DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND URBAN SUSTAINABILITY

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

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INTRODUCTION

JOSEPH S. TULCHIN AND DIANA H. VARAT

In the past century, the dynamism of cities that is, the concentration of political energy, economic activity, and social interactions within urban areas has fulfilled the promise of a better life for millions of migrants worldwide. Yet, rapid urbanization in the 20th century has left millions of others on the fringes of urban society with little access to basic services, stable employment, or adequate housing. Political instability, urban mismanagement, and incomplete processes of decentralization pose

governance dilemma develops. The management of cities becomes an increasingly complex process as the number of local stakeholders swells. Improved urban governance, then, is rooted in the difficult balance between municipal and metropolitan planning, and precariously situated among competing agendas. Formulating the policies and conditions for

the growth in civil society, current political structures offer urban populations little more power than they held previously. Traditional modalities of discipline and control persist despite the growth of nonstate actors. How, then, despite what many have considered to be progress in political activity from urban populations, will new forms of citizenship emerge? Will citizenship be dominated by market forces, by medieval structures or by the process of feminization?

The second section of this report confronts the linkages between the physical environment of the city and the quality of life for the urban poor. Current urban trends will test the sustainability of cities in the coming decades, both in the environmental sense and with respect to health. Growing desperation due to economic stagnation, the continuation of inadequate services, and the spread of disease make urban unrest probable in future years. Policymakers must consider urban policies in the long-term in light of the potential for social conflict. In chapter three, Ellen Brennan-Galvin discusses the importance of land use in defining the quality of life for residents. As the use of automobiles increases in developing countries, air pollution and subsequent health problems spread as well. The dangers of poorly managed growth become apparent through Brennan-Galvin's discussion of current trends in China, citing dangerously high levels of both lead and carbon dioxide. Preparing for future population growth, in the cities of Asia and Africa especially, demands that planners and politicians devise holistic strategies for land use patterns, coordinating public transportation and the construction of roads.

For the urban poor, environmental degradation manifests itself most clearly through negative impacts on health. In Mar a Elena Ducci's paper on Health, Habitat, and Urban Governance, she reviews ten years of a project on health and habitat aimed at bridging the gap between the public health and urban planning fields. Ducci notes the importance of involving and energizing communities through the urgency of health issues. She advocates participatory action research projects with a health-and-habitat perspective to determine how communities themselves can confront health challenges. Ducci also notes the linkages between housing policies

urban communities. In order to create socially sustainable cities, urban policies must be attentive to indigenous networks and coping mechanisms.

In her paper on Urban Health in the 21st Century: Challenges of Privatization, Participation, Individualism, and Citizenry, Carolyn Stephens further examines the notion that poverty leads to social fragmentation through the unequal provision of health services. She argues that urbanization and globalization allow prosperity and poverty to exist side by side. As opposite ends of the spectrum (le20(40(eth icloh sal pr)29(o)4x

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focuses on the role of government and the ways in which direct, but flexibly planned growth can improve a city. Nello introduces us to the recent growth of the city of Barcelona, examining local responses to current patterns of urban sprawl and functional specialization. Despite being one of Europe's most densely populated cities, recent expansion into the outer rings of the city region has challenged traditional planning modes. Ensuring that growth is managed effectively in an effort to preclude social segregation is of the utmost importance. Barcelona's municipal government has fought hard to preserve the compact, complex, and integrated

PART I

SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE IN THE URBAN MILLENNIUM

CHAPTER 1

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Richard Stren
University of Toronto

For those of us interested in local politics, these are exciting times. In the late 1980s, it was possible for a leading student of urban development in the United States to proclaim that the very heart and soul of local politics has surely died [1]; although this statement elicited various disclaimers, it was nevertheless an arguable proposition.[2] By the beginning of the present decade, however, local politics (and local governance) had become one of the most lively and active platforms for the expression of a wide range of social issues. Surveys show that, while the general population in North America has become disenchanted with their national governments, trust and confidence in state and local governments has been positive[3] and indeed, during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, rising sharply.[4] And issues having to do with urban gover-

system, from the local to the international, interest crystallizes elsewhere. Although the national state is still central to economic, social, and even cultural life, its powers and functions have changed in complex ways. To Manuel Castells, "the nation-state is increasingly powerless in controlling monetary policy, deciding its budget, organizing production and trade, collecting its corporate taxes, and fulfilling its commitments to provide social benefits. In sum, it has lost most of its economic power, albeit it still has some regulatory capacity and relative control over its subjects." [5] Other commentators have developed different arguments to explain the relative weakening of the state; some of these writers claim that the state has willingly deserted many of its central economic and social policy functions, essentially for ideological reasons.[6] The tendency to adopt "new public management" measures, which include the reduction in the size of government departments, privatizing or semi-privatizing a host of hitherto central government functions, and the adoption of business protocols of behavior and organization in public service agencies, are changing the traditional role of government. Domestic pressures in many countries are seriously questioning the balance between public and private and even between central and local allocation of functions.[7] In this post-September 11 world, we may be seeing a movement back to a stronger role for the state in military, and perhaps also economic and even social policy matters.

Deconstruction of the state has been paralleled by widespread decentralization of powers from the national to the provincial (state) and local levels all around the world. As the political scientist James Manor points out, this process has taken place for many reasons:

> *Decentralization has quietly become a fashion of our time. It is being considered or attempted in an astonishing diversity of developing and transitional countries…by solvent and insolvent regimes, by democracies (both mature and emergent) and autocracies, by regimes making the transition to democracy and by others seeking to avoid that transition, by regimes with various colonial inheritances and by those with none. It is being attempted where civil society is strong, and where it is weak. It appeals to people of the left, the center and the right, and to groups which disagree with each other on a number of other issues.*[8]

The nature of these decentralization policies varies tremendously from incremental changes in protocols of intergovernmental relations on

the one hand, to major constitutional amendments or even new constitutional dispensations on the other. The result of these policies is almost uniformly to invest local levels of governance with a new and more compelling importance. A number of major countries gave new constitutional powers to municipalities during this period. In Brazil, a new constitution in 1988 considerably increased the power of municipalities in relation to the states, assigning to them control of intra-city transport, preschool and elementary education, land use, preventive health care, and historical and cultural preservation. On the participatory side, municipalities in Brazil were given the right to establish councils of stakeholders (called in English, "municipal boards" or "community councils"). These bodies, established in most of the largest cities in the country, include non-elected representatives of community groups, and deal with such important matters as urban development, education, the environment, health, and sanitation.

that the community and important local stakeholder groups must be engaged in the local governance process.

