red priests" in Latin America. He is educated and has a grasp of many issues, but his political views cannot be called clear and well-founded. However, he has conducted himself very well at the session of the OAS on Nicaragua and now at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of the NAM in Havana. His appointment to the position of minister of foreign affairs of the FSLN also followed the advice of F. Castro to include several priests in the government. The minister of culture is a second priest in the government.

I thanked R. Castro for the information he conveyed.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA (V. Vorotnikov)

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 833, ll. 63-67; trans. by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

Minutes of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, 27 September 1979 (excerpt)

> <u>Top Secret</u> <u>Only copy</u> <u>Working Transcript</u>

MEETING OF THE CC CPSU POLITBURO

27 September 1979

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I. Attended by Coms. Grishin, V.V., Kosygin, A.N., Suslov, M.A., Ustinov, D.F., Chernenko, K.Y., Demichev, P.N., Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Tikhonov, N.A., Gorbachev, M.S., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Kapitonov, I.V., Rusakov, K.V.

[...] 5. About a response to the President of

the USA regarding the issue of the Soviet military personnel in Cuba

BREZHNEV. Last night Carter once again appealed to us via the hot line regarding the issue of the story they have dreamed up about the presence of our military brigade in Cuba. There is nothing new in the

COLD WAR I

In the last several months Brzezinski line took over in the American leadership. said Arbesu; and that had a negative effect not only on USA-Cuban relations but also on their policy to Latin America in general. The USA instigated the well-known "microcrisis" concerning the presence of the Soviet military training center in Cuba, renewed reconnaissance flights over our territory, conducted provocative maneuvers on their base at Guantanamo and naval exercises near our coasts. All this led to the situation where now we have reached "the lowest point in our relations with the USA since Carter became President in 1977," mentioned Arbesu.

At the same time the State Department does not want to close the door completely, and has shown an interest in maintaining our contacts. American congressmen, businessmen, university professors continue to visit Cuba, though in smaller numbers, and our cultural and sports contacts continue. The State Department, mentioned my interlocutor, agreed to conclude an agreement between the coast guards of our two countries, and allowed our aircraft to fly to the USA, mostly to transport members of the Cuban community for visits with their relatives in Cuba. The Americans were supposed to ratify the agreement on fishing before the end of this year. However, since the USA Congress is currently in recess, the agreement would probably be approved by the USA government with the subsequent ratification by the Senate.

The "gestures" made by the American side toward Cuba earlier remain in force, said Arbesu. Thus, our Interest Section in Washington was allowed to have accounts in American banks, which is necessary for its normal functioning, and to transfer the consular fees to Havana. Cuban citizens residing in the United States still have a right to transfer \$500 to their relatives in Cuba every three months. American tourists are allowed to bring Cuban goods valued up to \$250 into the United States. We consider all this, reiterated Arbesu, as a sign of the State Department's desire to maintain a certain, although minimal, level of relations as a basis for their future improvement when the circumstances become more favorable.

Arbesu pointed out that since December 1978 the American side no longer showed the initiative to conduct "closed meetings" with the Cubans, during which in the past they exchanged opinions on a broad spectrum of international, especially African and Latin American, problems. It is apparent, said Arbesu, that the Carter administration is now more than convinced that we would not make any concessions in the principled issues of our policy in Africa and in other regions of the globe, especially in the circumstances when the economic blockade of Cuba is being maintained in its fullest form. However, Arbesu mentioned, the Americans show some interest in a dialogue with our Interest Section in Washington, though it has a certain situational character. For example, when the "microcrisis" concerning the presence of the Soviet military specialists in Cuba came up, they discussed it with our representatives at the Interest Section.

The American side also tried to put pressure on us in the question of Nicaragua, said Arbesu. However, they did not make any official statements in that regard. Besides, it is not in Carter's interest to raise this issue because his political opponents could exploit it. If Carter claims that Cuba interferes in Nicaraguan affairs, it would give a reason for his opponents to blame him for not giving the necessary support to Somoza; and this is not in his interest.

Arbesu said that the question of lifting the American economic blockage of Cuba remains frozen, and is not on the agenda now. He mentioned that it might be reasonable to expect that when the USA Congress gathers in session, it would make a decision granting us licenses for purchase of some pharmaceutical products and drugs in the USA. Therefore, now we can speak about only a partial lifting of the economic blockade, emphasized my interlocutor.

Arbesu said that as far as he knew, the Americans did not in any form raise the question of Cuba joining the Treaty of Tlatelolco [in which Latin American countries agreed to make the region a nuclearHavana

Wednesday, 28 May 1980 (Beginning: 9:45 a.m.) i.e. disarmament, to detente, they have adopted the long-term defense program, in spite of opposing resolutions passed by the UN.

NATO's [December] 1979 Brussels missile deployment decisions [to deploy medium and intermediate range missiles in

insisted on a troop withdrawal from Angola and Ethiopia. We always replied that we are not on any account going to discuss this issue with them. We refused to talk about it. This was one of their most pressing demands.

Another demand relates to our solidarity with Puerto Rico's independence; and it is virtually a tradition of the revolution to show solidarity, to give support, if there is a struggle for the liberation and independence of Puerto Rico.

This was before the revolution in Grenada, a small country. This has important implications in the Caribbean, where there is instability after the success of revolution in Nicaragua [words unintelligibleed.] the difficulties in Central America.

For some time they have been hoping that we would make a mistake, so that they can teach us a lesson, as they put it. Thus we must act with great caution on all these issues.

It is not our fault that there are revolutions. We are [not] responsible for what happens in El Salvador. This is a phenomenon that has developed over time. Except for the example that Cuba gives, and to give an example is always best, because solidarity, too, plays a big role. These political phenomena, however, arise virtually as natural events, because the people no longer accept such a situation. When such a revolutionary situation emerges in these countries, then inevitably this leads to tensions. Thus, with the revolution, of course, there are tensions. In Afghanistan, too, with the revolution, there were tensions, and the new situation in Iran, the revolution, has produced tensions in that region. We take an interest in what happens in the Caribbean, but also what happens in all other areas of the globe, what happens in Afghanistan.

Some Yankees, some groups of forces within the intelligentsia, are developing the argument, the strategy, that, when a crisis unfolds in one part of the globe, in Iran or Afghanistan, in the Indian Ocean or anywhere else in the world, then the USA has to respond [against] Cuba. They have said that quite frankly. If they have some clash with the Soviet Union in a part of the globe where the balance of power is unfavorable for the USA, then they should respond in a place where the balance of power is favorable for the USA. Because one should not think that only a global conflict is possible. A world conflict is the most severe. The decisions are of tremendous importance and they are dramatic ones. However, the real prospects for a conflict, not a general conflict, but a local one, are much greater.

In this sense, it doesn't matter to us in

which part of the globe it happens. It will affect us. This is why the failure of detente is of special importance to us, of very special importance. First, because detente eliminates the possibility of a global conflict, but at the same time eliminates the possibility of local conflicts and also the opportunities for repression and attacks on the liberation movement.

Of course, detente has numerous advantages, particularly if it involves disarmament and a lowering of military spending. This is virtually the only way to give the Third World more resources for their development. This is why the policy of the Cold War, of arms races, is a catastrophe for all countries, but particularly for our country, given its geographic position. However [it is a catastrophe for Cuba], not only because of this position, but also as a developing country, and it is not only political and military effects, but also economic ones in Latin America. The Cold War can trigger a special effect. This allows the USA to better control certain wavering governments and to conduct a policy towards the whole liberation movement that suits them. This hurts the revolutionary movement all over the world, but especially in Latin America; because the Yankees believe that Latin America is their back yard. The USA has an interest in what happens in Asia, what happens in Europe, in Portugal, and so on, but they have a much stronger interest in what happens in Latin America, in the revolutionary changes in Latin America. Particularly in a Cold War situation, an intervention becomes more likely. This is why, for us, the issue of changing the current course and of finding the way back to detente, if possible, is of tremendous importance.

Erich Honecker:

There are some new aspects. We got information about the meeting between Comrade Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing. This meeting came as a complete surprise to the USA.

Even if one takes into account the existence of a certain class solidarity between France and USA imperialism, this talk bengfor nos. Th rtatfnitween Comrade Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing still suggests that France intends to pursue a policy independent from the USA and is not willing to support the hardened, Cold War, course of the USA. Giscard d'Estaing explained that France will not support the USA's economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, that its athletes will go to Moscow, and that France does not want the FRG to become the leading power in Western Europe. France, Giscard d'Estaing said, has an interest in the further

existence of a divided Germany as an important element of the European balance of power. With respect to the issue of Afghanistan, France wants a political, but not a military solution, and this goes for Afghanistan as well as for Iran. By and large, this is a useful element, since it limits the chances of the USA to revive the Cold War with all its ferocity.

In this context, the conversation that the new American Secretary of State, Muskie, had with Comrade Gromyko is interesting, too. Muskie presented himself as the man who wants to be the number one in U.S. foreign policy. He did not mention Brzezinski's name, but he said: I am independent from the President's entourage. Mr. Gromyko, let us discuss the issue of Afghanistan and sort it out.

Comrade Gromyko replied: We sent our limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan only after there was interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs, when there was the danger that you would get a foothold in Afghanistan after you got kicked out of Iran. Comrade Gromyko added, as discussed in Moscow, that Afghanistan is nothing but a pretext for the USA to heighten international tensions. This means, this was eouFSInt oflong-xplninedistops takan ym the USA.

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international situation leads to Cold War, also leads to an increased danger of local

afraid before the decision, because the missiles that can reach you in the Federal Republic are not at issue here at all. The group of the Soviet armed forces has got them, and Erich Honecker: As for the movie we've just seen, I have already asked if we can get it for our TV.

Fidel Castro: In less than four weeks we have organized three big rallies, the last of them being the one for your arrival yesterday.

Erich Honecker: This huge manifestation has already been covered by our TV yesterday, as will be today's negotiations; everything in color. Millions of GDR citizens are watching this. 80 percent of the people have a TV-set.

Fidel Castro: Hence, there are much more viewers than there are Catholics and Protestants.

Erich Honecker: These are loyal citizens as well.

Fidel Castro: If we said that we have Catholics, then we could talk about millions of Catholics who are baptized. Yet actually, nobody becomes involved with the church. Our relations with the church are not that bad. In the early days of the revolution it was necessary to make some priests leave the country, to expel them; because Catholicism was the faith of the rich. 60% of the people were farmers, and on the countryside there was not a single church. In other Latin American countries they do exist. Once a year, priests visit the villages to baptize the people, but they lack a religious education, they were only educated in the big landowners' private schools. Therefore,

have solved the problem by next year; because this plague has brought us into a very difficult situation. Other countries were hurt, too. In Jamaica, the whole tobacco production has been destroyed, in Canada, too, and perhaps the USA will be affected as well. It's blue mould [*Blauschimmel*].

On our sugar plantations we also had a very serious plague, but it affected only one type. 30% of our sugar plantations have been planted with this type of sugar. This led to a loss of some 1 million tons of sugar. We fight against this plague by replacing this type of sugar with another one, a new type, which is resistant against this disease.

Then there is the African swine fever, which we are fighting successfully. This swine fever is practically under control. It is strange, though, three plagues all at the same time.

A couple of days ago a plane overflew our country and dropped a gelatin-like, liquid substance containing a fungus; quite clever, in microscopically small capsules. Currently, we are conducting research on the issue. These things were dropped in a width of 25 kilometers. We haven't publicized anything yet, because we are still in the process of conducting research. We have asked the Soviet comrades for help. But we still need more facts.

This is very disquieting, however, since these could be symptoms of bacteriological warfare. These chemicals are highly developed. The material that has been used does not come from a small group of counterrevolutionaries, it belongs to a highly developed industry. Now we don't know who has done this. We know for sure that we are dealing with fungi, a type of fungus that could damage the sugar. We are doing the relevant tests before we publicize something. The dropping took place 12 to 14 days ago. But we don't have all elements available yet. Perhaps this is psychological warfare?

Furthermore, there are various signs of sabotage. A couple of weeks ago a very serious act of sabotage occurred. A day-nursery in a high-rise was set on fire. This fire was very dangerous, because there were 570 children in the nursery at this point. By a miracle, all children were saved.

A few days later, the same thing happened to a old people's home in Jamaica. 150 old women died. Image what would have happened here if 100 children had died! Maybe the people would have killed the rogue. The people might have killed some 10,000 of these guys, but then the problem would have gotten out of hands; because we have to run a visible campaign with the party and the mass organizations in order to keep the people calm. They want to strike back, and we are at pains to calm the people down. If 150 children had died, then we would have witnessed serious acts of revenge. And apparently this was the intention.

Three days ago a special school was set on fire, a dangerous incident, too.

Yesterday a small rum factory was set

dependent on the USA. Brazil seeks to increase its independence. Without any doubt, this is a very reasonable government, but the situation is different from that in Mexico. Mexico can be seen more as an ally, as a friend.

The Yankees have asked the Mexicans to do them some service here, in order to solve their problems with us. We told the Mexicans that we would agree, if the goal is to solve all problems at the same time, not only those that are of interest to the USA. They Mexicans said that they agree with that.

When the Mexicans, the Yankees, and we sit at a table, the relation will be two to one on some issues. The Mexicans have invited representatives from Panama, and we have said that it is better to have more Latin Americans. Maybe it is better for us if the Mexicans participate in these talks. Therefore we agreed. We don't know what is going to happen and where it is going to happen because the Yankees are quite constrained in their actions because of the campaign. Before the elections, Carter must make no concessions at all. Therefore, the situation is not going to change before the elections. On no account, can we help Carter solve his own problems. What guarantees is Carter going to give us? And what if he loses the elections? They don't talk about Angola and Ethiopia any more, now they talk about solving the problem in the USA's interests section which is full of counterrevolutionaries, and in Iran, they demand their hostages. They were afraid that our people would attack the consulate. Before our demonstration, they were very concerned, and Mariel is the second issue that they are very concerned about.

There, we are the ones who issue the exit visas. They are afraid of Latin America, of the people from Haiti, Mexico, and the next problem is the hijacked plane. They are interested in agreements and they are concerned about that.

However, they always find something new. At the time, they talked about subversion in Latin America, now there are new issues. In this pre-election period, it is very difficult for them to make concessions. Hence, we remain at the present point as long as the elections have not taken place.

This was a broad outline of the current situation. We will provide further information about Cuba, but these were the main issues.

Erich Honecker: Comrade Fidel Castro, thank you for your explanations. It is quite obvious that there are no issues between us that need further discussion.

As far as we know, the communique

has been prepared. All questions have been settled, and we have expressed our opinions on international issues.

We consider the conclusion of the treaty on friendship and cooperation very important.

(Fidel Castro: This is our first treaty.)

The people of the German Democratic Republic will be delighted when they learn about it, and it is certain that this will receive great attention; just as our stay here already receives great international attention. The conclusion of this treaty will outline all that what we, even more so than before, will have to live up to in our mutual cooperation.

Despite all agreement with regard to economic and other issues, there will be a whole string of additional possibilities to develop the cooperation of two countries that are so much joined together in friendship as are the German Democratic Republic and the Republic of Cuba.

We in the GDR follow with great pleasure with how much energy you implement the decisions taken at the Ist Party congress of the Communist Party. We follow with deep sympathy your efforts concerning the preparation of the IInd Party congress, about which you have just informed us.

The remarks you made in the context of the Party congress regarding the effectiveness and quality of your work are very familiar concerns for us. We, too, devote increasing attention to these issues given the conditions of our development. Moreover, in our activities we proceed from the assumption that revolutionary Cuba commands great authority and conducts a very active, principled foreign policy in full accordance with the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community while certainly taking into consideration your country's specific situation.

It is obvious that in the preparation of your IInd Party congress you are concerned with a whole string of issues that we also have to deal with in preparing for our Xth Party congress. Recently our Central Committee held its 12th conference. Supplementing the Politburo's report on the organization of our Xth Party congress, I held a speech there. The Xth Party congress has been scheduled for 11-16 April 1981. We publicized the agenda and at the same time we announced that motions to be considered by the Party congress have to be proposed before the end of March. In the context of the summoning of our Xth Party congress the entire country will engage in a great debate about the future shaping of the German Democratic Republic's developed socialist society. Of course, this will be related to the continuing carrying through of the GDR's foreign policy.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, the problems are quite obvious. The cooperation with the Soviet Union is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We coordinate our foreign policy with the socialist brother nations. Concerning foreign policy, there is agreement as to the basic issues, the issue of the further consolidation of the unity and indivisibility of the community of socialist countries, the issue of defending the achievements of detente, its supplementing with arms reductions, and active support for national liberation movements. In this process, we pay great attention to the development of the nonaligned countries about which Comrade Fidel Castro has informed us in the context of the Havana conference and the subsequent events.

Although all these issues concerning the future development of our foreign policy are understood, the citizens of the GDR certainly face a lot of problems. World events are highly complex, so that the Party has to be very active in this area; this all the more so since the enemy seeks to deceive the people through the mass media and to disguise its aggressive policies, particularly that of the USA. We have created a solid basis regarding these issues. The comrades now are increasingly capable of thinking for themselves and clarifying these issues in dialogue with the people.

In January of this year we held big talks with our party's first district secretaries (*I. Kreissekretaere*) under consultation of the local government secretaries (*Sekretaere der Bezirksleitungen*).

Fidel Castro: How many districts are there in your country?

Erich Honecker: There are 136 districts (*Kreise*), but also a whole string of industrial districts. Altogether there were 600 comrades present there. At this meeting, we assessed the class struggle between socialism and imperialism and its implications for the work of our party. One can note the differences between the various imperialist countries, but the basic conflict still is the one between socialism and imperialism. The imperialists are quite united in their struggle against socialism, they only disagree with regard to method.

We also evaluated the development of the national liberation movement and the role of the Communist and workers' movements in the developed capitalist countries. It was a broad range of international issues, which are mainly ideological issues, and issues concerning the future shaping of the developed socialist society. For example, we discussed the question how to continue our dynamic economic policy under changed international economic conditions in combination with the execution of our socio-political program. These questions are certainly not only of theoretical importance; above all they concern the masses and hence the Party.

We believe that we can compensate for the changed international economic conditions, which find expression in increasing prices, in inflationary tendencies, through higher labor productivity. You know our development, therefore I don't have to go into detail. The main problem we face is to combine the advantages of the socialist social order with the scientific-technical revolution. This means, among other things, especially a more efficient management of natural resources. We have great supplies of brown coal in our country. Within the framework of the plan, we are currently making it our task to extract 300 million tons of brown coal a year instead of the 240 million tons we have produced in the past. Of course this is a huge task, since it involves the opening of new coal mines.

Fidel Castro: How many kilocalories does coal have?

Erich Honecker: 2,000 to 3,000, it varies. However, given the increase in world prices, this is a very important natural resource.

Fidel Castro: How many tons of brown coal are necessary to substitute 1 ton of oil? I am talking about the type of brown coal that you produce.

Erich Honecker: Practically, we use brown coal for our carbochemical industry. Relatedly, it is the source material for various raw materials, plastics, rubber (elastomers?), for the production of gas. We just have opened a new factory near Buna. Near Leuna we then saw the old plant, which works in the field of carbochemistry. The new one works on the basis of oil. Initially, we intended to abandon carbochemistry because at that time oil was cheaper than brown coal. We wanted to switch completely to petrochemistry. But now we are developing a stronger carbochemical industry, and the new plant produces 100,000 tons of PVC per year on the basis of brown coal,

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try trych -skeerywoodryetc3 -0.005 el workers have graduated from the universities and technical colleges. Without the high level of education among workers, without the good professional training for everyone, tions, which perhaps can be answered later in more detail. These questions concern problems in the development of the GDR. Just like the comradeship between the Cuban Communist Party and the German Socialist Unity Party is the centerpiece of our friendship, the Party is the decisive force in your country. It couldn't be otherwise. We thus create the basis for the further development of the relations between the German Democratic Republic and socialist Cuba.

Fidel Castro: We have a Communist Party, but haven't built socialism yet; you have a Socialist Unity Party and are already building Communism.

Erich Honecker: This is the dialectic. Moreover, this is always connected with what you have said before. There are different ways to Communism. The important thing is to actually pursue these paths. Then it is no longer decisive how the party calls itself. All of us who are sitting here come from the German Communist Party (KPD), from the Communist youth organization. Through the unification of Social Democrats and Communists we became the German Socialist Unity Party. Now we have already developed so far that we think of Communism. You first thought of Communism and called your party Communist Party.

Fidel Castro: It's Karl Marx's fault. I have listened carefully to your explanations because we can still benefit more from the GDR's experience. That's what I was thinking of when you talked about the system of education. With respect to some things the conditions in your country are different from those in ours. There are some issues where we can use your experience. We have to make an effort in that regard.

In the realm of professional training there is still a lot of room for improvement.

Our situation, though, is very different from yours. Let us compare just a few figures. You produce nine times as much electricity as we do, and you consume 16 times as much wood. These are only two examples. We face severe constraints concerning raw materials and have no energy sources, neither gas nor oil. We don't even have wood. We are asking the Soviet comrades to establish a Cuban colony in Siberia for the production of wood.

Erich Honecker: You can get it. The Bulgarians are there. We also got an invitation, but we are lacking workers.

Fidel Castro: You should transfer this invitation to us.

Erich Honecker: Agreed.

Fidel Castro: Then we make the deal together. In the Soviet Union, people think that the Cubans can't work in Siberia be-

cause of the cold. But thousands of Cubans are in the South of Angola, in the trenches, for months. Why shouldn't they be able to work in Siberia? I am convinced that they can work there, and we are having discussions along these lines with Comrade Baibakov and various personalities in the Soviet Union. However, they doubt that we can stand the cold.

Erich Honecker: If we can stand the heat, why shouldn't you be able to stand the cold?

Fidel Castro: There are remote areas, where they kept prisoners, but that doesn't matter.

Erich Honecker: There are vast areas, and we got such an offer, too. We couldn't accept it for the reasons mentioned before. Therefore we have a well-developed forestry [sector]. Unfortunately, you don't, for objective reasons, and what we can't get, we have to substitute through chemistry. Yet what it does not produce are the silicon chips for microelectronics, the microprocessors.

Fidel Castro: We have silicon.

Erich Honecker: We have silicon en masse. We control the whole silicon chain with the help of our scientists. We have produced the multispectrum camera at Zeiss. When Comrade [Gunter] Mittag met Schmidt [on 17 April 1980 in Bonn], he claimed that our camera was better than the American one. We are not modest as far as our productive capabilities are concerned. However, apart from that, what is actually crucial are the cadres.

Fidel Castro: Where do you produce that camera?

Erich Honecker: In Jena. But in Dresden, the industry is very powerful, and the institute for microelectronics is located there.

I have yet to fulfill an honorable task. On behalf of our Party's Central Committee, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers, I would like to invite a party and government delegation of the Republic of Cuba under the leadership of Comrade Fi208 Cold War International History Project B

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after the words just spoken by the Secretary of State - to attribute the current intensification of our conflicts to geopolitical reasons. And I would hope to possess all of the necessary eloquence, within the short time available to us, in order to attempt to prove that the geopolitical reality is not what it is made out to be in this case.

I am aware that the Secretary of State is a great lover of philosophy. Thus, even in the seventeenth century, since the time of Hume, it has been considered proven that the factual appearance of "B" following the appearance of "A" does not signify that "A" necessarily is the cause of the appearance of "B." I will attempt, in the briefest of fashion, in order to avoid tiring you, to describe our interpretation of events, beginning in 1975.

We became involved in Angola without the slightest wish to establish our military presence there. Speaking of military presence, I have in mind the presence of regular troops. In sending the first 150 people to Angola, we had absolutely no conception of what would become of the events in that country. This I can state to you unequivocally.

We had long maintained our ties with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in its struggle against Portuguese colonialism. President [Agostinho] Neto requested our assistance in the preparation of groups which led to organization of the Angolan army. With this aim we dispatched 150 persons in three schools: one located in the south, the other in the northeast, and the third around Luanda. The subsequent development of events ensued as follows: suddenly we received news from Neto that they had been attacked by forces from Zaire and troops of Holden Roberto from the north, and by South Africa from the south.

I can assure you unequivocally, inasmuch as I played a direct role in this matter, that when the decision to dispatch Cuban forces into Angola was made, we communicated nothing about it to the Soviet Union. We were not even aware of its point of view on that account. And we had absolutely no idea of the number of troops that it would be necessary to send. In this manner, the first group was dispatched when the forces in the southern theater advanced more than 400, almost 500 kilometers from the Namibian border, approaching Lobito and Benguela, and the forces of Zaire were located 30 kilometers from Luanda. In this situation we sent at first not regular troops, but rather groups of commandos.

It is true that subsequently an agreement was reached between Cuba and the Soviet Union regarding the activity of the forces, inasmuch as the Soviet Union already had an obligation to Angola to supply arms and it became necessary to speed up its implementation. As a result, we reached an agreement, and we don't deny this, under which the Soviet Union proceeded to dispatch certain types of weapons, and we sent people who were capable of using them.

And thus it was. When we became involved in the events in Angola, we had absolutely no concept of the geopolitical conceptions about the importance of Angola in light of the interests of the Soviet Union. We saw in Angola a friendly country, a group of revolutionaries struggling against colonialism, against South Africa, and embarked on all of this.

And then Ethipia stepped to the front of the line. How did all of this happen there?

We established relations with Ethiopia at the request of Somalia. We had maintained no diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, and we harbored serious doubts in relation to the process that was taking place in that country. At the time, the leader of the revolution was not Mengistu. Power was in the hands of Teferi Bante. And I was personally assigned to establish contact in Colombo [Sri Lanka], where I headed the Cuban delegation at a conference of the heads of state and governments of the non-aligned countries [in August 1976], to establish contact with Teferi Bante and Ali Bukarom, at that time Vice President of Somalia, for the purpose of attempting to reconcile them among themselves, which turned out to be impossible because of the refusal of Teferi Bante.

Subsequently, Vice President [of Somalia Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar, simultaneously occupying the post of Minister of Defense of Somalia, came to Cuba. I was in charge of the preliminary negotiations 009 Tof im In thiseirountrsheaddvadsids

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ment of events, namely, the logic.

Let us turn now to Latin America, where, as you say, beginning in 1975, there has been a return to events characteristic of the 1960's.

As you indicate, there was a tranquil period in relations between the United States and Cuba. I would say, as you did, that this tranquil period was interrupted by the events in Angola. I believe that this was connected to the pride of Secretary of State Kissinger, who had his own plan for a solution for the course of a very short period of time. This is true, this is true, it is for sure. However, not one self-respecting small country will reconcile to a demand that it admit to its own destruction without putting up a fight. I think it is necessary to understand this. I think that it should be understood.

El Salvador.

We do not have there, Mr. Haig, we do not have there any troops, nor any military advisors, and we say this to you with the same clarity with which we have spoken to other leaders from different parts of the world. We have declared this and are ready to prove it. We would request to be shown close friends. We reject any suggestion that we are an agent of the Soviet Union in any part of the world. I have explained to you the nature of our position on this issue. We not only have real feelings for the Soviet Union, cemented in a common ideology, but also we have received significant assistance from the Soviet Union for our own economic development. Naturally, with that assistance alone we cannot develop our country as quickly as necessary and as we would like to. However, we do not believe that such assistance is incompatible with the establishment of normalized relations between the United States and Cuba. tion to these problems. Otherwise, we will be required to pursue a different course, which, I believe, after my discussions with you here, would not be desirable for you. I know that the United States also does not want this, but it is prepared, after many years of not being in a position to take any measures, is ready to take them very quickly. Therefore, I am speaking to you of the need to immediately find a solution. I can assure you, that these solutions would not impinge the honor, sovereignty, or integrity of Cuba or the Cuban people. Nobody wants that. That would be foolish. And it is an objecderstandings can arise.

I do not want at this time to commence a discussion about the facts, although at some point we can also discuss whether there or not there is falsification. When General Walters comes to Cuba, I think that it is important for him to bring with him as much data as possible in order to examine it for the purpose of interpreting these facts.

I remember that the "Bay of Pigs" was brought about by information from people located in Cuba that led the CIA to a mistaken conclusion. As regards your reference to aircraft, I can tell you, that everybody knows what is taking place in Cuba. We have no factions in the government. We have a division of labor. However, the members of the Politburo know everything that the military is doing. And I can assure you that you are telling me things with which I cannot in the slightest bit agree, frankly speaking, not in the slightest degree. About Angola, about Ethiopia. They ask, why are we still located there[?] Because they want us there, and the same in Angola. If, as a result of what is happening there now (we already know about the results of the meeting of the contact group, about the decision of the foreign ministers of Africa, we see that there is an opportunity to achieve a consensus on Namibia, and that there are visible signs of progress), if as a result of a solution to the Namibia issue the Angolans allow us to withdraw our forces, then we are ready to leave there. There is no doubt about this whatsoever. But I am concerned by the fact that we have in Angola not only several thousand soldiers, several tens of thousands of soldiers, but also several thousand construction workers and civilians.

And the information that you are spreading about Nicaragua is a complete falsification. We can discuss all of this with General Walters in detail in the course of several days. We can discuss this, and we can give you all of the details that are of interest to you, because we do not want a confrontation to arise because of a mistake.

We are also prepared for a confrontation. We know that such a confrontation will be traumatic for our people. We have no doubt about this. But neither are we afraid of a confrontation. What we fear is an unnecessary confrontation, in which, as a result of errors by both sides, as a result of an absence of contacts, thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Cubans will perish. This worries us. And I am worried by other elements of interpretation which, I believe, we must discuss. If necessary, I can on any day leave for New York and organize a different, more detailed meeting. But several of your personal interpretations

which, as you say, are also consistent with the interpretations of the President of the United States, cause me great anxiety. For example, I do not believe that the United States has any right to interfere in matters related to the presence of Cuban teachers in Nicaragua. This, and what they are teaching, is a question for the Nicaraguan government to decide. I can assure you, that these are elementary school teachers who can hardly teach Marxist-Leninism. I don't know whether you have ever attempted to read any books about Marxist-Leninism, but it would be very difficult for our 2,700 teachers to teach Marxist-Leninism to little Indians. However, we believe that only the government of Nicaragua, and no other, must decide whether or not they need our teachers. I am convinced of this, because I have had enough discussions with the Nicaraguan leadership and I have also spoken with Fidel, and I know from other discussions, at which I have been present, that the Nicaraguans do not have the slightest desire or in-

COMMENTARIES

CUBA AS SUPERPOWER: HAVANA AND MOSCOW, 1979

by Jorge I. Dominquez

In 1979. Cuba behaved as if it were a superpower. Tens of thousands of Cuban troops were stationed in Angola and Ethiopia, and hundreds of other Cuban military advisers, trainers, and additional troops were posted to other countries across the seas. Cuba had international programs assisting about three dozen countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; many of these programs required the overseas deployment of Cuban personnel, while others provided training in Cuba itself for over 20,000 foreigners. In part for these reasons (and notwithstanding Havana's tight alliance with the Soviet Union), Cuba had been elected chairman of the Nonaligned Movement-at the time a significant organization of African, Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean countriesand it hosted its sixth summit in Havana in September 1979.

Cuba was also the Soviet Union's only truly reliable military ally in the Cold War, and the Cuban armed forces proved to be the only communist army capable of fighting effectively in distant locales for objectives at best remote from the "cause" of the defense of the homeland. From the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, over 300,000 Cuban troops served abroad. In any given year, relative to its population, Cuba had more troops posted overseas every year than the United States had posted in Vietnam at the peak of its engagement in that war. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Cuban armed forces were able to accomplish three times on African soil (in Angola in 1976 and 1988, and in Ethiopia in 1978) what the United States could not do in Vietnam and what the Soviet Union could not do in Afghanistan: Cuban troops won the wars they went to fight.

Nearly two decades later, this account reads like a fantasy, for Cuba's government today is struggling to survive, all its troops have been repatriated, lateral Soviet concession to the United States.

Other important areas of disagreement between the Soviets and the Cubans become evident in the minutes of the 23 November 1981 meeting between Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig.³ The text makes it clear that the talks were not successful. Nonetheless, the minutes show a perhaps surprisingly accommodating opening gambit from Haig, followed by his lack of understanding of one key point that Rodríguez was communicating. Haig's principal concern was the close connection between Cuba and the Soviet Union in backing Cuban overseas operations. Rodríguez kept telling Haig, in effect, that it was fine for the United States to blame Cuba but, please, do not blame the USSR.!

Rodríguez first asserts: "I can assure you unequivocally, inasmuch as I played a direct role in this matter, that when the decision to dispatch Cuban forces into Angola was made [in 1975], we communicated nothing about it to the Soviet Union. We were not even aware of its point of view on that account." Next, Rodríguez discusses the Ethiopian war (1977-78): "I had the privilege to accompany Fidel Castro at the time of his meetings with the leadership of the Soviet Union. . . . And it was we who insistently urged the need to render military assistance to Ethiopia. This was the situation, to be distinguished from that in Angola, because in this case preliminary negotiations were taking place. But in these negotiations it was Fidel Castro himself who first advocated military assistance." Finally, Rodríguez turned to the troubles in Central America: "Certain American leaders are always expressing the opinion that the Soviet Union acted as a

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In addition, this section of the present Bulletin presents more information on several topics addressed both at Hong Kong and in the previous Bulletin:

* Russian and Chinese documents on the Mao-Stalin summit in Moscow that help flesh out the conversations between the two leaders published in the previous Bulletin;

* an analysis by William Taubman (first prepared for Hong Kong) of the personal conflict between Khrushchev and Mao and its role in the Sino-Soviet split, as well as contemporaneous Russian documents (from both Moscow and East Berlin archives);

* another paper prepared for Hong Kong, by M.Y. Prozumenschikov, on the significance of the Sino-Indian and Cuban Missile Crises of October 1962 for the open rupture between Moscow and Beijing, along with supplementary Russian and East German archival materials;

* and, perhaps most intriguingly, a Chinese response to a controversy opened in the previous Bulletin about the discrepancy between Russian archival documents and published Chinese documents regarding communications between Mao and Stalin on Beijing's entry into the Korean War in October 1950 (along with new evidence on a key omission from a Russian document in the last Bulletin).

Additional materials are slated for publication in CWIHP Working Papers, future Bulletins, and via the Internet on the CWIHP site on the National Security Archive's home page on the World Wide Web: http://www.nsarchive.com Following is the program of the

Hong Kong Confernce:

Cold War International History Project Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996

Panel I: New Evidence on the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance

Chair: Odd Arne Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.); Papers: Michael M. Sheng (Southwest Missouri State Univ.), "Mao, Stalin, and the Struggle in Manchuria, 1945-46: Nationalism or Internationalism?"; Yang Kuisong (Inst. of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [CASS], Beijing), "On the Causes of the Changes in Mao's view of the Soviet Union"; Niu Jun (Inst. of American Studies [IAS], CASS), "The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-50"; Brian Murray (Columbia Univ.), "Stalin, the Division of China, and Cold War Origins"; Commentators: James Tang (Hong Kong Univ.), O.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.)

Panel II: New Evidence on the Korean War

Chair: Jim Hershberg (CWIHP):

Session 1: The North Korean Dimension

Papers: Alexandre Mansourov (Columbia Univ.), "Did Conventional Deterrence Work? (Why the Korean War did not erupt in the Summer of 1949)"; Hakjoon Kim (Dankook Univ., Seoul), "North Korean Leaders and the Origins of the Korean War"; David Tsui (Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong), "Did the DPRK and the PRC Sign a Mutual Security Pact in 1949?"


Session 2: The Course of the War

Papers: Shen Zhihua (Ctr. forse U 105i

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tion: Mao Zedong's Response to Khrushchev's Destalinization and Dulles' Strategy of Peaceful Evolution"; Deborah Kaple (Princeton Univ.), "Soviet Assistance and Civilian Cooperation in China"; Zhang Shuguang (Univ. of Maryland/College Park), "The Collapse of Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation, 1950-60: A Cultural Explanation"; Sergei Goncharenko (IMEMO, Moscow), "The Military Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split"; Mark Kramer (Harvard Univ.), "The Soviet Foreign



MORE ON MAO IN MOSCOW, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950

Editor's Note: The previous issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/96, pp. 4-9) contained translations of the Russian transcripts of two conversations (16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950) between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1949-February 1950. Mao's trip to the USSR, shortly after the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the establishment in October 1949 of the People's Republic of China, marked the only personal encounter between these two giants of 20th-century history, and led to the signing on 14 February 1950 of a Sino-Soviet treaty formally establishing an alliance between the two communist powers—a landmark in the history of the Cold War.

