

and the South China Sea.⁵ In short, prevention is not simply a high ideal, but a prudent option that sometimes works (cf. Jentelso, 1996; Zartman, 2001: 305f; Miall, 2007: 7,16,17).

Given the evidence that inaction is wasteful and preventive labors can bear fruit, international actors could be collecting and applying what has been learned from recent experience to manage the tensions around the world from which future conflicts will

as dispersed as child-rearing practices, thus dooming the concept to impracticality.¹¹ To mark a beginning point when pre-emptive actions first become practicable, Peck (1995) usefully delineated early and late prevention. The former seeks to improve the relationship of parties or states that are not actively fighting but deeply estranged. Left unaddressed, such latent animosities might revert to the use of force as soon as a crisis arose.¹² Late prevention pertains to when fighting among specific parties appears imminent.

Boutros-Ghali also extended conflict prevention downstream to actions to keep violent conflicts from spreading to more places. But because such 'horizontal' escalation seemed to go beyond averting the rise to violence ('vertical' escalation) and thus to include containing open warfare, some analysts worried that it implied suppressing physical violence at any subsequent stage in an armed conflict. This would conflate it too easily with actions in the middle of wars (even though Boutros-Ghali offered the separate term 'peacemaking' for those). Bringing prevention into the realm of active wars would eclipse its proactive nature behind the conventional interventions that occur late in conflicts, for which terms like conflict management, peace enforcement or peacekeeping were more fitting. This merging would vitiate the pre-emptive uniqueness of prevention compared to those other concepts (cf. Lund, 1996). It would forego the opportunity to test the central premise that had animated this new post-Cold War notion: that acting before violent conflicts fully breaks out is likely to be more effective than acting on a war in progress. To think of prevention as occurring while wars are already waging not only disregards most people's connotation of 'prevention,' but would relegate the international community to remediating costly war after costly war in a perpetual game of catch-up, foregoing the chance to ever get ahead of the game. While some analysts continued to apply prevention to any subsequent level of violent conflict (Leatherman et al. 1999), most now confine it to actions to avoid the

eruption of social and political disputes into substantial violence, keeping the emphasis squarely on stages before, rather than during violent conflicts.

In particular, the focus of this chapter is 'primary prevention' of prospective new or 'virgin' conflicts, where a peaceful equilibrium has prevailed for some years, but fundamental social and/or global forces are producing new controversies, tensions and disputes.¹³ However, imperative later interventions are for minimizing loss of life, they are less humane and likely more difficult because the antagonists are organized, armed, and deeply invested in destroying each other.¹⁴ Graph 15.1 locates this particular

moment




Table 15.1 Taxonomy of illustrative conflict prevention instruments

	<i>A Priori Measures</i> (Generic norms and regimes for classes of countries)	<i>Ad Hoc Measures</i> (‘Hands on’ actions targeted to particular places and times)
Structural Measures (Address basic societal, institutional and policy factors affecting conflict/peace)	Standards for human rights, good governance Environmental regimes World Trade Organization negotiations OAS and AU’s protocols on protecting democracy International organization membership or affiliations	Economic reforms and assistance Enterprise promotion Natural resource management Decentralization, federalism Long-term observer missions Group assimilation policies Aid for elections, legislatures Human rights and conflict resolution education Aid for police and judiciary Executive power-sharing Security sector reform
Direct Measures (Address more immediate behaviors affecting conflict/peace)	International Criminal Court War Crimes Tribunals Special Rapporteurs for Human Rights Arms control treaties Global regulation of illegal trade (e.g., Kimberly Process for ‘conflict diamonds’) EU Lome and Cotonou processes on democracy, governance, and human rights	Human rights capacity-building Inter-group dialogue, reconciliation Conditional budget support Fact-finding missions Arms embargoes ‘Peace radio’ Good offices, facilitation, track-two diplomacy ‘Muscular’ mediation Preventive deployment Economic sanctions Threat of force Rapid reaction forces

this micro-focus within the macro-focus of the larger processes of nation and state-building, in which interactive techniques are only one among a much larger set of instruments.