In the Philippines, the Local Government Code of 1991 devolved significant powers from the national government to municipalities. At the urban level, the most important decentralized powers were health, social welfare, environmental protection, and local public works and highways. To administer these services, the code decentralized many categories of public servants

closely related to a worldwide "wave" of democratization from the late 1970s through the 1990s. A democracy in the twenty-first century may be understood as a system in which the "most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."[11] As such, democracy implies the concurrent existence of freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize and the active functioning of more than one major political party to give voters a choice of alternative leadership groups. Beginning in 1974 in Portugal, and eventually spreading outward, a wave of democratization engulfed more than thirty countries in both industrial and developing areas. During this period, regimes changed from authoritarian structures to democratic systems in 11 one-party systems, 7 regimes based on personal rulers, 16 regimes that had been under military control, and 1 regime (South Africa) that had been dominated by a racial oligarchy.[12] For states with a population greater than one million, the years 1973–90 saw an increase in what could be classified as "democratic states" from 30 to 59, and a decrease in "nondemocratic states" from 92 to 71.[13] During the early part of this period, the trend was particularly marked in Latin America, where "democratic transitions" took place in such major countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru; in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the transitional trend shifted to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This pattern continued during the 1990s, to the point that calculating from a somewhat different framework Freedom House could estimate that by 1999, 88 of the world's 191 sovereign states could be considered as "free," which meant "that they maintain a high degree of political and economic freedom and respect basic civil liberties."[14] A slightly higher number 117 could be considered valid electoral democracies, "based on a stringent standard requiring that all elected national authority must be the product of free and fair electoral processes."[15]

While overall trends have been encouraging, certain regions have lagged behind. The Middle East had only one "free" country out of 14; others have stagnated. In the latter category is Africa, which nevertheless witnessed such major events as the full democratization of South Africa in 1994, and the return to democracy of Nigeria in 1999. By the end of the decade, the Freedom House survey reported that of 53 African countries evaluated, 9 were "free" (that is, full electoral democracies), 21 were "partly free," and 23 were "not free" (that is, authoritarian systems).

Seventeen (or about a third) were electoral democracies. [16] Overall, these African figures showed little change over the course of the decade.

There is a very large literature (most of it written by political scientists) on democratization, democratic transitions, and even democratic consolidation in the developing world. This literature, which deals essentially with the politics of elections, is complemented by the efforts of a number of research institutions and NGOs to keep statistics on trends over time as we have seen in the case of the Freedom House calculations above. Although there was a period at least up to the mid-1980s in Latin America, for instance when neighborhood political movements were studied as part of the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, the most influential writers on democracy have, over the last decade, concentrated on national rather than local patterns of politics. In national and comparative surveys, the relationship between national and local democratic development is rarely if ever explored. It is apparently assumed (if not discussed) that what is true nationally is also true locally. Indeed, local politics almost appears to be the forgotten child of the family of national-level institutions and political practices that are the most powerful initiators and indicators of political change. When all is said and done, these national-level trends appear to be the key data in which we should be interested.

But in many countries, an active local political system has proved more resilient than an active politics at the national level. Indeed, in a number of important cases, authoritarian governments at the national level coexisted with relatively democratic institutions at the local level. For example, during much of the period since 1966, when Nigeria has been under military rule, local government elections have taken place. Ecuador, which was under military rule from 1972 to 1978, maintained elected local governments during this time. And Brazil, which was ruled by a military regime between 1964 and 1985, maintained at least the formalities of municipal autonomy and retained municipal elections with the exception of 201 municipalities that were either state capitals, national security zones, or mineral-producing areas, where executive heads were appointed by the military. [17] The logic behind this apparent contradiction in approaches between the national and local levels is that authoritarian governments are often prepared to support democratic institutions at the local level when they have little power in order to attempt to legitimize

their rule. However, when politics (for whatever reasons) becomes open and democratic at the national level, the culture of democracy is inconsistent with authoritarianism at the local level, because people tend to demand more access to political institutions at all levels.

Over the last decade, in Eastern Europe and Latin America in particular, elected municipal councils have proliferated over the political land-

months of their dissolution; the attribution to municipal governments of such tasks as poverty alleviation and planning for economic and social development; the setting up of finance commissions at the state level with the object of improving the financial position of the municipalities; and the requirement that one-third of all the seats in local bodies,

housing with a multiplicity of commercial and residential uses.[28] These demographic and economic innovations, under pressure of structural change, have resulted in complex new patterns which, in turn, have required more flexible and accommodating norms of regulation and urban management.

Two other African examples illustrate different aspects of this evolving new relationship between the local state and civil society. In a well-documented study of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, during the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Aili Mari Tripp shows how government policy was deeply affected by the decision of many women to resort to informal trading activities. As a result of the structural adjustment policies undertaken by the Tanzanian government which had the effect of laying off many male workers and holding wages down in an inflationary economy women began to undertake income generating activities on a massive scale. At first the government (including the central government as well as the municipality) tried to control and regulate this informal economy; abuses and unnecessary harassment were common, to the point that the government was becoming very unpopular. The privatization of many services, initially resisted by the government, was finally permitted. In the end, the municipality became more selective in its regulatory policies, and the central government was forced to reverse

contributed time, money, and effort. In the late 1980s Lima had an estimated eighteen hundred communal soup kitchens, serving approximately seventy thousand individuals daily, and some thirty-five hundred Vaso de Leche neighborhood committees delivering some 1 million glasses of milk a day in Lima. Dietz argues that the number of kitchens may have doubled after the initial economic shocks of Fujimori's adjustment policies in the early 1990s; in 1994, USAID estimated that, as an agency, it was feeding one in three Peruvians.[34] Partly as a result of this massive self-help and NGO effort, it was argued, people did not systematically protest the economic policies of the government, even though they were initially very much affected by them.

In some countries, NGOs helped to maintain political pluralism; in others, they kept authoritarianism at bay. In Brazil beginning in the late 1970s, for example,

> *civil society breathed the air of the political "opening," which heralded a return to democratic rule after twenty years of authoritarianism. Mobilization took root in the factories, but soon spread beyond the labour movement and political parties. In both poor neighbourhoods…and middle-class areas, the population organized to demand the right to basic services–water supply, sewerage, school facilities, health facilities, roads–and protested against ecological dangers, development plans which ignored residents' interests, housing evictions and a host of other causes.*[35]

The emergence of urban social movements in Mexico and Peru, involving in particular the mobilization and organization of low-income communities, predated the Brazilian awakening. But the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City, and a growing concern over urban environmental risk especially as a result of high levels of air pollution in the capital, led to a diverse range of protests and popular activity in the area of human settlements. As Latin America urbanized, the link between protests and organizational activity to secure land and improved urban services and demands for the reduction and control of air and water pollution in the cities became more pronounced. Both, in any case, were central to the democratization process in Latin America. A case in point of the relationship between environmental protest and democratization is Cubat o in southern Brazil, described in the late 1970s as the valley of death and

the [illegible] most polluted city in the world. In Cubat o, water, air, and soil

$15.20, in Asia (Pacific) $248.60, in Latin America and the Caribbean $252.20, and in the industrialized world $2,763.30. The ratio between the lowest and the highest region is in the order of 1:182, while the ratio between per-capita income in sub-Saharan Africa and that of the high income countries based on *World Development Report* figures for 1993 is 1:44.[41] In the very poorest countries, very few services can be supplied to urban dwellers by local governments, regardless of the degree or effectiveness of decentralization. The limited level of resources available at the local level on the part of the government poses very serious questions about the efficacy of the newly created local institutions.