To provide further examples of the newly-available East-bloc evidence on this crucial event, the *Bulletin* presents below a selection of translated additional materials from Russian and Chinese sources. They include three records of conversations between Mao and senior Soviet officials, on 1, 6, and 17 January 1950, located in the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, formally known as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), and provided to the *Bulletin* by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute (Oslo), author of *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War*, *1944-1946* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993); Westad's commentary precedes the documents.

In addition to immediate considerations relating to Mao's activities in Moscow, the conversations cover a range of subjects concerning Sino-Soviet ties—political, diplomatic, economic, and military. Especially notable for Cold War historians concentrating on international relations are the exchanges on joint strategy in the United Nations to unseat the Guomindang (Kuomintang) representative (foreshadowing a Soviet boycott that would enable the Security Council to approve U.N. participation in the Korean War) and a discussion of U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's National Press Club speech of 12 January 1950—particularly his efforts to foment discord between the USSR and China. These conversations, of course, should be read in the context of the two previously mentioned Stalin-Mao conversations, which bracket them (other talks are believed to have taken place, but no additional transcripts have emerged).

In contrast to the Russian documents, which were found by outside scholars working in the archives, the Chinese materials were published since the late 1980s in "neibu" or "internal" editions which have gradually made their way outside China, where they have been extensively used by scholars.¹ Most of these collections were assembled by teams working for or with authorities of the Chinese state or the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with outside scholars receiving little or no access to high-level archives for the post-1949 period, and thus unable to inspect the originals (let alone the surrounding documentation) of the materials contained in these publications. Nonetheless, albeit with due caution, scholars' use of such publications over the past decade has transformed the study of CCP and PRC foreign policy (at least through the 1950s), as well as the actions and motivations of senior figures such as Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai).

To make these Chinese-language materials accessible to an English-reading audience, two U.S.-based Chinese scholars have undertaken to translate, edit, and annotate a multi-volume collection of materials on PRC/ CCP foreign policy since World War II, culled from PRC sources. The two are Prof. Shuguang Zhang (University of Maryland/ College Park), author of *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), and *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995); and Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale; during 1996-1997 visiting fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC), author of Kremlinologists of yore used to liken analyzing political conflict in the Politburo to watching a dog-fight takvozhd personally.

What happened between the two sides in Moscow from December 17 to January 2 remains shrouded in mystery. Stalin obviously wanted to impress the Chinese, to show them Soviet power by arranging visits to memorials and symbols of the achievements of Communism. It is also obvious that he did not want anyone to engage in any further discussions of the main political issues beyond what had been said at the meeting between Mao and himself on December 16. protocols on Xinjiang and Manchuria which gave him a sense of strategic control of these areas. But Stalin and his associates paid a price for their concessions which was considerably higher than the price Mao paid for signing the agreements which provided him with protection, legitimacy, and aid. By his actions, Stalin undermined Chinese faith in the commonality of ideological principles between the two sides.

The "lessons" of Soviet perfidy in 1949-50 poisoned China's relationship to Moscow through the 1950s and beyond. Almost twenty years after the signing of the treaty, as Zhou Enlai advised Vietnam's Communists on the diplomatic aspects of liberating their country, he recalled his and Mao's experiences with the Soviets in the late 1940s. "The closer to victory your struggle is, the fiercer your struggle with the Soviet Union will be The closer your war comes to victory, the more obstructive and treacherous the revisionist Soviets-who cannot compare even to Stalin-will be. I refer to [our] past experiences in order to make you vigilant."11

As the evidence now stands, it is hard to see it corroborating Goncharev, Lewis, and Xue's view of Stalin and Mao as, in Michael Hunt's phrase, "shrewd nationalists and resolute realpolitikers engaged in an intricate game of international chess."¹² Where they see a well-considered plan, at least on Stalin's part, the documents suggest a good deal of improvisation and indecision on the part of the Soviet leadership. If one adds to this the multiple and often unintended consequences of cultural misperceptions and quirky personalities so clearly brought out in the memoirs, the picture which emerges is rather of two "giants of history" struggling, and ultimately failing, to construct a purpose to their bilateral relationship beyond the treaty text.

The Chinese side, if anything, came out better than the Soviets as far as a "realist," interest-oriented agenda is concerned. Mao's decision-making was, in 1950, still oriented toward consensus within his party and relied heavily on trusted advisers whose judgments influenced his own thinking. Stalin, on the other hand, often made hasty decisions based on little or no information or consultation. And since there was, at least in this case, little room for initiatives by any of Stalin's subordinates, the result was a disjointed policy-making process, through which the Soviets won a pyrrhic victory—exacting Chinese concessions, but losing the opportunity to forge a lasting alliance.

¹ By far the best survey of the summit available is in Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 84-129. Although very little has been published in China in terms of documents (except the items which are included in the present collection), there are a number of memoirs dealing with the summit. The most important is Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian* [Alongside giants in history] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991). Shi was Mao's interpreter in Moscow.

² The Mao-Stalin conversations of 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950 were published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 5-9, with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok.

³ For an overview of what was known up to the mid-1980s, see Peter Jones and Sin Kevill, comps., *China and the Soviet Union 1949-84* (London: Longman, 1985). For a comparative view, see Margot Light, ed., *Troubled Friendships: Moscow's Third World Ventures* (London: British Academic Press, 1993).

⁴ See, e.g., Mao's March 1956 conversation with Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin, *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 164-167.

⁵ Soviet records on Liu Shaoqi's trip to Moscow in the summer of 1949 have recently been released from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) and published in the journal *Problemi Dalnego Vostok* [Problems of the Far East] introduced by former Soviet ambassador to Mongolia Andrei Ledovsky. For an English translation, see Andrei Ledovsky, "The Moscow Visit of a Delegation of the Communist Party of China in June to August 1949," *Far Eastern Affairs* 4 (1996), 64-86.

⁶ See Odd Arne Westad, "Brothers: Visions of an Alliance," in Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance*, forth-coming.

⁷ Former Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa, author's interview, 7 September 1992. ⁸ Record of conversation, Shibaev-Li Kenong, 16 January 1950, Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), f. 0100, o. 43, p. 302, d. 10, ll. 38-44.

⁹ See Vyshinskii to Stalin, 2 February 1950, and attached draft agreements, AVPRF, f. 07, o 23a, p. 18, d. 234. On II. 29-34 Vyshinskii summarized his conversation with Zhou earlier that day. ¹⁰ See Roshchin's and Mikoian's conversations with Zhou on February 12, summarized in AVPRF, f. 07, o 23a, p. 18, d. 234, II. 71-74 and 64-68. For a very interesting summary of prospects for trade, see Kosiachenko et al. to Molotov et al., "O torgovle s Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi" ["On trade with the People's Republic of China"], 12 February 1950, AVPRF, f. 07, o. 23a, p. 18, d. 237, II. 1-249.

 ¹¹ Transcript of talks between Vietnamese and Chinese party delegations, Beijing, 11 April 1967.
 ¹² CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 143.

TRANSLATED RUSSIAN AND CHINESE DOCUMENTS ON MAO ZEDONG'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, DECEMBER 1949-FEBRUARY 1950

Document 1: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 December 1949¹

(1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the 16th and met with Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m.
(Beijing time). His attitude was really sincere. The questions involved included the possibility of peace, the treaty, loan, Taiwan, and the publication of my selected works.
(2) Stalin said that the Americans are afraid of war. The Amerians ask other countries to fight the war [for them], but other countries are also afraid to fight a war. According to him, it is unlikely that a war will break out, and we agree with his opinions. (3 ve. 23a, p. 18, d. 237, II

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retreating to Tibet and to the south have been cut off. They will be destroyed in the very near future. In Yunnan there are also up to another 30 thousand persons scattered to the south-west from Kunming in separate groups of Guomindang followers, but their fate has been decided.

Mao Zedong requested to transmit the following information concerning his health condition and his plans for further stay in Moscow to the leaders of the Soviet government:

"My health condition — says Mao Zedong, — has improved after a two-year resting period. For the last four days I have been sleeping 8 hours a day with no problems, without taking special sleeping medication. I feel much more energetic, but when going for a walk, I cannot remain out in the fresh air for more than a quarter of an hour - I get dizzy. With regard to this, I intend to rest one more week in total peace and completely restore a normal sleeping pattern."

Further he pointed out that following the week-long rest period he would like to visit comrades Shvernik, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov, Vasilevskiy, and Vyshinskiy. These visits will have to take the nature of ordinary conversations. He will not talk about any specific topics nor discuss any business matters. There must be one visit per day, they must not be very lengthy, and he thinks that the best time for them would be after 5-6 pm.

During the same time period he would like to meet with I.V. Stalin to discuss business matters.

After completing the discussion con-

signed between China and each of the imperialist countries in the past. (b) To publish through the news agencies of the two countries a brief communique stating that the authorities of the two countries have exchanged opinions on the old Sino-Soviet treaty and other issues, and have achieved a consensus, without mentioning any of the details. In fact, by doing so we mean to put off the solution of the problem to the future, until a few years later. Accordingly, China's foreign minister Zhou Enlai does not need to come here. (c) To sign a statement, not a treaty, that will summarize the key points in the two countries' relations. If this is the option, Zhou Enlai will not have to come either. After I have analyzed in detail the advantages and disadvantages of these three options, Comrade Molotov said promptly that option (a) was good and that Zhou should come. I then asked: "Do you

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Republic of China and the Soviet Union following the victory of the People's Revolution. A review of the existing treaty is especially necessary, since two important components of the treaty, Japan and the Guomindang, have suffered major changes: Japan has ceased to exist as an armed force and the Guomindang has been broken up. 232 C

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first and foremost, to reinforce the country's internal situation, which is sufficiently clear and understandable to us.

2. Furthermore, I said that the declaration by the People's Republic of China, which states that maintaining the Guomindang representative in the Security Council is unlawful and that Jiang Tingfu must be removed from it, as well as simultaneous actions by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, caused a commotion and, to a certain extent, confused our enemies' camp. However, in order to bring the struggle begun in the UN to a conclusion, we would consider it expedient for the People's Republic of China to appoint its own representative to the Security Council. And it would be preferable for this appointment to take place as soon as possible.

<u>Mao Zedong</u> responded that he had a conversation with comrade Vyshinsky concerning this matter and completely agrees with such a proposal. However, for us, emphasized Mao Zedong, this matter presents a technical problem - selection of the candidate. The only suitable candidate is the present deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs comrade Zhang Hanfu, even though he is somewhat weak for the purpose. I would like to coordinate the question of appointing Zhang Hanfu with comrade Zhou Enlai upon his arrival in Moscow.

I said that if that is the only problem, he can talk to Zhou Enlai over the phone (VCh [a high frequency link]), while he is en route.

<u>Mao Zedong</u> willingly agreed to communicate with Zhou Enlai over VCh and to coordinate this question immediately.

3. After this I said that according to our information the head of the Guomindang delegation in the Union Council for Japan, General Zhu Shi-Min, wants to break with the Guomindang and switch to the side of the People's Republic of China. However, we have no confidence that this information is sufficiently reliable and, in addition, we do not know Zhu Shi-Min well and it is difficult for us to arrive at any definite conclusion about him. For this reason we would like to discuss the matter with Mao Zedong and find out whether we should wait until Zhu Shi-Min announces his switch or, without waiting for it, demand the removal of the Guomindang representative from the Union Council for Japan.

Mao Zedong said that from his point

of view it would be more expedient to act through the Secretary of the Guomindang delegation in the Union Council for Japan Chen Tin-Cho, who not long ago sent a letter through General Derevyanko concerning the work he is performing with regard to the switch of the aforementioned delegation in Tokyo to the side of the People's Republic of China. We, noted Mao Zedong, need to exert influence on Zhu Shi-Min and convince him to switch to our side. This would allow us to reach a smoother solution to the question of our representative's appointment to the Union Council for Japan.

Mao Zedong said that he will prepare a response to Chen Tin-Cho's letter and will send it to us for delivery to the addressee in Tokyo.

I said that this proposal is acceptable and we will be able to deliver comrade Mao Zedong's answer to Chen Tin-Cho through General Derevyanko.

The conversation lasted 1 hour 20 minutes.

Persons present during the conversation: comrade N.T. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe (Karsky).

V. MOLOTOV [signature]

[Source: AVP RF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 234, pap. 18, ll. 1-7; provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

Document 18: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 17 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

18.1.50

(1) In response to the Vietnamese Government's request to establish diplomatic relations [with us], we should consent to it and give it our reply immediately. I have drafted a reply. Please broadcast it tomorrow (the 18th), while at the same time telegraphing it to Ho Chi Minh by internal radio transmitter.¹⁰ (2) Our foreign ministry should pass the Vietnamese Government's statement requesting establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries to the Soviet Union and the other new democratic countries.¹¹

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:238; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

Document 19: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

The telegram of 17 January has been received. (1) That the United States is evacuating all its official personnel from China is extremely favorable for us. However, those democratic figures who have suffered from the fear of the United States may have some disagreement with such actions as the requisition of foreign military barracks. Please pay attention to making explanations to them. (2) When the British charge d'affairs [John C.] Hutchinson arrives in Beijing, what questions should we raise in discussions with him? The Central Committee should draft a written document on the basis of a discussion with members of the foreign ministry, which should define the guidelines, approach that we are to adopt and the concrete issues that we are to address. The document should be reported to me in advance.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:241; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

Document 20: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5:30 p.m., 18 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) This afternoon, at 4:30, I had a telephone conversation with [Zhou] Enlai (he has arrived in Sverdlovsk and will, probably, arrive in Moscow on 20 January, at 5:00 p.m.), and we felt that as Zhang Hanfu does not have the necessary prestige and qualification, he should be assigned as a deputy. It is more appropriate to let Luo Fu become China's chief representative to the United Nations. A telegram to the United Nations has been drafted, and if the Central Committee agrees, please dispatch it and publish it tomorrow, on the 19th. (2) According to [Zhou] Enlai, both Gao Gang and [Li] Fuchun agree that Luo Fu is qualified to be [China's] diplomatic representative. But Luo Fu himself is yet to be informed. When you publish the telegram [to the United Nations], please send a telegram to Luo Fu at the same time, explaining that as we did not have

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tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 142.]

Document 26: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 12 February 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

Here is an internal party telegram I have just drafted. Please give it some consideration as soon as you receive it and dispatch it quickly[:]

All central bureaus, bureau branches, and front-line committee:

A new Sino-Soviet treaty and a series of agreements will be signed and published in days. Then, when different regions hold mass rallies, conduct discussions, and offer opinions, it is essential to adhere to the position adopted by the Xinhua News Agency's editorial. No inappropriate opinions should be allowed.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:260-1; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 142-3.]

¹ After leaving Beijing by train on 6 December 1949, Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on 16 December and stayed in the Soviet Union until 17 February 1950. Liu Shaoqi was put in charge during Mao's absence. When Mao was in Moscow, he maintained daily telegraphic communications with his colleagues in Beijing, and all important affairs were reported to and decided by him.

² After the Burmese government had cut off all formal relations with the GMD government in Taiwan, the PRC and Burma established diplomatic relations on 8 June 1950.

³ During the first two to three weeks of Mao Zedong's visit in Moscow, little progress had been achieved in working out a new Sino-Soviet treaty that would replace the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. This telegram recorded the first major break-through during Mao's visit to the Soviet Union. ⁴ China's minister of trade at that time was Ye Jizhuang.

⁵ The full text of Zhou Enlai's telegram to the United Nations, which was dispatched on 8 January 1950, was as follows: "Lake Success, to Mr. Carlos Romulo, President of the United Nations General Assembly; to Mr. Trygve Li, Secretary General of the United Nations; also to the member states of the United Nations Security Council—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, Ecuador, India, Cuba, Egypt, and Norway: The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is of the opinion that it is illegal for the representatives of the remnants of the reactionary gang of the Chinese Nationalist Party to remain in the Security Council. It therefore holds that these representatives must be expelled from the Security Council immediately. I am specially calling your attention to this matter by this telegram, and I hope that you will act accordingly."

⁶ In this telegram, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping reported that they planned to dispatch the 18th Army to Tibet by the summer and fall of 1950.

⁷ On 24 January 1950, the CCP Central Committee formally issued the order to dispatch the 18th Army to enter Tibet.

⁸ On 6 January 1950, Beijing Municipal Military Control Commission ordered the requisition of former military barracks of the American diplomatic compound in Beijing, which had long been transformed into regular offices. Mao Zedong is here referring to this matter.

⁹ On 6 January 1950, the Cominform Bulletin published an article criticizing Nosaka Sanzo, a member of the Japanese Communist Party's Politburo, for his alleged "mistake" of putting too much emphasis on the peaceful path to power in Japan and his "wrong understandings" of the existence of U.S. influence in Japan. Although Nosaka had long been known as a faithful support of the CCP (he spent the war years in Yanan and attended the CCP's Seventh Congress), the CCP leadership still decided to maintain as identical stand with the Cominform in criticizing Nosaka. For a more detailed description of the "Nosaka affair," see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 160-162.

¹⁰ On 19 January 1950, *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily, the CCP Central Committee's official mouthpiece], published a statement by the Chinese government which formally recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, announcing that the PRC would be willing to establish diplomatic relations with DRV.

¹¹ The Soviet Union and other East European countries quickly established diplomatic relations with the DRV.

¹² As a response to Acheson's speech made at the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, this article particularly criticized Acheson's comments on Sino-American relations. For the text of the article, see *Renmin ribao*, 21 January 1950.


¹³ This article was the CCP leadership's response

to the Nosaka affair (see above, Mao Zedong telegram to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950, and corresponding footnote).

¹⁴ This draft was worked out by Zhou Enlai under Mao's direction.

¹⁵ Ho Chi Minh, after walking for seventeen days, arrived on the Chinese-Vietnamese border in late January 1950, and then he was taken to Beijing to meeting Liu Shaoqi and other CCP leaders. He made it clear that his purpose to visit China was to pursue substantial Chinese military and other assistance to the Vietminh's struggles against the French. He also expressed the desire to visit the Soviet Union. By the arrangement of the CCP, Ho Chi Minh then travelled to the Soviet Union and met Stalin and Mao and Zhou there. He would come back to China together with Mao and Zhou and to continue discussions with Chinese leaders. These discussions resulted in Beijing's (but not Stalin's) commitment to support Ho. For a more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-1954," The China Quarterly 132 (March 1993), 85-110

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THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE VERSIONS OF MAO'S 2 OCTOBER 1950 MESSAGE TO STALIN ON CHINESE ENTRY INTO THE KOREAN WAR: A CHINESE SCHOLAR'S REPLY

by SHEN Zhihua translated by CHEN Jian*

[Translator's Note: The Chinese Communist Party leadership made the decision to enter the Korean War in October 1950. For several years, scholars have relied upon Chinese documents available since the late 1980s to discuss the process by which Beijing made that decision. Among these documents, one of the most crucial was a telegram Mao Zedong purportedly sent to Stalin on 2 October 1950, in which the CCP chairman informed the Soviet leader that Beijing had decided "to send a portion of our troops, under the name of Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee."

With the opening of Russian archives in recent years, however, a sharply different version of Mao's 2 October 1950 message to Stalin has emerged, according to which Mao related that because dispatching Chinese troops to Korea "may entail extremely serious consequences," many CCP leaders believed China should "show caution" about entering the conflict, and consequently Beijing had tentatively decided against entering the war. How did such a sharp discrepancy

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meeting failed to yield a unanimous decision to send troops to Korea. It thus decided that an enlarged Politburo meeting would be convened to discuss the issue on October 4.¹⁴ Evidently, before the Party leadership had reached a final decision, it would have been impossible for Mao to give an affirmative response to Stalin's October 1 request.¹⁵ In actuality, even at the October 4 enlarged Politburo meeting, which would last until October 5, the opinions of the CCP leaders were still deeply divided, with the majority, at one point, strongly opposing sending troops to Korea. The main tendency of the meeting was that "unless absolutely necessary, it was better not to fight the war."16

Within this context, it is easier to extrapolate what really happened with the Chinese version of Mao's telegram. It is quite possible that as Mao was willing to send troops to Korea, he personally drafted this telegram after receiving Stalin's October 1 telegram. However, because the opinions of the CCP leadership were still divided on the issue, and because the majority of Party leaders either opposed or had strong reservations about entering the war, Mao did not think it proper to dispatch the telegram. In fact, the Russian version of Mao's message mentions that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution." This indicated that the division of opinions among CCP leaders was a reason for Mao to send the message found in Russian archives, but not his personally drafted telegram, to Stalin. Of course, how, exactly, Mao changed his plans regarding the message is a question that might only be illuminated with further research, including the opening of additional archival materials in Moscow and, especially, Beijing.

Now, a question that needs further exploration is: Does Mao's message via Roshchin, as regarded by Roshchin and Stalin at that time, as well as currently interpreted by Mansourov, indicate that Mao was reluctant to send troops to Korea, or that the CCP leadership had changed its original stand on the Korean issue? This question should be answered in relation to Mao Zedong's

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considerations before and after October 2, as well as by comparing the contents of the Chinese and Russian versions of the telegram.

First of all, it should be emphasized that Mao Zedong felt that he was forced to make the decision to send troops to Korea. He fully understood that China's involvement in the Korean War would entail great difficulties. On this point, his views basically coincided with those of his comrades who opposed or had strong reservations about sending troops to Korea. In actuality, those reasons that Mao listed in the Russian version, such as America's technological superiority, the danger of an open war with the United States, and the possible negative domestic reactions, were all reflected in the Chinese version, though from a different angle. When Mao mentioned in the Russian version that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution," this does not mean that he had changed his own determination. A careful comparison of the two versions leads to a different conclusion: Mao did not change his goals but rather the tactics he would use to achieve them. Instead of replying directly and positively to Stalin's request, Mao adopted a more indirect and ambiguous response, so that he would be able to reconcile his own determination to enter the war with the disagreements still existing among other CCP leaders, while at the same time keeping the door for further communication (and bargaining) with Stalin open. This interpretation would explain why the CCP chairman specifically informed Stalin in the Russian version that "A final decision has not been made on this guestion. This is our preliminary telegram." It also explains why he proposed to send Zhou Enlai to consult with Stalin.

That Mao had not altered his determination to enter the war was most clearly demonstrated by his attitude at the October 4-5 Politburo meeting. Although the majority of CCP leaders attending the meeting continued to express strong reservations about entering the Korean War, Mao told them that "all of what you have said is reasonable, but once another nation, one that is our neighbor, is in crisis, we'd feel

sad if we stood idly by."¹⁷ Mao finally convinced his comrades of the need to send troops to Korea at the October 5 meeting. Once the decision was made, the Chinese leaders acted immediately. (It is unclear whether this decision was taken before or after Mao received Stalin's response—which strongly urged Chinese intervention in Korea, even at the risk of World War III--to his earlier telegram indicating doubt about entering the war.) After the October 5 meeting, Mao invited Zhou Enlai, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai to dine with him, and they further discussed some of the details. Mao also instructed Peng and Gao to travel to Shenyang to convey the Politburo's decision to division-level commanders of the Northeast Border Defense Army, preparing to enter operations in Korea by October 15. The next day, Zhou Enlai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which made concrete arrangements about how the troops should prepare to enter operations in Korea.¹⁸

It should also be noted that there exists no irreconcilable contradiction between the Chinese leaders' previous agreement to send troops to Korea and Mao's expression that China would "refrain from advancing troops" in the Russian version. Scholars who believe that China had completely changed its stand have ignored an important condition, that is, every time the Chinese leaders mentioned that China would send troops to Korea, they made it clear that a crucial precondition for taking action was that the enemy forces crossed the 38th parallel. In Zhou Enlai's meeting with K. M. Pannikar, India's ambassador to China, early in the morning of October 3, the Chinese premier particularly emphasized that if the U.S. (not South Korean) troops had crossed the 38th parallel, China would intervene.¹⁹ As of October 2, this precondition had not yet materialized.²⁰

In addition to the above factors, Mao did not give Stalin a direct and positive response because he sensed the need to put more pressure on Stalin. An important condition for China to enter a war with the United States was that it would receive substantial military support, especially air cover for Chinese ground forces, from the Soviet Union. By analyzing the two versions of Mao's telegram, a common point was that Mao believed that if China was to enter the war, it must win the war, and win it quickly. Only a speedy victory would solve all of China's difficulties and worries. In order to achieve a rapid victory, it was necessary that the Soviet Union, China's main ally, to provide the PRC with adequate military assistance, the air support in particular. However, Stalin, in his October 1 telegram to Mao, as well as in several other communications with the Chinese leadership before and afterward, failed to clarify this crucial issue. Without reaching clearly-defined and concrete agreements with the Soviets, Mao might have felt that it was better not to give Stalin's request a direct and positive response. This could have been the most important reason underlying Mao's proposal to send Zhou Enlai to the USSR to meet Stalin. And this also could explain why, under the circumstance that the Chinese leadership had already made the decision to enter the Korean War, Mao told Stalin on October 7 that China "would not be able to send troops [to Korea] at this moment, but would do so after some time."²¹ The key question had now become Soviet air support for Chinese troops that were to fight in Korea.

¹ See my paper, "China Was Forced to Enter the Korean War: Causes and Decision-making Process," prepared for "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia," international conference sponsored by the Cold War International History Project, University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996. ² For Kim's letter to Stalin of 29 September 1950, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 110-111; the original is kept in the Archives of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), Moscow, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 46-49.

³ Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950,

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KHRUSHCHEV VS. MAO: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

by William Taubman

Traditional and historical differences, ideological arguments, economic and geo-political issues, even racial tensions—these and other sources of the Sino-Soviet conflict have been analyzed along with the main episodes in the decades-long dispute. It has also been said that personalities of Chinese and Soviet leaders played a large role—how could they not given the likes of Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev?—but that side of events has been less studied.

Chinese sources indicate that Mao took the Sino-Soviet conflict quite personally, that he did not have a high regard (to say the least) for Khrushchev, and that he even tried deliberately to demean the Soviet leader. As for Khrushchev, his own memoirs indicate quite clearly that Mao got under his skin. Khrushchev prefaces his account of the conflict by condemning those who imply that the split stemmed from a mere "clash of personalities."¹ Yet he himself keeps coming back to that same cause. The trouble with Mao was his "unwillingness to consider anyone else his equal." When it came to the question of who would lead the world communist movement, "everything depends on personal characteristics, on how one or another leader feels about himself, and in which direction he directs his efforts."2

As the Communist saying goes, these and other similar references aren't accidental. Almost against his will, they register Khrushchev's conviction that the personal dimension, and in particular the clash between himself and Mao, was central.

But what was it about Mao that so irritated Khrushchev? Was Mao's ability to provoke him exceptional, or was Khrushchev in general easily provoked? What light does his conduct of Sino-Soviet relations shed on Khrushchev as a leader? And how did Khrushchev's leadership affect Sino-Soviet relations?

Not all political leaders are equally

good candidates for psychological study. Those who cry out for such scrutiny (as Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev all do) are distinguished by three traits. First, they have great power; to use Sidney Hook's well-known phrase, they are "event-making" rather than "eventful" men or women, the difference being that the former truly transform situations, whereas the latter merely attempt to cope with or respond to great changes already in progress.³ As paramount leaders of totalitarian (or in Khrushchev's case, perhaps, "post-totalitarian") systems, all three men surely fit this description.

Second, all three were unique; although leaders, like ordinary citizens, are influenced by values and other ideas widely shared in their societies, Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev nevertheless took actions and made decisions that no one else in the Soviet or Chinese leaderships would have. It is that fact that invites us to examine their personalities as a prime source of their actions.

The third criterion is a pattern of behavior that seems contradictory, irrational, and ultimately self-defeating. The importance of this is that it suggests a leader is *not* simply doing what a situation dictates, or what a culture encourages or allows, but rather is driven by some internal compulsion that influences his or her behavior.

Although all three traits characterize all three leaders, the focus here is Khrushchev. Not only was he extremely powerful, he was also distinctive among Stalin's potential sucessors. No one else in the Soviet leadership, I'd contend, would have (1) unmasked Stalin as Khrushchev did in his secret speech at the 20th Party Congress, (2) placed nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba, and (3) taken those same missiles out again as soon as he was caught in the act. In addition, he stood apart from his peers in three key elements of "political style": in his rhetoric (Khrushchev was as voluble, earthy, and informal as Stalin and his other colleagues were not); in his approach to work (he was hyperactive far beyond the Bolshevik norm); and in inter-personal relations (in which he counted on face-to-face encounters to gauge and to best his opponents).⁴ Not only was this combination of characteristics unusual; in the end, all three traits were viewed as liabilities by Khrushchev's Kremlin colleagues.

Khrushchev's rise from the humblest of origins makes his a success story. Yet almost as soon as he reached the top, his self-defeating behavior began—far from all his troubles were of his own making, of course, but many were brought on by his own actions. The Secret Speech itself triggered turmoil in Poland and then revolution in Hungary in 1956. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was the beginning of the end of Khrushchev's decade in power. And there were many other such instances in which Khrushchev's behavior ended up undermining his own position.

One of the them was the Sino-Soviet conflict itself. This article will look closely at several key episodes, focussing on Mao's behavior and Khrushchev's response, before trying to explain the pattern in terms of Khrushchev's personality.

At first, Khrushchev's relations with Mao went quite well. The Chinese need for assistance, even greater after the Korean War than before it, guaranteed Khrushchev would get a warm reception in Beijing in 1954, especially since he arrived bearing substantial gifts. Khrushchev claims in his memoirs that he returned from China warning his colleagues that "conflict between us and China is inevitable."5 But the fact that those same memoirs misattribute to his 1954 visit the famous Khrushchev-Mao swimming pool encounter that actually occurred in the summer of 1958 suggests that he mistakenly read back into 1954 the alarm he clearly felt four years later.

Even in 1954, however, Khrushchev probably first felt experienced sort of irritation with Mao that would grow steadily over the ensuing years. It was then, for example, that he offered to return the Port Arthur naval base without even being asked to by the Chinese—only to have Mao demand that the Soviets also hand over free of charge the Soviet weaponry located there.

Until 1956, recalls Mao's doctor,

Li Zhisui, the Chinese leader welcomed

his hand and said, "You've talked a long time but have still not gotten to the point."⁹

Shocked and embarrassed, Khrushchev is said by a Chinese witness to have mumbled, "Yes, don't worry, I will continue," and then blamed Yudin for not making things clear. Later, when Khrushchev explained his hope to build "a common fleet" to contend with America's 7th fleet, Mao is said to have "banged his large hands against the sofa, and stood up angrily. His face turned red and his breath turned heavy. He used his finger to point impolitely at Khrushchev's nose: 'I asked you what a common fleet is. You still didn't answer me.'"

By this time, Khrushchev's lips were pursed and white with strain, while his small, bright eyes flared with anger. But he swallowed hard, and as if in answer to Mao's pointing finger, spread out his arms. "I don't understand why you are acting like this," he said. "We came here just to discuss things together."

"What does it mean to 'discuss things together?" Mao demanded. "Do we still have our sovereignty or don't we? Do you want to take away all our coastal areas?" Tracing the shape of the Chinese coastline in the air with his finger, Mao added sarcastically, "Why don't you take the whole Chinese seacoast?"¹⁰

Struggling to stay calm, Khrushchev shifted to the subject of refueling stops and shore leaves for Soviet submarines at Chinese ports. But Mao rejected the idea out of hand and continued to do so even after Khrushchev noted how NATO countries mounted just such cooperation, and sweetened the pie by offering access the Chinese access to Soviet arctic ports in return.

"We aren't interested," replied Mao, looking at Khrushchev as if (recalls the Chinese witness) the Soviet leader "were a kid trying to do a trick in front of an adult." Moreover, when Khrushchev's face turned red with anger, Mao seemed positively pleased. "We don't want to use your Murmansk, and we don't want you to come to our country either." After that he offered a further lecture as if to a particularly dense student: "The British, Japanese, and other foreigners who stayed in our country for a long time have already been driven away by us, Comrade Khrushchev. I'll repeat it again. We do not want anyone to use our land to achieve their own purposes anymore."

During the next day's discussions beside the pool Mao invited Khrushchev for a swim. Since the Soviet leader couldn't swim very well, he at first spluttered about in the shallow area, then clambered out with the help of attendants, and finally re-entered the pool with an inner tube. As for Mao, he watched Khrushchev's clumsy efforts with obvious enjoyment, and then dove into the deep end and swam back and forth using several different strokes. For his next trick, Mao demonstrated his skill at floating and treading water, and then, highly satisfied with himself, he swam over to Khrushchev and struck up a conversation in what a Chinese onlooker called "a relaxed, friendly and open atmosphere."¹¹ After all, Dr. Li continues, "the Chairman was deliberately playing the role of emperor, treating Khrushchev like the barbarian come to pay tribute. It was a way, Mao told me on the way back to Beidaihe, of sticking a needle up his ass."¹²

To make matters worse, the substantive talks went badly. Moreover, Khrushchev's trip was followed by Beijing's shelling of the offshore islands of Quemoy [Jinmen] and Matsu [Mazu], undertaken without warning Moscow, and in order, says Dr. Li, "to demonstrate to both Khrushchev and Eisenhower that [Mao] could not be controlled, and to undermine Khrushchev in his new quest for peace." Or as Mao himself put it, "The islands are two batons that keep Khrushchev and Eisenhower dancing, scurrying this way and that. Don't you see how wonderful they are?"¹³

In the late summer of 1959, with an explosion building in Sino-Soviet relations, Khrushchev made his third and last trip to Beijing. Behind a facade of politeness, a series of heated clashes made even the tense 1958 talks appear warm and friendly in comparison. Khrushchev's infatuation with America, which he had just visited, was bad enough in Chinese eyes. His request that the Chinese release two American pilots who had parachuted into Northern China during and after the Korea War, and that they accommodate the Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, whose strong "neutralist" and "anti-imperialist" positions were all-important to the socialist camp, enraged the Chinese.

At one point in the talks, Khrushchev charged that the Chinese hadn't consulted Moscow before shelling Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. When Chen Yi counter-attacked, he provoked Khrushchev to a fury. His face turning bright red, Khrushchev shouted at Chen, "You may be a marshal in the army, and I a lieutenant general. But I am the First Secretary of the CPSU, and you are offending me."

"You are the General Secretary, all right," Chen responded. "But when you are right I listen to you, and when you are wrong I will certainly refute you."

At this, Khrushchev looked at Mao, spread his arms widely, and complained that he and his delegation were badly outnumbered in a meeting with the Chinese political bureau. "How many people do you have and how many do I have? The negotiation is unfair and unequal."

Mao smiled, recalls his interpreter, paused, and then began speaking slowly and in a low voice: "I have listened to you for a long time. You have accused us of quite a lot. You say we...did not unite with Nehru, that we shouldn't have shelled Jinmen, that the Great Leap was wrong, that we brag about ourselves as orthodox Marxists. There-

a Romanian Party Congress in Bucharest. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet leader decided to withdraw all Soviet advisers from China immediately, and to terminate all important contracts and projects. According to the Chinese, Moscow withdrew 1,390 experts, tore up 343 contracts, and scrapped 257 cooperative projects in science and technology, "all within the short span of a month."¹⁵ The immediate effects were substantial; the longer-run result was to politicize trade by adding to the long list of issues over which the two sides were now in conflict.¹⁶ Now it was but a matter of time until a full and final rupture took place in the summer of 1963, featuring an exchange of public broadsides in which both Khrushchev and Mao came in for violent personal attacks.

With these highlights (or lowlights) of the dispute in mind, let's return to certain personal characteristics of Khrushchev that help to explain his allergic reaction to Mao.