Prevention by other names

Table 15.1 reveals also that many de facto direct, structural and generic preventive instruments may not be recognized as such because they operate under aliases. Historically, the Congress of Vienna, League of Nations, the United Nations system of agencies, Marshall Plan, European Union, and NATO and other security alliances were all established to reduce the potential for future inter-state or intra-state conflicts and are thus fundamentally preventive (Lund, 1996a, 1997). During the Cold War, *détente* and co-existence, arms control treaties, and the CSCE sought to keep the tense superpower relationship from erupting into conventional or nuclear war. Since the Cold War, many

other policies and institutions encourage peaceful management of disputes, such democracy-building and as rule of law programs, nuclear non-proliferation, and regional organizations.²³ Whether any of these tools explicitly bear the term conflict prevention is immaterial, as long as features are built into them that perform prevention effectively. Conflict prevention is also at stake in current debates over current potential crises, such as Iran’s nuclear plans, although those words are not used (Ignatius, 2006). All in all, one answer to our question of why it seems that prevention is not tried more often is that it may actually be operating, but under other labels.

WHAT IS BEING DONE? A WELL-KEPT SECRET

The examples so far show that conflict prevention is neither hypothetical nor new.

UN has sought to promote more pro-active

Changing norms

New international norms appear to be emerging, albeit slowly and tacitly, that affirm an international obligation to respond to potential eruptions of violence, especially genocide. As successive bloody wars have hit the headlines, one no longer hears that they are inevitable 'tragedies' resulting from 'age-old hatreds.' Instead, concerns are voiced that the calamity could have been avoided,

(Moller and Svensson, 2007: 17). U.S. foreign policy debates constantly dwell only on the narrow question of how “tough” to be toward enemies and whether to go to intervene militarily here or there, thus totally ignoring the options available before such adversaries are created and crisis points are reached. Although humanitarian and development aid have increased, resources earmarked for conflict prevention, with the exception of a few dedicated funds, have not.

Dispersion of wills

The conventional explanation of why major international organizations do not respond to potential conflicts is a ‘lack of political will.’ But this is vague and does not explain how it can be that preventive actions sometimes *are* taken. While it may be assumed that Western publics are opposed to the use of force abroad to stop genocide or humanitarian crises, it is not clear they would balk at strengthening the capacity to avert crises and avoid later costs. (Jentleson, 1996: 14). Public opinion is also not the final arbiter, for political leaders can circumvent or influence it. Several recent prevention

such compatibility does not hold, yet there is no common understanding or procedure for prioritizing goals at differing stages of conflict.

These value conflicts reflect differing worldviews of diverse professionals regarding how to conflict. Diplomatic, military, and security communities often ignore the need to address underlying, longer-term factors that contribute to conflicts, as they pursue predominantly elite-oriented and state-centered approaches to already armed conflicts. On the other hand, development agencies and NGOs generally fail to recognize the need for sufficient diplomatic clout or other forms of power to confront the immediate drivers of intra-state conflicts, such as political leaders who can mobilize popular followings and armed groups. On their part, the human rights community often takes a legal-judicial approach to exposing violations of human rights principles and punishing the guilty – justice over peace – whereas the conflict resolution school emphasizes stopping violence, strengthening human relationships and achieving reconciliation.³⁶ But these philosophical differences lead the various fields to elevate one value above others and pursue differing policy goals, thus frustrating the achievement of effective overall prevention strategies. All good things do not necessarily go together. Empirically speaking, one kind of leverage without others may have serious limits or cause harm (see the following section). What is required is recognition that no one value necessarily can be achieved absolutely; compromises need to strike balances between competing values in differing circumstances.