Decentralization and the Local Associational Response in a Poor Country: The Case of Khartoum, Sudan

Under these circumstances, the responses of local civil society become absolutely crucial. As African cities in spite of the fact that they are decentralizing and even (in many cases) democratizing at the municipal level attempt to respond to growing populations and the insistent problems of water and sanitation, refuse collection, and transport, to say nothing of dealing with health, education, and housing problems, their cupboards are virtually bare. What appears to be happening is that all over the continent self-help and neighborhood groups are forming spontaneously to undertake local functions and even to generate and allocate resources that the state (or municipality) is incapable of dealing with. A study of local-level authorities and local action in Khartoum, Sudan, illustrates this point graphically.[42] Partly because of famine and civil war elsewhere in the country, the population of Khartoum has increased dramatically over the past two decades. By 1993 it was estimated at 2.8 million, with a ten-year intercensal growth rate of 7.7 percent per annum one of the highest in the world. During the 1990s, the Sudanese government experienced extreme economic hardship, combined with the fact that, for political reasons, it received little international assistance. Partly as a result, the government undertook an ambitious scheme to decentralize government structures, with the goal of mobilizing local resources and energies. Without going into all the major details of this complex scheme, suffice it to point out here that the country has been divided into states, provinces, localities (or local councils), and basic con-

ferences. At both the state and very local levels are elected bodies some of whose members are elected to a national assembly of the whole country. The localities which include both elected representatives and civil servants seconded from state ministries have the important responsibilities of service delivery (including education and public health), environmental protection, neighborhood policing and keeping order, and a number of other functions. At the very bottom, beneath the level of the conferences, are popular committees that monitor local government services and attempt to fill in with their voluntary efforts when the system does not provide.

Decentralization in itself, while beneficial as a general rule, is no panacea for ineffective government at other levels. Whereas the decentralization reform has in principle given power to the people at the neighborhood level, Gamal Hamid contends that the system is overly ambitious, as it has delegated too many responsibilities to new, inexperienced institutions all at once. Most localities, for instance, lack trained staff and equipment, and some have very thin resource bases upon which to draw in the first place. [43] The funding of localities was further depleted in late 1999 when the president issued a decree restricting the ability of provinces and localities to impose certain local taxes, and again in 2000 with the replacement of most local taxes by a single value-added tax collected at the national level. Therefore, local resources are at an absolute minimum in Khartoum a situation very similar to many other poor sub-Saharan African cities.

street, the local community first cleaned, graded, and beautified their street, eventually constructing a small bridge over a drainage ditch in order to make their street more accessible during the rainy season. Here the community was energized in the first instance by an informal group of fifteen young men, who convinced the locality committee to lend them its grader; they then collected contributions to pay for fuel and reasonable financial rewards to the grader operators. One small success led to another. At no time did the formal (even very local) organs of government render more than minimal service, and the neighborhood commit-

8 James Manor, *The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization*. (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999), 1.

9 Proserpina Domingo Tapales, “The Philippines, in Patricia McCarney, ed., The *Changing Nature of Local Government in Developing Countries* (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1996), 214.

10 Juan Pablo Guerrero Ampar n and Tonatiuj Guill n L. ,pez, eds., *Reflexiones en torno a la reforma municipal del artículo 115 constitucional* (Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrua, 2000).

11 Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 26.

14 Adrian Karatnycky, “The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1998-1999. A Good Year for Freedom, http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey99/essays.karat.html (1999), 1.

15 Ibid., 3.

16 Ibid., 8.

17 R. Andrew Nickson, *Local Government in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 119.

18 Tim Campbell, “Innovation and Risk-taking: Urban Governance in Latin America, in Allen J. Scott, ed., *Global City-Regions. Trends, Theory, Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 216.

19 In Costa Rica, one of the few Latin American countries not to have changed the selection process for mayors (until 2001, municipal councillors have been elected, while the executive head of the municipality is a manager appointed by the municipal council), the year 2002 will see a shift to electing mayors all over the country.

20 Om Mathur, “Governing Cities in India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka: The Challenge of Poverty and Globalization, in Patricia McCarney, ed., *Cities and Governance: New Directions in Latin America, Asia and Africa*

25 Le Pape, *L'Énergie sociale à Abidjan*, 148.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.,149.

28 Le Pape, *L'Énergie sociale à Abidjan,* and Philippe Antoine, Alain Dubresson, and A.

Seteney Shami, ed., *Capital Cities. Ethnographies of Urban Governance in the Middle East* (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 2001), 140-68.

43 Ibid., 151.

44 For an earlier description of the importance of self-help in Khartoum, see Mohamed O. El Sammani, Mohamed El Hadi Abu Sin, M. Talha, B.M. El Hassan, and Ian Haywood, "Management Problems of Greater Khartoum," in Richard Stren and Rodney White, eds., *African Cities in Crisis. Managing Rapid Urban Growth* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 246-75.

But to what extent can this overflowing of urban neighborhoods, this spilling into and through the grand boulevards, be seen as protest, challenge, or revolution? Political observers note that amidst the ruins of neoliberal economics, Peronist populism is being steadily resurrected. The people occupy the public spaces of Argentinian cities, but it would be misleading to interpret their public presence as structural change just as it would be misplaced to interpret populism as democracy and political freedom. That urban social movements can coexist with semiauthoritarian or even fully authoritarian systems is not only historical lineage but also contemporary reality.[4]

Such issues greatly complicate any discussion of urban governance, of the relationship between state and civil society. [5]

city of Macondo, once thriving with life, with an economy brought to it by the plantations of the banana company, lies deserted. In this silence remains Aureliano, descendant of a long line of Aurelianos, including the founder of the city. It is a city forgotten even by the birds, choked by heat and dust, where the train never stops, and where the only life is in the torrents of red ants that flow through the streets. It is amidst this solitude that Aureliano comes across the chronicles of Melquiades, an old and wise man who had lived when the city was founded. As he reads, Aureliano learns of his origin, he sees how the time and space of his life has been ordered, preordained by these aged chronicles. He comes to the part of the predictions that deals with the instant that he is living. He begins to decipher it as he lives it, as if he were looking into a speaking mirror. Before reaching the last line he has already understood that he will never leave that room, for it is foreseen that the city of mirrors (or mirages) will be exiled from the memory of men at the precise moment when he, Aureliano, will finish deciphering the parchments.