One such trait was a combination of vaulting ambition and an extraordinarily low level of culture. Just as important was a persistent sense of inadequacy centered around his lack of education and refinement. Khrushchev's remarkable rise slaked both his ambition and his shaky sense of self-esteem. But with ever greater power and fame came more responsibility in areas about which he knew nothing, and over which he had little control. Under such circumstances there were bound to be failures, but with them came increased doubts about his own capacities, thus aggravating a moodiness, impulsiveness, and hyper-sensitivity to slight that had been there all along but were usually covered by gregariousness and extraversion.

Increasingly during his long career, Khrushchev reacted with hostility to actual or implied criticism (especially from better educated and more cultured intelligentsia types), going so far in some cases as to pursue what amounted to vendettas against his antagonists. Moreover, one round of failure led to another to which he reacted badly as well. None of this cycle, I hasten to add, can be isolated from troubles inherent in the Soviet system, and in any effort

A Crucial Step toward the Breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China in July 1960

by Chen Jian

For scholars of Sino-Soviet relations, that the Kremlin leadership abruptly decided in July 1960 to recall all Soviet experts working in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not fresh information. During the great polemical debate between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s, the Chinese leaders and media repeatedly claimed that the Soviet leadership took this action in order to put more pressure on Mao Zedong and his comrades, so that they would yield to Moscow's evil intention of maintaining China as the Soviet Union's inferior subordinate.¹ As this decision came at a time when China was facing great economic difficulties in the wake of the "Great Leap Forward," Mao and his comrades also used it to make the Soviets the scapegoat of the Leap's disastrous aftermath. Consequently, Moscow's decision proved to be a crucial step toward the breakdown of Sino-Soviet alliance.

Despite the importance of this event, scholars have been unable to gain access to many pertinent documents. Most of our knowledge has been based on Beijing's and Moscow's official accounts, which, as one might expect, offer no more than an incomplete and sometimes distorted version of the story. Recently, however, Dieter Heinzig*, a German scholar who has extensively studied Sino-Soviet relations and is completing a monograph on the Sino-Soviet relations, 1945-1950, unearthed a key document about this event in the archives of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East Berlin: a copy of the note delivered by the Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Chinese Foreign Ministry dated 18 July 1960. It was in this note that the Soviet government formally informed Beijing that it had decided to recall all Soviet experts from China and explained in detail why it had decided to do so. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev provided a copy of the note to his Communist comrades in East Germany together with a cover letter, which introduced the background and motives of the decision, thereby more or less repeating the arguments of the note.²

Reading this note, one is impressed by the depth of the divergence already present between Moscow and Beijing in 1960. Indeed, the language used in the note was serious, revealing both disappointment and anger among Soviet leaders. While presenting the reasons underlying the decision to withdraw Soviet experts from China, the Kremlin emphasized three particular grievances. First, they made it clear that they had noticed Chinese "dissatisfaction with some Soviet experts and advisors." Second, they criticized the Chinese side's "unfriendly" treatment of, and "sp[ying] on," the Soviet experts. Third, and most important, the Soviet leaders emphasized that they were extremely unhappy, even angry, about the Chinese practice of forcing the Soviet experts to embrace Beijing's viewpoints on the world situation and the orientation of the international communist movement as elaborated in the lengthy article "Long Live Leninism,"³ which explicitly revealed that the ideological divergence between the Chinese and Soviet leaders was having a tremendous negative impact upon the development of the state relations between the two Communist powers.

A sensitive, controversial, yet central, concept pervading the Soviet note (in a more general sense, also dominating the overall development of Sino-Soviet relations) concerned "equality." Throughout the note, the Soviet leaders attempted to argue that they had always paid close attention to treating China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as other "brotherly Parties," as equals, and that the decision to withdraw Soviet experts from China was based on the belief that it would better serve a more equal relationship between the two Communist powers.

No matter how sincerely Moscow's leaders might have believed this, the leaders in Beijing would have viewed the whole issue in a radically different way. What is important here is to put the note into a historical context. During the long process of the Chinese Communist revolution, the CCP had consistently regarded itself as part of the Soviet-led international Communist movement. Mao Zedong's "lean-to-one-side" state *continued on page 249* (of the sort Khrushchev, and later Gorbachev, mounted) to reform it. But neither can they be separated from the personal deterioration that Khrushchev (and Gorbachev, too?) underwent as the world they tried so hard to improve unravelled around them. The fact that Khrushchev's Kremlin colleagues, who eventually ousted him, held his mishandling of relations with Mao against him, and that in part, they were correct to do so, underscores both Khrushchev's selfdestructiveness, and its impact on overall Sino-Soviet relations.

In the beginning of his decade in power, Khrushchev attached a very high priority to consolidating the relations with Beijing that he believed Stalin had put at risk. Khrushchev condemned Stalin for condescending to Mao, for regarding the Chinese leader as a kind of "cave-man Marxist," and for manifesting "a kind of haughty arrogance" during the latter's visit to Moscow in 1949-50.¹⁷ Khrushchev launched his own relationship with Mao with the feeling that he could, should, and would do much better by the Chinese leader than Stalin had done. But instead of evoking Mao's gratitude and respect, the Chinese leader seemed to be condescending to him. Not only was such lack of fealty a problem in larger ideological and political terms, it grated irritatingly on Khrushchev's uneasy self of self. As a white European, Khrushchev felt a sense of superiority over the upstart Chinese. All the more devastating then that the upshot of Mao's treatment of him was to make Khrushchev himself feel inferior.

Both in 1954 and during their later meetings, Mao's negotiating methods suggested to Khrushchev that the Chinese leader was playing him for a fool. Yet that was precisely the sort of image which Khrushchev could not abide, particularly because he had been forced to trade on it for so long to survive Stalin's terrible suspiciousness toward his top lieutenants.

As one who prided himself on taking the measure of his interlocutors, Khrushchev was particularly annoyed that he couldn't figure Mao out. When Mao tried to convince him that the USSR should respond to an American attack by retreating beyond the Urals and holding out until the Chinese entered the war, Khrushchev was not only appalled by the idea itself, he was upset that he couldn't tell whether the Chinese leader was being serious.

"I looked at him closely," Khrushchev recalls. "I couldn't tell from his face whether he was joking or not."¹⁸ Later, when he better understood Mao's bluster about standing up to the United States even at the risk of nuclear war, Khrushchev decided that "Mao obviously regarded me as a coward."¹⁹

Given his chip-on-the-shoulder attitude toward his own Soviet intelligenparticularly vividly the role of Khrushchev's personality. Would any other Soviet leader have acted so rashly?

Several times Khrushchev described Mao and the environment around him as "Asiatic," referring especially to the Chinese leader's reliance on "flattery and insidiousness." Describing politics as "a game," Khrushchev confessed his continuing frustration at the way Mao played it. "I believed him," the Soviet leader complained at one point, but "he was simply playing."25

When Mao boasted about Chinese uniqueness, recalls Khrushchev, "I was jolted by all that bragging." The true believing internationalist in Khrushchev was offended by Mao's "nationalism and chauvinism." But since no one was a bigger boaster than Khrushchev himself, surely there is an element of projection in criticizing Mao for sins Khrushchev shared. Likewise when he charges that Mao's "putting his own person first created friction, and even more than friction in relations between our two countries."26

Granted, then, that the Sino-Soviet dispute was personal as well as political, and that Khrushchev let himself be provoked by Mao for the sorts of reasons I have cited. To fill out the picture further, we would need to know why Mao reacted to so negatively to Khrushchev. What was it about Khrushchev personally that Mao found so irritating? Did Mao deliberately go out of his way to provoke his Soviet counterpart? Or was he unaware of how Khrushchev perceived and reacted to him? Did aides of either or both leaders play on their bosses' sensitivities, either knowingly or unknowingly, so as intensify the antagonism between them? Or were they adept enough at outraging each other all by themselves?

Documents from still-closed Chinese archives, as well as additional materials from Russian archives, and not only memoir accounts, valuable as they may be, will be needed to address these and many other aspects of the Mao-Khrushchev relationship.

¹"Memuary Nikity Sergeyevicha Khrushcheva," Voprosy istorii 11-12 (1992), 66.

Ibid., 80.

³ Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1943), 151-170.

⁴ See James David Barber, "Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two Weak Presidents," Journal of Social Issues 24:3 (July 1968), 51-79.

"Memuary," 66.

⁶ Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao New York: Random House, 1994), 115-118. Ibid., 220-224.

⁸ Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 258.

Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu ["Mao Zedung and Khrushchev"] (Jilin: Jilin renmin chuban she), 126-128.

¹⁰ Quan, Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu; Tracy B. Strong and Helene Keyssar, "Anna Louise Strong: Three Interviews with Chairman Mao Zedong, China Quarterly 103 (September 1985), 503.

¹¹ Quan, Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu, 126-128. ¹² Li, Private Life, 261

¹³ Ibid.

14 Li Yueren, Waijiao wutai shang de xin Zhongguo lingxiu ["New China's leaders on the diplomatic stage"] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chuban she, 1989), 182-183. ¹⁵ Letter of CCP CC to CPSU CC, 29 February

1964, in John Gittings, ed., Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 139. See also Steven M. Goldstein, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937-1962: Ideology and Unity" (manuscript), forthcoming in Harry Harding, ed., Patterns of Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of China.

¹⁶ Gittings, *Survey*, 130-131; Goldstein, " The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937-1962."

¹⁷ "Memuary," 68, 74.

18 Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 256-257

¹⁹ Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970),470.

²⁰ Michael Schoenhals, ed., "Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 'Moscow Conference,' Journal of Communist Studies, 2:2 (June 1986), 121-122

21 Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 260. 22 *Ibid.*, p. 259.

23 Interview with Stepan Chervonenko, Moscow, 1993. ²⁴ Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, "Brezhnev and

Khrushchev," Novoe vremia 22 (1993), 39.

25 "Memuary," 66, 70.

26 Ibid., 70, 80.

William Taubman, a professor of political science at Amherst College, is working on a biography of Nikita Khrushchev.

SUSLOV ON MAO

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cannot accept that even our friends talk to us down their nose [svisoka razgovarivali s nami]"; later, after calling the discussions ultimately "quite useful," Suslov noted:]

One should not omit the fact that the aforementioned mistakes and shortcomings in the field of domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party of China are largely explained by the atmosphere of the cult of personality of com. Mao Zedong. Formally the CC of the Communist Party of China observes the norms of collective leadership, but in effect crucial decisions are made single-handedly, and thus are often touched by subjectivism, and in some instances are simply not well thought through. Glorification of com. Mao Zedong is visibly on the rise in China. In the party press one can increasingly find such statements that "we, the Chinese, live in the great epoch of Mao Zedong," comrade Mao Zedong is portrayed as a great genius. They call him the beacon illuminating the path to communism, the embodiment of communist ideas. One equates the name of com. Mao Zedong with the party, etc. One presents the works of com. Mao Zedong in China as the last word of creative Marxism, of the same rank as the works of the classics [klassiki] of Marxism-Leninism. In effect, the works of com. Mao Zedong are put in the foundation of all educational work in the party and in the country. Even in PRC's colleges and universities the teaching of social sciences during the last two-three years has been reduced to the study of Mao's works. All this, unfortunately, pleases [imponiruiet] com. Mao Zedong, who, by all accounts, himself has come to believe in his own infallibility. This reminds of the atmosphere that existed in our country during the last years of life of I.V. Stalin. Of course, we could not talk with the Chinese comrades about it, but the Plenum should be aware of this, yet another aspect in the life of the Communist Party of China....

[Source: Excerpted from Suslov draft report to CC CPSU Plenum, 18 December 1959, Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, listy 56-91; document provided and translated by V. M. Zubok.]

ment presented to the PR of China and the other socialist countries the proposal to recall the Soviet experts, taking into consideration that these countries had by then trained their own cadres and were, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, well capable of solving by their own efforts the practical tasks they were encountering in the fields of economic and cultural developments. The majority of the people's democratic countries had at that time agreed to the proposal of the Soviet Government, and the Soviet experts were recalled from these countries to their motherland. After the Chinese leaders had expressed their critical attitude toward the Soviet experts in the year 1958, the Soviet Government once again presented to the Government of the PR of China the proposal to recall the Soviet experts. But this time, just as in the year of 1957, the Chinese side pronounced that it favored prolonging the stay of the Soviet experts by claiming that they were needed in the PR of China.

Recently, the Chinese side, when dealing with the Soviet experts working in the PR of China, began to pursue an apparently unfriendly line toward the Soviet Union, which was incompatible with the obligation of the treaty as well as with the norms prevailing between socialist countries. Following the instructions from their superiors, Chinese officials distribute specially compiled material in Russian language among the Soviet people propagating views directed against the position of the CPSU and of other brotherly parties. They make efforts to draw Soviet experts living in the PR of China into discussions on questions where certain differences of opinions exist between the CPSU on the one side and other brotherly parties on the other; they make efforts to impose their viewpoints upon the Soviet experts and try to lead them into opposition to the

The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives

by M.Y. Prozumenschikov

The year 1962 was marked by a further intensification of the discord between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Community Party (CCP) and, correspondingly, between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's refusal to stay within the boundaries defined by Moscow, which was especially marked after the 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, caused serious anxiety among Soviet officials who frequently spoke of the CCP leadership's deviation "from the generally fraternal countries and parties" and described Beijing's authorities as seeking "to more widely bring into the open their disagreements [with us], both in theory and in practice."¹

In the international arena, these disagreements touched on a wide circle of problems, including questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, evaluations of the character of the contemporary period, and others. Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, who was trying (albeit inconsistently) to conduct a policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, could hardly agree with the declarations coming from Beijing to the effect that the aspiration "to achieve peace without wars is sheer nonsense," that impirialism "will never fall if it isn't pushed," and which characterized the atom bomb as a "paper tiger."² Moscow reacted especially sensitively to Beijing's efforts to depreciate the role of the socialist countries and the international communist movement, having declared the decisive factor of the development of human society in the contemporary epoch to be the national liberation movements of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the USSR it was feared, not without reason, that one reason why the "wind from the East had come to prevail over the wind from the West," was the PRC's

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emy of Sciences, P. Gafurov, to organize in Moscow a meeting with the participation of Chinese and Indian scholars on questions connected with the history and mutual influences of Chinese and Indian cultures.⁷

Third, the border conflict sharply worsened the position of the Communist Party of India (CPI): subjected to attacks from the bourgeois parties of India, the CPI also itself split between those who felt that only India was at fault in the conflict and those who suggested that responsibility could be divided between both countries. At the 6th CPI Congress in 1961, Soviet representative M. Suslov exerted considerable effort so that, on the one hand, militant pro-Beijing party members who felt the CPI must always align itself with the CCP would not prevail, and on the other hand, to block discussion at the Congress of a resolution proposed by a number of prominent Indian communists criticizing the PRC and backing Nehru. These Soviet actions could hardly pass unnoticed in Beijing; in a talk with Soviet ambassador S. Chervonenko, CC CCP secretary Deng Xiaoping made a point of referring indignantly to "some Indian communists, who are even praising Nehru."8

Finally, another relevant aspect of the problem was the fact that Moscow clearly grasped that Beijing's bellicose method of resolving border questions with India could also be repeated in other disputed portions of the Chinese border, and not necessarily only with countries liberated from colonial dependence. As early as 8 September 1959, two weeks after fighting broke out on the Sino-Indian border, the CC CPSU received from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs a detailed report "On the Question of the Soviet-Chinese Border." The preparation of such a report at a time when Sino-Soviet relations, at least on this question, were ostensibly satisfactory strongly suggests that at least some Soviet officials already foresaw the danger of border problems with China.

For the previous three years a situation of unstable equilibrium had been maintained on the Sino–Indian border, threatening the outbreak of new armed Havana established diplomatic relations in September 1960; now the PRC began actively to invite envoys from the "island of freedom" and recruit from them advocates of their own course.¹³

Considering that the Chinese revolutionaries' militant language in many "third world." This desire might account for the thoroughness and satisfaction with which the CC CPSU apparatus collected the enthusiastic reactions from the developing countries to the TASS report of 11 September 1962 vowing that the USSR would protect Cuba against U.S. aggression. In China, despite the fact that this report fit Beijing's propaganda style, only 32 lines were allotted to it in the periodical press.

The CC CCP 10th Plenum, which took place in the fall of 1962, strengthened anti-Soviet moods in Beijing. On October 12, Chinese leaders stated that the conclusion of a nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty (which Khrushchev supported), would further the interests only of the USA, which was trying "to bind China by the hands and feet" in the development of its own nuclear arsenal.¹⁷ An October 20 memorandum from the PRC government to the USSR government on the nonproliferation question, distributed also to representatives of other socialist countries, declared: "However strong the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, it is not able to solve the defense issue of all the socialist nations. For example, on the question of the defense by the Chinese of their borders with India, the Soviet side played just the opposite role."18 A similar announcement explained that the military conflict on the Sino-Indian border, which was again flaring in autumn 1962, had not only failed to move the Soviet Union to change its fundamental position but also, from the Chinese perspective, caused Moscow to become even more pro-Indian, since prior to these events it had given India the military helicopters and transport planes, which took part in the border clashes.

In October 1962, Beijing made a last attempt to compel Moscow to take a "class position" on China's border dispute with India and "to teach certain comrades to separate truth from untruth."¹⁹ On October 15, *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) assistant editor Chen Tseiun organized in the newspaper's editorial office a meeting with foreign correspondents, which was intended, according to the opinion of the Soviet journalists who were present, "to dem-

onstrate the seriousness of the situation on the Indian-Chinese border," and to urge "the press organs of the fraternal parties to come forward on the given question with accounts of the Chinese side's positions."²⁰ A week later, Soviet ambassador Chervonenko, as he reported to Moscow, spoke on this very question with PRC Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Hanfu, and "emphatically declared to Zhang Hanfu that it was necessary to understand who was right and who was not right [in the border conflicts]. It would be incorrect not to distinguish between those who were guilty and those who were not guilty. It would likewise not be right to blur the distinction between the guilty and the innocent."²¹ Such an answer could not be reassuring to Beijing. Chervonenko also mentioned certain problems which were raised by Zhang Hanfu and which evidently were connected "with the aggravation of the situation on the Sino-Indian border, in light of the fact that the Chinese leadership expected different reactions on the part of the Soviet leadership."22

One must also note that at first, the Sovie leadership, preoccupied with Cuban affairs, did not pay particular attention to the renewed aggravation of tensions on the Sino-Indian frontier. The documents relating to events on the bordern which various organs of the CC

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per–level Chinese leadership: Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, et al.³⁵ The political campaign culminated with elaborately orchestrated³⁶ mass demonstrations of solidarity at the Cuban Embassy in Beijing, which took place non–stop from the 3rd to the 6th of November and in which, the Chinese media reported, more than five million people participated.³⁷

Soviet officials well understood the ulterior motive behind these mass demonstrations. While under the ostensible slogan of solidarity with Cuba, they sharply criticized those "who were frightened in the face of imperial aggression," who "bartered with the freedom and independence of another people," and so on.³⁸

the principal issues once again returned to the USSR's old viewpoint on that conflict, in which China did not at all appear to be the victimized side.⁴⁹ The new *Pravda* article, however, could scarcely seriously change anything, because by then the border situation had largely stabilized and, in the opinion of diplomats from the socialist countries, both combatants were searching for a means to withdraw from the conflict with as much dignity as possible.

In its main counterattack, Moscow turned to the congresses of the Communist parties of a number of countries which took place in late 1962 and early 1963, and also to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which took place in December 1962. Those who did not support Khrushchev were declared "babblers," "ultra-revolutionaries," and "reckless adventurists." In his indignation, the Soviet leader went to the point that he named as the main instigators of war not U.S. President Kennedy or West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (which at the time would have been entirely normal), but ... the Albanians! And although at these congresses there was still preserved the ritual, accepted in the last few years in the Communist world, when Moscow, cursing the Albanians, really had the Chinese in mind, and the PRC, cursing the Yugoslavs, meant the USSR, a new step on the path to a total split had been taken. Khrushchev, in particular, stressed that "someone taught the Albanians to pronounce vile words," and Wu Xiuquan, CC CPC member and former Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia, speaking in his capacity as the permanent leader of the CPC delegation to the Communist party congresses which were taking place during that period, was subject to well-organized filibusters.⁵⁰ In its turn, the CPC responded in a series of articles in Renmin Ribao showing that the world had by no means been put on the brink of nuclear war by "babblers" and that "the juggling of

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cations between Nehru and Khrushchev. While these excerpts hint at how the Soviet archives can offer a fascinating and rich window into these and many other aspects of the stillmurky Sino-Indian border dispute, much further research in Moscow is still necessary, particularly with key Chinese and Indian archives still closed. In any event, CWIHP would be pleased to assist scholars interested in examining the photocopies of these and other Russian documents obtained during research on Soviet-Indian relations, 1959 and 1962, or in commissioning English translations of more of them. The documents are on file as part of the Russian Archives Documents Database (RADD) at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at the George Washington University on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037, tel. (202) 994-7000; e-mail: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; fax: (202) 994-7000.

The third section below is the transcript, found in the East German archives, of a 26 December 1962 conversation in Beijing between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Premier Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal (J. Zedenbal in German). Although the occasion of the talk was the signing of a Sino-Mongolian boundary treaty, the conversation soon turned to the recent clashes along the Sino-Indian border. According to the transcript-presumably kept by the Mongolians, though it is unclear from the document how it came to be translated into German and rest in the East German archives-Zedenbal took the opportunity to criticize Chinese policy in the border dispute with India as detrimental to the interests of the international socialist camp, producing a tense exchange with Zhou. Whether or not the transcript is accurate-no Chinese version is available-the Mongolians clearly wanted

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truth and justice is on China's side. In this regard one must inform the Plenum that the letter we addressed to the CC of the Communist Party of China and the TASS announcement about the Indo-Chinese border conflict did not evoke a proper understanding among the Chinese leaders. In their answer to our letter the Chinese comrades claimed that the incident on the Sino-Indian border had been provoked by the Nehru government, which, as the letter of the Chinese friends reads, "has long been marching in its domestic and foreign policies in the reactionary direction." It follows: "We believe that if one carries out only the policy of unprincipled adjustment and concessions to Nehru and the Indian government, not only would it not make them change their position for the better, but, on the contrary, in the situation of the growing offensive on their side, if China still does not rebuff them and denounce them, such a policy would only encourage their atrocity. It would not be advantageous for the friendship between China and India, and also not be advantageous to make Nehru and the Indian government improve, instead of moving toward further rapprochement with the West."

The letter contains a reproach that "the TASS announcement displayed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union toward the incident on the Sino-Indian border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, who use this to drive a wedge into the relations between China and the Soviet Union. This cannot help evoking regrets."

The analysis of this letter of the CC of the Communist Party of China leads us to two conclusions of fundamental importance. They are the following: the Chinese comrades could neither correctly assess their own mistakes committed in their relations with India, nor the measures taken by the CC CPSU for regulation of the Sino-Indian conflict. The Chinese leadership's assessments of the situation in India and the behavior of Nehru with regard to the conflict are undoubtedly erroneous and arbitrary.

Let me refer to the opinion of our Indian friends expressed in their letters to the CC CPSU and the CC of the Communist Party of China. While registering the aggravation of the situation in India as a result of the conflict, the Indian comrades stated that "if the disputes continue, it would benefit reactionary forces in India and would cause a negative influence on the masses of the Indian population." Indian comrades justifiably believe that further exacerbation of the Indo-Chinese relations could weaken the democratic movement in India, gravely undercut the position of the Indian communist party and threaten it with a ban. In the words of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India comr. [Ajoy Kumar] Ghosh, Indian communists do not know how to explain the position of the PRC, the reason why it raised the border issue if China at this time and what hides behind it. All leading officials of the Communist Party of India wonder why the government of the PRC let itself be pulled by Indian reaction into this border conflict.

And as to the statement of the Chinese comrades about the glee and jubilation of Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, with regard to dissimilar positions of China and the Soviet Union on the incident on the Sino-Indian border, it is erroneous in its basic premises. The imperialists rejoiced indeed, but they did so at the moment when the Indo-Chinese conflict flared up. One can imagine them exulting and rejoicing even more, if the Soviet Union had become enmeshed in this conflict and the impression had been created that there the Nehru government is correct. At times the tone of our discussion became quite sharp. It came to the point when a member of the Politburo CC Communist Party of China, minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi, claimed that our line on Nehru is allegedly opportunistic [*prisposoblencheskaia*], and the policy of China is more firm and correct. Naturally, we gave a resolute rebuff to these pronouncements.

In connection with the remarks of the Chinese leaders one cannot help wondering how they understand the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, whether they see it as a general line of foreign policy of the socialist camp, whether they think it is necessary to struggle for relaxation of international tension and for securing general peace.

We are getting an impression that, while recognizing formally the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two global systems, the Chinese comrades tend to regard this principle just as a temporary tactical maneuver.

[ed. note: after additional critical remarks and recounting of discussion of other matters at the meeting, Suslov noted:]

One should say that at the end of the conversation on 2 October Mao Zedong and other Chinese comrades declared that they did not want war; that they would resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means and would settle the conflict with India through negotiations. They confirmed again that the Communist party of China has a common line and common goals with us. We expressed our satisfaction in this regard.

[noting that Khrushchev had pointed out the Chinese leadership's "nervousness and touchiness" at being criticised, Suslov harshly criticized the "atmosphere of the cult of personality" surrounding Mao, which he likened to that of Stalin; recalling that during a 1958 conversation with Khrushchev, Mao had compared Soviet-Chinese relations to two hands in which nine

in his diary four days later):]

On 27 January of this year I and Comrade Zhukov G.A. had a conversation with the secretary of the CC CPI Comrade Gupta.

We stated to him the answer of the CC CPSU in connection with his earlier conversation with me. Gupta expressed gratitude for the readiness of the CC and the Presidium of the CC CPSU to assist the leadership of the CPI in this difficult moment and to support it. He promised to inform the CC CPSU about the situation in the party in the future as well...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 5, p. 80, ll. 31-36; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[The second excerpt, dealing with the brewing crisis over the Sino-Indian border dispute, is from a 10 October 1962 entry from Benediktov's diary, this one describing a conversation with the provisional charge d'affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, "Comrade E. Cheng-Chang," referred to as "Comrade E." in the document. In the conversation, the Chinese official gave Beijing's version of the building confrontation, blaming India for attacking Chinese posts along the border, and asserting that India had "gone too far" to resume normal relations with the PRC. Ten days later, China launched a broad attack on Indian positions along the disputed frontier.]

I received Comrade E. in connection with his departure for his homeland and had a conversation with him.

Comrade E. on his own initiative dwelt in detail on the problem of the Indian-Chinese border dispute. He said that India has finally rejected the proposal of the PRC about negotiations [for] 15 October in Beijing. The Indian side continues to maintain that the recent clash on the eastern border occurred on Indian territory, south of the McMahon line, and was elicited by the advance of Chinese troops to the south and their attack on Indian posts. In fact, Comrade E. said, the entire affair was completely the opposite. Indian troops crossed the McMahon line and attacked Chinese posts far to the north of that line. Comrade E. talked about his last conversation in the Indian Foreign Ministry with the head of the China department, Menon. During this conversation Comrade E. asked Menon to take a map of the eastern part of the border, published in India in 1960, and find on it the region in which the clashes are now occurring, orienting by latitude and longitude the places indicated in the Indian notes. As a result it turned out that this region, the latitude and longitude of which were indicated by the Indians themselves, is located significantly to the north of the McMahon line on Chinese territory. Menon, in the words of Comrade E., was forced to acknowledge this, but maintained at the same time that it was not possible that the Indians had crossed the McMahon line and so forth.

Comrade E. stated that the main things that will motivate India to end the conflict with the PRC are, on the international level, the wish to receive money from the USA, and on the domestic level the desire to suppress political forces which are objectionable to the ruling circles. Moreover, in the opinion of Comrade E., the Indian government has already gone too far in this conflict to have the possibility of returning to normal relations....

[Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. 147-148; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[This third excerpt from Benediktov's diary, dated 26 October 1962, describes a conversation with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."]

Today at my own initiative, fulfilling the commission of the CC CPSU, I met with

E.M. Nambudiripad and informed him of the statement of the CC CPSU on the Indian-Chinese border conflict. He listened most attentively to the statement of the CC and promised immediately to convey its contents to the members of the secretariat of the National Council of the CPI.

Nambudiripad said that four members of the secretariat, who were in Delhi, today carefully studied and discussed at length the Pravda article of October 25 on the border question. "We ask that you transmit this to the CC CPSU, - he continued, - that the publication of this article and the advice of the CPSU contained in this letter of the CC CPSU, truly will help our party get out of the extremely difficult position it is now in. Before this [help] there were moments when we felt ourselves to be simply helpless, but now the party will be able to remedy this situation. We are grateful to the CC CPSU for this help; you can transmit this personally from me and from Comrade B. Gupta." He pointed out the whole array of difficulties the CPI faces in correcting its earlier positions and statements on the border question. The most typical mistake of many communists, in his words, is that they cannot clearly distinguish [between] patriotism and bourgeois nationalism. Some of the members of the party considered it possible [that there would be] support for the Indian position in this dispute from a number of communist parties of the socialist countries in light of the ideological differences between the CCP PRC and other fraternal parties, although - he continued, - I knew that this was impossible and incorrect. Moreover, it is very difficult in general to sharply reformulate the whole system of views on the border conflict held by members of the party, since these views in many cases were contradictory to those expressed in Pravda and in this letter of the CC CPSU. In particular, the CPI for three years considered the McMahon line the real border between the two states. Many rank and file members of the party and some members of the leading organs, in solidarity with the widespread opinion among the population, hold to the view that the PRC is [the] guilty [party] in the origin and exacerbation of the border conflict." "Undoubtedly the article in Pravda will have an influence on these comrades, he said, it will forpresse conr5 5froTj e today's meeting pointed out that the <u>Pravda</u> article, while in fact criticizing the position of the Indian communists and India's relation to this question as a whole, did not express any critical comments with regard to the PRC and the Chinese comrades.

Nambudiripad reported that the secretariat of the CPI after the discussion of the Pravda article today reached the conclusion that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India." The campaign that is going on everywhere against the PRC will, obviously, be extended to the Soviet Union, and then to all countries of the socialist system....He expressed the opinion of the secretariat that in connection with this statement of the Soviet press and in connection with the pressure on India from many neutral countries regarding a more rapid peaceful settlement of this conflict, the Indian government...can reach the conclusion that only western countries are our true friends...

"In this connection we very much would like to find out if Soviet leaders could help the CPI give an understanding to the Chinese comrades that it is extremely desirable to give the possibility to Nehru to move toward peace negotiations and cease military actions without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself, -Nambudiripad stated. The Secretariat has unanimously reached the conclusion that such a step by the PRC would have a huge significance for the cause of world peace, for all progressive forces, for the anti-imperialist struggle..."

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, ll. 134-139; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[This fourth excerpt is from a 2 November 1962 entry from Benediktov's diary, describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai—with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the nonaligned movement only a few years earlieropposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians West, but into two camps: one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

6. "We are on the leading edge of the struggle against the realization in practice by these fanatics of their theoretical program, which is a threat to the entire world, to all peoples. Therefore, everyone must assist our struggle. Therefore we must not in any case retreat before them, not submit to their threats, not agree to conditions which they dictate on the basis of force and seizure of our territory. On the contrary, we must without fail defeat them, smash their first practical attempt to prove their thesis. Only their defeat and the preservation by India of its policy of nonalignment can teach them a lesson and force them to reconsider their theoretical convictions."...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. 120-124; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[The fifth and final selection from Ambassador Benediktov's diary is from a 12 December 1962 entry recording a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. In the excerpt presented here, Nehru expressed a positive evaluation of Soviet-Indian relations, complimenting Khrushchev for his role in resolving the Cuban crisis, but in response to the Soviet envoy's emphasis that the border crisis with China be settled peacefully he firmly defended India's stand that PRC forces must withdraw from recently-occupied positions (e.g., return to the line held on September 8) before talks could start.]

In accordance with the commission of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev today I visited prime minister of India J. Nehru. I gave him warm greetings and best wishes from N.S. Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet government.

Nehru first of all inquired about the health of N.S. Khrushchev...

I further set forth the substance of the questions which I was commissioned by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to communicate to Nehru. I said to Nehru that the Soviet government appreciates the efforts of the Indian government and of Nehru personally which are aimed at preserving the policy of nonalignment, at preserving and further developing the friendly relations with the Soviet Union. I set forth the opinion of N.S. Khrushchev on questions of the necessity of activating in every way the struggle for peace and general disarmament, for carrying out the policy of peaceful coexistence and resolution of disputed international questions through negotiations. I expressed the wish of N.S. Khrushchev that the border conflict between India and the PRC also will be resolved through peaceful means, through negotiations.

Nehru listened to all of this attentively and with great interest, taking notes in his notebook. He expressed great satisfaction with the friendly relations which exist between the USSR and India, between the governments of both countries and also between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and him personally. He expressed also the conviction that these relations will not only be preserved, but also will further develop in the future.

The prime minister stated further that he "fully agrees with Mr. Khrushchev in regard to the necessity of our general struggle for peace and disarmament." He gave us to understand that the USSR can count on the support of India in these questions.

Concerning the question of the peaceful resolution of sharp international problems, Nehru stated that "in this regard Mr. Khrushchev has given us all a great example during the incident with Cuba."

Nehru then dwelt in detail on the position of India in the Indian-Chinese border dispute. He said that "all this began not from our side, - it was thrust on us. We do not want it to be prolonged, we do not want to carry out military actions. We would like it to be settled...."

Nehru noted the truth of Khrushchev's observation about the presence of reactionary forces that are trying to push the government to a resolution of the border dispute by military means. He stated in this regard that the government knows about the activities of these forces, but does not consider this the main thing. In his words a very important point is the fact that all the people of India, simple peasants, workers and employees, "all feel the harshest feelings toward China, toward what it did against India. They, of course, do not want war (no one wants it), but they demand the withdrawal of Chinese from Indian territory, they demand the defense of our territory.

We, of course, never will make an incursion into Chinese territory, but it is necessary to consider that the people insist on the liberation of the territory that belongs to India."

In answer to my statement about the necessity of a peaceful resolution of the problem and of explaining to the people the correctness of peaceful means, Nehru said: "We are trying to explain this necessity and will do this in the future." He noted in this regard that attempts at peaceful resolution of the dispute have not yet given results. "We would like to sit at the negotiating table with the Chinese. We are ready. But the government has explained to them that for this it is necessary that the position on the border that existed 3 months ago be restored - the position on 8 September."

Further J. Nehru in detail and confidentially illuminated the question of the relations of India with Pakistan...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, ll. 197-203; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

III. Record of Conversation (from East German archives) between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Mongolian leader J. Zedenbal, Beijing, 26 December 1962

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II.

About the Meeting of Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade J. Zedenbal

On 26 December the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China [PRC; VRCh in German], Comrade Zhou Enlai, paid a return visit to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR; MVR in German], Comrade J. Zedenbal.

During this meeting, which took place in the residence of Comrade Zedenbal, a conversation [took place] between the two [men], which lasted from 11 until 14 hours.

Present during the conversation were: on the Mongolian side—the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, Comrade Shagwaral, the deputy Foreign Minister Schagda[r]suren, the Ambassador of the MPR in Peking [Beijing], Zewegmid, the Deputy of the Great People's Hural [Parliament] of the MPR, S. Bata, the Head of the 1st Division of the Foreign Ministry of

these conditions, begins an invasion again, this will be a true challenge and provocation.

If India gives up Kashmir to Pakistan and tries to annex our Aksai district again, this will only be a proof that India is really working for and under the orders of the Americans.

India's attempts to give Pakistan the rich, bounteous Kashmir and, in exchange, to occupy our unpopulated, poor district, only proves [India's] aggressiveness. Under these conditions, we have ceased fire and withdrawn our troops.

The people of Asia and Africa, [and] all the peace-loving people of the Earth, support our policy and our measures. We thank you for the fact that your government welcomed the explanation of the government of the PRC.

Presently, India is in a difficult position. The countries of Asia and Africa are supporting our proposal, and that puts India in an even more exit-less [*ausweglosere*] situation.