These dissonances may be getting more crossfield attention, however. Procedurally, efforts to achieve policy coherence are being made by country-level coordinators such as the UN Secretary General's special representatives and UNDP resident representatives. Whole-of-government efforts are reflected in such entities as the US State Department's new Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Inter-agency harmonization is being attempted by the UN's

Peacebuilding Commission, at least for post-conflict countries.³⁷ Some development agencies are funding non-official diplomacy initiatives that are intended to influence domestic power politics, while the notion of 'soft power' encourages diplomats and military officials to explore the utility of development and other non-coercive policies. In sum, another part of the lack of sufficient proactive response is the dispersion of international activities and goals already in countries threatened by violence. The problem is not deploying them anew. A downside of the expansive notion of prevention is that these various activities are pursued with no procedures for galvanizing them into concerted prevention strategies. Alternatively, a considerable multiplier effect would be achieved if the multiple efforts in a given country were each made more 'conflict-smart,' for their aggregate impact would be more potent. Conflict prevention might be largely a matter of re-engineering the many diplomatic, development and other programs that already operate in developing countries so that they serve conflict prevention objectives more directly and in a more concerted way (Lund, 1998a).

WHAT KINDS OF PREVENTION ARE

B

The first wave of this research looked mainly at preventive diplomacy (direct prevention), and thus relatively late stages of confrontation (e.g., Miall, 1992; Manuera, 1994; Lund, 1996). It suggests convergence around elements that appear to be associated with effective avoidance of violence:³⁸

1. Act at an early stage (Miall, 1992: 198), that is before a triggering event (Wallensteen, 1998: 15), "early, early, early" (Jentleson, 2000: 337).
2. Be swift and decisive, not equivocal and

1998, 2004; Nicolaides; Rowsbotham and Miall; Leatherman et al.,)⁴¹ to get at this issue. Differing levels of analysis, typologies, and cases have impeded the task of cumulating and verifying findings, and many are partly deductive rather than empirical (e.g., Lund, 1997; Leatherman; Kriesberg, 2003; Rothchild, 2003: 45). Nevertheless, gathering up what extant findings and grounded reasoning suggest so far can provide useful heuristic guidelines for policymakers about which combinations of instruments to apply to the early stages of conflict.⁴²

To explore the available evidence, we examine below what research suggests are most useful of the basic types of prevention at each of three distinguishable early phases of conflicts. These phases lie in the realm of unstable peace between a peaceful equilibrium where conflicts are managed predictably, on the one hand, and tensions are beginning to escalate into confrontation, significant violence or organized armed conflict, on the other (cf. e.g., Mitchell, 1981; 2006; Lund, 1996; Lund, 1997; Kriesberg, 2003; Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005).⁴³ To frame the following discussion, we pose here a familiar assumption that “soft” measures must be followed by “hard” ones, the more a conflict escalates – e.g., diplomacy must precede the use of force. The UN Charter envisions that the procedures in Chapter Six for peaceful settlements of disputes may have to be followed by the more coercive measures in Chapter Seven of sanctions and peace enforcement. Others subscribe to this graduated ‘ladder of prevention’ (Eliasson). Similarly, regarding interactive conflict resolution methods, the contingency model hypothesizes that the greater the intensity of conflict, the more that non-assertive techniques of facilitation must give way to the directive techniques of mediation, arbitration and adjudication (Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

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These arise when exogenous or endogenous changes are generating underlying but unacknowledged strains among societal groups but