The challenge of our times is to decipher this moment as we live it but to reject the sentence of solitude and silence. For we must learn to speak without wiping out our cities and our cities of memory. In addition, we must learn to pay attention to the privileges of voice, to those whose voices are silenced by the chronicles of history. There cannot be a discussion of urban governance if not all can meaningfully participate in that discussion; there cannot be a celebration of social energy without a commitment to social justice. With this in mind, I will highlight three processes the corporate paradigm of state practice, the feminization of policy, and the rise of illiberal democracy as key determinants of both the trajectory of urban change as well as of the ability to participate in such change.

The Corporate Paradigm of State Practice

It is an obvious fact, but one worth stating, that at this moment of liberalization, despite the rhetoric of the end of the nation-state, it is more important than ever before to talk seriously about state power. The hollowing-out of the state, as Bob Jessop puts it, is not about reduced state capacity but rather about the ability of the state to reconfigure and rescale.[10] In other words, the state is perhaps less visible but clearly not less powerful. The implications of disguised and deflected state power are far reaching.

A significant trend is the rise of the corporate paradigm as a model of state practice. In the United States, the Bush administration has put into place an MBA-style management, a form of governance that can be thought of as "America, Inc. This pattern goes well beyond the privatization of state functions. Rather, it involves the modeling of public administration and public policy along the lines of the market. Such changes are amply evident in the recent restructuring of the American welfare state. The end of welfare has come not only through extreme localization and privatization, but also in the form of an aggressive market ideology that brutally implements participation in wage-earning capitalism.[11] Here, social citizenship has become contingent upon the "work ethic and poverty has been reinscribed as the behavioral failure to desire work. Through punitive regulations workfare thus seeks to enforce work. But this is work in the context of a violent economic restructuring that has scorched labor markets and has left the urban poor at the mercy of the market and now the market in the form of the state.

At the urban level, liberalization involves what David Harvey has designated as a shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism.[12] City managers are increasingly entrepreneurs, and, as in the case of Michael Bloomberg's recent ascendancy to the mayorship of New York, they are private entrepreneurs bringing with them corporate models of administration. Such patterns have also been evident in city-level appointments, particularly in the "housing czars appointed to head various local housing authorities Harry Spence of Boston, Vince Lane of Chicago all market-styled men assuming public office to dismantle public programs such as public housing.[13]

In other cases, a more subtle blurring of the boundaries between state and corporation is taking place, but with equally significant consequences for urban governance. In such state-market combinations, the rituals of the state are becoming the rituals of the market. This is particularly evident in postsocialist transitions, for it is here that the hybrid process of "market socialism [14] is evident.

Perhaps the most obvious example is postreform China where local states enter into joint ventures with foreign investors via nonmarket allocations of land to state-owned enterprises. It is thus that finance is constantly mobilized at the local level in China, making possible a new state-based entrepreneurial class as well as the renewal of urban infra-

Giulani's New York applied to the homeless population to the quality-of-life tickets instituted by liberal San Francisco, city after city has sought to implement mean streets, producing what Don Mitchell has called "the annihilation of space by law."[25] Neil Smith characterizes this genre of urban policy as "revanchist": a vengeful reaction that pervades an increasingly market-determined public policy.[26]

The second is the articulation of compassionate conservatism as a legitimate policy response to social inequality. The disjuncture between the structural realities of what Loïc Wacquant calls "advanced marginality," a long-term and spatially concentrated form of poverty tied to advanced sectors of the economy,[27] and this public rhetoric of volunteerism and moral goodwill could not be more stark. To borrow a line from the feminist debates about development, it could be argued that this is a bit like treating cancer with a Band-Aid.[28] Compassionate conservatism masks the deepening inequalities of our current moment through the rhetoric of liberal freedoms, particularly the freedom to participate in the market. And in providing a moral salve for the harshness of the market regime, it hastens the neoliberal withdrawal of the state from social responsibilities.

Although this is not the appropriate forum for such a discussion, let me simply note that these trends of criminalizing the poor and advocating a voluntarist charity-based response to social injustices are not new. Their historical genealogies can be traced to the late nineteenth century and the rise of social reform movements as an attempt to regulate the perceived disorder of the modern city. That turn of the century continues to cast a long shadow on this one, replicated through repeating configurations of geopolitical power.

The Feminization of Poverty

It is now widely perceived that the solution to both the ills of the market and the failure of the state lies in the collective action of the poor. The enablement paradigm, which has gained great popularity, celebrates, and thereby advocates, modes of self-governance. My concern is with how

nance models, and that such trends can be interpreted as the feminization of policy. I mean the term to encompass the following elements: the privatization of collective consumption; the incorporation of women and women's issues into the policy agenda in ways that maintain gendered hierarchies and boundaries; and the concern with the moral-behavioral characteristics of target populations.

The neoliberal agenda has been implemented most brutally through state withdrawal from social programs of spending. It is not so much that states are spending less, but rather that they are spending less on policies that once sought to mitigate poverty and inequality. As the Anglo-American welfare state comes to be replaced by the warfare state, so in other world regions, structural adjustment has imposed a harsh regime of austerity. In turn, the poor, and particularly poor women, have been left to shoulder the burden of coping. Quite simply, the paradigm of self-help involves not only the older patterns of "sweat equity"—the unpaid, voluntary labor of the poor,[29] but also now an unpaid "third shift" of community work for women.[30] This feminization of collective consumption is acutely evident in informal settlements around the world. What at first glance seems to be a lively associational life rich with soup kitchens, social networks, and volunteerism often turns out to be bloody, hard work. Such is the case with Villa El Salvador, Peru, a settlement often touted as a model of self-management. But in the context of structural adjustment, as Alan García sought to negotiate the IMF's strictures, the state resources available to the settlement were reduced to a trickle. A poignant documentary, *City in the Sand*, focuses on one of the settlement's residents, Emerita.[31] As the camera follows her around, in a single day, she volunteers in the government's health clinic, supervises seven community kitchens run through the volunteer work of women, makes house visits, organizes mother's knitting groups, all in addition to her wage-earning work as crochet seamstress.

Although such forms of self-help have been interpreted as entrepreneurship, there is little evidence to show that the informal sector bears the possibility of successful self-employment. Indeed, the research points to how global restructuring has been accompanied by intense downgrading and informalization, a feminization of work if you will.[32] In this scheme of things, entrepreneurship rests not in the desperate struggles of the rural-urban poor but, as I have earlier argued, in the state as it remakes

erty. The pendulum has swung but the poor, this time poor women, continue to be represented as essentially different, this time as self-sacrificing, altruistic actors. And they are thus damned to a fate of self-governance.