Not long ago, a meeting of leading statesmen from many countries took place in Colombo [Ceylon; now Sri Lanka] concerning the Sino-Indian border question. They decided to send the Ceylonese prime minister [Sirimavo Bandaranaike] to China in order to inform us of the results of the conference. It was confirmed that the Ceylonese Minister-president would arrive [in China] on 31 December. We have already received a special plenipotentary in order to confer on this question. The aforementioned countries are making efforts to reconcile India and China and to initiate negotiations between our countries in order to confirm our cease-fire. We are ready to respond to these efforts. The most important [thing] is that both sides do not allow any renewed clashes. That is our main goal. Many ask, why there is no settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict, because the border question between China and Pakistan is actively discussed[?] We think that Pakistan negotiates with us without submitting itself to America and England, although it belongs to an aggressive bloc. India, however, speaks the language of America, although it maintains that it does not belong to any aggressive blocs.

J. ZEDENBAL: Do you consider India a neutral country?

ZHOU ENLAI: India is diverging from

its so-called neutrality. Furthermore, there is a less important border question between China and Afghanistan. In short, we will start negotiations. Experience shows that we can solve the border problems handed down to us by history through friendly negotiations both with socialist countries and with the new states of Asia. The treaty regarding the Chinese-Mongolian border demonstrates this. Both of our states are socialist countries and in a short period we have solved the border question correctly, according to principles of friendship, equality, mutual understanding and mutual concessions. Our countries' governmental delegations have successfully concluded negotiations over the border question. This opens the way to the signature of a border agreement. Consequently, we will have to form a joint commission that will undertake border demarcation on the spot.

J. ZEDENBAL: Thank you, Premier Zhou Enlai both for the information regarding the course of negotiations you are conducting with neighboring countries and for the information about your government's position on this question.

The negotiations between our countries to define exactly and mark the borderline have been successfully concluded, and nothing more stands in the way of signing an agreement. Comrade Premier, you have correctly stated that our countries' governmen-

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dertaking flexible measures towards settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict in a peaceful manner by negotiations.

In general, life confirms daily the need for flexible policies to solve international problems. We do not doubt that the Chinese-Indian border conflict can be settled peacefully.

By "speculating" on the Chinese-Indian border conflict, the reactionary forces in India have strengthened their activity and their offensive against the country's [India's] Communist Party and democratic forces.

We are convinced that the measures that your government has taken towards a ceasefire on the Indian-Chinese border, toward the withdrawal of border troops and towards the future settlement of this problem by negotiation will generate positive results. We are of the opinion that this would be, on the one hand a blow against reactionary forces in India itself, and on the other hand a blow against the forces of imperialism, with the USA at its head. We assume that such measures will strengthen India's neutral stance and will prevent India from abandoning this position. This will advance the battle for peace in the whole world. The American imperialists are making efforts to derive advantages from this conflict. The peaceful settlement would undoubtedly be a serious [line illegible-trans.] for imperialism.

After the signing of the border agreement between our countries, we will begin the demarcation of the borderline. As is well known, during the negotiations our delegation raised the question of the village of Hurimt in the Balgan-Ulgiisk district in western Mongolia. Our inhabitants have erected several buildings there and begun lumbering. Your delegation, however, replied that this place cannot be recognized as Mongolia, because this would meet with difficulties. At the same time, your delegation answered that the inhabitants on both sides have come to an agreement and can find a reasonable solution [to the problem of] the use of the forest's riches. Therefore, I do not want to insist that Hurimt should necessarily belong inside Mongolian borders. Of course, I think that this question must be decided by taking both sides interests into consideration. We are grateful that you have declared yourselves ready to make possible our use of our buildings as well as the forests in this district. This problem occurred, because there are no other woods nearby. But it can be solved on the basis of friendly, mutual understanding.

Since the founding of the PRC it has become a good tradition that during temporary difficulties caused by drought and dry wind, the administrations of individual districts of our countries, in friendly contacts, have permitted the reciprocal use of pasture land. We hope that it will also be possible in the future, in case of difficulties, to continue this excellent tradition.

I suppose that our Comrade "Landowner" ["Gutsbesitzer"] Shagwaral, who is responsible for agricultural questions would be very interested in this.

We thank you for the help that you have provided in difficult times to the cattlebreeders in our Aimaks and Somons, especially in winter and spring. We also express further our satisfaction that the border question between our countries will soon be settled.

I would like to make use of this meeting, Comrade Premier, to broach two aspects [of Sino-Mongolian relations].

We were and are grateful that for the construction of our country the PRC has provided us with financial and economic help as well as qualified workers. The appropriate authorities in our countries are already negotiating regarding the building of objects agreed upon earlier by our governments. I suppose that these negotiations will continue.

I would like to pose the following two questions to you: First, has railway freight traffic gone down considerably in the last years? Maybe that is also an effect of your drought. We hope that railway freight traffic will go up in the future. The full use of the railway that will be built as a consequence of a three-sided agreement between us and the Soviet comrades is economically advantageous for our country, Comrade Premier. We are convinced that you will take this factor into consideration.

Secondly, one of the forms of help that you provide to us is the provision of workers from appropriate professions. This labor is a great help in the building up of our country. Recently, it has nevertheless happened that a few less conscientious and inexperienced people put down their work. I think you know about this.

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* the *Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.*, including reports from the USSR's newly-arrived ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, on the situation in Washington and his meetings with leading personages, and from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on his conversation with Kennedy on October 18;

* the *United Nations in New York*, from which USSR ambassador Valerian Zorin reported on debates in the Security Council, and on contacts with other delegates and U.N. officials, and then more senior Soviet officials sent to handle the diplomacy of the settlement, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov and Mikoyan, reported on their negotiations with U.S. negotiators John J. McCloy and Adlai Stevenson as well as conversations with U Thant;

* and the *Soviet Embassy in Havana*, from which USSR Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseev reported on Cuban developments, including the fervor gripping the country when it seemed war might be imminent, the leadership's angry reaction when Khrushchev accepted Kennedy's request to withdraw the missiles without advance consultation with Castro, and the difficult conversations which ensued as Soviet officials, in particular Mikoyan, tried to mollify the upset Cubans and at the same time secure Havana's acquiescence to the measures Moscow had accepted in order to resolve the crisis.

The fact that almost all of the documents below came from the Foreign Ministry archive should induce some caution among readers seeking an understanding of Soviet policy regarding the crisis. Not surprisingly, for instance, they illuminate diplomatic aspects of the

the gravest issues would arise." While stressing that the situation had taken a turn for the worse since July as a result of Moscow's stepping-up of military aid to Cuba—calling the situation "perhaps the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War"—Kennedy made no mention of the missiles.

After reading the account of the conversation, it is hard to explain Gromyko's smug assessment that the situation was "completely satisfactory," other than as a spectacular case of wishful thinking (or a blase memo to mask a more candid assessment relayed through other channels). It is clear, from his repeated statements of concern, that Kennedy was trying to caution Moscow to rethink its adventure without tipping his cards—and perhaps even signalling a possible way out of the crisis that had (so far as Moscow knew) not even begun. Repeatedly assuring Gromyko that the United States had "no intentions to launch an aggression against Cuba," Kennedy noted pointedly that, "If Mr. Khrushchev addressed me on this issue, we could give him corresponding assurances on that score," and repeated the offer twice later in the conversation. A little more than a week later, of course, after the world had been brought to the brink, precisely such a declaration from Kennedy would give Khrushchev the fig leaf he needed to swallow his pride and accept the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

The Russian documents reveal nothing new on the issue of whether, in fact, the Kennedy Administration had been moving toward taking military action against Cuba even before it discovered the existence of the Soviet nuclear-capable missiles on the island in mid-October. In a previous publication, the current author presented evidence that the U.S. government and military undertook serious contingency planning, and even some preliminary redeployments, in September and the first two weeks of October 1962 toward the objective of achieving, by October 20, "maximum readiness" for either an air strike against or invasion of Cuba, or both, although the article remained agnostic on the issue of whether Kennedy had actually made a decision to attack Cuba or simply wanted the option available.⁸ Recently, a potentially crucial, yet still problematic, piece of evidence from American archives has surfaced to suggest that, literally on the eve of the crisis, the Kennedy Administration was *not* on the verge of imminent military action against Cuba.

At issue is a recently declassified purported fragment of notes of a conversation on the afternoon of Monday, 15 October 1962,

early October 1962, deliberately floated the idea of an imminent intensive diplomatic effort (or possibly a renewed superpower showdown) on Berlin, to take place in late November after the U.S. Congressional mid-term elections, in order to distract American attention from Cuba long enough to allow Moscow to complete its secret missile deployment. Such is, at any rate, the strategy that Anastas Mikoyan privately described to Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership on 4 November 1962 (published in Bulletin 5) as the one the Kremlin had followed in the weeks and months preceding the crisis: "We let the Americans know that we wanted to solve the question of Berlin in the nearest future. This was done in order to distract their attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diversionary maneuver. In reality, we had no intention of resolving the Berlin question at that time."¹⁵ In the memorandum of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversation on October 18, one can see the Soviet Foreign Minister dangling the Berlin bait, suggesting that a summit meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev take place in the United States "in the second half of November"—when Khrushchev would attend a session of the U.N. General Assembly-"in order to discuss the issues that separate [the USA and USSR] and first of all the questions of the German peace treaty and West Berlin."¹⁶ Gromyko's message, in turn, came on the heels of a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy dated 28 September 1962 threatening to sign a German peace treaty-the same vow that had triggered the Berlin Crisis in November 1958, for it implied an agreement between Moscow and East Berlin that would cut off Western access to West Berlin-but grandly (and ominously) informing Kennedy that in deference to the passions of American domestic politics, "we decided to put the German problem, so to say, on ice until the end of the elections" and will "do nothing with regard to West Berlin until the elections ... [afterwards], apparently in the second half of November, it would be necessary in our opinion to continue the dialogue."¹⁷ "Some sort of crisis relating to Berlin is clearly brewing now, and we will have to see whether we can surmount it without recourse to military action," Dobrynin quoted Kennedy as saying in a background meeting with reporters on October 16 in a cable to Moscow three days later.¹⁸ On the same day, with evident satisfaction, Gromyko reported to the CPSU CC after his conversation with Kennedy that in recent days "the sharpness of the anti-Cuban campaign in the USA has subsided somewhat while the sharpness of the West Berlin question has stood out all the more. Newspapers bleat about the approaching crisis vis-a-vis West Berlin, the impending in the very near future of a [Soviet treaty] with the GDR, and so on." Gromyko even detected a White House-inspired propaganda campaign "to divert public attention from the Cuba issue."¹⁹

Only afterward did Mikoyan, at least, realize that at the October 18 encounter Kennedy had been playing along with Gromyko just as Gromyko had been deceiving him—as soon as they discovered the missiles, he related to Castro, they "began crying about Berlin," and both the Soviet Union and United States were talking about the Berlin Crisis but simultaneously knew that the real crisis was about to erupt in Cuba.²⁰

Soviet Perceptions of Washington During the Crisis

While evidence (such as Politburo minutes) necessary to judge the evolution of Kremlin perceptions of Kennedy during the crisis is still lacking, and intelligence assessments remain off-limits, the reports of USSR Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin between 22 and 28 October that have emerged thus far raise some interesting questions about the accuracy and impact of Soviet reporting on its "main enemy" at a critical moment. How is one to evaluate, for example, a cable sent over Dobrynin's name on 25 October 1962 relaying gossip around the bar of the Washington Press Club at 3 o'clock in the morning to the effect that Kennedy had "supposedly taken a decision to

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January 25, 1993 Mr. James J. Hastings Director Records Appraisal and Disposition Division National Archives Washington, DC 20408

Dear Mr. Hastings:

This responds to your letter seeking information concerning the destruction of recorded minutes of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to in an article by the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff astings

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corresponding assurances on that score. The build-up of the Cuban military might has badly impressed the American people and the USA congress. As President I was trying to calm public opinion and I have declared that, taking into account the kind of aid rendered by the Soviet Union to Cuba, we must keep cool and self-controlled. But I was not able to find a satisfactory explanation for those actions of the Soviet Union.

Kennedy said later, that the Soviet Union is aware of the American opinion regarding the present regime in Cuba. We consider that it would be better if there were another government. But we do not have any intentions to attack Cuba.

You are saying that we have established a blockade around Cuba, but that is not the case. We have only taken the decision that the ships, after bringing cargo to Cuba, will be barred entry to the American ports to pick up freight.

The actions of the Soviet Union create a very complicated situation and I don't know where the whole thing can bring us. The present situation is, perhaps, the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War. We, certainly, take on trust statements of the Soviet Union about the sort of armaments supplied by you to Cuba. As President I am trying to restrain those people in the USA who are favoring an invasion of Cuba. For example, last Sunday in one of my speeches I declared against one of the American senators, who had previously supported such an invasion.³

I repeat, a very dangerous situation has nevertheless arisen regarding this issue and I don't know what can be the outcome.

I answered Kennedy that once there was an attempt to organize an invasion of Cuba and it is known what was the end of the affair.⁴ From different official statements and your own statements, Mr. President, everybody know what were the circumstances and how that invasion was arranged. Everybody knows also that the USA administration needs only to move a finger and no Cuban exiles, nor those who support them in the USA and some countries of the Caribbean, would dare launch any adventure against Cuba.

At this moment Kennedy put in a remark that he had already had an exchange of opinions with N.S. Khrushchev on the issue of the invasion of Cuba in 1961 and had said that it was a mistake. I should be glad, Kennedy stressed, to give assurances that an invasion would not be repeated neither on the part of Cuban refugees, nor on the part of the USA armed forces.

But the issue is, Kennedy said, that as a result of the USSR government's action in July of the current year the situation suddenly has changed for the worse.

Proceeding with the previous idea, I said that for the Cuban government the vital issue is the question what is to be done next. The question comes to the following: either they will stay unprepared to repulse new attempts at invasion or they must undertake steps to ensure their country from attack, take care of their defense. We have already said that the Soviet government has responded to the call of Cuba for help only because that appeal had the aim of providing Cubans with bread and removing the threat hanging over Cuba by strengthening its defensive capacity. Regarding help, rendered by the Soviet Union, in the use of some exclusively defensive armaments, by no means can it be seen as a threat to the USA. If, I repeat, the situation were different the Soviet government never would have gone along with such an aid.

Kennedy said that, to make things completely clear on this issue, he would like to announce once more that the USA do not have any intentions to invade Cuba. Nevreceived before departure, the question of a possible meeting of the heads of the two powers has been touched upon.

The Soviet government, as before, is building its foreign policy on the recognition of that indisputable concept that difference in ideologies, to which our states adhere, need not be a barrier to their peaceful coexistence and cooperation in the interests of strengthening the peace. You and we, as it was underlined more than once by N.S. Khrushchev, are human beings and you have your own ideology, and you are well aware of our attitude towards it. The USSR is a socialist state, and is building communism. We are guided by communist ideology. Who will gain the victory in the end-this question must be solved not by the force of armaments, but by the way of peaceful competition and we, the communists, have urged this since the days of Lenin.

We resolutely condemn the calls to solve ideological disputes by the force of armaments. A competition in economics, in satisfying the material and spiritual requirements of the peope—that is the field where in a historic, peaceful "battle," without use of armaments, must be solved the question of which ideology would prevail and which one would quit the stage of history. On behalf of the Soviet government I would like to reaffirm that [position] once more because it is one of the main principles of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. speech. Appended to the letter was the draft of a resolution which in its main strategic part runs as follows:

"The Security Council...

1. <u>Demands</u>, as a temporary measure, in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter, the immediate dismantling and removal from Cuba of all ballistic missiles and other armaments used for offensive purposes.

2. <u>Authorizes and requests</u> the acting secretary general to dispatch to Cuba a corps of UN observers to ensure fulfillment of this resolution and to deliver a report.

3. <u>Demands</u> the cessation of quarantine measures directed against military deliveries to Cuba after the UN has been assured of the fulfillment of Point 1.

4. <u>Strongly recommends</u> that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics immediately discuss the issue of measures to be taken to eliminate the currently existing threat to the security of the Western hemisphere and to peace throughout the world, and to deliver a report on this to the Security Council."

We will forward the text of Stevenson's letter and the draft of the resolution to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by teletype.

The United States' formulation of the imaginary threat posed by Cuba and the USSR is clearly aimed at concealing and justifying to public opinion the USA's unilaterally imposed military blockade of Cuba, which is an overtly aggressive act. In light of this, the demand for convening the Security Council is put forth after the USA has in fact established a blockade and undertaken a series of other aggressive actions against revolutionary Cuba. Thus the Americans have presented the Security Council, as they have done in the past, with a *fait accompli*.

Before consulting with the other members of the Security Council on the time for convening the meeting of the Council, we met with the Cuban representative and had a preliminary discussion of the possibility of Cuba's submitting to Council an examination of the issue of the USA's aggressive actions against Cuba.

The Cuban representative is conferring with his government on this issue.

We will undertake measures toward initiating the meeting of the Council no earlier than 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on 23 October, although pressure from the Western majority of Council members for its immediate convocation has already been exerted.

We will provide supplementary information on our position in the Security Council.

22.X.62 V. ZORIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962

23 October

Raul Castro has announced that in response to Kennedy's threat, the Cuban government would make a decision regarding the mobilization of all subdivisions of the popular militia.

All in all, 350,000 persons will be mobilized.

The full mobilization of this group will take 72 hours.

The forces of the military units in this group (105,000 persons) have been brought to military readiness, and are occupying departure positions.

The mass labor organizations are devoting all their energy to helping the army and to replacing workers in businesses.

The mobilization will prove to be a new and heavy burden for the Cuban economy, given that the maintenance of the army will cost the country up to one million pesos per day, not counting losses from reductions in production connected with the transfer of significant numbers of workers to the army.

Tomorrow at 12:00 noon, Fidel Castro will deliver a television and radio address to the Cuban people.

Commenting on Kennedy's speech, Raul Castro said that it was undoubtedly aimed at American voters and at the Latin American governments that still have diplomatic ties with Cuba.

Castro thinks that, under this pressure, a whole series of these governments, if not all of them, will break off relations with Cuba.

The Cuban government, said Castro,

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nection with this we are taking steps to make the convocation of the Council contingent on Roa's arrival. Nevertheless it can be expected that the Council meeting will have to be convened (given the demands of the Western majority of the Council's members) on 23 October of this year at 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.

During the examination of the issue in the Council, we will declare our objections to the misleading American formulation of it. Bearing in mind the Cubans' demand for entering on the agenda the issue of USA aggressions that they introduced, it can be expected that the affair will come down to entering American as well as Cuban statements on the Council's agenda.

In examining the affair in its essence, guided by the Soviet government's most recent announcements on the Cuban question, we will point out that the USA's aggressions against Cuba cannot be evaluated as anything other than a provocation pushing the world to the verge of nuclear war. We will demand a condemnation of the USA aggressions, the immediate cessation of the blockade they have declared and all infractions of maritime freedom; and an immedi-



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to the current, more flexible, [version] prepared by Rusk.

The President is vacillating right now,

sels bound for Cuba keep away from the interception area for a certain period of time, and that the USA for the duration of that same period avoid immediate encounters between their ships and Soviet vessels. In this event we will declare that U Thant's proposal, which is the basis on which all the interested parties have agreed to conduct negotiations, goes above and beyond the "primary measures" that he put forth in his second message.

Since the forthcoming meeting with U Thant is a preliminary one and raises the issue of further negotiations, including a conclusive normalization of the whole situation in the Caribbean region, we ask to be briefed on your decision as to the level, form, and direction of further negotiations.

If there are supplementary instructions for the first meeting with U Thant, we ask you to take into consideration the meeting time proposed by U Thant.

25.X.62 V. ZORIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962

26 October 1962

The Cuban delegate, Garcia-Inchaustegui, met with U Thant on 26 October, at which time U Thant entrusted him to deliver to Havana a message from him to Fidel Castro (we are sending this as a separate telegram).

In the conversation with Garcia-Inchaustegui, U Thant, who had informed him of the correspondence between U Thant and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, and President Kennedy as well, expressed his ideas for using Dorticos's proposal of 8 October in the General Assembly as a way to achieve a lasting normalization of the Caribbean basin situation. The Cuban reminded U Thant that Dorticos in his speech had emphasized the extenuating circumstance that the USA had already declared that it did not intend to attack Cuba, but that now it had broken their promise.

To this U Thant responded that for this reason it is necessary to specify what guarantees should be made by the USA to assure that it will not take any antagonistic actions against Cuba, and asked Garcia-Inchaustegui to explain the views of the Cuban government on this matter.

2. The head of the Brazilian delegation, [Alfonso] Arinos [de Melo Franco], has worked out a draft resolution on the denuclearization of Latin America and Africa under the observation of a monitoring committee (we will send this as a separate telegram). In a conversation with Garcia-Inchaustegui, Arinos expressed his view that approving this resolution would allow Cuba to "avoid humiliation" if it is forced to renounce the construction of missile bases.

According to Garcia-Inchaustegui, this draft resolution has received great currency among the Latin American countries, and the delegates from the Latin American contingents who met with U Thant this evening should discuss the draft with the acting Secretary General.

Garcia-Inchaustegui told the Brazilian himself that, in his personal opinion, it would be better that the issue of the elimination of all foreign military bases in Latin America be brought up, since then such a formulation would include the base at Guantanamo as well.

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[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962

26 October 1962

I delivered N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant's second message (at 13:00 local time).

U Thant expressed satisfaction with the

fact that once again his proposal had been approved. After this, U Thant told us that tonight he had received a response to his second message from Kennedy as well, and at our insistence he provided us with the text of that response (after he had submitted this disclosure to the approval of the USA legation, and after receiving our consent to his disclosing to the USA legation the content of our own response).

We are communicating the text of Kennedy's response as a separate telegram.

U Thant presented us with the possibility of his immediate publication of both his messagees to N.S. Khrushchev and to Kennedy, and of both responses given to those messagees by the USSR and the USA. He led us to understand that a comparison of both responses would show the world community that the Soviet Union, unlike the USA, was continuing to aim for support of peace and the prevention of war.

We responded to the effect that we were not yet authorized to agree to the publication of N.S. Khrushchev's response, and would give him an answer later.

We believe it would be expedient to give our consent to the publication of the documents mentioned.

Today at 16:00 there will be a meeting between Stevenson and U Thant. At 18:00 Eastern Standard Time we are once again meeting with U Thant, and if we do not receive other instructions by that time, we will give our consent to the publication of N. S. Khrushchev's second response.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962

26 October 1962

On the evening of 26 October we ([Platon] Morozov and I) met with U Thant, in the presence of [UN Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Chakravanthi V.] Narasiman, [UN official Omar] Loutfi, [Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-General Brig.-] General [Indar J.] Rikhye, and, on our request, Comrade [E.D.] Kiselev. After giving our consent to the publication of N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant's second message, U Thant immediately released for publication both his message and the responses to them by the Soviet Union and the USA. In so doing, U Thant again emphasized that now the whole world would be again convinced that the Soviet Union is positively and constructively working towards the peace initiative that it undertook, and he also asked to convey his thanks to the Soviet government and personally to N.S. Khrushchev for the speedy and positive response to his second message.

U Thant said furthermore that Kennedy's reponse to his second message was not as clear as N.S. Khrushchev's response. Nevertheless U Thant noted that, as he sees it, an agreement has been reached at the present moment between the Soviet Union and the USA which, although for only a short period (2 to 5 days, as he put it), ensures the possibility of avoiding dangerous encounters on the open sea. In this way, a situation will be created in which further steps can be taken towards the lessening of tensions.

Stevenson today announced to U Thant that the USA was prepared to approve U Thant's proposal contained in his first message (concerning the cessation for 2 to 3 weeks of arms stockpiling in Cuba, and the USA's simultaneous suspension of blockade activities), on the proviso that measures would be taken to guarantee that ships arriving in Cuba (Soviet ships, as well as freight vessels) are not supplying any weaponry during this this period.

U Thant explained that the satisfaction of this demand, either in this way or in some other fashion, is a very important issue for American public opinion. It would be possible to discuss a particular procedure for maritime traffic, or for particular ports of call in Cuba, whereby for example UN delegates from neutral countries, selected by agreement, or representatives of the International Red Cross might one way or another ascertain that vessels arriving in Cuba are not carrying arms. He implied that the Americans would apparently be satisfied with a simple procedure, and would not demand searches or inspections of vessels bound for, or in the ports of, their destinations.

We declared to U Thant that the American proposal was at odds with U Thant's own proposal, and shows that the USA, unlike the Soviet Union, is not ready to agree to that proposal. We remarked that in giving consent to U Thant's proposal, the Soviet Union was taking a highly important step toward preserving the peace. We pointed out that the Soviet Union would stick to its obligations with unconditional steadfastness if an agreemnt was reached on the basis of U Thant's own proposal. No checks on this are needed, not only because of what has been put forth, but also because if the arms provisioning continued, it would not be hard to detect anyway. For this reason, the Americans' push for the abovementioned proposal proves that they are looking for a pretext for not fulfilling the very agreement that would facilitate a conclusive settlement.

We also noted that while the USA is advancing a new proposal that complicates matters, they themselves are continuing to prepare intensively for an invasion of Cuba. If we are to talk about UN observation, then we must first of all demand an immediate end to that sort of military preparation against Cuba, which threatens the general peace.

We noted as well that we cannot enter discussions about what actions may be taken on Cuban territory, since that is a matter for the Cuban government alone to decide. But the forms of monitoring proposed would constitute an obvious interference in the domestic affairs of Cuba.

U Thant said that he understood all this personally, and that he firmly believed that the Soviet Union would keep its word. Nonetheless it is clear that the USA is acting as it is in order to justify before American public opinion its refusal to take the appropriate blockade measures that have been announced.

We told U Thant that the Soviet Union has already approved two of his proposals, proceeding in such a way as to frustrate the American provocation that threatens the peace, and also that it is now up to U Thant, in his capacity as acting General Secretary of the UN, to exert the necessary pressure on the USA with the aim of reaching a provisional agreement for 2 to 3 weeks, based on the initial proposal of U Thant himself. We emphasized that it is necessary to act quickly, since our ships cannot remain on the open sea for an indefinite period of time, and since the situation cannot be allowed to get out of control. U Thant said that he would do all he could, although he asks us as well to think of measures that would be favorably received by the USA.

At the end of the conversation, U Thant said that today he had presented the Cuban delegate to the UN with the message, to be conveyed to Castro, in which he asked that missile installation work in Cuba, which according to reports received by him from the Americans continues day and night, be suspended for the 2 to 3 week period that is necessary for negotiations.

In response to our question about what plans U Thant had concerning the basis upon which a conclusive settlement would be attainable, U Thant answered that he found the key to this in Dorticos's speech to the General Assembly on 8 October of this year, in which the latter announced that if the USA were to give effective guarantees that they will not undertake a military invasion of Cuba, and will not aid its invasion by anyone else, it would not be necessary for Cuba to take military measures, or even to maintain its army.

U Thant said that today he had explained his point of view to Stevenson, and that the latter had promised to inform Kennedy about it.

In conclusion, we arranged with U Thant that he inform the Americans of our conversation, and agreed that our forthcoming meeting would be contingent upon how events unfold.

At the next meeting, if we do not receive other instructions, we will continue to push for the provisional agreement on the 2 to 3 week period, based on U Thant's proposal that was approved in Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's response, without the supplementary conditions advanced by the USA.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

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Castro and to the latest message to Kennedy about the dismantling of special weaponry it became clear that confusion and bewilderment are reigning inside the Cuban leadership.

Dorticos said that, unfortunately, Cu-

provide a good and fair foundation for re-

going on for more than five days, and now there are no longer any reasons for not suspending the quarantine activity.

The declaration of the quarantine by

the United States and other Latin American countries, and for Cuba. For this reason, U Thant intends to propose that United Nations observers be placed not only on Cuban territory, but also on the territory of the United States and several Latin American countries neighboring Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov said that we now have a clearer idea of the task that U Thant is setting for himself during his trip to Cuba. In connection with this he expressed some of the Soviet views on this matter. First and foremost, Kuznetsov stressed, as is already known from N. S. Khrushchev's messages, the missile installations in Cuba are in the hands of Soviet specialists. The Soviet government has stated that it is dismantling and removing these launchers from Cuba.

It is evident from the message sent by N. S. Khrushchev to Kennedy on 27 October and from the later message with which the American government generally agreed, that the Soviet government has agreed to the imposition of on-site checks after the abovementioned dismantlings, of course with the consent of the government of the Republic of Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov asked whether the Americans are not moving away from the position laid out in Kennedy's message.

V. V. Kuznetsov expressed his agreement with the Soviet Union's granting of guarantees on arms provisioning and the dismantling of missile installations, and so too the United States should make guarantees to the effect that it will not infringe upon the security and sovereignty of Cuba either with its own armed forces, or through support for other countries, and that it will not permit or aid the activity on its own territory of subversive sabotage groups. These pledges must be firm.

We have made note of Kennedy's statement that the USA will guarantee that no aggression against Cuba will take place. However, on one hand Kennedy declares that the Soviet Union's statements are reassuring, while on the other hand the USA is making new demands that place the two parties in unfairly different positions.

V. V. Kuznetsov concluded that his idea

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30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Telegram from Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962

completion, especially if the dismantling is to take a long time. With regard to this it is advantageous to accelerate the dismantlings, in order not to show the installations to the inspectors. The Americans prefer that the inspection be carried out by the UN, and for the composition of the inspection groups they propose two variants: representatives of neutral countries, or representatives of the 2s asked1Trese2y1.333 7.antor repctors. Thcb6gib.. r1antlt, the A-

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30 October 1962

On 29 October a second meeting with U Thant was held at his initiative.

1. U Thant informed me that the Americans have favorably received our agreement to the inspection of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by representatives of the International Red Cross.

U Thant also informed us that he had contacted the Red Cross and received a preliminary response that the Red Cross was ready to undertake the inspection of vessels both on the open sea, and in ports of disembarkation. U Thant intends to negotiate with Fidel Castro on carrying out the inspection in ports.

In the Red Cross's preliminary reponse received by U Thant, it is indicated that all personnel carrying out the inspection of the vessels will consist of Swiss citizens.

2. U Thant explained to Stevenson our position on the inspection of the dismantlings and the removal of the socalled "offensive" weaponry from Cuba. The Americans asked U Thant to clarify how long the dismantling would take. On his own initiative U Thant put this question to us. We told U Thant that we would ask our government, but provisionally the dismantling will be expected to take 2 to 3 weeks. (In provisionally specifying this time frame, we were proceeding from the relevant points made in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 27 October.)

We request to be informed about the duration of the dismantling processes in order to give an answer to U Thant.

 According to U Thant, the Americans are insisting that the monitoring of the dismantling be carried out during the very process of dismantling, and not after its the International Red Cross, and prefers that such checks be carried out not on the open sea, but in Cuban ports.

Stevenson said furthermore that now the USA attributes primary importance to reaching an agreement on the inspection of the dismantling of the Soviet military em-

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egates of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba with the participation of the acting Secretary General of the UN on the normalization of the situation that has arisen around Cuba, you should follow the messages of N.S. Khrushchev to President John Kennedy and U Thant, and also by the instructions given in our dispatches #1254 and #1267.

In the negotiations you should try to record the agreement deriving from the exchange of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and John Kennedy in the form of a protocol statement that would be presented to the Security Council for all measures taken in accordance with the UN Charter. As a basis for negotiations, after receiving the consent of our Cuban friends, convey to the Americans and to U Thant the statement of protocol, and declare that this statement is being introduced jointly by the governments of the USSR and Cuba. (The text of the statement of protocol is being communicated by separate telegram.)

Since Fidel Castro's statement of 28 October contains a demand concerning the evacuation of the USA naval base in Guantanamo, the protocol statement includes a point concerning the negotiations of the USA and the Republic of Cuba on this matter. If however the USA objects to the inclusion of this point, and this impedes the reaching of an agreement according to the whole protocol statement, then with the consent of the Cuban representative you may not insist on a separate mention of the Guantanamo base in the protocol statement. In this we proceed from the fact that the protocol statement contains Article 16, which stipulates the necessity of carrying out negotiations on other issues, including issues raised in Fidel Castro's statement of 28 October, i.e. in other words, the issue of the military base in Guantanamo.

As far as a possible Security Council resolution with regard to the protocol statement is concerned, in negotiations you should aim for the Council's approving a resolution that would generally contain the following basic points:

"1. The Security Council welcomes with satisfaction and expresses its approval of the agreement reached by the governments of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba with the participation of the acting Secretary General of the UN U Thant, on measures to be taken for normalizing the Caribbean situation, which facilitates the lessening of the tension that had had arisen in the relations among the countries.

2. The Security Council takes into consideration the obligations of the governments of the USSR, the USA, and the Republic of Cuba recorded in the protocol presented to the Security Council, including precisely:

(Here the text of all 17 articles of the protocol statement is given.)

3. The Security Council is proceeding from the stipulation that the governments of the countries participating in the protocol statement will strictly carry out the obligations they have taken on, which will contribute to the strengthening of trust among the countries and to affirming peace generally.

4. In accordance with articles 10 and 13 of the protocol statement, the Security Council requests the governments of [gap in text] countries to share their own delegates as agents for ascertaining the carrying out of the obligations to dismantle and remove the weaponry indicated in articles 9 and 12 of the protocol statement.

5. The Security Council asks acting UN Secretary General U Thant to grant the group of agents the necessary means and cooperation for carrying out the functions with which they have been entrusted."

The text of the protocol statement is now being submitted to the approval of Fidel Castro.

On receiving the approval of Fidel Castro, we will notify you of the possibility of forwarding this text to the Americans and U Thant on behalf of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

If you have any thoughts pertaining to the local situation, communicate them.

Confirm reception of this telegram.

that U Thant has promised to make a statement immediately on his return to the USA, that the Soviet Union had fulfilled its commitments.

Inform [Castro] also about our consent to permit U Thant's representatives, if he raises such a question, to be allowed to visit sites of dismantling even after U Thant's departure from Cuba, in order to check that the dismantling has been carried out and to be sure about the launchers' withdrawal from Cuba.

Immediately inform about these instructions Pavlov [Pliyev], who has to fulfill them without delay.

2. Inform Fidel Castro that in Moscow it is considered advantageous UThant's proposal about creating UN posts on the territory of Cuba, corresponding countries of Latin America, and in the USA territory in order to observe compliance with the commitments; this proposal corresponds to both the interests of Cuba and our common interests. Implementation of this proposal for a "UN presence," made by U Thant, would mean that the UN equally regard Cuba and the USA on this issue. That is advantageous for the party which does not intend to attack, i.e. for Cuba, and it is not advantageous for the party with aggressive intentions, i.e. for the USA and their assistants from the Latin American countries.

Immediately inform Pavlov [Pliyev] about these instructions too.

Express confidence that Fidel Castro and his friends would also accept U Thant's proposal, which is very important for us.

We proceed from the assumption that the Cuban government and comrade Pavlov [Pliyev] would undertake all the necessary measures on site.

Cable report on the execution of these instructions.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

Telegram from Soviet ambassador to Cuba A. I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 31 October 1962 After we learned that the Cubans will not permit U Thant and his advisors to visit the dismantling of military sites, and honoring Rikhye's request to meet with the Soviet general, Comrade Pavlov [Pliyev] and I made the decision to engage U Thant in talks with myself and General [Igor D.] Statsenko,¹³ who would offer him and Rikhye detailed information on the issues raised by them yesterday.

Preliminary to our decision to visit U Thant, I informed President Dorticos, who supported this step.

31/X/62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

Telegram from Soviet Foreign Ministry to A.A. Soboleva and A.F. Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

31 October 1962

1. On 28 October the Ministry sent to the USA embassy a note of protest from the Soviet government to the American government concerning the flights around the Soviet ship "Simferopol" by American planes on 24 October of this year, and also concerning the cannon-fire during these flights.

On 31 October the embassy in a reponse note declares that no artillery shots at the "Simferopol" or near it had been carried out, and that the command of the "Simferopol" could have mistaken for gunfire the use by the plane's pilot of several magnetic photo-illuminating cartridges.