they have yet to mobilize to express their interests.⁴⁴

A priori instruments: structural and direct

As described earlier, one prominent a priori instrument involves global and regional organizations promulgating standards or regulations backed by incentives in order to encourage present or prospective member states to respect human rights, adopt democratic procedures, settle disputes peacefully with their own minorities and neighboring states, or submit to restrictions on terms of trade (e.g., Lund, OECD-DAC, 1998; Jentleson, 2000: 338; Hamburg, 2002: 147; Cortright, 269–72).⁴⁵ The evident effectiveness of this instrument in reducing potential causes of conflict seems to derive from the conditional incentives offered to leaders who have already subscribed to particular norms, at least nominally, and are already in power *before* particular conflicts ensue, thus avoiding the difficulties of intervening where parties have already violated the norms and become entrenched in opposed positions on specific disputes. When agreeing to them, a regime’s future stakes are not immediately apparent, compliance can be voluntary, there is time to adjust a country’s policies, and individual actors cannot argue they are being singled out. If the penalties for violations are significant, ‘the sunk costs borne by the parties ... are not so overwhelming as to dwarf the public good provided by the

para-statal, reduce public spending, remove price subsidies, stabilize monetary systems, and liberalize trade regulations (Muscat, 2002: 196), the rationale was not solely economic productivity and growth, but political stability, an implicit theory of peace. In fact, considerable large 'n' research suggests that economic liberalization such as free trade policies are highly correlated with lower levels of poverty, and that development correlates with lower levels of conflict (e.g., Hegre et al., 2002; Goldstone et al., 2003). Failing to enact reforms, on the other hand, is likely to deepen poverty and inequities that increase the chances for upheaval.

However, critics argue that structural adjustment measures can increase political instability and thus risk of conflict, especially in the poorest countries by reducing income and increasing competition among prospec-

reforms because they are more or less 'lumpy.'⁵⁴ Implementing programs through multi-group and locally-run mechanisms may help to avoid obvious partiality and bridge such cleavages (e.g., Anderson).⁵⁵

Both economic reform and outright aid are less likely to provoke conflict if developing societies have *ttt* that manage the

run institutions (Nicolaidis, 51). A point is reached when the question is whether a body politic adopts such habits on its own without third-party therapy. Such non-formal methods are not intended as alternatives to tougher approaches, but complementary (Fisher, in Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997: 241).

A innovative hybrid of a priori, ad hoc, structural and direct engagement that lies between non-formal facilitation and formal mediation is the work of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), an office mandated to become proactively engaged in ethnic disputes arising in the 1990s. The first able incumbent and his successors have made innumerable visits to Eastern Europe and newly independent states to meet with leaders and minority groups. They facilitate dialogues, recommend policy remedies to chief executives and parliaments, and show how OSCE norms may apply, including drafting model legislation. Only very rarely have they publicly pressured the parties, but crucial to the success that many analysts judge this innovation has often had in reducing divisive tensions and eliciting accommodation is the eventual reward for good behavior of economic aid and membership in the EU, NATO, and other Western bodies (e.g., Hopmann, Mychajlyszyn).

Still, leaders in conflict-vulnerable societies and weak states are often disinclined to compromise and/or they affirm positions and agreements they cannot enforce (Nicolaidis, 1996: 52). If their recalcitrance breaks off communication or thwarts opportunities for joint problem-solving, third parties may need to get more directive by engaging parties in 'muscular mediation' or formal negotiations with teeth (e.g., Jakobsen, 1996: 24), such as proffered aid or 'coercive diplomacy,' such as threats to cut off aid (Rothchild, 2002: 48f), impose economic sanctions, or use force (e.g., George, 1994: 199).

Military measures can also be used for direct prevention, but not yet in the form of a threat or actual use of force. The usual foreign policy debate over 'force versus diplomacy' tends to pertain to high levels of confrontation. But before that stage,

the overlooked but promising instrument of preventive deployment (Nicolaidis, 44f) can act as a deterrent by inter-positioning forces even before any hostile actions have occurred. The only clear example has been UNPREDEP, the UN force that posted 1100 troops along MacedevveG3wl5(,)no5(Drdctuaong)-376.(postpertai)

most urgent is to halt the spiral through potent political and military direct prevention.⁷³

The tougher tools of formal diplomacy, though difficult, may arrive at short-term settlements to buy time such as ceasefires (Nicolaidis, 1996: 52; Rothchild, 2002: 54; Heldt, 8). These are more likely to be effective to the extent a strong mediator or team is skillful in instilling the parties with an urgent sense of the costs that can come from further bloodshed (Rothchild, 2002: 55). They also work better if accompanied by potential rewards that buy off the parties and help them fulfill an agreement, including the offer of development aid (Cortright, 1998, Rothchild, 2002), and/or punishments that pressure them to agree. Where there is asymmetry in power between the parties, measures to strengthen the power of the weaker party may budge the stronger.