There are important linkages between the feminization of policy and the rescaling of state practice. The localization and privatization of the welfare state can be read as a distinctive process of feminization, one that shifts the locus of responsibility from the state to the household via the market. Similarly, there are significant interactions between the feminization of policy and the localization of development practices and discourses. The 1990s saw an uncanny convergence between the antidevelopment critics who defended the "local" against modernization and the premier development

It would be a grave mistake to read these trends as simply social disorganization and anarchy, or only in the newly coined vocabulary of terrorism. As Wacquant argues in relation to the American ghetto, disorganization is itself an institutional form, the characteristic of a sociospatial mechanism of ethnoracial closure and control.[45] If the informal sector can be seen as structured through "extralegal" systems of regulation,[46] then so can these new or newly noticed processes of medieval modernity be seen as modes of governance. They even possibly involve what Asef Bayat sees as the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary," the terrain of political struggle and enfranchisement being carved out by a "deinstitutionalized and marginalized subaltern in Third World cities."[47]

None of this can be understood outside of globalization and liberalization. Structural adjustment promised the utopia of the market but left entire world regions at the mercy of the most vicious of fears and hatreds, reinforcing rather than challenging authoritarian, fascist, and fundamentalist regimes.

Within such contexts, decentralization has often meant a medieval carving up of territory, as in the imposition of *sharia* law by the Muslim elites of northern Nigeria. The move away from centralization, the end of a military dictatorship, all celebrated and feted, have brought a territorial fragmentation, with brutal justice being meted out in medieval ways.[48] Perhaps the most heartbreaking irony of decentralization can be seen in settings such as Somalia and Afghanistan. In these regions, in the aftermath of American militarization, decentralization has become synonymous with rampaging warlords, clan warfare, and blood feuds.[49] Here, citizenship comes to be dissociated from national territory and is instead articulated in a "honeycomb of jurisdictions," in "an almost medieval body of overlapping, heterogeneous, nonuniform and increasingly private memberships."[50]

In drawing attention to these processes, I do not mean to condone the regimes that preceded the current governments in place. My critique does not imply a return to military dictatorship or overcentralized states. Rather, it is intended to draw attention to the nonlinear pathways through which the landscape of the world is being restructured, to how illiberal democracies and medieval modernities greatly complicate any discussion of urban governance.

It is thus more important than ever before to pay attention to the state. In closing, I want to return full circle to the first issue I raised: of the state

as a site of market power. The most recent research on India is provocative, for it shows how both market and state are steeped in communal and religious practices. Arjun Appadurai's work on Bombay tracks the eviction of Muslim squatters and vendors, as local space is violently reinscribed as Hindu.[51] What seems to be gentrification is in fact communal violence. And in Calcutta, the reverse is at work: what at first glance seems to be a communal riot, the clash of Hindus and Muslims, turns out to be a land-grabbing exercise, as in the clearing of slums by landlords who are deploying religiously charged mobs.[52] As the urban rituals of medieval modernity and of the free market coincide, so is the hegemony of the nation-state consolidated.

As a citizen of the new millennium, I want to imagine cities as sites of social citizenship and sturdy governance. The question remains: What kind of citizenship and governance? Marketized? Feminized? Medieval?

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37 See, for example, Vandana Shiva, *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Development* (London: Zed Books, 1989).

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PART II

PHYSICAL ENVIRONS OF A HEALTHY CITY

CHAPTER 3

Ellen Brennan-Galvin
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

For the foreseeable future, virtually all of the world's population growth will occur in urban areas. Between 2000 and 2030, urban population is expected to increase by 2.1 billion inhabitants, nearly as much as the 2.2 billion that will be added to the entire population of the world. Almost all of this growth will take place in low- and middle-income countries. Whereas urban growth rates are not unprecedented, what is unprecedented is the scale of urban growth. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, only one city in the world Beijing had more than one million inhabitants. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 16 cities of this size; by 1950, the number of million-plus cities had risen to 86. Today, there are 400 such cities and, by 2015, there will be some 150 more. Likewise, in 1950, there were only 8 cities in the world with five million or more inhabitants. Today, there are 39 and 16 have become megacities, surpassing the ten million mark; by 2015, there will be 57 five million-plus cities, 21 of which will have become megacities.[1]

Although the term city is still commonly used, the historic city has gradually faded away, and the urban has risen in its place. Indeed, in many parts of the world what we now refer to as the city can extend over hundreds and even thousands of square kilometers, housing many millions of people. In the search for sustainability in the twenty-first century, it is vital that these vast urbanized areas tackle both green and brown agendas. The impact of brown agenda issues that is, environmental issues that have an immediate local impact is often made worse by the density of both pollution sources and residents exposed to that pollution in the world's large cities. The situation in many large cities in the developing world is extremely bleak, with health-threatening levels of

almost total absence of sanitation for the urban poor. Urban managers also have a major role to play in addressing the "green agenda" through helping to limit the consumption of nonrenewable resources. Indeed, a key issue in urban areas is the need to reduce the production of greenhouse gases. Cities are responsible for the majority of CO_2 production in the world, both through direct emissions from industry, heating, and vehicles, and from urban residents consuming manufactured products and electricity, which usually depend on the burning of fossil fuels.

Changing Urban Structures

In examining the linkages among population, urbanization, and the environment, it is not just the size of urban populations and the pace of urban

argued that it would lead, paradoxically, to more traffic congestion and

THE CASE OF BANGKOK

Thailand has been a major success from a demographic point of view, having undergone a dramatic transition to low fertility over the past several decades. It is somewhat atypical in that it exhibits extreme demographic primacy; the capital city of Bangkok is forty times larger than the country's second largest city.

In 1950, Bangkok had around 1.5 million inhabitants and was a relatively compact city. Today, there are well over 8 million inhabitants in Bangkok Metropolis (BMA) and 11.5 million in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR). However, the Extended Bangkok Region contains some 17.5 million inhabitants, and it is expected that it will contain nearly 24 million inhabitants by 2010 and be a multinodal region extending some 200 kilometers from the current core.[11] Virtually all of the growth over the next decade will occur in suburban areas, particularly to the east.

Since World War II, the overall form of the Bangkok region has been dominantly shaped by road infrastructure. Road development accelerated rapidly in the 1950s, largely at the expense of the city's canal system. Rice fields were rapidly urbanized. This marked the beginnings of the

The most serious environmental problem in the Bangkok region is air pollution, approximately 70 percent of which is a product of the city's congested traffic. Indeed, whereas large stationary sources, often located at a distance from densely populated city centers, disperse into the higher layers of the atmosphere, vehicles emit near ground level in highly populated areas, thereby contributing more to human exposure than their share in total emissions loads would indicate. Of greatest concern is suspended particulate matter, which a recent World Bank study found to be higher inside houses in some areas of Bangkok than outside.[16] Lead levels in the air are also of concern, particularly in the case of children. Overall, respiratory illness is about five times as prevalent in the Bangkok region as in rural areas of Thailand. Approximately half a million people in the Bangkok Metropolis suffer from respiratory problems, and respiratory disease in the urban areas is growing by 5 to 7 percent per annum.[17] As Utis Kaothien and Douglas Webster note, about 70 to 80 percent of Bangkok residents could now be categorized as middle class.[18] Their expectations are rising quickly and some wonder whether the costs of rapid economic growth have been worth it in terms of the negative externalities of some of the world's worst traffic congestion and harmful levels of air pollution.