2. On 30 October the embassy sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note of protest concerning the "obvious inability or refusal of the Soviet powers responsible for upholding the social order to take measures in recent days to defend the personnel and the property of the embassy."¹⁶

The embassy raises the issue of the repair of or compensation for damages incurred by embassy property and personnel, and also "expects appropriate measures to be taken for averting a repetition of such cases." This has been conveyed for informational purposes.

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign.sov(vidUSSR5(eig67 4TJ 0.9.667 Tc25 viet5For)54(eign Ministr)23(,)00 1 Nicam0 O)26(ctober55(.]))T

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tageous for us. Make a statement about this in categorical form to U Thant, Stevenson, as well as to the UN delegates of the other nations that will deal with this issue along with you. Insist on the necessity of prolonging the trilateral negoatiations with U Thant's participation, and on their speedy completion by securing the results of the negotiations in a corresponding written agreement (a protocol statement).

<u>Second.</u> 1. <u>On the monitoring of the</u> <u>dismantling and the removal of the special</u> because of the present situation in which our vessels remain immobilized on the open sea. This cannot continue endlessly.

We believe that the missiles have achieved their effect, and achieved it well. You say that you do not believe the Americans. We too do not believe them. But we are operating on the assumption that the socialist states should take the necessary steps to ensure their security, and to coexist with the USA. It is possible that I am simply repeating here what I was saying to you before your trip, but I think that these concerns should be borne in mind when you are presenting our case to Castro. This does not mean, of course, that they should be expressed literally and explicitly. But you must make him clearly understand that we are worried by the unreasonable position that our Cuban comrades have been forced to take.

1.XI.62 A. GROMYKO

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Cable of V.V. Kuznetsov on 1 November 1962 Conversation between CPSU CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and Acting UN Secretary General U Thant, 2 November 1962

Ciphered telegram

Top Secret No copying is allowed Copy no. 1

2 November 1962

CC CPSU

Transmitting the record of conversation of com. A.I. Mikoyan

The conversation took place with U Thant on 1 November 1962 in the U.N. mission [of the USSR - trans.].

At the start com. Mikoyan passed to U Thant regard from com. N.S. Khrushchev as well as on his own behalf. He told U Thant that N.S. Khrushchev recalls with warmth the conversations that he had with the acting Secretary General. Personally N.S. Khrushchev and his colleagues believe that U Thant took a good initiative with the aim of resolving the Cuban crisis and that in this regard we are ackowledging his large contribution. This raises the authority of U Thant himself as well as of the United Naalf. He told as on taNIve we bRF;6sikoyace with U once again postpone his speech.

The U Thant asked Castro not to mention in his speech the position of the government of Cuba regarding the [issue of] UN inspection, to which he gladly agreed, saying that he would remove this paragraph from the text he had already prepared.

U Thant asked com. Mikoyan, having in mind the confidential character of his conversations with Castro, not to raise this issue on his own initiative.

As Castro pointed out, in his speech he planned to lay out the entire foreign policy of Cuba and in particularly to emphasize the five points on the settlement of the Cuban crisis he had advanced on 28 October. To this U Thant responded that in view of the deliberations on the Cuban issue in the Security Council and his own speech he could not do it. The Security Council did not authorize him to discuss with the sides issues of permanent or longterm character of settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean sea.

To this Castro responded that a temporary resolution of immediate problems did not resolve the Cuban issue as a whole. The resolution of these immediate questions, in the opinion of the government of Cuba, had to be linked to resolution of the longer-term problems. The Security Council had to discuss also and resolve the issue about a lasting peace in the area of the Caribbean sea. If the Security Council were preoccupied with resolution of only immediate problems, then similar problems would emerge in the foreseeable future again, and they could create a situation similar to the current one. Therefore the government of Cuba is convinced that to ensure lasting and secure peace in the whole world it is necessary that the Security Council should preoccupy itself with the issue of ensuring lasting peace in the Caribbean region. In case the Security Council would be convened, Castro intends to send to the UN Minister of Foreign Affairs Raul Roa so that he would present the viewpoint of his government on the entire Cuban issue. The delegation of Cuba would address the Security Council with a request to find a lasting and final solution to this issue. The government of Cuba is firmly convinced that such a solution can be found only on the basis of 5 points advanced on 28 October by Premier Castro.

U Thant told Castro that at that point he was not competent to discuss this issue,

although he received with understanding the viewpoint of the Prime Minister of Cuba.

Then in the conversations U Thant and Castro touched on the issue about "the UN presence" in the region of the Caribbean sea during the period of the crisis.

U Thant told Castro that in the interests of the government of Cuba and the Cuban people themselves it would be useful to have in Havana UN representatives, and, if Castro agrees, he was ready to leave 2 to 3 of his officials to establish contacts and to follow-up on their dialogue.

Castro responded that had the government of Cuba agreed at the present moment to the presence of UN representatives in Cuba, it could have been interpreted by people as consent to the presence of inspecting groups of the United Nations. While saying so, he referred to American radio broadcasts which affirm on an hourly basis that the U Thant mission had exactly the inspection goals in mind. Under such terms people might have misperceived such a step. Castro asked U Thant not to insist on this proposal.

He then declared that, if the Security Council accepted some kind of formula to resolve the Cuban issue on a permanent basis, then he, Castro, would be glad to have some kind of UN presence on the reciprocal basis. However, this cannot be done in the present phase.

In conversations with Castro, U Thant raised the question about the return to the USA on humanitarian grounds of an American pilot who, according to press publications, had vanished without a trace in the area of Cuba. Castro told him that the USA aircraft of the type U-2 had indeed violated the aerial space over Cuba in violation of international legislation and the UN Charter. It was shot down by the Cubans, the pilot died, since he could not bail out. Castro would have been ready to return the pilot, and alive, but he is dead, therefore he is ready to return the body under auspices of the UN. (This information U Thant passed to the Americans).

Castro also said that any further violation of the aerial borders of Cuba would be dealt with in a similar way.

The next question that was discussed between U Thant and Castro was about a voluntary suspension by the Soviet Union of its supplies of weapons for Cuba for a period of 2 to 3 weeks and the simultaneous voluntary suspension of the quarantine on the part of the USA.

U Thant informed Castro about the acceptance on the part of the Soviet Union of such a voluntary commitment, and also that the USA would have also agreed to suspend the quarantine for 2-3 weeks, on the condition that there would be a mechanism for checking if Soviet ships heading for Cuba were not carrying arms.

U Thant informed Castro also that the Soviet Union had agreed that the Red Cross should deal with inspection of vessels outside of the boundaries of the territorial waters of Cuba. He said that for the Red Cross it would have been more convenient to inspect ships in the ports of arrival, and not in the open sea, if, of course, the government of Cuba agreed to that.

Castro said to this, that his government would not allow groups of the Red Cross to inspect Soviet ships on Cuban territory, but if the USSR agreed to the inspection, then the UN should start organizing this business on the open sea.

Responding to the question of U Thant about a possible time of convocation of a next session of the Security Council on the Cuban issue, Castro said that he would have preferred that the Council convene no sooner than next Wednesday, i.e. after the elections in the United States.

Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant for interesting and useful information, stressing that this would facilitate his talks with Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

He observed that the Americans were now trying to focus all attention on the dismantling and withdrawal of missile equipment, doing nothing on their part concerning the guarantees of Cuba's security.

Therefore Castro is right when he speaks about the need to solve the Cuban issue on a permanent basis. Now it is important to move from general declarations to concrete stekrnmentu-yaemen-1.3 the UN dation of the conflict has been adopted and declared by the interested sides, and also by the UN, since the acting Secretary General is taking active part in this, then, in our opinion, the Security Council should be convened at the moment when the current negotiations would approach the phase of an agreed-upon document finalizing this crisis. Until then convening of the Security Council would hardly assist in this matter.

Com. Mikoyan voiced the idea that after the end of talks of the sides, some kind of document might be passed for approval to the Security Council and on its basis and in following up on it the Council might take a decision on subsequent practical steps. Such a document might have the character of a protocol which would describe talks that would have taken place between the sides with participation of U Thant on the basis of the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, and also the declarations of Fidel Castro, and that would inform about the achieved agreement that, thereby, would have been sealed by the Security Council.

[Mikoyan] said to U Thant that we learned with great interest about his initiative concerning the practicality of having observers in Cuba, in the USA, and in other countries neighboring Cuba for a duration of some period. He informed [U Thant] that N.S. Khrushchev was delighted to see this initiative of U Thant and considered it to be interesting and useful. It is good that Fidel Castro took it in a positive way. This proposal contains in itself the principle of reciprocity, and the USSR is ready to support such a proposal. It could be included into a draft protocol.

He asked U Thant if he had spoken to the Americans on this subject and if so what was their attitude toward this idea.

U Thant said that in conversation with Soviet representatives he advanced several formulas for solution of the issue in its entirety, and the problem of guarantees in particular. At one of these meetings with com. Zorin he indeed proposed that, provided the agreement of the sides, the presence of the UN in the Western hemisphere, in the flashpoints, would be useful. Were it to prove acceptable, then, in the opinion of U Thant, such a measure would have facilitated a settlement of the situation in the Caribbean region on the permanent basis.

U Thant discussed this idea with heads of missions of Latin American [countries] in the UN even before his trip to Cuba and they seemed interested. Some Latin American delegates not only were interested in this idea but also let U Thant understand that such a measure would be desirable.

The USA so far does not want to openly express its attitude towards this proposal of U Thant. Its reaction was reduced to the argument that, well, since this arrangement concerns all the countries of Western hemisphere, this issue should be discussed in the Organization of American States.

Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant about his opinion regarding a possible form of the document stating the reached agreement.

U Thant said that if the sides agree in general, then the goal will be reached through any such document in the form of protocol, joint declaration, separate declaration of the sides, agreement and even in the form of summing-up declaration of the chairman of the Security Council.

Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant also to express his personal considerations on the time of convocation of the Security Council.

U Thant said that it should be done after the elections in the USA, but everything depends on the sides' agreement. If the sides come to agreement, the Council can be convened at any time.

Then U Thant passed his wish to thank the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba for his genuine and wholehearted cooperation during the trip of U Thant. In particular, U Thant noted that our Ambassador in Havana and the Soviet officer informed him without delay about the time when dismantling of the mis-

cil.

spections, and that now it was necessary to find new methods of monitoring that would confirm that the dismantling and removal of the missiles had begun (in McCloy's opinion, the best solution would be aerial photos along with a check on the ships removing the cargoes from Cuba on the open sea. McCloy underscored that this monitoring should be formal— without inquiring into the details of the missiles, which are secret).

3. McCloy spoke a lot about the future prospects of an American-Soviet collaboration which would open up as a result of the settling of the Cuban crisis. In his view, it is necessary in the first place to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing, which would make a huge impression on public opinion. It would be good if this agreement could be signed by Kennedy and Khrushchev. Such a meeting would strengthen public faith that their personal contacts can be fruitful.

McCloy also believes it expedient to conclude an agreement concerning a renunciation of the military use of outer space, and to sign a treaty on at least one bilateral agreement concerning the colonizing of outer space (for example, the launching of a Soviet-American rocket aimed at Venus).

McCloy also reiterated several ideas expressed earlier by Salinger and Thompson (concerning in particular the issue of bases in Turkey—it may be possible, in his view, to eliminate them in the course of "the first stage of disarmament"—by way of "redistribution").

4. McCloy implied that he would play the role of an unofficial intermediary in the preparation of a meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, which in his view could take place within a few months, if resolutions of the issues enumerated above have been completed by that time.

5. McCloy asked us to pass on his warm greetings to N. S. Khrushchev and the members of his family, from himself and his own family.

2.XI.62 G. ZHUKOV

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU re 1 November 1962 Meeting with

Stevenson, 2 November 1962

[...] We raised the question that it was necessary to write down in the form of a protocol the important provisions that are contained in the exchange of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy taking into account the statement by Fidel Castro. The Americans by all means were evading discussion of this question and trying to bring the whole matter to the organization of control over the dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of the Soviet missiles. Nevertheless, in the course of conversation they were obliged to answer our questions relating to the settlement of the Cuban problem in general and disclosed some of their positions that seem interesting for further negotiations. To save space in this cable we omit our remarks during the conversation. You may learn them from the transcript of the conversation which is being sent separately.

1. Though reluctantly, the Americans agreed with the need to fix in documents the corresponding commitments, including the non-aggression commitment against Cuba. In their opinion, these documents must include: a statement by the Soviet Union on the completion of the missiles' evacuation; a USA statement saying they are convinced of the withdrawal and giving corresponding non-aggression guarantees to Cuba; possibly also a statement by U Thant.

The statement by the Soviet government must be the first.

The texts of these statements will be coordinated in advance.

It is foreseen that a corresponding statement will be made by the Government of Cuba. All these statements must be presented to the Security Council.

The unwillingness of the Americans to sign a protocol, apparently, can be explained in addition by the following thing: they do not want to put their signature side by side with the Cubans'.

The Americans underlined their readiness to include in their statement provisions based on corresponding wording from Kennedy's messages regarding the issue of non-aggression guarantees for Cuba.

When we mentioned that in the American press there has appeared a statement by D. Rusk to the effect that Kennedy's statement is not a non-aggression guarantee to Cuba, Stevenson assured us that D. Rusk had not said it, but that the press gave an erroneous interpretation of his speech.

Stevenson and McCloy confirmed that the USA are [is] ready to give a non-aggression guarantee to Cuba as it was mentioned in Kennedy's letter, if an inspection in some form confirms that the Soviet "offensive" armament is really removed from Cuba.

Stevenson and McCloy affirmed that the encampments where the Cuban exiles had been training for an invasion of Cuba were currently closed.

2. During the conversation we resolutely demanded the removal of the socalled "quarantine," underlining that its continuation in no way can help to create a suitable atmosphere for the solution of the Cuban problem and may only complicate the situation. In this regard we noted that the Soviet Union had complied with the request from U Thant for a temporary suspension of armaments' supplies to Cuba, but that the USA had not stopped their "quarantine" for at least some time, as it had been suggested by U Thant.

McCloy and Stevenson evaded a clear answer to the question of ending the "quarantine," having limited themselves to a reference that to the Soviet vessels going to Cuba would be applied the same procedure as it was on October 25 regarding the tanker "Bucharest," without an inspection on board, but with the help of a hailing-request by radio.

It is illustrative that in response to our statement that in the event of dropping the practice of "quarantine" and giving our vessels the possibility to visit Cuba without any obstacles some 10-15 days will be needed to dispatch [from Cuba] all the armaments called offensive by the Americans, McCloy and Stevenson said that in their opinion it is hardly possible from the technical standpoint to carry out the mentioned volume of work in such a short period of time. According to McCloy, at least a month would be needed for that.

3. There has been a detailed discussion of methods for control of the dismantling and removal of missiles.

Apparently, feeling the weakness of their position and taking into account objections on the part of Fidel Castro to permit verification on Cuban territory, McCloy and Stevenson declared in the course of discussion that the American side would be ready not to insist on verification methods foreseen in the message to N.S. Khrushchev and was ready to look for some new methods that would in essence give the Americans the possibility to be certain of the implementation of our commitment to withdraw the weapons.

To our specific question what new methods was he referring to, McCloy said: the USA could limit [itself] to the continuation of their flights which give them confidence that there has not resumed in Cuba an installation of the dangerous for them types of armaments.

If Castro is against a ground verification, continued McCloy, another thing could be done - a transfer of the lists of armaments withdrawn from Cuba, when they would be removed, and of the corresponding information, which however would not disclose Soviet technological secrets. We do know roughly how many missiles currently are situated in Cuba. In this case we could manage without ground verification. We are glad, - said McCloy, - that today our plane had not come under fire when it had been flying over Cuba. As far as we know the anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba are in the hands of your people, not the Cubans, although it's possible that there are some Cuban personnel.

McCloy received a very firm response that the USA [has] no right to overfly Cuba and nobody can guarantee the security of such illegal flights.

4. We raised the question of normalizing relations between the USA [and] their Latin American allies, and Cuba. We also asked what is their attitude to U Thant's plan for a UN presence in the Caribbean. The Americans flatly rejected any inspection of their territory whatsoever and declared: "You will have to trust our word."

At the same time, Stevenson said that the USA aspires to normalize the situation in the Caribbean, but under the condition of Castro's cooperation. We could in some form elaborate mutual guarantees, acceptable to Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is afraid of them, they are afraid of him, too. I consider, said Stevenson, that after the Cuban crisis is settled the tension in this region would be lessened.

In this regard we put the question in this way:

"Castro may ask me if the USA [is] going to re-establish diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba? Maybe you intend to do so not immediately, but some time later?"

Stevenson said that he was not able to give an answer to that question insofar as it is part of the competence of the OAS [Organization of American States]. But perhaps we can consider the possibility of organizing corresponding regional arrangements, giving the necessary confidence to the countries of the Caribbean. I hope that steadily we will succeed in eliminating antagonism between Cuba and its neighbors.

At the same time Stevenson made the observation that currently the "antagonism" between Cuba and its neighbors is instigated by "subversive actions in this region, perhaps undertaken mutually." McCloy noted that "Cuba is the breeding ground of infection and Venezuela an example."

It was clear that in the immediate future the USA [is] not going to re-establish diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba.

5. Stevenson and McCloy stated that the USA refuse[s] point-blank to discuss the question of liquidating the American base at Guantanamo.

6. In the course of the conversation McCloy attempted to broach the subject of an eventual evacuation from Cuba of the Soviet "ground-air" anti-aircraft missiles. We have resolutely warded off this probing, declaring that such a question could not be raised and that we had sold these weapons to a number of countries, including the United Arab Republic and Indonesia. McCloy made the observation that "they are good machines against attacks from airspace."

7. McCloy and Stevenson agreed that it would be good for Soviet and American delegations to try to reach preliminary agreements over the issues to be discussed by the Security Council.

8. McCloy and Stevenson expressed satisfaction over the exchange of opinions and Stevenson underlined that the USSR and USA positions "are not so far from each other." Both of them were inquiring whether I would stop on my way back [from Cuba].

I said in response that for the moment I had no plans to do so but if necessary I assumed it would be possible.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVPRF; trans. V. Zaemsky; copy on file at National Security Archive.] Soviet Record of 1 November 1962 Dinner Conversation between CPSU CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and White House envoy John McCloy and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson

Secret. Copy no. 24

RECORD OF CONVERSATION OF com. A.I. MIKOYAN WITH JOHN MCCLOY AND ADLAI STEVENSON AT A DINNER IN THE SOVIET MISSION AT THE U.N. 1 November 1962

At the outset of the conversation <u>A.I.</u> <u>Mikoyan</u> poses a question about the lifting of the American blockade on the surroundings of Cuba for the period of negotiations, as it was proposed by U Thant in his first missive to com. N.S. Khrushchev and to President Kennedy on 24 October this year.

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u> says that the USSR accepted recommendation of the acting General Secretary of the U.N., and the United States did not. On 24 October U Thant proposed that the Soviet Union would stop delivery of weapons to Cuba for the duration of talks (2 to 3 weeks), and the United States during the same period would suspend the blockade. The Soviet Union fulfilled the recommendations of U Thant, but the United States did not.

<u>McCloy</u> remarks that U Thant seeks to start as soon as possible to check up Soviet vessels sailing to Cuba, by the forces of the International Red Cross.

<u>Stevenson</u> says that the United States hoped that by the end of next week observers of the International Red Cross would be able to begin their work in Cuba. Here apparently some sort of misunderstanding emerges. It was understood that the suspension of the "quarantine" would be conditioned on the simultaneous introduction of inspection.

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u> objects that no such understanding took place.

<u>McCloy</u> remarks that perhaps U Thant did introduce the proposal mentioned by A.I. Mikoyan, but the United States accepted not his proposal, but the proposal of Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to President Kennedy. <u>Stevenson</u> says that in fact the issue about immediate suspension of the "quarantine" is purely academic. Soviet ships will probably not reach Cuba until next week, and meanwhile he hopes that the inspection of the Red Cross will be already in force, and then, naturally, there will be no need for the "quarantine."

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u> reiterates that N.S. Khrushchev accepted the proposal of U Thant and the Americans did not accept it.

Stevenson. We believe that a certain understanding was achieved in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy.

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. This is correct. What was envisaged in the letters must be implemented and will be implemented. However, had the United States adopted the same reasonable approach, permeated with good will, as was adopted by the Soviet Union, then they would have accepted the proposal of U Thant and would have lifted the blockade immediately.

<u>McCloy</u>. Would you make a stop on the way back [from Cuba] in New York?

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. I have no definite plans on this score, but I would not exclude such a stop-over.

<u>McCloy</u> (in a jocular tone). But would Castro let you out?

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. He and I are special friends and will work it out somehow

<u>Stevenson</u>. Perhaps you will bring him along over here?

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. You showed such a poor hospitality to him, that he can hardly be convinced to come to New York again. Such a great power as the United States should be ashamed to mistreat such a small country. When Stevenson had not yet been the USA representative [in the United Nations trans.], he had good understanding of everything, but now apparently his official position makes him speak and act in a different way.

Stevenson. We learn in government office, but we forget nothing. We immediately accepted the proposal on inspection by the Red Cross. I do not know how many Soviet ships are approaching Cuba, but I would prefer that there will be more of them, so that they would sooner take away your missiles. I must tell you that we were very favorably impressed by the speed with which Soviet officers dismantle the missiles.

<u>McCloy</u>. I am struck by the speed of assembling as well as disassembling [of the

missiles - trans.].

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. Those who can assemble fast, can also disassemble fast. Our military are men of discipline, they punctually fulfill the order of N.S. Khrushchev. But there are not enough ships around Cuba to carry away the equipment which is the subject of the understanding, so in addition other ships will be necessary. And your blockade stands in their way to Cuba and, consequently, hampers the withdrawal of missiles. In other

<u>McCloy</u>. We would gladly let your ships pass in both directions, if they carry all your missiles away. I would like to be on the ship that would transport the last missiles from Cuba, added McCloy in jest.

A.I. Mikoyan (in a jocular way). So lift the "m1aanstne,3223and then everything wilkssurance that neither the United States, nor be in order. Stevenson will become the one he had used to be before he was nominated [to his position] in the UN. of N.S. Khrushchev J. Kennedy gave the iit Lastn American allies would attack Cuba, we declared our readtness to pull out some types of armaments from Cuba.

<u>Stevenson</u>. When do your ships arrive in Cuba?

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. But you have not yet lifted the blockade. Our ships are now in the open sea, about 4-5 days away from Cuba. They should reach Cuba, disembark their load, then load themtseves and leave. This would, of course, require a certain time, no less than 10-15 days.

Stevenson. We could agree on a schedule. Next week one might agree on an inspection of the Red Cross; then the "m1aanstne,3223might be lifted.

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. I would like to know if [the leadership of] the United States think[s] that we should work out an agreement that would seal what has been said in the exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev? Or you are interested only in the dismantling and withdrawal of missiles? Would you think that we should agree on other issues touched upon in the exchange of missives, and confirm the achieved understanding in a written document?

Stevenson. First of all we want to reach understanding on the withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba and we do not want to tolerate that unstl the establishment of inspection by the Red Cross there would be an uncontrolled flow of armaments into Cuba.

<u>McCloy</u>. There is already too much armament there. We cannot tolerate -it buildup. <u>A.I.Mikoyan</u>. It is correct that there is sufficient amount of armament in Cuba, but we already stopped sending it there.

<u>McCloy</u>. Yes, but we cannot risk, when it may happen that some arms are being withdrawn and other arms are being shipped in. When the missile equipment will be shipped off, the political atmosphere will ameliorate and it will be easier to agree. You preferred U.N. inspections to an inspection of the Red Cross. We agreed to that. We are interested in your ships reaching Cuba soon, and we will not obstruct their way.

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. Arms were not provided to Cuba to attack the United States, but as a means of containment [*sderzhivaiyuchego*], so that there was no aggression against Cuba. But since in his answer to the letter of N.S. Khrushchev J. Kennedy gave the hassurance that neither the United States, nor iit Lastn American allies would attack Cuba, we declared our readtness to pull out some types of armaments from Cuba.

Stevenson. I do not think there is any disagreement on the issue that Soviet ships should enter the ports of Cuba. It is only that the "m1aanstne,3223should be preserved unstl the establishment of the Red Cross inspection. We are interested to see that there will be no new shipments of arms, and we hope you will understand us.

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. We agreed with the proposals of U Thant and declared that we would not bring armaments to Cuba pending the talks. Those ships that are now at sea carrying no weapons at all. I must say that Stevenson is a good diplomat: I am pushing him in one direction of the talk, but he veers off.

Then for some time the conversation was focused on the issues of protocol nature.

In the second half of the conversation the discussion of bustness resumes.

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. Yet I would like to pose the following question. Would the USA government think to come to an agreement where all that was said in the exchange of well-known letters would be fixed? I have in mind the kind of document that would formulate the settlement of the crisis. We think it is preferable to work out such a document.

<u>V.V. Kuznetsov</u>. The need in working out such a document stems from the understanding achieved between the sides about the settlement of the crisis. territory, so that there would be no invasion of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insisting on that, there will be additional complications.

<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u>. U Thant expressed this idea.

We will inform Fidel Castro of the content of the documents [not further identified--ed.]. He has entrusted me to convey a translation of the draft to President Dorticos, and to reach an agreement with him on all points.

Dorticos, having read through the document, said that in principle the document serves the interests of Cuba, and that it would be approved.

Separate remarks will be introduced after the discussion of our proposals with Fidel Castro and the other leaders, and also after their talks with Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, which are slated for today.

2.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in New York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

From the following telegram you will learn the details of the important statement made by McCloy in the talks on monitoring the dismantling of the "offensive weaponry." He declared that in view of Castro's refusal to agree to a ground-based monitoring, the Americans were willing not to insist [on that], knowing the forms and methods of monitoring put forth in Khrushchev's message, [but] that it was necessary to find other methods for convincing the Americans that the dismantling process had been completed and that everything had been removed.

In response to my question about whether there was some concrete proposal as to how this should be done, he said the following: to allow them the possibility of flights over Cuba for inspections from the air, without ground-based monitoring; this was the first point. The second was that the Soviets provide the Americans with information about how much of the weaponry has been dismantled and removed, and when. The important part of this is not to impart secret military information that reveals the nature and capacities of this weaponry.

I rejected here the possibility of flights over Cuba, since that would affect the sovereignty of Cuba itself. The proposal about information from our side, I said, should be discussed with our military specialists, who arrived with me to aid Kuznetsov.

McCloy reported with great satisfaction that on 1 November their plane had flown over Cuba without being fired at, and had made photos. He attributed this to the presence of Soviet specialists at the anti-aircraft missile installations.

I conclude that if our agreement with Castro not to shoot down American planes retains its force, then when they fly one or two more tes9ip40ewillmeand that inspectiond

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Six Soviet vessels now on the open sea beyond the announced limits of the "quarantine" have received orders to proceed into the Cuban ports, and at present they are now on their way toward Cuba.

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[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 3 November 1962

3 November 1962

On 3 November Morozov, Mendelevich, and Timerbaev had a meeting with Narasimhan and Loutfi (replacing U Thant) for the examination of technical issues connected with the sending of observers from the International Red Cross Committee to ascertain that on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba there is no weaponry considered offensive by the USA.

Narasimhan said that the the secretariat of the UN in New York had not yet received the definitive consent of the International Red Cross to its participation in the organization of the monitoring. An answer from the Red Cross could be received today, 3 November.

Narasimhan also laid out the thoughts of the Americans, as he understood them, regarding the Red Cross's monitoring procedure.

The USA considers it expedient to deploy two vessels with observers from the International Red Cross on the open sea near the Cuban coast—one 8 to 10 miles off Ha-

Telegram (No.4448) from the Minister of the USSR Merchant Fleet to Captain of Ship "Amata" via Soviet ambassador in Havana (Alekseev), 5 November 1962

5 November 1962

I ask that you transmit information on the location of the ship "Amata." Your ship has been selected for use by the Organization of the United Nations for the conveyance of a group of representatives from the International Red Cross consisting of 16 people. Your location, after you take this group on board, should be near the port of Havana, but beyond the 12-mile zone of Cuba's territorial waters. The vessel chosen for these operations should arrive in Havana on 6 November. If you have cargo in your holds leave it in the holds, since the deck should be free. Your ship's number has already been communicated to the UN, as well as the fact that you will be operating at a frequency of 500 kilohertz; beginning on 6 November they will be able to contact you from the UN radio station. On your arrival in Havana, immediately contact our envoy. Bring the vessel into complete order, temporarily move your equipment and crew into tighter quarters, and prepare room for the comfortable accommodation of the representatives of the Red Cross. It is assumed that this group will be with you until 12 November of this year. You will have to come to an agreement with the head of this group concerning food-related matters. You should have ready for operation the ship's motor boat, on which the representatives will be able to travel out onto the arriving vessels. You should follow all the instructions of the group. Report on your carrying out of these instructions, and keep us regularly informed, through closed communication, of your operations.

BAKAEV

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,

sary to rigorously proceed from the agreement reached through the exchange of letters, that it is necessary for the Americans to hold to the statement of their own President. He said that he was against offensive weaponry, but in favor of the right of each side to possess defensive weaponry.

Say that in general we are not presently authorized to carry on negotiations on points that directly concern the defense interests of the Republic of Cuba. We have not been authorized by Cuba to carry on such negotiations. For this reason, if the Americans insist on this, it will only complicate the

5 November 1962

Today the "Washington Post" published an article by [columnist Joseph] Alsop under the title "The Soviet Plan for Deception." The article talks about Robert Kennedy's connection with [Georgi] Bolshakov¹⁹ (the latter was not named directly), and also declared in dramatic tones how that connection was used "for the deception" of the President in the issue of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. It mentions in particular Bolshakov's reception by N. S. Khrushchev in the summer of this year, and the oral message for the President conveyed through him.

This and several other details are known in Washington only by Robert Kennedy, whom Bolshakov met with after his return from vacation (the article also mentions this meeting). For this reason it is clearly obvious that the article was prepared with the knowledge of, or even by orders from, Robert Kennedy, who is a close friend, as is the President, of Alsop.

After his first meeting with Robert Kennedy, immediately after his return from vacation, Bolshakov no longer met with him. Robert Kennedy promised him to set up a meeting with the President for passing on to him the oral message, but yet did not organize such a meeting.

5.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHPARAurhivge,2Washingto, D.C.; trans-r

warheads and bombs. At the same time the Americans kept shying away from a discussion of the issues concerning the Americans' fulfillment of their own obligations. The discussion at times became pointed, and this was an effect created largely by Stevenson and McCloy.

1. More than half the discussion was devoted to an exchange of opinions on the issue of the IL-28 planes located in Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy stated that the agreement between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy stipulated the removal of all these planes from Cuba, and their return to the Soviet Union. The essence of Stevenson's and McCloy's argument on this issue can be reduced to the following:

Kennedy's statement of 22 October and his proclamation of 23 October placed jet bombers in the category of the so-called "of fails fly 020 Sonviet weapon thein Cuba. Kennedy's message of 27 October referred to the "offensive missile bases," as well as to "all armament systems that can be used for offensive purposes," apparently including jet bombers in this category. Comrade N.S. Khrushchev indicated in his message of 28 October that the Soviet government had issued instructions to dismantle and return to the Soviet Union the arms that "you call offensive." The Americans call both missiles as well as jet bombers offensive weaponry.

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McCloy and Stevenson came back many times in the course of the talks to these arguments, interpreting them in such a way as to make it seem as though the Soviet Union had committed itself to dismantle and return to the Soviet Union from Cuba not only missiles, but also bombers.

We explained our position in detail to McCloy and Stevenson, in accordance with your instructions. We emphasized in particular that at the present time there is only one basis for an agreement, the one established by the exchange of messages between Comrades N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. As far as Soviet obligations are concerned, that agreement stipulates that the Soviet Union will remove from Cuba the missile weaponry that the President of the USA has called "offensive," and that it will never in the future supply such weaponry to Cuba. The USA in its turn committed itself not to invade Cuba, and not to allow any invasion by the other states of the Western hemisphere. The Soviets are fulfilling to the letter this agreement, which is the result of compromise and mutual concessions. On 28 October the dismantling of the missiles was begun, this dismantling was completed on 2 November, and the dismantled missiles have been broughts to the ports for shipping, and will be removed no later than 10 November.

We directed the attention of the Americans to the fact that, if they want to raise new issues, then we have many issues that we will want to raise too, for example concerning the American military bases on foreign territories, but that we are not doing this because we do not want to complicate the negotiations.

We adduced concrete facts concerning the IL-28 bombers, showing that this bomber is a purely defensive weapon, long ago outmoded, and that it can be used only **fontions**@@Pdefense when**Texcoite**d by antiaircraft units. We said with regard to this that if the USA representatives insist on their own demands concerning the IL-28 planes, then in doing so they will only place the USA in a position in which the whole world will see that the United States are reneging on their promise, and imposing unacceptable conditions that create the possibility of a continuation of the conflict.

We said that Stevenson's assertion in his letter of 3 November, that according to the reports of American intelligence there was evidence that IL-28 bombers are still being assembled in Cuba, is a fabrication by American intelligence that clearly aims to avoid the settlement of the conflict and the normalization of our relations, and that indeed tightens the tensions. If the United States take as their goal a return to the incendiary situation of earlier, then this is scarcely in the interests of the USA or the USSR, or in the interests of peace. We propose to select reasonable positions, and to proceed in our negotiations from the agreement that has already been reached.

The Americans contested our views of the purely defensive character of the IL-28 bombers. McCloy and Stevenson asserted that "in Castro's hands" these bombers could be offensive weapons, and that for the Latin American region they represent a threatening weapon which the other Latin American countries do not possess.

In response to our statement, in accordance with your instructions, that one cannot always rely on the facts produced by intelligence reconnaissance and that, with regard to the IL-28 bombers, the American intelligence information on the continuing assembly in Cuba of these planes is incorrect, McCloy asserted that in the photos taken by an American reconnaissance plane over the area where IL-28 planes were being stored, it was obvious that there were more of them in recent days, and that new containers of parts for these planes were being unpacked. In a half-joking tone McCloy stated that once Soviet representatives had also denied even the American intelligence photos of missile bases in Cuba. McCloy said that he himself had seen the photos of recent days in which IL-28 bombers were visible, and that he believed these photos.

We answered McCloy and Stevenson pro-u8rj T* e whole world by sasmboceed Tw (66 bovern whiloyshese

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negotiations.

2. Then Stevenson and McCloy asked one more question-about the nuclear warheads on the missiles, and about nuclear bombs. They asked how we proposed to give the Americans the possibility of ascertaining that our nuclear warheads and bombs had been removed from Cuba in conditions in which ground-based inspection in Cuba was impossible. We stated that the Americans' formulation of still another issue could only complicate the situation. We emphasized that the Soviets would fulfill to the letter all the obligations, stipulated in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's messages, for returning from Cuba to the Soviet Union the whole complex of weaponry that the Americans have called "offensive." McCloy stated in response to this that the USA did not want to allow "nuclear warheads to be found in Castro's hands," and wanted to be sure that there was no such weaponry in Cuba.

McCloy said moreover that, since ground-based inspection in Cuba was impossible, the Americans would want to be allowed the same possibility for checking on the removal from Cuba of the nuclear warheads that they had been allowed for checking on the removal of the missiles. "Tell us how many nuclear warheads you have in Cuba," McCloy said, "and allow us the possibility to ascertain that they have all been loaded onto your vessels."

We repeated that none of this was being put forth by the Americans in order successfully to complete the negotiations, and that the Soviets would fully and precisely fulfill their obligation to remove from Cuba In order to be convinced that it is precisely missiles that are being shipped out, rather than something else, the Americans are requesting that the covers or casings be removed from certain missiles during the observation. The desire was expressed that the missiles be shipped on the decks of the ships. Gilpatrick emphasized that they did not have in mind the sort of unveiling of the missiles that would allow a disclosure of their technical characteristics.

The Americans emphasized that they considered it important to become convinced that the entire quantity of missiles that they had been informed of was being removed from Cuba.