Where the parties remain obdurate, coercive diplomacy such as sanctions or threat of force may be needed to reverse undesired actions or compel desired actions. Threats of the use of force were used when, for example, Presidents Bush and Clinton issued several warnings to President Milosevic not to support any armed activity in Kosovo as he had in Bosnia. Such threats are more likely to be effective if issued before possible escalations of hostile actions occurs, or if they follow immediately upon initial manifestations of violence (Nicolaidis, 44–5), not *ex post facto*. Threatening to expel a state from an international organization is less effective once significant investment in a violent course has occurred. The more that the conflicting parties inflict physical harm on each other, they cannot just back down the ladder they climbed up, for mutual hurt and increasing fear remain (Mitchell, 2005; cf. Rothchild, 2002: 51). By the same token, indictment by a war crimes tribunal is not likely to prevent the perpetrator continuing to fight, and can be counter-productive, once they are named and being hunted down, as they have no incentive to refrain from fighting, unless some provision allows amnesty. If sanctions are actually used, they must be comprehensive to be effective (Jentleson, 2000: 337). But such coercive

diplomacy is less applicable when the threat is a breakdown of a state since the source of the problem is hard to target (Nicolaidis, 42). Similarly, non-targeted sanctions have been widely criticized as having considerable negative side-effects for the general population while benefitting well-positioned elites.

One of the few joined debates in this scattered literature pertains to this stage: when are conflicts ‘ripe for prevention?’ Some analysts believe it more propitious to act before the outbreak of any significant violence. Violence ‘crosses a Rubicon’ from which it is very difficult to return (Jentleson, 2000), creating huge challenges for intervenors (cf. Edmead, 1971 cited in Berkovitch, 1996: 251). Others believe that some initial fighting that gets nowhere, a ‘soft stalemate,’ is needed before parties will no longer be tempted to try violence to see if it gets them gains (Berkovitch, 1996: 251). Thwarted violence or blocked confrontation are thus needed to soften parties up to compromise.⁷⁴

Third-party willingness to use force can also influence the calculations of actors regarding their use of force. Much discourse in conflict prevention assumes military force to be antithetical to peace. Some NGOs that first stepped up to undertake conflict resolution responsibilities in threatened countries tend to oppose any form of force ideologically, or to downplay the role of any coercion in favor of non-coercive methods and policies such as diplomacy and, lately, development assistance. But some analysts suggest that sticks as well as carrots need to be exerted more or less simultaneously – with flexibility shown regarding what quotients of each are applied in specific situations (Jentleson, 2000; Byman, 2002: 219). ‘...while coercion rarely is sufficient for prevention, it often is necessary’ (Jentleson, 2000: 5). Deterrence through the threat of using force may often be a pre-requisite for effective negotiations

(Jakobsen, 1996: 3), such as through possessing capabilities and having domestic and international backing that can be sustained. They also need to be targeted precisely at specific actors who might otherwise escalate their actions, be potentially more costly to the parties than their persevering, identify the proscribed behaviors, and be accompanied by realistic alternative solutions (Nicolaidis, 42–4).⁷⁵ The chances increase if the balance of power favors the threat sponsor and the value to the targeted actor of ignoring the threat is greater than the costs of compliance (Jakobsen, 1996: 3–5).⁷⁶