Which Way Will China Go?

On the transport front, China is confronting dilemmas that have plagued many countries before it, although with the added complexities of its huge population and the transition to a market economy. China has nearly one hundred cities of over one million inhabitants, and five of over five million, two of which (Beijing and Shanghai) are m Tct[(o)39(v)40(e8?0 TBran

required, authorities at the State Planning Committee were cautious in approving large-scale mass transit projects, with the result that only four cities Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin currently have metros.[20] Instead, the government embarked upon development of the country's trunk highway infrastructure. Highway construction continues to receive priority, particularly in the most rapidly developing regions such as Guangdong, where growth rates of total road traffic have averaged 20 to 30 percent per year since 1980 and where heavily congested roads are exacerbated by the mixed use by motor vehicles, tractors, bicycles, and pedestrians, without separation.[21] In such areas, highways will play an increasingly large role in the future, because the fast-growing industries will need the speed, flexibility, and door-to-door delivery that only road transport can provide.

Substantial road building also was undertaken in all large Chinese cities during the 1990s, with investment for road infrastructure doubling in most large cities. In many cities, master plans have called for development of Beijing-style ring roads. Indeed, today, throughout China, many municipalities are implementing road plans that impose ring roads, grid, or other road networks over the urban structure in an attempt to improve accessibility within the urban area and to stimulate motorization. These1 Tw[(most

analysts now put the proportion of vehicles sold for private use in China at about 50 percent, up from less than 10 percent a decade ago. The Chinese vehicle fleet is projected to reach seventy million motorcycles, thirty million trucks, and one hundred million cars by 2015 and the scope for further growth remains huge.[27]

A major issue in China has been urban sprawl. With the increase in

the first class national air quality standards. One of the challenges is that air quality monitoring data are limited in Chinese cities, especially in high traffic areas. From the data that are available, however, it is estimated that mobile sources are currently contributing 45 to 60 percent of NOx emissions and about 85 percent of the CO (carbon monoxide) emissions in typical Chinese cities; in Shanghai, for example, in 1996, of the total air pollution load in the downtown area, vehicles emitted 86 percent of the CO, 56 percent of the NOx**,** and 96 percent of the nonmethane hydrocarbons (NMHC); in Beijing in recent years, the NOx concentration shows a clear increasing trend.[31] A growing number of Chinese cities are also being blanketed by photochemical smog, which not only obscures visibility, but also can be highly detrimental to human health. In regard to greenhouse gas emissions, China is now the second largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world (after the United States, which emits 20 percent of the total), and it is expected to pass the United States in twenty to twenty-five years.[32]

The Chinese government has been enhancing its laws to improve environmental quality and to respond to the growing problem of air pollution. A white paper setting out the Chinese government's response to the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 challenges the automobile-dependent transport model, arguing that the country cannot afford to import large quantities of oil and does not have enough land to provide highways, roads, or even parking lots.[33] Chinese cities, it is argued, should rather be designed to meet the needs of bicycles and public transport.

In some Chinese cities, bicycles still account for some 80 percent of local trips and are quite efficient. However, even in traditional cycling cities such as Guangzhou, those using nonmotorized transport are apparently doing so because there is no affordable alternative. A survey conducted in 1996 in five developing country cities, including Guangzhou, found that most bicycle users preferred the bicycle to the bus primarily because it was cheaper, but also because it was faster, more reliable, and more flexible in routing. The survey did suggest, however, that many would change to motorcycles were it not for the cost.[34]

During the 1970s and 1980s, the provision of segregated cycling capacity was a standard design feature in new urban arterial roads in Chinese cities. Such attention to cyclists now appears to be declining. In Shanghai and Guangzhou, the development of nonmotorized vehicle

In Search of Sustainable Cities

recently introduced by the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau will force the retirement of vehicles that have accumulated more than 500,000 kilometers. Beijing also plans to retrofit some fourteen thousand taxis to become dual fuel vehicles.[39] No more buses with diesel engines will be purchased and new regulations will require that new buses and taxicabs be fueled by compressed natural gas.

Regarding specific measures to control the growth in personal transport, the municipal authorities in Shanghai began three years ago to auction car and motorcycle licenses in an effort to stem the tide of private vehicles flooding city streets. As an article in the *International Herald Tribune* noted, Shanghai tags have become one of the world's most precious metals.[40] At a recent auction, the minimum bid required to claim one of the 2,350 new plates soared to a record 17,800 yuan (about $2,150), worth far more, ounce for ounce, than gold. Whereas even the lowest priced new passenger car still exceeds a decade's pay for a typical Chinese worker, annual household incomes in the major cities are passing the $4,000 milestone, regarded by manufacturers as a takeoff point for private auto consumption.

Other variables are facilitating the dramatic growth of motorization in China. Credit facilities and installment paEhTds n(o)39(e bting intr)29(oducef)]TJT*
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The International Arena

In the international arena, there has been surprisingly little reference in environmental discourse to the role of cities in the future of the global environment. To date, sustainability has mostly been defined at the global and national levels and only recently has begun to be applied to cities. Much of the debate on sustainability has been through United Nations conferences and high-level international meetings, such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992). Although the principles of sustainability that were outlined in Agenda 21 can be applied to cities, guidance on how this can be done was not made clear.[42] The International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) had very little focus on urban issues, whereas the Habitat Conference (Istanbul, 1996) had very little focus on population. Moreover, the biggest gap at the Habitat Conference was the lack of progress in operationalizing the notion of environmentally sustainable development.[43] The goals outlined at the Millenium Summit (2000) contained only vague language regarding the environment (noting that it would be desirable to "integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes").[44] Likewise, the events leading up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD, Johannesburg, 2002) have focused to some extent on brown agenda issues, such as water and sanitation in urban areas, as well as on energy supply, mainly in rural areas, but have focused very little on the complex issues surrounding motorization and urban sprawl, with their concomitant negative health and environmental impacts. Of course, the controversy continues over such topics as optimal greenhouse gas reduction strategies, and the distribution of action between developed and developing countries. However a "business as usual" scenario for the transport sector, which is the likely outcome of WSSD, offers little prospect of relief.

The Eco-city Literature

Practitioners who have turned to various "eco-city" paradigms or movements for guidance in applying the concept of sustainability may find much inspiration but relatively little guidance.[45] In fact, the literature on

relevant to the challenges being faced in many of the world's megacities. Regardless of how the domestic sprawl debate evolves, it is likely to have significant impacts on strategies and policies adopted in large cities in the developing world, where decision-makers often emulate transport choices made in the United States. The phenomenon of sprawl is neither new, of course, nor uniquely American. Although sprawl is seldom defined with adequate rigor or consistency (reminiscent of Potter Stewarts' famous remark about pornography: "I can't define it, but I know it when I see it), sprawl is now the all-purpose scapegoat for many of America's urban discontents, and has even been blamed for the rise in obesity in Americans, who drive instead of walk.