The question was raised as to how and where a meeting could be arranged between

based on the correspondence between N.S.

now that there were essentially no inspec-

troupe, he delivered a welcome speech in which he said that the President was preparing to attend their premier the following evening. At the end, he kissed Maya Plisetskaya when he found out that he and she had been born in the same year, month, and day, and said they would celebrate their birthdays in a week. None of this needs to be mentioned especially, but all in all the behavior of Robert Kennedy, who is ordinarily quite a reserved and glum man, reflects to some degree the calmer and more normal mood in the White House after the tense days that shook Washington, even though this fact is concealed in various ways by American propaganda.

12.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive; trans. J. Henriksen.]

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 14 November 1962

Having familiarized himself with our response, Robert Kennedy said that he would pass it on to the President today. Then, saying that he would like to express a little of his own views provisionally, Robert Kennedy stated the following.

The President-he, Robert Kennedy, expects-will be disappointed by the answer when he receives it. The President's proposal was very simple: the USA would immediately and officially lift the blockade in exchange for assurances-public or notthat before some definite date the IL-28 planes would be removed. The President believes that this proposal of his serves the interests of both countries, and opens the way towards a resolution of the remaining aspects of the Cuban problem, creating a significantly less tense situation than the one that would arise if his proposal was approved by the Soviets. The President intends to fulfill his obligations, which were stipulated by the correspondence between the heads of the two governments. But for this there must be a certain time in which all the details of the future agreement can be worked out. The President's proposal referred to above could be carried out immediately, without any delay. The insistence of the USA government in this matter of the IL-28 planes has been provoked by the growing pressure that has been brought to bear on the President by representatives of Congress, the press, and so on. It is important that this aspect be properly understood in Moscow, since the President himself has great difficulties in dealing with this issue (Robert Kennedy twice emphasized the "difficulties for the President").

I carried on the discussion with Robert Kennedy of these difficulties using the arguments advanced by N.S. Khrushchev's response. It was especially emphasized that we have removed from Cuba the missiles and warheads, in other words that we have fulfilled the obligations we assumed, while the USA is not fulfilling its own obligations; for this reason, in order to conduct assurance inspections after the missiles and warheads have been removed, the quarantine should have already been lifted by now, the flights by American planes over the territory of Cuba should have already ceased, and the mutual obligations assumed by the parties should have been formalized in appropriate documents under the auspices of the UN.

Robert Kennedy stated that the USA government would not cease its flights over Cuba in circumstances in which he had no other guarantees that the government of Cuba would carry out its end of the agreement. Mr. Mikoyan's long stay in Cuba shows-or at least this conviction has been created in us-that Premier Castro does not want to approve the agreement reached between the President and the head of the Soviet government on such guarantees. We understand the circumstances that have been created, but this does not relieve the difficulties of our position, said Robert Kennedy. The issue of UN guarantees, in the form of UN posts or something like them, would require a significant amount of time before concrete approval of the agreement could be reached. Let us take for example the issue of UN posts in the area of the Caribbean basin. Here Robert Kennedy asked, would the Soviet Union itself really agree to some foreign posts on its own territory? As far as we know, in every such case it has categorically rejected, and still rejects, the idea of observational posts within its borders.

Robert Kennedy was immediately told that evidently he had not been sufficiently familiarized with N.S. Khrushchev's response, which spoke, as did his preceding message to the President, of how it seems that our countries must in the first place come back in their disarmament negotiations to the Soviet proposals that stipulated posts in airports, in the major ports, at railroad hubs, and on motorways in order to guarantee for all countries of the world that no country can assemble troops and prepare for attack on or invasion of another country.

Robert Kennedy corrected himself, confirming that such a proposal was indeed to be found in N.S. Khrushchev's responses. By the way, the remark I made has no direct connection to the subject presently under discussion, the subject from which I digressed, he continued. As far as I am aware, there are no unsurmountable obstacles on this point, although for us it seems a highly complicated issue to organize UN posts in the parts of the USA bordering the Caribbean Sea, if that agreement with Cuba is indeed reached. However, just yesterday at a White House meeting I heard that far from all the countries of this area would agree to participate in such an agreement. Thus if you insist on all the countries of the Caribbean area, the whole affair might be delayed even longer. I am saying all this, Robert Kennedy concluded, not in order to discuss the details of this issues-I do not know them myself, since they are the responsibility of Stevenson and Kuznetsov-but rather to show that time is needed for all this, and that it would scarcely be expedient or reasonable to wait for it before lifting the quarantine and removing the IL-28 planes. The President has put forth a proposal that he believes serves the interests of both parties, but that proposal is being rejected now by the Soviets, which can lead only to an extension, or perhaps even a complication, of the present situation which clearly does not satisfy us or, we believe, you. Both parties are equally uninterested in that. We hope nonetheless that Chairman N.S. Khrushchev will be able to approve the proposal put forth by the President, who himself had great confidence in it when he sent it to Khrushchev.

I told Robert Kennedy that the position of the Soviet government has been clearly laid out in today's response by N.S. Khrushchev. The Soviet Union has fulfilled its obligations. Now it is simply the USA government's turn to do the same, so that the situation of tension that has been created in the Caribbean Sea can be eased. For this it is necessary: to lift the quarantine without delay, to cease all flights by USA planes over Cuba, and to fix the mutual obligations deriving from the correspondence between the heads of both governments on 27 and 28 October. If corresponding instructions were given by the President to McCloy and Stevenson on the issue of UN posts in not to open fire on American planes.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Memorandum from the Head of the USSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU, 20 November 1962

I am reporting on the situation on the USSR-Cuban sea lanes.

At the present time, there are 20 drycargo ships and 4 oil-carriers on their way to Cuba from Soviet ports on the Baltic, the Black Sea, and in the Far East, carrying industrial and agricultural equipment, automobiles, metal, grain, flour, conserves, sulfates, oil, gas, ammonia, and other loads. Besides this, the tanker the "Tukmus" is nearing Cuba, sailing out of the Canadian port of Montreal with a cargo of animal fat. Four of the vessels mentioned are passing through the zone of the blockade imposed by the USA. The others will reach this zone between 20 and 30 November.

There are 13 dry-cargo vessels and 7 tankers en route from Cuba to Soviet ports. They have all successfully passed through the blockade zone.

The Soviet vessels bound for Cuba are being subjected to overhead flights by USA Navy airplanes during their whole passage across the Atlantic Ocean. Within the blockade zone these flights occur more frequently, aerial photos are taken, American ships come up close to them, inquiring what cargo is being carried and where, and then they follow close behind the Soviet ships until they reach the territorial waters of Cuba. Demands concerning the stopping of the ships or the carrying out of inspections by American naval ships are not forthcoming.

The Minister of the Merchant Fleet (V. BAKAEV)

[Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; copy provided to CWIHP by R. Pikhoia and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Cable from Mikoyan to CC CPSU, 23 November 1962

CC CPSU

During yesterday's conversation with Fidel Castro and others, when I spoke of the significance of the new success in liquidating the crisis and of the cancellation of both our and the American measures of extraordinary preparedness, Fidel Castro said, that they are, moreover, also preparing to carry out demobilization.

23.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National

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<u>A.I. Mikoyan</u> invited Heller to visit the Soviet Union.

Those present asked Mikoyan if, in his opinion, Castro is interested in normalizing relations and about Castro himself as the ruler of Cuba.

A.I. Mikoyan in his statements about his trip to Cuba underlined Cuba's intrest in having the chance to build a [word illegible] life in a peaceful setting, and the lack of any serious signs of readiness on the part of the USA to normalize [relations] with Cuba.

Dobrynin and Bubnov transcribed the conversation.

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive; translated by David Wolff, CWIHP.]

Memorandum from the Head of the USSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU, 7 December 1962

I am reporting on the removal of 42 IL-28 planes from Cuba.

1. The ship "Okhotsk," carrying 12 IL-28 airplanes, left the port at Nuevita on 4 December at 23:00 Moscow time.

After the departure of the "Okhotsk" from the port, American planes began flying back and forth over the ship, taking photos. We recorded the identification numbers of the planes.

On 6 December at 9:00, the USA warship number 943 appeared near the stern of the "Okhotsk," and informed the captain of our vessel that it would be following the "Okhotsk" all night, and asked that the boxes containing the IL-28 planes be opened for photographing. The captain gave his consent, and towards dawn on 7 December the USA destroyer carried out an inspection of the Soviet ship.

2. The "Kasimov" left the port of Mariel at 14:45 on 5 December, carrying on board 15 IL-28 planes.

The "Kasimov" was also subjected to constant overhead flights by USA war planes whose identification numbers we recorded.

A bomber of the "Neptune" class, with the number 6-145922, asked us to open the packing of our deck cargo for photographing. This request was fulfilled by the captain of the "Kasimov." After this, the plane circled over the vessel six times and then flew away.

3. The ship "Krasnograd" left from the port of Mariel on 6 December at 7:30, carrying on board 15 IL-28 planes.

This vessels was also constantly subjected to overhead flights by American planes whose numbers were recorded by us. One plane of the "Orion" class, number 5605-BF-505, and two planes of the "Neptune" class, numbers LK-131499 and JP-22, asked the captain how many IL-28 planes he was carrying. The captain answered that there were 15 "IL-28" planes on board.

The flights over vessels carrying IL-28's continue. The vessels are proceeding normally.

All the planes, 42 units, have been removed. According to the Ministry of Defense, a forty-third plane (an instructional model) was wrongly registered, and had never been received by Cuba.

> The Minister of the Merchant Fleet V. BAKAEV

[Source: Russian State Economic Archives, Moscow; copy provided to CWIHP by R. Pikhoia and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Official note from the US embassy in Moscow to USSR Foreign Ministry, 10 December 1962

Received by mail 10 December 1962

Translated from the English No. 478

The Embassy of the United States of America is expressing its respect to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and has the honor of quoting from the Embassy's note No. 348 of 24 October 1962. The Embassy has been entrusted by its government hereby to bring to the attention of the Ministry the operational portion of the Proclamation, issued by the President of the United States of America on 21 November 1962, on the lifting of the quarantine announced on 23 October 1962.

"I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, acting with the authority given to me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, hereby declare that at 23 hours 00 minutes Greenwich time on 20 November 1962, I rescinded the powers given to the Defense Department by Proclamation No. 3504 of 23 October 1962, and cancelled the orders it contained to the armed forces under my command."

The Embassy of the United States of America

Moscow, 10 December 1962 Translated by Ju. Sokolikov

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

EDITOR'S NOTES

¹ Gromyko here evidently refers to Dorticos' speech to the U.N. General Assembly of 8 October 1962. Dorticos stated: "Were the Untied States able to give us proof, by word and deed, that it would not carry out aggression against our country, then, we declare solemnly before you here and now, our weapons would be unnecessary and our army redundant." *New York Times*, 9 October 1962.

² Kennedy had asked Congress to approve the call-up of 150,000 reservists on 7 September 1962.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ An obvious allusion to the failed attack on Cuba in April 1961 at the Bay of Pigs by CIA-supported anti-Castro Cuban exiles.

⁵ The date of this conversation is not specified in the text, but Kennedy appears to be referring to the meeting between Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin on the same day as the 4 September 1962 statement to underline the President's concerns about Soviet military aid to Cuba.

⁶ The Russian text is unclear as to whether it refers to a "bar-man" (barkeeper) or a last name such as "Berman," "Barman," or "Burman."

⁷ Possibly a reference to journalist Robert J. Donovan.

⁸ It is noteworthy that the Soviet message strongly implies that a U.S. invasion of Cuba would not trigger a military response from the USSR, but only political condemnation. This hinted at a brewing disagreement between Moscow and Ha338 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY

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the documents. We have had discussions about your question whether the dismantling of the base at Guantanamo is better. That would be better for Cuba, but from a military point of view of the interest of Cuba, it is not possible. If we decided to withdraw all the weapons from Cuba, then we could demand the withdrawal from Guantanamo, Guantanamo has no importance in military terms. That would be more dangerous, and that is important from a political perspective. Concerning the inspection: if we said we reject any inspection, the enemy could interpret that as an attempt to trick them. All it is about is seeing the sites, where the weapons were and their shipping for a few days. Cuba is in the hands of the Cubans. But because we were the owners of those weapons... (paragraph missing). [notation in original-ed.] We thought that you, after the consultations, you would accept the inspection. But we never thought of deciding anything for you. Why did we think that we could accept a verification of the dismantling by neutrals, without infringement of the Cuban sovereignty? It was understood that no State would accept an infringement of your sovereignty. In very particular cases, a State can ... [ellipsis in document-ed.] its acts, by agreement and not due to pressures from abroad - the territory of the Embassy within a sovereign State for example. When discussing the problem of Indochina and Vietnam in Geneva [in 1954], an agreement was reached to create an International Control Commission.

I talked to them about the aerial photographic inspection, but I responded that Cuba has the right to its air space. I told them that their planes have flown over Cuba and they were convinced that the dismantling is been carried out. They admitted that, but pointed that not everything is finished. We told them that this is nearly completed and he did not talk further about it. [McCloy said:] We have to be sure that they are not going to hide them in the forest. We do not want data pertaining to your military secrets; but we need assurances that the missiles will go.

We can provide the pictures of the dismantled weapons and how they are loaded. Nor we will oppose that you observe the ships on the high seas, at a particular distance. They (or you) will see something on the decks. I did not tell them that, but that is our opinion and we will provide them with the materials to convince them that we have withdrawn the missiles. So we will not contradict your [Cuban] declaration, against the inspection or the aerial verification. They feared that the Cubans would not allow us to withdraw the missiles, given that they have 140,000 and you only have 10,000 men. I did not talk about these numbers. He said that the U-2 that was shot down here, was shot at with Russian missiles and probably operated by Russians. Although they think there may be Cubans who are able to operate those weapons. We kept on insisting that they lift the quarantine immediately. I told them that if they wanted the missiles withdrawn faster, they should lift the blockade. Because the ships that are now in Cuba are not able to take those missiles out. [underlined in original]. I told them they should issue instructions so that the inspection of the ships be carried out without anybody boarding the ships. It would rather be carried out in a symbolic manner, asking by radio, as it was done with the tanker Bucharest.

Stevenson said they will accept the proposals of U Thant. We reproached him that he proposed not to bring weapons to Cuba and to lift the blockade. We have complied with this and they continue.

We have loses because the ships wait on the high seas. The losses are considerable, that is why we have allowed the control of the Red Cross. The Red Cross is better because it is not a political institution, nor a governmental institution. U Thant proposed two inspections, one at the shipping harbors and another on the high seas. Not wanting to hurt his feelings, we responded that we accept the inspection on the high seas and not at the shipping harbors.

U Thant, when returning from Cuba, told me that you did not agree, although this verification is easier at the harbors. U Thant is ready, he is choosing the personnel and has already two ships. I do not know more about it, for it is [Soviet Deputy Foreign

We spoke about the problem of dismantling with [U.S. negotiator John J.] McCloy in New York. He said that "given that Cuba is opposed to the North American inspection, he did not insist on this formula - for them to verify that the weapons will not be kept hidden in the forest. [no close quotation marks in original—ed.]

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then request the inspection of other sites in Cuba - the forests for instance. They can claim that the missiles could have been diverted from their route between the base and the ships.

FIDEL: How would the inspection they pro-

BOBBY AND THE CRISIS

continued from page 274

shine through clearly, obviously also representing that of his brother. "The President felt himself deceived, and deceived intentionally," Dobrynin quoted Robert Kennedy as saying, noting that he had arrived at the Russian Embassy in "in an obviously excited condition" (although he later "cooled down a bit and spoke in calmer tones"). In general, while Dobrynin resolutely defended Moscow against Robert Kennedy's accusations, the lengthy account of the meeting that he transmitted to the Foreign Ministry must certainly have alerted the Kremlin leadership to just how personally affronted the Kennedy brothers were, and to their apparent determination to confront Soviet ships heading for the blockade line around Cuba.4

Quite aside from the substance of the meeting, in terms of subsequent developments it is worth noting Dobrynin's own astute bureaucratic reflex in promoting his own stature in the negotiations—forging this new direct path to the president via his brother (side-stepping normal State Department channels), the Soviet envoy concluded by recommending that he could meet again with Robert Kennedy to pass "in confidential form N.S. Khrushchev's thoughts on this matter, concerning not only the issues which R. Kennedy had touched on, but a wider circle of issues in light of the events which are going on now." Dobrynin may have sensed an opening in the fact that the previous Soviet Embassy official who had served as Khrushchev's back-channel to Robert Kennedy and thence his brother, Georgi Bolshakov (ostensibly a press attache, presumably an intelligence officer), was evidently in acute disfavor in the White House for having been used to deliver a personal assurance from the Soviet leader that only defensive weapons were being shipped to Cuba. (And, in fact, Dobrynin would report shortly after the crisis that a Joseph Alsop column in the

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

RFK: amn

[Source: John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; provided to CWIHP by Prof. Peter Roman, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA.]

¹ Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1969; citations from Mentor/New American Library paperback edition, 1969). Questions about the book's reliability deepened after another former Kennedy aide, speechwriter Theodore Sorensen, acknowledged that, as an uncredited editor of the manuscript, he taken it upon himself to delete "explicit" references to the arrangement he and Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin reached on the evening of 27 October 1962 regarding the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the settlement of the crisis. Also problematic is the fact that Robert Kennedy's original diary, on which the book is based, has not been opened to researchers. Sorensen made

by Mark Kramer

The role of the Warsaw Pact in the Cuban missile crisis was negligible. All evidence suggests that the Soviet Union neither consulted nor even informed its East European allies about the installation of medium-range and tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba before the deployment of the former was revealed by the U.S. government.¹ Nor did the Soviet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact allies about the removal of the missiles. Although the Pact declared a joint military alert on 23 October 1962 (the day vana later that fall, would have left the "military units of the two states under the command of their respective governments."¹² Even so, the Cuban leader's message on 26 October still struck a raw nerve in Moscow.¹³ It was a vivid reminder of the dangers that might have resulted if the Soviet Union had delegated any responsibility for nuclear operations.

A related lesson about the dangers posed by local actors pertained to the role of the commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, Army-General Issa Pliev, who was chosen for the post because of his long-standing and very close friendship with both Khrushchev and the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii.¹⁴ At no time during the crisis did Pliev have authority to order the use of either medium-range or tactical nuclear missiles, but it is now known that several weeks before the crisis-in the late summer of 1962-Malinovskii had considered the possibility of giving Pliev pre-delegated authority to order the use of tactical missiles against invading U.S. troops if Pliev's lines of communication with Moscow were severed and all other means of defense against an invasion had proven insufficient. A written order to this effect was prepared on 8 September 1962, but in the end Malinovskii declined to sign it.¹⁵ Thus, at the time of the crisis Pliev had no independent authority to order the use of nuclear weapons or even to order that nuclear warheads, which were stored separately from the missiles, be released for possible employment. The limitations on Pliev's scope of action during the crisis were reinforced by two cables transmitted by Malinovskii on 22 and 25 October, which "categorically" prohibited any use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances without explicit authorization from Moscow.16

The strictures imposed by the Soviet leadership held up well during the crisis, as the procedural safeguards for nuclear operations proved sufficient to forestall any untoward incidents.¹⁷ For when, allegedly in response to deployments by NATO, Khrushchev warned that the Pact would be "compelled by force of circumstance to consider stationing [tactical nuclear] missiles in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia."25 Shortly thereafter, the Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces began receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and surfaceto-surface missiles from the Soviet Union.²⁶ The Bulgarian and Hungarian armies also soon obtained nuclearcapable aircraft and missiles from Moscow; and even the Romanian military was eventually supplied with nuclearcapable Frog-7 and Scud-B missiles. In all cases, the deployment of these delivery vehicles was well under way by the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

The wartime command-and-control arrangements for the new East European weapons were still in flux in 1962, and a variety of options were under consideration. One such option had been alluded to in 1959 by the East German government, which announced that it would "request its allies to place [nuclear] missile weapons at its disposal" if the West German government gained a role in NATO's nuclear operations.²⁷ At the time, Soviet officials had reacted warily to this proposal, but had not dismissed it out of hand. Moscow's stance changed, however, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. From then on, all wartime command-and-control arrangements for allied nuclear operations were made to fit a single pattern. The East European countries' weapons were still officially described as components of the "Warsaw Pact's joint nuclear forces" and were used for simulated nuclear strikes during Pact exercises, but all nuclear warheads for the delivery systems remained under exclusive Soviet control, and the delivery vehicles themselves would have come under direct Soviet command if they had ever been equipped with nuclear warheads during a crisis. Moreover, the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons deployed by Soviet forces on East European territory were not subject to any sort of "dual-key" arrangement along the lines that NATO established in the mid1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exercises included combat techniques for nuclear warfare (as they routinely did from early 1962 on), the decision on when to "go nuclear" was left entirely to the Soviet High Command and political leadership.²⁸ In every respect, then, the East European governments were denied any say in the use of the Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal.

The exclusivity of Soviet command was reinforced by secret agreements that the Soviet Union concluded in the early to mid-1960s with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland regarding the storage of nuclear warheads in those countries. Although all the agreements were bilateral, they were described as coming "within the framework of the Warsaw Pact." The first such agreements were signed with East Germany and Czechoslovakia before the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviet-East German agreements, signed at various intervals in the early 1960s, covered some 16 storage sites, all of which were controlled exclusively by special troops assigned to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.²⁹ The East German authorities had no say at all in the location or maintenance of these facilities, not to mention the use of the munitions stored there.

Soviet agreements with Czechoslovakia were somewhat more complicated because no Soviet troops had been present on Czechoslovak territory since the end of 1945. Two preliminary agreements were signed in August 1961 and February 1962 entitling the Soviet Union to dispatch nuclear warheads immediately to Czechoslovakia in the event of an emergency.³⁰ After the Cuban missile crisis, those two agreements were supplanted by a much more far-reaching "Treaty Between the Governments of the USSR and CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat Readiness of Missile Forces," which was signed by Malinovskii and his Czechoslovak counterpart, Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, in December 1965.³¹ The treaty provided for the permanent stationing of Soviet nuclear warheads at three sites in western Czechoslovakia.

This third agreement with Czecho-

slovakia was concluded just after the Soviet Union had worked out a similar arrangement with Hungary.³² The Soviet-Hungarian agreement was signed by Brezhnev and the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, and was kept secret from almost all other Hungarian officials. Much the same was true of an agreement that the Soviet Union concluded with Poland in early 1967.³³ Only a few top Polish officials were permitted to find out about the document.

The Soviet agreements with all four countries covered nuclear warheads slated for use on delivery vehicles belonging to Soviet troops stationed in those countries. Some of the warheads were also intended for weapons deployed by the local armies, but in that case the delivery vehicles would have been transferred to direct Soviet command. Under the new agreements East European officials had no role in the use of the Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal, nor any control over the reinforced storage bunkers for nuclear warheads (or even the housing for elite units assigned to guard the bunkers). A senior East European military official later confirmed that "the procedures for the defense and protection of these special-purpose storage centers for nuclear warheads were such that no one from our side had permission to enter, and even Soviet officials who were not directly responsible for guarding and operating the buildings were not allowed in."34

Thus, by the late 1960s the Soviet and East European governments had forged a nuclear command-and-control structure for the Warsaw Pact that gave exclusive say to the Soviet Union. Even before the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet leaders had been inclined to move in this direction, but the crisis greatly accelerated the trend and effectively ruled out anything less than complete control in Moscow.

Intra-Pact Debate on Nuclear "Sharing"

The effects of the Cuban missile crisis could also be felt, if only implicitly, when the Soviet Union had to deal with complaints from its allies about the Warsaw Pact's nuclear arrangements. The lack of East European input proved unsatisfactory to several of the allied governments, who urged that they be given some kind of role in nuclear-release authorization. Their concerns were prompted in part by changes in Soviet military doctrine in the mid-1960s, which seemed to open the way for a nuclear or conventional war confined to Europe. Under Khrushchev, Soviet military doctrine had long been predicated on the assumption that any war in Europe would rapidly escalate to an all-out nuclear exchange between the superpowers; but by the time Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, Soviet military theorists had already begun to imply that a European conflict need not escalate to the level of strategic nuclear war.³⁵ Under Brezhnev, Soviet military analyses of limited warfare in Europe, including the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons, grew far more explicit and elaborate.³⁶ Although this doctrinal shift made sense from the Soviet perspective, it stirred unease among East European leaders, who feared that their countries might be used as tactical nuclear battlegrounds without their having the slightest say in it.

The issue became a source of contention at the January 1965 meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee (PCC), where the assembled leaders discussed NATO's plans to create a Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) that would supposedly give West Germany access to nuclear-armed missiles. The PCC warned that if an MLF were formed and the West Germans were included, the Warsaw Pact would have to resort to "defensive measures and corresponding steps."37 The nature of these "corresponding steps" was never specified, but Romanian and Czechoslovak officials at the meeting maintained that the obvious solution was for the Soviet Union to grant its Warsaw Pact allies a direct say in the use of nuclear weapons stationed on East European soil. 38 The Romanians were especially insistent on having responsibility shared for all Warsaw Pact nuclear systems, including those deployed with the various Groups of Soviet Forces. Brezhnev and his colleagues, however, were averse to any steps that would even marginally erode the Soviet Union's exclusive authority to order nuclear strikes, and it soon became clear during the meeting that Soviet views on such matters would prevail. As a result, the PCC communique simply called for both German states to forswear nuclear weapons, proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, and advocated a freeze on all nuclear stockpiles.³⁹ The implication was that arrangements within the Warsaw Pact were best left unchanged.

That stance was reaffirmed over the next few months in a series of conspicuous Soviet declarations that "the Warsaw Pact is dependent on the Soviet strategic missile forces" and that "the security of all socialist countries is reliably guaranteed by the nuclear missile strength of the Soviet Union."40 (Italics added by the author.) The same message was conveyed later in the year by the joint "October Storm" military exercises in East Germany, which featured simulated nuclear strikes authorized solely by the USSR.⁴¹ In the meantime, the Soviet monopoly over allied nuclear weapons procedures was being reinforced by the series of agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, as discussed above. The codification of exclusive Soviet control over nuclear

not to share or delegate any responsibility for the nuclear-capable weapons based in Cuba, but the very fact that the issue was considered at all suggests that if the Cuban missile crisis had not in-

not yet authority for actual use). For greater detail about this issue, see Mark Kramer, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and Nuclear Proliferation," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn 1995), pp. 171-9. ¹⁹ "Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 76639

¹⁹ "Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 76639
(Top Secret), 27 October 1962, reproduced in *Operation ANADYR*, p. 182. See also Kramer,
"Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 46; and Pavlenko, "Bezymyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu," p. 4.
²⁰ Marshal V. F. Tolubko, "Glavnaya raketnaya

²⁰ Marshal V. F. Tolubko, "Glavnaya raketnaya sila strany," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 19 November 1963, p. 1.
²¹ See Khrushchev's comments on this point in

 ²¹ See Khrushchev's comments on this point in Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," p. 18.
 ²² rep.06, ywetom23 "Tam23

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both crises; the impact of the invasion on Eastern Europe; the Western response; China's shifting position on the crises; and Radio Free Europe's controversial role. A number of participants in the uprising itself spoke either as panelists or as members of the audience, and several witnesses to the revolution led a "walking tour of revolutionary Budapest" to scenes of the street battles 40 years earlier.

Among the most noteworthy findings of the Hungary Conference were presentations and analyses of notes from Soviet Presidium meetings in fall 1956 taken by V.N. Malin, head of the CPSU General Department. These notes constitute the only known contemporaneous record of the key sessions of late October and early November at which Kremlin leaders went back and forth over whether to pull out from Hungary or reintroduce new troops. A comprehensive analysis of the significance of the Malin Notes and other recent evidence on Soviet policy toward the 1956 Poland and Hungary crises, along with a translation and annotation of the Malin Notes themselves, has been prepared for the Bulletin by Mark Kramer of Harvard University; it appears immediately following this article.

In Potsdam, sessions examined the origins and consequences of the June 1953 East German uprising; the "Beria Affair" and post-Stalin succession struggle in Moscow; Soviet policy toward Germany before and after June 17; Stalin's death and East Central Europe; and the West's position and actions in 1953. Both conferences ended with roundtables on the long-term significance of the abortive revolts of 1953 and 1956, particularly for the 1989 collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and for contemporary Germany and Hungary.

Both conferences generated considerable public as well as scholarly attention. As might be expected, local interest in the Budapest gathering, coming on the eve of the revolution's 40th anniversary, was intense. The main hall of the elegant Academy of Sciences building on the banks of the Danube was filled on the conference's opening day, and Hungarian media coverage throughout was extensive. Overseas interest was evidenced by three articles and an editorial in *The New York Times*, as well as pieces in *The Washington Post* and numerous European publications. Timothy Garton Ash, who delivered the concluding remarks for the conference, wrote up his reflections in the 14 November 1996 edition of *The New York Review of Books*.

The Potsdam Conference, for its part, resulted in an Associated Press report, carried in many major newspapers, on newly declassified U.S. documents obtained by the National Security Archive on the Eisenhower Administration's reactions to the events, including a 29 June 1953 report approved by the National Security Council (NSC 158) which, among other actions, declared that one official policy objective was to "Encourage elimination of key puppet officials."

CWIHP is pleased to note the efforts of major contributors to the success of both conferences: Christian F. Ostermann, a scholar based at the National Security Archive and the new Associate Director of CWIHP; the Director of the 1956 Institute, Dr. Gyorgy Litvan, and its Research Director, Csaba Bekes; at the ZZF in Potsdam, Director Prof. Dr. Christoph Klessman, and Anke Wappler; at the National Security Archive, Malcolm Byrne, Pete Voth, and Vlad Zubok; and at the Wilson Center, Jim Hershberg and Michele Carus-Christian. Many scholars assisted in obtaining key documents and in other ways for the conferences. Principal financial supporters for both meetings included the Open Society Institute; the

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War Flashpoints" Project is to gather new archival materials from all sides of the events, the conference organizers prepared "briefing books" of recently declassified U.S., Russian, and European documents for both conferences: Christian F. Ostermann, ed., The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17 June 1953 Uprising in East Germany: The Hidden History—Declassified Documents from U.S., Russian, and Other European Archives (Washington, D.C.: CWIHP/National Security Archive); and Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Christian F. Ostermann, ed. and comp., The Hidden History of Hungary 1956: A Compendium of Declassified Documents (Washington, D.C.:

TOGLIATTI ON NAGY, 30 OCTOBER 1956: MISSING CABLE FOUND

In the midst of the deliberations on 31 October 1956 leading to a decision to invade Hungary to crush the revolution and the government led by Imre Nagy, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU CC) Presidium approved a secret message to Italian Communist Party Secretary Palmiro Togliatti. Clearly responding to an earlier communication, the Soviet leadership expressed agreement with Togliatti that events in Hungary was heading in a "reactionary" direction and that Imre Nagy was "occupying a two-faced position" and "falling more and more under the influence of the reactionary forces. This cable, a revealing indication of the hardening

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National Security Archive, 1996).

These briefing books, in turn, accelerated the process toward the ultimate preparation and publication by the conference organizers of edited volumes of papers and documents emerging from both the Potsdam and Budapest meetings. In addition, the Cold War International History Project, which has previously published East-bloc documents on all of the major "Flashpoint" crises, plans to publish selected materials from both the Potsdam and Budapest gatherings in forthcoming *Bulletins*, Working Papers, and in electronic form.

For more information on the Budapest or Potsdam meetings, contact Malcolm Byrne or Christian F. 358 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

ment condemning the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, no such statement was issued about the intervention in Hungary. Although numerous Soviet officials, such as deputy foreign minister Anatolii Kovalev, later denounced the invasion of Hungary, the Soviet High Command apparently blocked efforts to release a statement about 1956 comparable to the one about 1968. Moreover, in August 1990, the same journal that had published Lashchenko's 1989 article featured another essay, by a Hungarian lieutenant-colonel, that was even more scathing in its assessment of the "counterrevolution" of 1956; the journal's editors highly recommended the article to their readers. Although senior officials on the CPSU Central Committee staff were secretly ordered in November 1990 to begin studying archival materials from 1956 and preparing an assessment for the CPSU leadership, this effort was intended mainly to find ways of deflecting pressure from the Hungarian government, and no public Soviet statements resulted.⁸ Even when the last Soviet troops were pulled out of Hungary in June 1991, Gorbachev still declined to condemn the 1956 intervention.

The Soviet leader's belated apology in October 1991 was soon overtaken by the collapse of the Soviet regime. The new government in Russia under President Boris Yeltsin proved far more willing to reevaluate and condemn controversial episodes in Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. As a result, a large quantity of Soviet documentation about the 1956 Hungarian crisis and Moscow's response has recently become available. Yeltsin turned over a preliminary collection of declassified materials to the Hungarian government in November 1992, which are now stored at the Institute for the Study of 360 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY P

up strategic positions all around Warsaw and called in reinforcements as Soviet columns were reported to be moving in.²⁶ In this game of politicalmilitary brinkmanship, a clash seemed to be looming between the KBW troops and Soviet forces, and an even more explosive situation emerged *within* the Polish military establishment, pitting KBW units against troops from the National Defense Ministry under Rokossowski's command. Thus, for a brief while, Poland appeared to be on the verge of civil war as well as a conflict with the Soviet Union.

The latent danger of a clash between Soviet forces and the KBW-a danger that loomed large even though neither side wanted a direct confrontation—spurred Khrushchev and Gomulka to make a renewed effort to find a peaceful solution. After being informed about the troop movements, the Polish leader requested that the Soviet units be pulled back; and Khrushchev, after some hesitation, complied with the request, ordering Konev to halt all troop movements.²⁷ Although Khrushchev assured Gomulka that the deployments had simply been in preparation for upcoming military exercises, the intended message was plain enough, especially in light of other recent developments. The existence of Soviet "plans to protect the most important state facilities" in Poland, including military garrisons and lines of communication, had been deliberately leaked to Polish officials earlier in the day; and Soviet naval vessels had begun holding conspicuous maneuvers in waters near Gdansk, keeping the Polish Navy at bay.²⁸ Despite these various forms of pressure, the Polish authorities stood their ground, and the meeting ended without any firm agreement. The official communique merely indicated that talks had taken place and that Polish leaders would be visiting Moscow sometime "in the near future."²⁹ In most respects, then, the negotiations proved less than satisfactory from the Soviet standpoint.

Shortly after the Soviet delegates returned to Moscow on 20 October, they briefed the other members of the CPSU Presidium on the results of the trip.³⁰

By this point they knew that the PZPR Central Committee had reconvened early on the 20th and had elected Gomulka first secretary and dropped Rokossowski and several neo-Stalinist officials from the PZPR Politburo. Khrushchev made no attempt to conceal his disappointment, arguing that "there's only one way out-by putting an end to what is in Poland." He indicated that the situation would get much worse if Rokossowski were not permitted to stay as Poland's defense minister. Khrushchev lay a good deal of the blame for the crisis on the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Panteleimon Ponomarenko, who, according to Khrushchev, had been "grossly mistaken in his assessment of [Edward] Ochab and Gomulka." (Khrushchev declined to mention that he himselfand the rest of the Soviet leadershiphad "grossly" misjudged the situation in Poland over the previous few months. 31)

The Presidium adopted Khrushchev's suggestion that a meeting be held soon in Moscow with leading representatives from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Khrushchev also proposed that they consider sending a few senior officials to China "for informational purposes." In the meantime, the Presidium resolved to "think carefully" about additional measures, including new military exercises and the formation of a "provisional revolutionary committee" that would displace Gomulka. In addition, Khrushchev authorized a new campaign in the press, building on an editorial in the 20 October issue of Pravda, which had accused the Polish media of waging a "filthy anti-Soviet campaign" and of trying to "undermine socialism in Poland."32 These charges, and subsequent accusations, prompted vigorous rebuttals from Polish commentators.

Strains between Poland and the Soviet Union remained high over the next few days as tens of thousands of Poles took part in pro-Gomulka rallies in Gdansk, Szczecin, and other cities on 22 October. Even larger demonstrations, each involving up to 100,000 people, were organized the following day in Poznan, Lublin, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and elsewhere. In the meantime, joint meetings of workers and students were being held all around Poland, culminating in a vast rally in Warsaw on 24 October attended by some 500,000 people. Although these events were intended mainly as a display of unified national support for the new Polish leadership in the face of external pressure, some of the speakers, particularly at a rally in Wroclaw on the 23rd, expressed open hostility toward the Soviet Union.