Alternatively, if the threat of force is not backed up with credible force when there is non-compliance, they run the risk of encouraging aggression by calling the bluff of the international actors (Nicolaidis, 45).⁷⁷ A lack of follow-through or half-hearted measures can embolden their target (Nicolaidis, 1996: 42–3) if that party comes to believe that the threat is empty. Empty threats toward Bosnian Serbs had adverse effects when the latter did not follow through in protecting safe areas such as in Srebrenica (Jakobsen, 1996: 24).⁷⁸

Actual use of force may be needed to limit emerging violence such as being visited upon a threatened minority group (Nicolaidis, 42). Several argue that timely introduction of a relatively small force in Rwanda in May of 1994 would have stopped Hutu extremists from continuing to carry out their plans to kill thousands of Tutsi and Hutu moderates (Feil, 1998; Feil (1998) cited in Jentleson, 2000: 16; cf. Melander, 10f.). But this has been questioned (Kuperman, 2000). The tactical question is what amount is sufficient to restrain or reverse the undesired behavior.⁷⁹

(derived perhaps from a Cold War crisis paradigm in which sovereignty is supreme and engagement comes late in the form of diplomacy or military action) does not sufficiently factor in structural measures, hands-on institutional support and positive incentives, and deterrent military measures. Regrettably, however, as useful as all these research findings may be as guidelines to action, they are not followed because decisionmakers do not have such lessons at their fingertips.⁸⁰

NEXT STEPS: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL

To answer the puzzle this chapter first posed, conflict prevention is still a relatively marginal international concern for several reasons: a plurality of possible instruments and agents; its de facto operation under other names, lack of conceptual closure about stages and types of interventions; a lack of confidence due in part to dim awareness of the actual extent of recent capacity building and effective actions on the ground; dispersed activism globally and in a given country by diverse professions and overstretched governmental and non-governmental international organizations; and scattered research agendas and findings, yielding little usable guidance for would-be preventors. Yet, pro-active responses to head off potential conflicts are happening, and prima facie evidence suggests that combined with certain conducive factors, they can be effective. To tap the unfulfilled potential of conflict prevention, this state of the art could be advanced through three steps:

1. Consolidate what is known. Lack of sufficient knowledge does not excuse why more frequent and effective responses to incipient conflicts are not undertaken. Policymakers tend to ignore the useful knowledge that already exists. Professionals need to gain access to top officials to present promising options and evidence of their results. The main problem is not epistemological but organizational. We need not wait until social

scientists have found the universally highest correlations among the limited set of variables already most plausibly known as relevant before we continue as in the previous section to gather, synthesize, and disseminate the existing findings among policymakers and field practitioners. Enough is known to produce heuristic guidance, for even the most verified conclusions are cannot be implemented mechanically in any particular conflict setting, but used as action-hypotheses to be combined with astute political judgments. A structured framework could pull together the preventive instruments available with guidelines about which are likely to be most feasible and productive in what conditions.

2. Focus the knowledge on emerging conflicts. Conflicts do not emerge in Washington, New York or Brussels, but in particular developing countries at specific times. To have practical value, any gathered policy wisdom needs to be applied on the ground in real time. Many currently early-warning-identified poor societies and weak states (e.g., Papua, Kyrgystan, Guinea) would benefit from pro-active and concerted efforts that apply peaceful policies to avoid escalation to crises and violent conflicts. The country level is where the diverse agendas and tools are most clearly juxtaposed and concretely reconciled. This requires organizing consultations through which key actors (USG, UN, EU, regionals, governments, NGOs) can jointly assess the country situations and devise and implement diagnosis-driven targeted strategies, both at the field and desk officer level. Such processes would (a) apply conflict-sensitive indicators to identify systematically the most important short- and long-term risks in a country that are affecting the prospects for escalating conflict as well as its capacities for peaceful management of conflict; (b) identify what actions each actor can contribute within the strategy; and (c) consult the lessons learned from actual experience with various combinations of instruments.⁸¹

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