Among the opponents of sprawl are members of the "smart growth movement and the "New Urbanists (a movement with a formal constitution founded by prominent architects including Peter Calthorpe, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Andres Duany). As Calthorpe sees it, sprawl matters.[48] According to a poll conducted in 2000 by the Pew Center for Civic Journalism, urban sprawl was the most important local issue in the country edging out more traditional issues such as crime, the economy, and even education.[49] This distress with urban sprawl arises from a range of factors, from loss of open space and teenage alienation to traffic congestion and economic segregation, and from a lack of affordable housing to a lost sense of community.

Calthorpe argues that, whereas supporters of sprawl contend that everyone wants a detached home in the suburbs and that any form of growth management will frustrate this "natural market, the range of choices offered by the market has yet to catch up with economic and demographic changes. The New Urbanists maintain that, "where choices are available whether bungalows in walkable villages, town homes in real towns, lofts in vital urban neighborhoods, or affordable housing just about anywhere the housing market responds enthusiastically. If more towns would allow the development of compact communities that offer urban amenities and street life, we might find that the market actually supports more density and housing diversity, not less. [50]

Regarding road building, those whom the New Urbanists term the "apologists for sprawl contend that the traffic congestion problem could be solved by building more roads. The New Urbanists argue that this would only be a temporary fix. More roads lead inevitably to more auto-

mobile-oriented development, which consumes more open space and leads to more congestion. Likewise, whereas the "smart growth" movement strongly believes that new developments should be more "transit oriented," with provision for light rail lines or bus routes, critics argue that light rail is slow and provides automobile-competitive trips to only a small part of an urban area; moreover, historic downtowns are no longer the dominant regional employment centers, and not just in the United States. The New Urbanists agree that transit alone will not solve the congestion problem; rather, the key is building more walkable environments, which not only reduce the necessity of using cars for local trips but also support the use of transit for longer trips:

> *New Urbanism assumes that the future is not necessarily a linear extension of the past, that yesterday's market is not necessarily tomorrow's. The American Dream is changing. The issue is not density but design—the quality of place, its scale, mix and connections. The alternative to sprawl is not a forced march back to tenements but a range of unique places with various densities and in various locations—more choices for a diverse society.*[51]

Critics argue that the New Urbanists are trying to reverse strong market-driven spatial forces, which include declining densities, continuing suburbanization and exurbanation of both jobs and people, decreasing numbers of jobs in the central business district, falling public transit ridership combined with stable personal travel times, and increasing suburbanization by modest-income households. They claim that the New Urbanists ignore powerful consumer preferences for single-family suburban homes, high levels of mobility achieved via driving, and inexpensive shopping at suburban malls and "big box" retailers. Peter Gordon and Harry Richardson claim, for example, that whereas the New Urbanists promote high-density living and design improvements in housing, landscape, and streets to promote "communitarianism" and non-motorized travel, they typically have ended up building high-income communities on peripheral greenfield sites: "Almost a cult, with its own gurus, New Urbanism suggests that by changing architectural styles, street layout and physical neighborhood characteristics, we can somehow change human behavior. We can solve all societal problems by changing the built environment."[52]

Such debates are not unique to the United States. In the UK, for example, there is a growing divide between the rural commons group, which abhors increasing density, and the urban commons group, which is attracted to increased density because it provides more urban diversity and more pedestrian-based environments. The difference between these various approaches to cities is becoming critical in urban policy debates. Environmentalists are at the center of most land use-oriented debates and are now in serious conflict in many cities regarding what should be done to make urban areas more ecologically sensitive and sustainable. Moreover, the debates have become highly personalized and emotional, highlighting the basic worldview differences at stake. The major problem in not resolving these conflicting views of reality is that it gives the impression to politicians and developers that the environment of cities is just a matter of personal taste.[53]

The Way Forward

The controversy over urban sprawl can be seen as a debate over two solutions from the past, a nineteenth-century solution and a twentieth-century one; that is, a debate over railroads and automobiles. As it is now the twenty-first century, surely there is a way to cut the Gordian knot and come up with something better.[54] There is no silver bullet or universal blueprint for resolving transport-related problems in the world's large cities. Clearly, there will be a need for short-termwtr prtr prs117(,ef34ttracteebateT

including elimination of traffic bottlenecks, constructing limited-access commercial bypasses, high occupancy toll lanes, high occupancy vehicle lanes, computerized traffic signals, electronic road pricing, and so forth. In this regard, the rapid pace of development of intelligent traffic system technologies offers relatively poor countries the chance to leapfrog to the latest technology, just as some have done in telecommunications.

The United States, the European Union, and Japan are pursuing the best available technology for further reducing emissions from new vehicles, including the use of alternative fuels for very low emission or zero emission vehicles (as mandated in California). Although the rest of the world will probably adopt these standards and technologies some day, the issue for developing countries is how to phase in these measures cost-effectively. Likewise, revolutionary automobile technologies are on the horizon that are likely to reduce air pollution. Honda and Toyota, for example, are now marketing hybrid gasoline-electric vehicles that substantially increase gasoline mileage and reduce air pollution. A number of manufacturers are also working on fuel cell propulsion technology that would be nonpolluting. Pricing, however, is crucial; to date, electric/gas hybrid cars have been a commercial failure.

The Challenges Ahead for China

Ironically, whereas the Chinese government for many years has viewed unchecked population growth as a serious threat to societal and ecological sustainability, the increasing consumption level of Chinese citizens is seen as beneficial. The Chinese population, and especially urban residents, is moving up the consumption ladder at a remarkable rate. Indeed, in recent years city planners, decision makers, and the public increasingly aspire to the Western urban lifestyle, including highways, low-density single family dwellings, cars, color television, air conditioning, and profligate water use.[55]

China faces many challenges as well as opportunities. At present, it is witnessing the most rapid development of road construction in the world. It is anticipated that it will take another twenty years of construction for China to complete its road network, at which time most of the industrialized countries will be utilizing intelligent transportation systems (ITS).

and ITS simultaneously in order to enhance public transport efficiency and traffic safety and to mitigate the environmental impacts of transport.

While the Chinese leaders are faced with the daunting challenge of managing the explosive growth in expectations of its rapidly expanding population, they have an opportunity, possibly unique in the world, to chart an alternative path to facilitate the sustainability of its cities. Transportation is a crucial element in the process and China is still very near the starting point in establishing a nationwide transportation system. Unlike the United States, the choices it makes are not heavily encumbered by economic investments in preexisting infrastructure. It could choose to build a system from the ground up, using the latest propulsion technologies and fuels rather than merely replicating the oil-based model of the nineteenth century. In the grand scheme of Chinese history, there is still time.