As tensions mounted on 20 and 21 October, Soviet leaders reexamined a variety of economic sanctions and military options, but again they found that none of these options seemed the least bit attractive. At a meeting on the 21st, the CPSU Presidium unanimously decided to "refrain from military intervention" and to "display patience" for the time being.³³ The rationale for this decision remained just as compelling in subsequent days, as Khrushchev emphasized to his colleagues and to other East European leaders during an expanded Presidium meeting on the evening of 24 October: "Finding a reason for an armed conflict [with Poland] now would be very easy, but finding a way to put an end to such a conflict later on would be very hard."34 The standoff on 19 October had demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that most of the Polish troops who were not under Rokossowski's command, especially in the KBW, were ready to put up stiff resistance against outside intervention. Khrushchev and his colleagues also seem to have feared that Polish leaders would begin distributing firearms to "workers' militia" units who could help defend the capital. (Gomulka later claimed that arms were in fact disseminated, but the evidence generally does not bear out these assertions.³⁵ The important thing, however, is that Soviet officials assumed that Gomulka would proceed with this step.)

Khrushchev's reluctance to pursue a military solution under such unfavorable circumstances induced him to seek a *modus vivendi* with Gomulka whereby Poland would have greater leeway to follow its own "road to socialism." Gomulka reciprocated by again assuring Khrushchev that Poland would remain a loyal ally and member of the Warsaw Pact. The Polish leader demonstrated the credibility of his promises by ordering Polish officers to cease considering the prospect of a complete withdrawal of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces from Poland.³⁶ (On 21 October, as the crisis with Moscow began to abate, a number of Polish commanders, led by General Waclaw Komar of the Internal Army and General Wlodzimierz Mus of the KBW, had thought it was the right moment to press for a total Soviet withdrawal, and they started drafting plans to that effect. Gomulka put an immediate end to their activities.) Gomulka also adopted a far more conciliatory line in public, as reflected in his keynote speech at the rally in Warsaw on 24 October.³⁷ The Polish leader not only called for stronger political and military ties with the Soviet Union and condemned those who were trying to steer Poland away from the Warsaw Pact, but also urged his fellow Poles to return to their daily work and to refrain from holding any additional rallies or demonstrations.

Over the next few days, Soviet leaders became annoved when Gomulka insisted that Rokossowski be removed from the national defense ministry (as well as from the PZPR Politburo), a demand that perplexed even Chinese officials, who overall were staunchly supportive of Gomulka.38 Had the crisis in Hungary not intervened on 23 October, Soviet leaders might well have been inclined to take a firmer stand against Rokossowski's dismissal from the ministry. But by the time Gomulka began pressing this demand on 26 October, the deteriorating situation in Hungary gave Khrushchev a strong incentive to prevent renewed difficulties with Poland. Having been reassured that Gomulka would keep Poland in the Warsaw Pact and retain Soviet troops on Polish soil, Khrushchev reluctantly acquiesced in Rokossowski's ouster. In mid-November, Rokossowski was recalled to Moscow, where he was appointed a deputy defense minister.

Early in the crisis, some members

of the Soviet Presidium, especially Vyacheslav Molotov and Kliment Voroshilov, had strongly opposed the leeway granted to the Poles, but by the time the Presidium met on 21 October, as noted above, all members agreed that it was best to eschew military intervention and to "display patience," at least for a while.³⁹ Nor were any major signs of dissent evident at the Presidium meeting on 23 October.⁴⁰ Participants in the meeting emphasized the "fundamental difference" between the situation in Poland and the emerging crisis in Hungary. Gomulka's speech on 24 October and his follow-up discussions with Khrushchev further convinced the Soviet leader that Poland would remain a loyal member of the "socialist commonwealth" and Warsaw Pact.41

This did not mean that all tensions with Poland were instantly dissipated. In addition to continued bickering over Rokossowski's status, Khrushchev remained concerned about the "unacceptable" views espoused by certain PZPR officials, including some who allegedly wanted to assert territorial claims against the USSR.⁴² Soviet leaders also were disturbed by reports that an influential PZPR Secretary, Wladyslaw Matwin, had given a speech in Poznan on 10 November in which he condemned recent "abnormalities in Polish-Soviet relations" that had "raised doubts about the sovereignty of our country."43 Nevertheless, these frictions did not detract from the basic assurances that Gomulka had provided to Khrushchev. By late October and early November 1956 the two sides had reached a broad accommodation that was able to withstand occasional disruptions.

Gomulka's determination to preserve a Communist system in Poland and to remain within the Warsaw Pact had a strong bearing on Soviet policy during the Hungarian revolution. The outcome of the Polish crisis demonstrated that some Soviet flexibility would continue and that a return to fullfledged Stalinism was not in the offing, but it also set a precedent of what would be tolerated. Had Gomulka not been willing to keep Poland firmly within the Soviet bloc, a military confrontation might well have ensued. The contrast with Hungary was telling. Early on, Soviet leaders may have hoped that they could rely on Imre Nagy to do in Hungary what Gomulka had done in Poland, but the Soviet Presidium soon concluded that there was "no comparison with Poland" and that "Nagy is in fact turning against us."⁴⁴

The Onset of the Hungarian Crisis

Social pressures had been building in Hungary since the spring of 1955, when the reformist prime minister Imre Nagy was dislodged by the old-line Stalinist leader Matyas Rakosi, who had been forced to cede that post to Nagy in mid-1953. The earlier transfer of power from Rakosi to Nagy, and the shift back to Rakosi, were both effected under Moscow's auspices. In June 1953 the Soviet authorities, led by Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria, had summoned Rakosi and other Hungarian officials to Moscow for a secret meeting. During three days of talks, Malenkov and his colleagues stressed that they were "deeply appalled" by Rakosi's "high-handed and domineering style" in office, which had led to countless "mistakes and crimes" and ers were concerned (or claimed to be concerned) that Nagy's policies were giving impetus to "rightist deviationists" and "opportunists" in Hungary who were seeking to realign their country with Yugoslavia or the West. As a result, in March 1955 the CPSU Presidium again summoned top Hungarian officials, including Nagy and Rakosi, to Moscow for secret talks; and a highlevel Soviet delegation then traveled to Hungary to oversee the reversal of Nagy's New Course and the elevation of Rakosi's protege, Andras Hegedus, to the post of prime minister. This "friendly interference in [Hungary's] internal affairs," according to a senior CPSU Presidium member, Kliment Voroshilov, provided "a model for our relations with all the People's Democracies."46

Nevertheless, these fluctuations were bound to spark social unrest in Hungary. The appointment of Nagy as prime minister in 1953 had helped stave against "hostile" and "anti-socialist" forces. This marked a reversal of his approach over the previous few months, when he had grudgingly put up with a limited thaw in the wake of the 20th CPSU Congress. At a meeting of the Budapest party aktiv on 18 May, Rakosi had even reluctantly acknowledged his part in the "unjust repressions" of the Stalin era. These concessions, limited though they were, raised public expectations in Hungary; but the increased defiance of the Petofi Circle and the riots in Poznan spurred Rakosi to try to reassert an "iron hand." Within the HWP, however, this move was far from universally welcomed. A large number of officials, especially in the HWP Central Leadership, concluded that the real problem in Hungary was not the opposition forces or the Petofi Circle, but Rakosi himself.

The mounting disaffection with Rakosi was duly noted by Andropov in a cable to the CPSU Presidium on 9 July.⁵⁴ Andropov reported that "hostile elements and the intra-HWP opposition have embarked on an open and intensive struggle" against Rakosi. He emphasized that some prominent opposition figures had begun calling for an "independent national policy" and a "national Communist movement," which would "permit the Hungarians to resolve their own affairs independently, 'rather than on the basis of Soviet interference." Andropov also noted that Gero saw "few ways, unfortunately, to overcome the situation that has emerged." Although Gero believed that the HWP Central Leadership plenum on 18 July might "restore solid unity" at the top levels of the party, he was concerned that "severe complications could emerge unexpectedly" at the plenum. In this connection, Andropov reported that the former head of state security in Hungary, Gabor Peter, had written a letter from prison accusing Rakosi of direct personal complicity in the Rajk trial. Andropov warned that "if this letter is read out at the plenum, Cde. Rakosi's plight will be enormously aggravated." Andropov underscored Gero's hope of receiving "concrete advice from the CPSU CC," and he added that "Cde. Gero's alarm about the situation is fully understandable." The ambassador expressed misgivings of his own about the "indecisiveness, feeble actions, and inadequate vigilance of the Hungarian comrades in the struggle against hostile influences within the party and among workers," and he recommended that the CPSU leadership issue a clear-cut endorsement of the HWP resolution of 30 June "as well as of all the measures needed to strengthen the [Hungarian] party's unity and to intensify the struggle against hostile forces."

Andropov's cable served as the

basis for a CPSU Presidium meeting on 12 July 1956, which focused on the latest events in both Hungary and Poland. Malin's notes from the meeting show that Khrushchev and his colleagues still did not want to come to grips with the underlying Sources of political unrest in Hungary.⁵⁵ To be sure, the events in Poznan had provoked "alarm [in Moscow] about the fate of Hungary" as well as of Poland: "After the lessons of Poznan we wouldn't want something-torted that0.3.ed t

statue of Stalin in the center of Budapest was torn down. Similar rallies were held in other Hungarian cities, where thousands of protesters called on the government to resign. Faced by this growing wave of unrest, Gero desperately tried to regain control of the situation, but the protests continued to mount.

Gero's plight was made immeasurably worse later in the evening when Hungarian state security (AVH) forces, acting without authorization, opened fire on unarmed demonstrators outside the main radio station in Budapest who were seeking to enter the building to broadcast their demands. The shootings precipitated a chaotic rebellion, which was much too large for the Hungarian state security organs to handle on their own. Soviet "advisers" and military commanders in Hungary had been trying since early October to convince Hungarian officials that stringent security precautions were needed to cope with growing unrest; but, as one of the top Soviet officers later reported, "the leaders of the [Hungarian] party and members of the [Hungarian] government did not adopt the measures called for by the urgency of the situation. Many of them were simply incapable of evaluating the state of things realistically."⁷² As a result, the violent upheavals on the evening of 23 October quickly overwhelmed the Hungarian police and security forces and caused widespread panic and near-paralysis among senior Hungarian officials.

The Intial Soviet Intervention in Hungary

Until very recently, nothing was known about decision-making in Moscow on the evening of 23 October 1956, when the first reports came in about the Hungarian revolution. Some gaps in the story persist, but a reasonable account can be pieced together on the basis of new sources, including the Malin notes.⁷³ It is now known that despite the growing turmoil in Budapest, Gero did not even mention what was going on when he spoke by phone with Khrushchev on the evening of the 23rd. Gero's evasiveness during that conversation is hard to explain. By that point he had already transmitted an appeal for urgent military assistance to the military attache at the Soviet embassy, so it is unclear why he would not want to raise the matter directly with Khrushchev. Gero's behavior in the two months prior to the revolution, when he chose to be out of the country at critical moments, was odd in itself; but his reaction on 23 October seems even more peculiar.

Despite this strange twist, information about the rebellion quickly made its way to Moscow. When the Soviet attache received Gero's request, he immediately passed it on to Andropov, who telephoned the commander of Soviet troops in Hungary, General Lashchenko. Lashchenko responded that he could not comply with the request without explicit authorization from political leaders. Andropov then cabled Gero's appeal directly to Moscow, which prompted Khrushchev to contact Gero by phone for the second time that evening. Khrushchev urged Gero to send a written request for help to the CPSU Presidium, but the Soviet leader soon realized, after the brief conversation ended, that events in Budapest were moving too fast for him to wait until he received a formal Hungarian request (which, incidentally, did not arrive until five days later).⁷⁴ A Soviet Presidium meeting had already been scheduled for the 23rd to discuss other matters, and Khrushchev abruptly changed the agenda to focus on the situation in Hungary.

The newly declassified notes from the 23 October meeting show that the CPSU Presidium could not reach a unanimous decision on whether to send in troops.75 Khrushchev and all but one of the other participants strongly supported the introduction of Soviet forces, but a key Presidium member, Anastas Mikoyan, opposed the decision, arguing that "the Hungarians themselves will restore order on their own. We should try political measures, and only then send in troops." Despite the prointervention consensus among all the other participants, Mikoyan held firm in his opposition. The Presidium therefore had to adopt its decision without

unanimity, an unprecedented step for such an important matter. The Presidium also decided to send Mikoyan and Suslov to Budapest along with the KGB chief, Ivan Serov, to provide onthe-scene reports, following up on the tasks they had accomplished in Hungary earlier in the year (see above). In the meantime, Khrushchev authorized Soviet defense minister Zhukov to "redeploy Soviet units into Budapest to assist Hungarian troops and state security forces in the restoration of public order."⁷⁶ Khrushchev's directive was promptly transmitted to Lashchenko by the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, who specified that the bulk of the Soviet troops in Hungary were to be used in "establishing control over the most important sites in the capital and in restoring order," while others were to "seal off Hungary's border with Austria."

Having finally received due authorization, Lashchenko was able to set to work almost immediately. The troops under his command had been preparing since late July to undertake largescale ond4c

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radical elements in Hungary, who wanted to overthrow the existing regime. Although Soviet leaders were determined to adhere to a "firm line" and put an end to Nagy's and Kadar's "flip-flops," they reluctantly agreed that they had little choice but to support the current government and to be prepared to withdraw troops from Budapest (though not from Hungary as a whole).

By 30 October, however, the mood within the Soviet Presidium had taken a surprising turn. All the members, including Molotov and Voroshilov, had reached a consensus-ephemeral though it may have been-that the Soviet Union should forgo large-scale military intervention in Hungary.⁸⁷ Marshal Zhukov conceded that the Soviet Union had to be ready, if necessary, to withdraw all Soviet troops from Hungary, viewing this as "a lesson for us in the military-political sphere." Others reluctantly concurred. Khrushchev and his colleagues were well aware that the situation in Hungary had continued to deteriorate, and had taken on distinctly anti-Soviet overtones. Even so, they unanimously agreed to adopt what Khrushchev described as "the peaceful path-the path of troop withdrawals and negotiations"-rather than "the military path, the path of occupaotiations"r3c -0.0fthat the SoSuslov had been predicting.

Concerns about the internal situation in Hungary were reinforced by the latest news about international developments, particularly the start of French and British military operations in the Middle East and the increasing signs that unrest in Hungary was spilling over into other Warsaw Pact countries. Each of these factors is important enough to warrant a separate discussion below. Not only were the Suez Crisis and the fears of a spillover crucial in their own right; they also magnified the importance of Hungary's status in the Warsaw Pact. The prospect of an "imperialist" victory in the Middle East and of growing ferment within the bloc made it all the more essential to keep Hungary within the Soviet camp; but on this score, too, there seemed increasing grounds for pessimism. By late October it was clear that momentum for Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact was rapidly building. One of the members of Nagy's new "inner cabinet," Bela Kovacs, explicitly called for a "neutral Hungary" and the end of Hungary's "ties to military blocs" in a speech he delivered on 30 October.92 That same day, Nagy himself endorsed the goal of leaving the Warsaw Pact, and he opened talks about the matter (and about the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary) with Mikoyan and Suslov, who promptly informed their colleagues in Moscow about the discussions.⁹³ It seems likely that Nagy's expressed desire to renounce Hungarian membership in the Warsaw Pact was one of the factors that induced the CPSU Presidium on 31 October to reverse its decision of the previous day.

ready flooding into Moscow about the spectacular "successes" that the French, British, and Israeli forces were supposedly achieving. It soon turned out that their joint military efforts got bogged down (for want of U.S. support) and a stalemate ensued, but Khrushchev and his colleagues could not have foreseen that when they met on 31 October because they automatically assumed—in a classic case of misperception—that the United States would back the allied incursions. Khrushchev himself expressed the dominant sentiment at the Presidium meeting:

If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French—the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive. We would then be exposing the weakness of our positions. Our party will not accept it if we do this. To Egypt [the imperialists] will then add Hungary.¹⁰⁰

Khrushchev's subsequent comments about Suez, especially at a Presidium meeting on 4 November, show that he believed the decision to intervene in Hungary would help, rather than hurt, Moscow's policy *vis-a-vis* Suez. The distraction posed by Hungary, he implied, had prevented an effective response in the Middle East. Now that a firm decision to suppress the uprising had been adopted, the Soviet Union would be able to "take a more active part in the assistance to Egypt."¹⁰¹

In another respect as well, Soviet policy in Hungary was linked-if only inadvertently-to the Suez Crisis. The sudden conflict diverted international attention from Poland and Hungary to the Middle East. Because the United States refused to support the Israeli and French-British military operations, the crisis generated a deep split among the Western powers at the very moment when they needed to show unity in response to the events in Hungary. The intra-NATO rift engendered by the Suez Crisis was not a critical factor in Moscow's response to the Hungarian uprising-after all, the rift was not yet fully evident when the Soviet Presidium met for its fateful session on 31 October-but it did, as Khrushchev pointed

out at the time, provide a "favorable moment" for the Soviet Union to undertake a large-scale military operation in Hungary.¹⁰² The French and British governments, he noted on 2 November, "are bogged down in Suez, and we are stuck in Hungary."¹⁰³

The invasion of Hungary undoubtedly would have been approved even if there had been no Suez Crisis, but Soviet fears of "imperialist" successes in the Middle East and the sudden emergence of a divisive row within NATO clearly expedited Moscow's decision.

Fears of a Spillover

New evidence confirms that Soviet leaders feared the Hungarian revolution might spread into other East European countries and possibly into the USSR itself, causing the whole Communist bloc to unravel. Warnings to that effect had been pouring in throughout the crisis from the Soviet embassy in Budapest, from KGB representatives in Hungary, and from three former Hungarian leaders (Rakosi, Andras Hegedus, and Istvan Bata) who had fled to Moscow after being ousted. Contraordinary powers, including the right to issue shoot-to-kill orders and to declare a state of emergency.¹¹² The command staff was successful in its task, but the very fact that this sort of measure was needed was a disconcerting reminder to Soviet leaders that the events in Hungary, if left unchecked, could prove contagious.

Equally disturbing reports flowed into Moscow from Czechoslovakia about student demonstrations in Bratislava and other cities amidst growing "hostility and mistrust toward the Soviet Union."113 The Czechoslovak authorities denied most of these reports, but they acknowledged that the events in Hungary were having "deleterious psychological effects" and creating a "hostile, anti-socialist mood" among some of the Czechoslovak troops who had been sent to reinforce the 560-km border with Hungary.¹¹⁴ Senior Czechoslovak military officials warned that the confusion might even "tempt the counterrevolutionary forces [in Hungary] to penetrate into our country and stir up a rebellion in Slovak territory," especially in the southern areas inhabited mainly by ethnic Hungarians.¹¹⁵ They also warned that the danger would increase "if Soviet and Hungarian units are withdrawn" from northern Hungary, since "it is unlikely that [Czechoslovakia's] existing combat forces will be enough to prevent incursions by counterrevolutionary groups."¹¹⁶ The risk of a spillover into Czechoslovakia was explicitly cited by Soviet leaders when they approved a full-scale invasion: "If we don't embark on a decisive path, things in Czechoslovakia will collapse."¹¹⁷ It is unclear whether the actual danger was as great as they feared, but the important thing at the time was the perception in both Moscow and Prague that a failure to act would have ominous consequences.

The growing concerns about a spillover were shared in East European countries further away from Hungary, notably East Germany. Initially, the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, mainly feared that the return of Nagy might presage a similar turn of events in the GDR.¹¹⁸ Once the Hungarian

revolution broke out, apprehension in East Berlin rapidly increased. A top East German official, Otto Grotewohl, warned that "the events in Hungary and Poland show that the enemy looks for weak spots in the socialist camp, seeking to break it apart."¹¹⁹ He and other East German leaders were acutely aware that the GDR itself was one of these "weak spots." Soviet officials, too, were worried that developments in Hungary could undermine their position in East Germany, which by this point was closely tied to Ulbricht. Soviet foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov warned that certain elements in East Germany might exploit the crisis to launch a campaign against the "Ulbricht clique."¹²⁰

Quite apart from the threat of a spillover into Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders were aware of serious problems in the USSR itself. The inception of de-Stalinization had spawned numerous instances of public disorder and unrest. Mass disturbances erupted in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities in early March 1956, as students, workers, and intellectuals joined together to protest the growing criticism of "our great leader Stalin."121 These demonstrations marked the first time that "anti-Soviet activities" had occurred in Georgia since Communist rule was established, and Soviet leaders responded by imposing martial law.¹²² Very different challenges arose elsewhere in the Soviet Union, where intellectuals and some other groups took advantage of the opportunity to voice long-suppressed grievances. Criticism of Stalin and of the "cult of personality" opened the way for broader complaints about the nature of the Soviet regime itself. Soviet leaders tried to regain control of the de-Stalinization campaign by issuing a decree that specified what was permissible and what was not, but this document failed to put an end to dissidents' activities.¹²³ Thus, when the revolution began in Hungary, Khrushchev and

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decision, but Mikoyan was dismayed by it, opposing it just as strongly as he had resisted the original decision on 23 October. Mikoyan pleaded with Khrushchev to call another meeting of the CPSU Presidium to reconsider the matter, but Khrushchev refused. According to Khrushchev's memoirs-which seem eminently plausible on this point-Mikovan even threatened to commit suicide if Khrushchev did not reconvene the Presidium.¹³⁰ Khrushchev responded that it would be the "height of stupidity" to behave so "irrationally," and he set off to take care of the final political and military preparations for the invasion. Had it not taken the CPSU Presidium so long and been so politically costly to reach a final decision about Hungary, Khrushchev might have been willing to comply with Mikoyan's request; but Khrushchev explained to Mikoyan that he was loath to "resume fruitless discussions" and "destroy our whole plan" now that "everything has been decided and a timetable has finally been laid out."131

Despite these explanations, Mikoyan remained deeply upset by the decision, as he indicated at the Presidium meeting on 1 November (when Khrushchev had already headed off to Brest to inform the Polish leadership of the decision).¹³² Mikoyan insisted that "the use of force now will not help anything," and that "we should enter into negotiations instead." Although he agreed that "we cannot let Hungary escape from our camp," he argued that it was still possible to wait 10-15 days to see how the situation would unfold: "If things stabilize by then, we can decide whether to pull out our troops." The other participants disagreed with Mikoyan, but he held his ground, arguing that an invasion was "inappropriate in the current circumstances." In public, however, Mikoyan did not display any qualms. The first time that Mikovan's objections were revealed was in Khrushchev's memoirs, and the Malin notes fully bear out Khrushchev's account.

Interestingly enough, in later years Mikoyan tried to gloss over his anti-interventionist stance in October 1956, arguing that the decision to send in troops was unanimous.¹³³ Technically, this assertion was correct because the participants in the 31 October meeting did indeed approve the decision unanimously. What Mikoyan failed to point out is that if he had been present, the decision would not have been unanimous, just as he dissented from the original decision to send in troops on the night of 23-24 October. In spite of this subsequent backtracking, Mikoyan's position in October-November 1956 was in fact both courageous and consistent.

Janos Kadar's Trip to Moscow

It had previously been known that Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich were spirited to Moscow aboard a Soviet military aircraft on the evening of 1 November, and were brought back with Soviet troops after 4 November to be installed as the prime minister and deputy prime minister of a "Provisional Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government." Nothing was known, however, about what Kadar was doing in Moscow on 2 and 3 November. Almost all Western accounts of the Hungarian crisis have assumed that Kadar was duplicitous and supportive of Soviet military intervention from the outset. The Malin notes provide a more complex picture, offering the first solid evidence of Kadar's and Munnich's roles in the establishment of a post-invasion regime.

Both Kadar and Munnich took part in sessions of the CPSU Presidium on 2 and 3 November, though Kadar did most of the talking.¹³⁴ (On the 2nd they were joined by another Hungarian official, Istvan Bata, one of four senior figures who had been transported to Moscow several days earlier, on the evening of 28 October. On the 3rd, they were joined by Imre Horvath, who took detailed notes of the session.) On 2 November, Khrushchev and Malenkov were still away conferring with the leaders of other Warsaw Pact countries and with Tito, but the rest of the Presidium members met at length with Kadar and Munnich. On 3 November, Khrushchev and Malenkov joined in as well.

The notes from the two sessions

indicate that even though Kadar had been willing to travel surreptitiously to Moscow at a critical moment, he did not favor large-scale Soviet military intervention in Hungary. Nor did he arrive in Moscow intent on becoming the head of a new, post-invasion government. At the session on 2 November, Kadar warned that "the use of military force will be destructive and lead to bloodshed." Such an outcome, he added, would "erode the authority of the socialist countries" and cause "the morale of the Communists [in Hungary] to be reduced to zero."¹³⁵ The next day, Kadar's tone had changed somewhat, though not drastically. He highlighted the existing government's failure to prevent the "killing of Communists," and said he "agreed with [Soviet officials]" that "you cannot surrender a socialist country to counterrevolution." Kadar also asserted that "the correct course of action [in Hungary] is to form a revolutionary government." But even then, he implied that a Soviet invasion would only make things worse-"The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary will be of great significance"-and warned that "the [revolutionary] government must not be puppetlike; there must be a [popular] base for its activities and support among workers."136 In this respect, his views differed sharply from those of Bata, who insisted that "order must be restored through a military dictatorship" imposed by the Soviet Army.¹³⁷

It is also interesting that even on the 3rd, Kadar did not portray the recent events in Hungary in a uniformly negative light. Although he claimed that "Nagy's policy has counterrevolutionary aspects" and that "hour by hour the situation [in Hungary] is moving rightward," he urged the Soviet leadership to recognize that the uprising had stemmed from genuine popular discontent and that "the HWP has been compromised in the eyes of the overwhelming masses." He argued that "the entire nation took part in the movement" to "get rid of the Rakosi clique."138 Kadar's perspective at this time was far more nuanced and insightful than the rigid formulas adopted by his government in December 1956, which characterized the whole uprising as no more than a "counterrevolution" instigated and supported by the West.

One other surprising aspect of Kadar's remarks is that he made little effort to gloss over his own actions or to downplay the negative influence of Soviet policy. He gave a detailed account of the meetings of the Hungarian "inner cabinet" on 1 November, noting that he "was a supporter of the view that no sorts of steps should be taken without having spoken with Andropov." This position, however, did not really distinguish Kadar from Nagy, who himself had summoned Andropov to the evening session for urgent consultations about Soviet troop movements.¹³⁹ Moreover, Kadar acknowledged that when the consultations were over, he joined the other members of Nagy's cabinet in voting for the declaration of neutrality, the appeal to the United Nations, and the resolution demanding an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. On both the 2nd and 3rd of November, Kadar spoke harshly about past Soviet "mistakes" in Hungary, and was far more critical about Rakosi than about Nagy. His comments on this topic were echoed by Munnich, who argued that the fundamental "source of anti-Soviet sentiments" in Hungary was the population's "certainty that the [Communist] regime exists and is preserved only through the . irlt s3 in

Hungarian people alone and not by foreign intervention." This statement appeared (in slightly modified form) in the PZPR newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* the following day.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, on 2 November, Gomulka publicly offered Warsaw as a forum for Soviet-Hungarian negotiations, which he (and Imre Nagy) hoped would "lead to the settlement of problems in bilateral relations."¹⁴⁸ When Gomulka's last-ditch efforts proved futile and the invasion began as scheduled on 4 November, the Polish leader briefly considered voicing his objections openly. After further thought, however, Gomulka decided that he should maintain a discreet public stance to avoid undue antagonism with Moscow.¹⁴⁹ At his behest, the PZPR Politburo instructed the Polish envoy at the

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exclusively by Soviet troops. Although one might have thought that Marshal Konev, as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, would have preferred a joint operation with the East European armies, he in fact was among those who recommended that the task be left to the Soviet Union alone.

To ensure that mistakes made during the initial Soviet intervention in late October would not be repeated, Konev met with General Lashchenko and other Soviet officers who had been in Hungary from the outset.¹⁶¹ For a variety of reasons, as one of Lashchenko's aides later explained, the Soviet Union's chances of success were much greater during the second intervention:

In November our combat operations took place under more auspicious circumstances than at the end of October. Budapest was already under martial law; armed groups were less successful in carrying out sudden attacks; and our troops controlled the situation on the 376 C

countries" would be "crucial to the process of normalization" in both Poland and Hungary.¹⁸⁰ Although Kadar was eventually able to redress some of the most acute economic grievances in Hungary through the adoption of a New Economic Mechanism in 1968 and other reforms in subsequent years, his retention of state ownership and centralized economic management thwarted any hope of genuine prosperity. This was even more the case in Poland, where, despite some leeway granted for private activity (especially in agriculture, retail trade, and light industry), the economic policies under Gomulka and his successors spawned periodic outbreaks of widespread public unrest. No matter how often the Polish authorities claimed that they would pursue drastic economic improvements, they always proved unwilling to accept the political price that such improvements would have necessitated.

From a purely military standpoint, the invasion in November 1956 achieved its immediate goals, but in the longer term it exacted significant costs. When the revolution was crushed by Soviet troops, the morale and fighting elan of the Hungarian armed forces were bound to dissolve as well. The reveals unknown events. Disagreements about how to interpret the past will persist even if all the archives are someday open, but the new documentation is enabling scholars to achieve a far more accurate and complete understanding not only of specific episodes (e.g., the Soviet Union's responses to the Polish and Hungarian crises) but of the entire course of the Cold War.

¹ "Zayavlenie rukovoditelei Bolgarii, Vengrii, GDR, Pol'shi, i Sovetskogo Soyuza" and "Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Soyuza," both in *Pravda* (Moscow), 5 December 1989, p. 2.

² F. Luk'yanov, "Vengriya privetsvuet zayavlenie Moskvy," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 24 October 1991, p. 4.

³ See, e.g., Army-General A.D. Lizichev, "Oktyabr' i Leninskoe uchenie o zashchite revolyutsii," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3 (February 1987), p. 96; Admiral A. I. Sorokin, ed., *Sovetskie vooruzhenye sily na strazhe mira i sotsializma* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 254; V. V. Semin, ed., Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), esp. pp. 127-141, 181-220; and the interview with Army-General V. N. Lobov in "I tol'ko pravda ko dvoru," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 8 May 1989, pp. 1, 3.

⁴ Colonel I.A. Klimov, "KPSS ob ukreplenii edinstva i boevogo sotrudnichestva vooruzhenykh sil sotsialisticheskikh stran," *Voenno-istoricheskii* zhurnal (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1987), p. 80.

⁵ V.F. Khalipov, *Voennaya politika KPSS* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), esp. pp. 256-257.

⁶ Army-General P. I. Lashchenko, "Vengriya, 1956 god," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42-50.

⁷ Budapest Domestic Service, 28 January 1989. ⁸ "TsK KPSS: Ob izuchenii arkhivov TsK KPSS, kasayushchikhsya sobytii 1956 g. v Vengrii," Report No. 06/2-513 (Secret), from R. Fedorov and P. Laptev, deputy heads of the CPSU CC International Department and CPSU CC General Department, respectively, 23 November 1990, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 11, Delo (D.) 23, List (L.) 1. The memorandum warned that the "new Hungarian authorities" were "clearly intending to use this question [i.e., the 1956 invasion] as a means of pressure against us." For the article praising the invasion, see Lieut.-Colonel Jozsef Forigy, "O kontrrevolyutsii v Vengrii 1956 goda," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 8 (August 1990), pp. 39-46. This article was explicitly intended to counter the "traitorous revisionists" in Hungary who had claimed that the events of 1956 were a "popular uprising" and who in 1989-90 were carrying out a second "counterrevolution." The article was unstinting in its denunciation of the "traitors" led by Imre Nagy and of the "new counterrevolutionaries in our midst today who regard themselves as the heirs of 1956." The chief editor of the Soviet journal, Major-General Viktor Filatov, endorsed the Hungarian author's arguments and warmly recommended the article to his readers. Filatov added that "upon reading the article, one cannot help but notice features of that [earlier] counterrevolutionary period that are similar to the changes occurring in the East European countries at the present time."

⁹ Jelcin-dosszie Szoviet dokumentumok 1956 rol.
Budapest: Dohany, 1993); and Hianyzo Lapok:
1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP
KP Leveltarabol (Budapest: Zenit Konyvek,
1993).

10 "O sobytiyakh 1956 goda v Vengrii," Diplomaticheskii vestnik (Moscow), Nos. 19-20 (15-31 October 1992), pp. 52-56.

¹¹ "Vengriya, aprel'-oktyabr' 1956 goda: Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta"; "Vengriya, oktyabr'-noyabr' 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK KPSS"; and "Vengriya, noyabr' 1956-avgust 1957 g.," all in *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), Nos. 4, 5, and 6 (1993), pp. 103-142, 132-160, and 131-144, respectively.

¹²See, in particular, the segment of Khrushchev's memoirs published in "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," Voprosy istorii (Moscow), No. 4 (1995), pp. 68-84. Another extremely useful account is available in the memoir by the former Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980). Because of his fluency in Russian and close ties with Tito, Micunovic regularly had direct contacts with Khrushchev and other senior figures. Less reliable, but potentially illuminating (if used with caution), are the relevant portions of the memoir by the police chief in Budapest during the revolution, Sandor Kopacsi, Au nom de la classe ouvriere (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1979), which is also available in English translation under the same title (In the Name of the Working Class). Kopasci ended up siding with the insurgents and was arrested in November 1956. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1958, but was granted amnesty in 1963. In 1974 he was permitted to emigrate to Canada.

¹³ A few well-connected Russians have had privileged access to Malin's notes from the Presidium meetings dealing with Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress, but these notes have not been made more widely available. See V. P. Naumov, "K istorii sekretnogo doklada N. S. Khrushcheva na XX s"ezde KPSS," *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* (Moscow), No. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 147-168; Vladimir Naumov, "'Utverdit' dokladchikom tovarishcha,'" *Moskovskie Novosti*, No. 5 (4-11 February 1996), p. 34; and Aleksei Bogomolov, "K 40-letiyu XX s"ezda: Taina zakrytogo doklada," *Sovershenno sekretno* (Moscow), No. 1 (1996), pp. 3-4.

¹⁴ Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds., Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1996).

¹⁵ The notes about Hungary appeared in two parts under the title "Kak reshalis' 'voprosy Vengrii': Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, iyul'-noyabr' 1956 g.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp. 73-104 and 87-121, respectively. The notes about Poland appeared in Issue No. 5 of the same journal.

¹⁶ See the assessment of this meeting and the annotated translation of the Czech notes by Mark Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56. The Czech document, "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku," 25 October 1956, in Statni Ustredni Archiv (Praha), Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru Komunisticke Strany -Khrushchev boch5va o jviewsarkCold Roman Bombicki, *Poznan '56* (Poznan: Lawica, 1992).

19 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.," 12 July 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D.1005, Ll. 2-20b.

²⁰ "Pol'skii narod kleimit organizatorov provokatsii," *Pravda* (Moscow), 1 July 1956, p.
6.

²¹ The best overview of the events in Poland in 1956 is Pawel Machcewicz, *Polski rok 1956* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1993). Leszek Gluchowski has done excellent work on the Soviet-Polish crisis; see, for example, his "Poland, ⁴⁷ "Shifrtelegramma," Special Nos. 316-319/No.
16595 (Strictly Secret), from Yu.V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium and CPSU Secretariat, 30 April 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 1, L. 2.
⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, L. 5.

⁴⁹ "Vypiska iz protokola zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 3 maya 1956 g.," No. P13/XXIII (Strictly Secret), 3 May 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, L. 133.

⁵⁰ "Telefonogramma iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS," 13 June 1956 (Top Secret), from M. A. Suslov to the CSPU Presidium and Secretariat, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 146-149.

⁵¹ "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva s kitaiskimi tovarishchami 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine," 2 October 1959 (Top Secret/Special Dossier), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 331, L. 12. For other disparaging remarks by Khrushchev about Rakosi, see Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, pp. 135-136, 140.

⁵² See Janos Kadar's remarks to this effect in "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.," 3 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 31-330b.

⁵³ The resolution was broadcast on Hungarian domestic radio on 30 June and published in *Szabad Nep* the following day. For an English translation, see Paul E. Zinner, ed., *National Communism and ,K*

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1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 22. 118

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¹⁷² Quotations here and in the following paragraph are from "Rabochaya zapis'zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 34-36ob; and "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 6 noyabrya 1956 g.," 6 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 41-45ob. This bickering was first described by Khruschev in his memoirs ("Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 77-78), and a few additional details (not mentioned in Malin's notes) came to light in the recently declassified transcript of the June 1957 CPSU Central Committee plenum ("Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda," Ll. 27ob-28ob). The Malin notes confirm and add a great deal to these earlier sources.

¹⁷³ The Russian phrase that Molotov used (*odernut' nado, chtoby ne komandoval*) is slightly awkward in the original, but it can be roughly translated as it is here.

¹⁷⁴ See "Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda," Ll. 2, 25. The charge of "dangerous zigzags" was leveled by Molotov at a CPSU Presidium meeting a few days before the Central Committee plenum.

175 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 156.

176 "Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the President," 20 November 1956 (Secret), in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. XXV: Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 473, 475. This FRUS volume contains a large number of documents essential for understanding the U.S. government's response to the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956, although many other materials have since been declassified through the Freedom of Information Act. A collection of newly declassified materials is available to researchers at the National Security Archive in the Gelman Library of the George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

¹⁷⁷ Data on Hungarian and Soviet casualties come, respectively, from Peter Gosztonyi, "Az 1956-os forradalom szamokban," *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), 3 November 1990, p. 3; and "Sobytiya v Vengrii 1956 g.," in Col.-General G. A. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti snyat: Poteri vooruzhenykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), p. 397. The number of Soviet deaths was 720, the number of Soviet wounded was 1,540. The number of Hungarian deaths was 2,502, and the number of Hungarian wounded was 19,226. ¹⁷⁸ Attila Szakolczai, "A forradalmat koveto megtorlas soran kivegzettekrol," in Evkonyv, Vol. 3 (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1994), pp. 237-256. Szakolczai provides a considerably lower figure (229) for the number of executions. The figure of 600 comes from Maria Ormos, "A konszolidacio problemai 1956 es 1958 kozott," Tarsadalmi Szemle, Vol. 44, Nos. 8-9 (1989), pp. 48-65. See also Janos Balassa et al., eds., Halottaink, 2 vols. (Budapest: Katalizator, 1989). 179 "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," L. 12.

¹⁸⁰ Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," p. 81.

¹⁸¹ Testimony of former national defense minister Lajos Czinege in Magyar Orszaggyules, A Honvedelmi Bizottsag 1989 oktoberi ulesszakan letrhozott vizsgalobizottsag 1989 december 11-i, HSWP will be used in the listings to refer to the successive incarnations of the Hungarian Communist party.

Third, two Hungarian officials who played contrasting roles in 1956 were both named Istvan Kovacs. The identifications and the translator's annotations should prevent any confusion about which was which.

CPSU CC PRESIDIUM

FULL MEMBERS: Nikolai BULGANIN (prime minister), Kliment VOROSHILOV (chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), Lazar' KAGANOVICH (first deputy prime minister), Aleksei KIRICHENKO (First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party), Georgii MALENKOV (deputy prime minister), Anastas MIKOYAN, Vyacheslav MOLOTOV (foreign minister until June 1956), Mikhail PERVUKHIN, Maksim SABUROV (first deputy prime minister), Mikhail SUSLOV (CPSU CC Secretary), and Nikita KHRUSHCHEV (CPSU CC First Secretary).

CANDIDATE MEMBERS: Leonid BREZHNEV (CPSU CC Secretary), Georgii ZHUKOV (defense minister), Nurotdin MUKHITDINOV, Ekaterina FURTSEVA (CPSU CC Secretary), Nikolai SHVERNIK (chairman of CPSU Party Control Committee), and Dmitrii SHEP-ILOV (foreign minister after June 1956).

CPSU CC SECRETARIES NOT ON THE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM

Averki **ARISTOV**, Nikolai **BEL-YAEV**, and Pyotr **POSPELOV**.

OTHERS MENTIONED IN THE NOTES

ANDICS, Erzsebet: chief historian for the HWP until the autumn of 1956; fled to the Soviet Union with her husband, Andor Berei (see below), in late October 1956

ANDROPOV, Yurii: Soviet ambassador in Hungary

APRO, Antal: member of the HCP/ HWP Politb (3*Pw5 1956Tw (dorMEMBERS.0F8

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[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 4-40b, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 5

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 26 October 1956

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik, We must draw the right conclusion: In Budapest there are forces that want to get rid of Nagy's and Kadar's government. We should adopt a position of support for the current government.

Otherwise we'll have to undertake an occupation.

They're also insisting on a ceasefire.

Our line now: this time the gov't is recommending a ceasefire, and the military command is devising an order for the withdrawal of troops from Budapest.⁷⁴

Nagy and Szanto raised the question of removing Hegedus from the Directory.⁷⁵

There's no need to hold elections.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 54-63, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 7

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956⁷⁶ (Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)⁷⁷

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov

On the Situation in Hungary

Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serov is read aloud. $^{78}\,$

Cde. Zhukov provides information about the concentration of mil.-transport aircraft in the Vienna region.⁷⁹

Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin's opinion).

Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.⁸⁰

On Discussions with the Chinese comrades.⁸¹

(Khrushchev)

We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people's democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based.

The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position.

One document for the Hungarians, and another for the participants of the Warsaw Pact.

On Rokossowski—I said to Gomulka that this matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.⁸²

Cde. Bulganin—The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect impression of our relations with the countries of people's democracy.

On our appeal to the Hungarians—we should prepare it.

A declaration should be prepared.

Cde. Molotov—Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

There is the Warsaw Pact.

This must be considered with other countries.

On the view of the Chinese comrades—they suggest that relations with the countries of the socialist camp be built on the principles of Pancha Shila.⁸³

Relations along interstate lines are on one basis and interparty relations on another.

Cde. Voroshilov: We must look ahead. Declarations must be composed so that we aren't placed into an onerous position. We must criticize ourselves—but justly.

Cde. Kaganovich—Pancha Shila, but I don't think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila.

Two documents—an appeal to the Hungarians and a Declaration.

In this document we don't need to provide self-criticism.

There's a difference between party and state relations.

Cde. Shepilov—The course of events reveals the crisis in our relations with the countries of people's democracy.

Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. The underlying reasons must be revealed.

The foundations remain unshakable.

Eliminate the elements of diktat, not giving play in this situation to a number of mea-

sures to be considered in our relations. The declaration is the first step.

There is no need for an appeal to the Hungarians.

On the armed forces: We support the principles of non-interference.

With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We'll have to keep up a struggle with national-Communism for a long time.

Cde. Zhukov—Agrees with what Cde. Shepilov has said.

The main thing is to decide in Hungary. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole.

This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.

Cde. Zhukov—With regard to troops in the GDR and in Poland, the question is more serious.

It must be considered at the Consultative Council.⁸⁴

The Consultative Council is to be convened.

To persist further—it is unclear what will come of this.

A quick decision, the main thing is to declare it today.

Cde. Furtseva—We should adopt a general declaration, not an appeal to the Hungarians. Not a cumbersome declaration.

The second thing is important for the internal situation.

We must search for other modes of relations with the countries of people's democracy.

About meetings with leaders of the people's democracies (concerning relations).

We should convene a CC plenum (for informational purposes).⁸⁵

Cde. Saburov: Agrees about the need for a Declaration and withdrawal of troops.

At the XX Congress we did the correct thing, but then did not keep control of the unleashed initiative of the masses.

It's impossible to lead against the will of the people.

We failed to stand for genuine Leninist principles of leadership.

We might end up lagging behind events. Agrees with Cde. Furtseva. The ministers are asking; so are members of the CC.⁸⁶

With regard to Romania—they owe us 5 billion rubles for property created by the people. 87

We must reexamine our relations. Relations must be built on an equal basis.

Cde. Khrushchev: We are unanimous. As a first step we will issue a Declaration.

Cde. Khrushchev—informs the others about his conversation with Cde. Mikoyan.

Kadar is behaving well.

5 of the 6 are firmly hanging in there.⁸⁸ A struggle is going on inside the [HWP— trans.] Presidium about the withdrawal of troops.

(Malinin, apparently, became nervous and left the session.)

Officers from the state security (Hungarian) are with our troops. 89

<u>Consideration of the Draft Declaration</u> (Shepilov, Molotov, Bulganin)

Cde. Bulganin—we should say in what connection the question of a Declaration arose.

Page 2, Par. 2, don't soften the self-criticism. Mistakes were committed.

Much use should be made of "Leninist principles."

Cde. Khrushchev—expresses agreement. We should say we are guided by Leninist principles.

Page 2, Par. 5—we should say we are making a statement, not an explanation.

Page 3—we should speak about economic equity, make it the main thing.

We should say that no troops are stationed in the majority of countries.

We should say that on the territory of the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian states the stationing of troops is done with the consent of their governments and in the interests of these gov'ts and peoples.⁹⁰

We should express our view of the government of Hungary.

Measures to support them.

About support for the party and HWP CC and for the gov't. We should refer specifically to Nagy and Kadar.

Cde. Kaganovich, Cde. Molotov, Cde. Zhukov: We should mention the Potsdam agreement and the treaties with every country. 91

Cde. Zhukov—We should express sympathy with the people. We should call for an end to the bloodshed.

Page 2, Par. 2: We should say the XX Congress condemned the disregard for principles of equality.

Cde. Zhukov—we should speak about economics.

Restructuring was thwarted after the XX Congress.

(Cde. Khrushchev)

We are turning to the member-states of the Warsaw Pact to consider the question of our advisers.⁹² We are ready to withdraw them.

Further editing.93

Transmitted via high frequency to Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.

Information from Cde. Yudin on Negotiations with the Chinese Comrades.

What's the situation: Will Hungary leave our camp? Who is Nagy? Can he be trusted? About the advisers.

Those taking part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Saburov, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin. Chinese comrades.

On the Situation in Hungary

(Cde. Khrushchev, Cde. Liu Shaoqi)

Cde. Liu Shaoqi indicates on behalf of the CPC CC that troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest. 94

Cde. Khrushchev—there are two paths. A military path—one of occupation. A peaceful path—the withdrawal of troops, negotiations.

Cde. Molotov—the political situation has taken clearer shape. An anti-revol. gov't has been formed, a transitional gov't.⁹⁵ We should issue the Declaration and explain our position. We should clarify our relationship with the new gov't. We are entering into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

Nagy-the prime minister.

Kadar-a state minister.

Tildy Zoltan—

Kovacs Bela-

Losonczy—a Communist and a supporter of Nagy 96

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 6-14, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 8

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 31 October 1956⁹⁷

(Re: Point VI of Protocol No. 49)⁹⁸ <u>Information about Discussions with</u> Gomulka

Regarding the Situation in Poland and Hungary⁹⁹

(Khrushchev)

A meeting with Cde. Gomulka (in the Brest region) was proposed.

On Hungary

Cde. Khrushchev sets forth the various considerations.

We should reexamine our assessment and should not withdraw our troops from Hungary and Budapest.¹⁰⁰ We should take the initative in restoring order in Hungary. If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French—the imperialists.

They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive.

We would then be exposing the weakness of our positions.

Our party will not accept it if we do this. To Egypt they will then add Hungary.¹⁰¹ We have no other choice.

If this point of view is supported and endorsed, let's consider what we should do.

Agreed: Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Saburov¹⁰²

We should say we tried to meet them halfway, but there is not now any government. What line are we now adopting?

We should create a Provisional Revol. Gov't (headed by Kadar).¹⁰³ Best of all—a deputy. Munnich—as premier and min. of defense and internal affairs.¹⁰⁴

This government—we should invite them to negotiations about the withdrawal of troops and resolve the matter.

If Nagy agrees, bring him in as dep. premier. 105

Munnich is appealing to us with a request for assistance. We are lending assistance and restoring order.

We should negotiate with Tito.

We should inform the Chinese comrades, the Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgarians. $106\,$

There will be no large-scale war.

Cde. Saburov—after yesterday's session this discussion is all pointless. It will vindicate NATO.

Cde. Molotov—yesterday was only a compromise decision.

Cdes. Zhukov, Voroshilov, Bulganin: We should reject the view that we are reexamining our position.

Cde. Furtseva—What further should be done?

We showed patience, but now things have gone too far. We must act to ensure that victory goes to our side.

Cde. Pospelov—we should use the argument that we will not let socialism in Hungary be strangled.

Cde. Shvernik—Cde. Khrushchev's proposal is correct.

Cde. Molotov—we should not defer the creation of organs in localities. We should act simultaneously in the center and in the localities.

Cde. Zhukov is instructed to work out a plan and report on it. $107\,$

Shepilov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Pospelov are to handle the propaganda side.¹⁰⁸

An appeal to the people from the military command or the government. An appeal to the people from the Prov. Revol. Gov't. An order from Cde. Konev.¹⁰⁹

We should send a group to the region of Cde. Konev's headquarters. 110

Cde. Rakosi—favors Munnich (as premier)¹¹¹ Cde. Hegedus—" Cde. Gero—"

Apro¹¹²

Kadar Kiss Karoly¹¹³ Boldoczki Horvath

On Negotiations with Tito

(Cdes. Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin)

Draft a telegram to Tito about the meeting.¹¹⁴ To Brest: Khrushchev, Molotov, Malenkov.¹¹⁵

To Yugoslavia: Khrushchev, Malenkov.

To discuss with you the situation that has emerged in Hungary. What is your view of it? If you agree, our delegation will visit incognito from

1. XI in the evening to

2. XI in the morning your time.

Confirm the telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 15-18ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 9

Notes of a Telephone Message from F. N. Gryaznov, a Counselor at the USSR Embassy in Yugoslavia, on 31 October 1956

The message was transmitted through Kardelj.

Cde. Tito is at Brioni. Kardelj reported that Tito is prepared to meet with Cdes. Khrushchev and Malenkov on 1 November. However, because the doctors have forbidden him to leave his current premises in view of his illness, Tito requests that our delegation, if possible, come to Brioni.

As Kardelj further said, it would be desirable if the aircraft carrying the delegation arrived at the airport in Pula at roughly 5:00 p.m. Belgrade time so they can leave from the airport for Brioni with the approach of darkness.

Instructions about the flight path and the landing in Pula will be given in due course.

Kardelj requested that we let him know the time of departure for the aircraft and the time of arrival in Pula.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 64-65, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 10

Notes of a Telephone Message¹¹⁶

There was a certain common understanding. The position is what we expected. This is an internal affair. There should not be interference.

Reaction is rearing its head. 8-10% at elections. Arm the workers, let them keep the weapons.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 66, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT NO. 11

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 1 November 1956 (Re: Point I of Protocol No. 50)¹¹⁷

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Konev, Serov¹¹⁸

On the Situation in Hungary.

(Cdes. Mikoyan)

The demand for the withdrawal of troops became universal.

Anarchy is spreading; reaction is triumphing. The decision: occupation.

Cde. Kaganovich: The discussion was complicated.¹²¹ The Chinese said we should not withdraw troops. Objectively—a sharp reactionary movement. The party doesn't exist. We can't wait long. The reactionary forces are attacking, and we are attacking.¹²²

Cde. Furtseva—reactions to the Declaration. Are worried that we're giving away Hungary.¹²³

Cde. Zhukov—there is no basis for reconsidering the decision of 31-X-56. I don't agree with Cde. Mikoyan that we must support the current gov't. Our actions must be decisive. Remove all the unsavory elements. Disarm the counterrevolution.

Delay the parliamentary delegation to France. To the ambassador in Budapest—send the families.¹²⁴ Reconsider sending a parliamentary delegation to Thailand.

Cde. Bulganin—everything is being done in the spirit of the decision of 31 X.

Cde. Zhukov: Everything will be restored to order.

We are acting on the basis of the Declaration—the redeployments will bring order.

Cde. Suslov—now the situation has become clearer. Separate out the honest ones.

I was a witness when a Hungarian unit opened fire on Soviet troops.

The Soviets didn't respond. Further such restraint couldn't be expected from even the most disciplined army.

Whether deliberately or not, the gov't is laying the groundwork for a confrontation of

Soviet and Hungarian troops.

Order must be restored through a military dictatorship.

Change the policy of the government.

the USSR.

Cde. Munnich:

Believes that Cde. Kadar's assessment and conclusions are correct.

Cde. Kadar—the center of counterrev. is in the city of Gyor.¹⁶⁰ If we declare Nagy's gov't counterrev., all parties will fall under this rubric. The government does not want to struggle against the counterrev.

The position:

on the basis of defending the peop.-dem. order, socialist gains, and friendship with the USSR and with other socialist countries and cooperation with all peaceloving countries.

At the head of the gov't is Kadar.

To send: Malenkov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev.¹⁶¹ To fly off: (at 2:00-3:00) at 7:00 to 8:00 in the morning.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 31-33ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 16

Imre Horvath's Notes of Khrushchev's Speech at the 3 November Session¹⁶²

Khrush., Bulg., Vorosh., Malen., Molot., Kagan., Mikoyan, Brezhnev

Khrush.: Organized counterrev. Events are without letup.

From the north.

Mistakes of Rakosi, Gero, + others

Miskolc!¹⁶³ We are doing a lot, but not everything! This is no justification for the fact that there are no Hungarian leaders! Rakosi was paralyzed, but we didn't actively speak out. We were too late in requesting that he be replaced.

It's my fault and Mikoyan's that we proposed Gero rather than Kadar.¹⁶⁴ We gave in to Gero. Rak. and Gero are honorable and committed Communists. But they did many stupid things.

Rak. is hardline, and Gero hapless.

They criticized I. Nagy and regarded him as an opportunist, but he is also a traitor. The exclusion of I. Nagy from the party was a mistake and a reflection of Rak.'s stupidity. We would have arrested I. Nagy. We were for admitting him back into the party. Some of the rebels are not enemies! They were antagonized by the mistakes of the leadership. We welcome your (Kad.'s) choice. We cannot regard I. Nagy as a Communist. Dulles needs someone just like I. Nagy. We uphold the Declaration. But with I. Nagy that's impossible! Eng. + Fr. Egypt.¹⁶⁵ We consulted with other parties. Malen., Khr. Poland. We can't be observers on the sidelines. Yug., Rankovic, Kardelj, Micunovic, the ambassador in Mosc. + Malenk., Khrush. Alarm! Revol. government. The traitors want to use Kadar as a screen. If I. Nagy is not forced into retirement, he'll be working for the en-

emy.

-Munnich - Apro | Hidas deputy, -Ronai Berei internal affairs, Kiss Andics defense -Marosan -Kadar as chairman Kovacs -Kossa at finance Egri Veg They want to isolate Kadar -Dogei Miskolc |---> Budapest Szolnok |

[Source: Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, XIX J-1-K Horvath Imre kulugyminiszter iratai, 55, doboz.]

DOCUMENT No. 17

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 4 November 1956 (Re: Protocol No. 51)

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov,

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Hegedus and Rakosi).

Rakosi caused enormous damage, and for this he must be held accountable. He must be excluded from the party.¹⁸⁴

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

¹ Protocol No. 28 was the formal protocol drafted

Cde. Khrushchev:

Cde. Kaganovich, when will you mend your ways and stop all your toadying? Holding to some sort of hardened position. What Cde. Molotov and Kaganovich are proposing is the line of screeching and face-slapping. Speak about Nagy. About Losonczy and Donath.

Cdes. Mikoyan, Suslov, and Brezhnev are to transmit our changes and requests in a tactful manner.

II. Ciph. Tel. No. . . . from (Zhukov, Shepilov)¹⁸⁵

Affirm as an unfortunate event.¹⁸⁶

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 41-45ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 20

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 27 November 1956 (Re: Protocol No. 60)¹⁸⁷

I. From Bucharest.

(Khr., Vorosh., Kagan., Mik., Mol., Perv., Bulg., Sab., Zhuk., Grom.)

It's not advisable.¹⁸⁸ We should inform Dej that this is not to our advantage, and is not to the advantage of Hungary.

Cde. Bulg. is to negotiate with Cde. Dej. 189

Zhukov—we should state our view of the position of the Yugoslavs.

Khr.—we don't need to enter into correspondence with Tito about Imre Nagy; that's a matter for Hungary to handle. It was a mistake for our officer to go into the bus.¹⁹⁰

II.¹⁹¹

Instructions to: The Foreign Ministry KGB, and On the discrediting of Imre.¹⁹² Koney

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 52, compiled by V. N. Chernukha.]

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24 Mikoyan, Suslov, Malinin, and Serov arrived somewhat late in Budapest because inclement weather forced Mikoyan's and Suslov's plane to be diverted to an airport 90 kilometers north of the capital. A Soviet armored personnel carrier, accompanied by tanks, brought the four into Budapest, where they promptly began sending reports back to Moscow. See "Shifrtelegramma" from Mikoyan and Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L1. 1-7. A retrospective account of Mikoyan's and Suslov's arrival in Budapest, by Vladimir Kryuchkov, who was a senior aide to Andropov in 1956 and who later followed in Andropov's footsteps at the KGB, claims that Mikoyan's and Suslov's plane was diverted northward because it came under fire and was struck by a machine gun. Kryuchkov also asserts that Mikoyan and the others had to walk for more than two hours to reach the em-

the morning of 24 October, Maleter had been ordered by the then-defense minister Istvan Bata to move with five tanks against the insurgents in Budapest's 8th and 9th Districts, providing relief for the Kilian Barracks in the 9th District. When Maleter and his tank unit arrived on the scene, they decided to support the rebels' cause instead. Maleter then assumed command of insurgent forces in the Kilian barracks.

⁷¹ The original reads the 24th, but this incident actually occurred on the 25th. A peaceful demonstration of some 25,000 people was held on 25 October outside the Parliament Building (where Nagy's office was located, though Nagy was not inside). The precise sequence of events cannot be conclusively determined, but most evidence suggests that Hungarian state security (AVH) forces suddenly opened fire on the unarmed ernment and in the interests of the [East German] government and people." ⁹¹ The final Declaration noted that "Soviet units

⁹¹ The final Declaration noted that "Soviet units are in the Hungarian and Romanian republics in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental agreements. Soviet military units are in the Polish republic on the basis of the Potsdam four-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty." The Declaration then claimed that "Soviet military units are not in the other people's democracies," omitting any mention of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany.

⁹² Khrushchev presumably is referring here to both the military advisers and the state security (KGB) advisers.
⁹³ When this editing was completed, the Pre-

sidium formally adopted Resolution No. P49/1 ("Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii," 30 October 1956, in APRF, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, L1. 25-30) stating that it would "approve the text, with changes made at the CPSU CC Presidium session, of a Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the foundations of development and the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries." The resolution ordered that the "text of the Declaration be broadcast on radio on 30 October and published in the press on 31 October 1956." For the published text, see "Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal'neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami," Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, p. 1.

⁹⁴ It is unclear precisely when the Chinese changed their position from non-interventionist to pro-intervention. The statement recorded here, if correctly transcribed, would suggest that the change occurred before the final Soviet decision on 31 October, but almost all other evidence (including subsequent Presidium meetings recorded by Malin) suggests that it came *after*, not before, the Soviet decision. In any case, if the change did occur before, it did not have any discernible effect on the Soviet decision at this meeting to eschew intervention. ⁹⁵ Molotov is referring here to major develop-

ments in Hungary. On 30 October, at 2:30 p.m. Budapest time, Nagy announced the formal restoration of a multi-party state and the establishment of an "inner cabinet" of the national government. The new cabinet consisted of Nagy, Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Erdei, Janos Kadar, Geza Losonczy, and Anna Kethly (from the Social Democratic Party). That same day, a "revolutionary national defense council" of the Hungarian armed forces was set up, which supported the demands of "the revolutionary councils of the working youth and intellectuals," and called for the "immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and their withdrawal from the entire territory of Hungary within the shortest possible time." The new Council also promised to disarm all agents from Hungary's disbanded state security forces (AVH), who had been notorious agents of repression during the Stalin era. A Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee also was formed on 31 October, and it was em-

powered by the government to 0Bgi6 Tw [(ments in ression durin).051 T.n97(MolotoeklJ -anded state945(TheJ T phe sawal of0 Ts* 0.019gi6 0 [(05 -s06lr)10(-Tw (31 oekl

Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February-November 1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 473-481.

¹⁰⁹ For the final text of this order, see "Prikaz Glavnokomanduyushchego Ob"edinennymi vooruzhennymi silami No. 1, 4 noyabrya 1956 goda," reproduced in Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 3), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 12 (December 1993), p. 86.

¹¹⁰ It is unclear what "group," if any, was actually sent. Presumably, the reference here is to a group of Presidium members. ¹¹¹ The three former Hungarian officials listed

here-Rakosi, Hegedus, and Gero-had fled to the Soviet Union within the past few days. No doubt, Khrushchev had solicited their views beforehand about the proper course to pursue in Hungary. It is also possible that the three were asked to take part in this phase of the CPSU Presidium meeting, and that they offered their views directly.

¹¹² The five Hungarian officials listed here were among those who were slated to take part in a forthcoming "provisional revolutionary government." The first three were still in Budapest (though Kadar was spirited out the next evening), Boldoczki was in Moscow (in his ambassadorial post), and Horvath, the foreign minister in Nagy's government, was on his way to a UN General Assembly session, but was delayed in Prague. ¹¹³ Kiss's name is incorrectly rendered in Malin's

notes as Kisskar.

 114 The formal protocol for this session (cited in Note 77 *supra*) "affirms the text of the telegram

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newspaper *Pravda* featured a letter purportedly sent by Kadar and Imre Horvath to Dag Hammarskjold. The letter claimed that Nagy's submission of the Hungarian question to the UN had been illegal, and requested that all consideration of the issue cease.

177This brief session produced few results. The formal protocol for the session (in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 14, D. 73, L. 4) simply reads: "Defer consideration of the matter."

178Voroshilov's name is not listed among the participants, but the notes below indicate that he actively took part.

179Other documents recently declassified by the Russian government shed light on what occurred at this meeting. On 5 November an official from the CPSU CC international department, Vladimir Baikov, who had been sent to Budapest the previous day to maintain liaison with Kadar, sent a secure, high-frequency message back to Moscow along with the draft text of a statement prepared by Kadar. Baikov's message reads as follows: "At the request of Cde. Kadar, I am conveying the translation from Hungarian of an Appeal by the Provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 'To Hungarian Communists! To Loyal Members of the Hungarian Workers' Party!' Cde. Kadar requested that I transmit the views and observations of the Soviet comrades regarding the text of the Appeal by 10:00 a.m. on 6 November." (See "Po VCh," APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 132.) The draft went to Mikoyan, who prepared a number of changes and suggestions before the Presidium meeting began. The most significant change was the addition of a reference to the "treacherous" activities of a "group of Imre Nagy, Losonczy, and Donath" after the condemnation of the "Rakosi clique." (See the marked-up draft in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 136.) Kadar incorporated this change, though he dropped the mention of Ferenc Donath, referring simply to the "Nagy-Losonczy group," which he claimed had committed "treason" and inspired the "counterrevolution." Other proposed changes also were included. The final text was released as a leaflet in Hungary on 6 November. It was published in the Szolnok newspaper Szabad Nep on 7 November and in Russian translation in the CPSU daily Pravda that same day. On 8 November it was published in Nepszabadsag. This was the first major programmatic statement by Kadar's government.

¹⁸⁰This is the same telegram that Kadar mentioned earlier. See Note 159 *supra*.

¹⁸¹The draft statement pledged that the HSWP would "make a decisive break with the harmful policy and criminal methods of the Rakosi clique, which shook the faith of the broad popular masses in our party." This was preserved in the final text along with other condemnations of "past mistakes."

¹⁸²Malenkov obviously is referring to a CC plenum of the HWP, not of the CPSU.

¹⁸³Again, the reference is to a CC plenum of the HWP, not of the CPSU.

¹⁸⁴From exile in Moscow, Rakosi had made overtures about his possible readmission into the Hungarian Communist party.

¹⁸⁵The topic discussed here was a telegram received on 5 November 1956 from the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, transmitting a formal protest by the Yugoslav government about the death of Milenko Milovanov, a Yugoslav embassy employee in Budapest who was struck by shots fired from a Soviet tank. The

Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca P - 1ewhich he clcthe r5 in Ru Twc -0.062 Tw 97(, ny041 Tw (The tlu 1 Tf 9.313 0 TD .43

gime of people's democracy. In this way, said Gheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy." See "Informatsiya," 27 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 16-17.

¹⁹⁰This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagy and his aides were arrested. A bus had been brought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, supposedly to transport the officials and their families to their apartments. It turned out that the bus was merely part of an elaborate plot devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagy from the embassy. A Soviet military officer was sitting in the bus, and others quickly approached. Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompanying the Hungarians were forced out of the bus, and the remaining passengers were placed under arrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar's government had given to the Yugoslavs. This episode is recounted in detail in the note of protest that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovic

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Some particular items in the Special Committee's documentary collections deserve special mention. Besides the Committee's meeting protocols, these are protocols and related materials of meetings of the Technical (Scientific and Technical) and Engineering and Technical Councils which were active in 1945-1946 within the Special Committee and then within the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers; resolutions and orders of the USSR Council of People's Commissars Council of Ministers on the atomic issues; correspondence with First Main Directorate organizations and enterprises and other Ministries and agencies; and important documents of the First Main Directorate. Among the Special Committee's materials are unique documents signed by Stalin and Beria, uniqu-Lanuscrips sy Sleadng psc-

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to denote the improved plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested in 1951. During the period through 1954 the USSR verified and tested three more types of improved atomic bombs: RDS-3, RDS-4, and RDS-5. The documents reflecting the development of the RDS-1, RDS-2, RDS-3, RDS-4 and RDS-5 atomic bombs that will constitute the first part of the compilation being prepared by the commission. The second part will be composed of documents reflecting the Soviet work on the hydrogen bomb, whose first version (referred to as RDS-6s) was successfully tested on 12 August 1953.

Returning to the USSR CM resolution of 21 June 1946, readers should note the extremely short duration of the work phases set by that resolution. Thus the technical task orders for the RDS-1 and RDS-2 designs had to be developed by 1 July 1946, the main unit designs by 1 July 1947. The work on the design development had to be conducted in parallel with the establishment of special laboratories at KB-11 and arrangement of the works of these laboratories (the first phase laboratories had to start functions in the period from September to December 1946, the second phase laboratories in the period from January to June 1947).

The short duration and arrangement of the parallel works became possible thanks to availability in the USSR of intelligence materials about the designs of the U.S. atomic bombs "Fat Man" and "Little Boy," prototypes of RDS-1 and RDS-2, Soviet atomic bombs, which the leaders of the USSR atomic project decided in 1946 should be copied as closely as possible from the American designs.

It should be emphasized that the availability of the intelligence materials could not substitute for independent experimental, theoretical, and design verification of the Soviet atomic bombs which were being prepared for testing. Owing to the extraordinary responsibility of the leaders of and participants in the Soviet atomic project, RDS-1 was tested only after thorough confirmation of the available information and a full cycle of experimental, theoretical, and design studies whose level corre-

sponded to the maximum capabilities.063 Tw (reflecg,Tc (P)Tj 7 0 0 7 2ee8Tpabil T* 0.008 T

3. Designate:

<u>C[omra]de Zernov P.M.</u>, Transport Machine Building Deputy Minister, as KB-11 Chief with release from his current Ministry duties;

<u>Professor Khariton Yu. B.</u> as KB-11 Chief Designer on jet engine prototype designing and manufacture.

4. Adopt the proposal by Commission composed of Vannikov, Yakovlev, Zavenyagin, Goremykin, Meshik and Khariton on location of KB-11 on the base of Ministry of Agricultural Machine Build414 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

tures.

That the USSR Ministry of Finance (Mr. Zernov) be charged with allocation of the above funds to the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers.

11. That the wages, salaries, and all types of food-stuffs and goods provision established for USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 be extended to KB-11.

12. That the following be determined:

a) salary rates for the workers assigned to work at facility No. 550 should be increased during their stay at facility No. 550 from 75 to 100% and the persons performing multiple tasks of KB-11 should be paid additional salary amounting from 50 to 75% of relevant salary established for workers of KB-11 of Laboratory No. 2;

b) all leading, scientific, engineering, technical, administrative and economic workers of facility No. 550 should be provided on site with three meals a day in norms according to Annex No. 4 and ration according to the letter "A" limit for leading and scientific workers and to the letter "B" limit for other workers.

13. That the USSR Ministry of Trade (Cde. Lyubimov) be charged with:

a) allocation by request of Cde. Zernov of all needed foodstuffs for arrangement of three meals a day for all leading, scientific, engineering-technical, and administrativetechnical workers of facility No. 550 in norms according to Annex No.4 and ration of letter "A" for leading and scientific workers, of letter "B" for other workers;, scientific, 416 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY P

Soviet policy. On 14 December 1959, six days after his memorandum was drafted, it was approved by the Presidium; four days later, on December 18, a conference of the military elite convened to work out practical measures to implement the proposal; and eight days after that, on December 26, the Plenum rubber-stamped it. Despite Khrushchev's strong position, he could not help worrying about the political fallout of such a radical revamping, which constituted a de facto replacing of the Soviet military machine; hence the memorandum's rather long and (for Khrushchev) elaborate argument. It is interesting that Khrushchev regarded his initiative as a direct follow-up to his proposal on General and Complete Disarmament which he made to the U.N. General Assembly on 18 September 1959. He presented his initiative to his colleagues as a means to boost the level of discussion at the specially-appointed United Nations "Committee of Ten" countries, set up to study disarmament questions, which was scheduled to start its deliberations in February 1960.

memorandum The reveals Khrushchev as a convert of the nuclear revolution; he was convinced that no power could threaten a Soviet Union armed with nuclear missiles. In the same breath the Soviet leader poses as an exuberant romantic and bluffer, this time not before the outside world, but in front of his own, much less informed colleagues. Most important, he boldly but falsely claims that "we are in an excellent position with [regard to] missile-building" and that the USSR has already set in motion assembly lines capable of serial production of "an assortment of rockets to serve any military purpose." In fact, as was known to the tiny group of military and missile designers who reported directly to Khrushchev as the head of the Defense Council, the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had not yet begun and there were only four unwieldy R-7s on a launching pad near Plesetsk in northern Russia. The first test of the next-generation ICBM of the Yangel firm was still nine months away.

At the core of Khrushchev's reasoning was his belief that from then on

the Cold War would be decided by the outcome of economic competition between the United States and Soviet Union. With the great optimism characteristic of the times, he explained to the Politburo members that if the West did not reciprocate to Soviet cuts, so much worse for it, since the burden of military budgets would drag its economies down. And the romantic Khrushchev firmly believed that once "workers, but also peasants, petit bourgeois elements," saw the USSR's determination to disarm, they would shed their anti-Soviet fears and move "to neutral positions, and then would develop sympathies toward our country." Thus, Khrushchev repeated the disarmament dictum of the Soviet diplomacy of the 1920s and early 1930s, but, unlike his predecessors, did not intend to use it merely as a smoke-screen for Soviet build-up, but, on the contrary, as a rationale for a unilateral build-down.

The point where Khrushchev's imagination reached record-breaking heights was in plotting an army of the future. On one hand he was primarily moved by his conviction that the construction of communism would require maximum military demobilization. He was attracted by the reforms of the 1920s carried out by Mikhail Frunze, when more of the Red Army conscripts would be trained not in "the cadre move and East German leader Walter Ulbricht had to ask Soviet representatives what its implications would be for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

A resurgence of tensions with the West would doom Khrushchev's dalliance with disarmament. Perhaps surprisingly, his proposals outlived the flare-up with the Eisenhower Administration surrounding the Soviet downing of an U.S. U-2 spy plane and the collapse of the East-West summit in Paris in May 1960. But they fell victim to an another Khrushchev initiative: his determination to change the status of West Berlin and achieve a German settlement favorable to the Kremlin through an ultimatum to the West. The renewal of the Berlin Crisis in June 1961 (after



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