In the United States, the automobile and oil industries exert phenomenal political and economic pressure with huge social consequences. China has not had that pressure   yet. China can learn from what the United States and other industrialized countries have done with their transportation systems to enhance the efficient mobility of their citizens but, equally important, China can learn from the mistakes. The vast economic and social costs to its people of unfettered road expansion can be avoided. But time is of the essence since the window of opportunity in China will not be open for very long. Once the infrastructure is in place, it will be nearly impossible to change.

NOTES

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4 Newman and Kenworthy, *Sustainability and Cities.*

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CHAPTER 4

MARÍA ELENA DUCCI
Catholic University, Chile

More than ten years of multidisciplinary research integrating health with social issues and the physical environment (habitat) have made me aware of the great wealth of innovative ways to handle urban problems. There are new ways to understand and address the realities of city life, and new tools to tackle problems. Herein lies the importance of efforts that join health and urban studies from the standpoint of physical, social, political, and economic conditions.[1]

For several decades the field of urban planning recognized and integrated economic elements into proposals for the city that failed to consider the implications of urban health challenges. However, in the 1970s, the World Health Organization issued its declaration in Alma Ata calling for Health for all by the year 2000, marking a shift in the paradigm of health practitioners and urban planners. Furthermore, in the 1980s and 1990s, medical science continued to make major strides, positively impacting not only the life expectancy of the world's population, but also greatly improving the quality of life of urban inhabitants.

In a sense, however, medical science has reached its limits, at least in

tant impact that lifestyle, housing, and the environment in which people live and work have on health; accordingly, it must work together with sectors such as planning, labor, housing, and education, among others.

From the standpoint of an urban planner, I have been surprised by what I call the power of health. Health is a fundamental issue for most of the world's population, especially the poor. Subsequently, improving health conditions is a very powerful tool for making people take an interest in changing behaviors and accepting policies they think may have a positive impact on their health. Similarly, when people feel their health is threatened, they generally react against projects such as the siting of garbage dumps, hazardous factories, high-voltage antennas, and the like. Understanding people's needs is fundamental for good planning and for designing adequate policies. As health is always high among priorities of the poor, it is important to integrate it into the planning process. In this regard, if governance is considered to be the relationship between the state and civil society, the relationship between governance and health and habitat is also fundamental.

By definition, projects based on a health-and-habitat approach work with the community and require support from the public sector for improving (urban) physical conditions and, thereby, health. Such multisectoral projects show people that they can improve their health and their children's health through actions that have nothing to do with taking medicine or going to the doctor. These projects can serve as excellent examples of good governance in terms of helping people to participate in taking control of their own lives, which is essential for good health.

A good illustration of the relationship between health problems and other aspects of development, such as urban environment, socioeconomic conditions, and the like, was developed in an action-research project with a health-and-habitat approach realized between 1992 and 1997 in Villa Los Nav os, a poor neighborhood in the southern peripheral area of metropolitan Santiago, Chile.[3] Villa Los Nav os was selected by the municipal officials as one of the most troubled sections of the municipality, with a concentration of health problems, overc2rob

women in the neighborhood, compared to data from other countries at that time.[4] Even though the physical characteristics of Villa Los Nav os were much better than those of a traditional shantytown, the degree of mental health problems was much greater than in shantytowns of poorer countries in Latin America and Africa. In 1995 the WHO performed comparative studies in fifteen cities worldwide and found that Santiago had the worst levels of psychiatric disorders (see Table 1).

Table 1. Prevalence of major psychiatric disorders in primary health care

Cities	**(%) Current depression**	**(%) Generalized anxiety**	**(%) Alcohol dependence**	**(%) All mental disorders (according to CIDI*)**
Ankara, Turkey	11.6	0.9	1.0	16.4
Athens, Greece	6.4	14.9	1.0	19.2
Bangalore, India	9.1	8.5	1.4	22.4
Berlin, Germany	6.1	9.0	5.3	18.3
Groningen, Netherlands	15.9	6.4	3.4	23.9
Ibadan, Nigeria	4.2	2.9	0.4	9.5
Mainz, Germany	11.2	7.9	7.2	23.6
Manchester, UK	16.9	7.1	2.2	24.8
Nagasaki, Japan	2.6	5.0	3.7	9.4
Paris, France	13.7	11.9	4.3	26.3
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	15.8	22.6	4.1	35.5
Santiago, Chile	29.5	18.7	2.5	52.5
Seattle, USA	6.3	2.1	15.0	11.9
Shanghai, China	4.0	1.9	1.1	7.3
Verona, Italy	4.7	3.7	0.5	9.8
Average	10.4	7.9	2.7	24.0

*CIDI: Composite International Diagnostic Interview.

Source: D.P. Goldberg and Y. Lecrubier, Form and Frequency of Mental Disorders across Centres, in T.B. st n and N. Sartorius, eds., Mental Illness in General Health Care: An International Study (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons on behalf of WHO, 1995), 323-34.

Villa Los Nav os is a project comprising 2,569 houses produced by the government through the Basic Housing Program (two-story townhouses), all identical, where the families own their housing. The outside appearance of such housing is much better than that of shantytowns in countries such as Ecuador, Mexico, or Colombia. Even so, the women suffer from high levels of depression and anxiety, as well as sexual dysfunctions. Our research showed that there were direct relationships between these health problems and the physical and social environment of the neighborhood.

One key factor in the high level of mental distress observed in women was the system used to assign the housing units. Chilean public housing policy has been most efficient with respect to the number of units delivered to the population, but for many years has failed to take account of preexisting social networks. When a family without housing applies to one of the programs offered by the ministry, it is entered on a list based on income, family size, and so on; the computerized system then assigns the beneficiaries who meet the requirements to a housing unit. However, the home may be located at the other end of the city, far from relatives and friends. This has led to a breakdown in support and

AIDS orphans from their own families, as extended families are still a fundamental basis of African societies.[9] This is creative thinking, not only about a new kind of housing stock, but also about a new kind of society and urban form.

The Deputy Mayor of Lusaka, Zambia, in an informal talk at the same meeting, said that the most important urban problem at the moment was that they did not have enough cemeteries in which to bury their dead. His second concern was transportation to the cemeteries. As burial ceremonies are an essential part of their culture, people need to accompany their deceased to their last residence, yet most of them are so poor they cannot cover the costs entailed. Less than a year later, at another conference organized by the Woodrow Wilson Center in Uganda, health officials presented data proving that while AIDS has become the main health concern of the government, more people are now dying from malaria because public health money has been taken from malaria programs to fight AIDS. Furthermore, the money that comes to NGOs within Africa from external donors is simply insufficient given the magnitude of the problem.

It is important to explore further what the communities themselves can do to confront their own dire situation. As there is no possibility of obtaining sufficient resources to provide medical treatment to everyone affected, no doubt the approach based on prevention and health promotion that the WHO has been developing in recent decades should be bolstered. In this regard, participatory action research projects with a health-and-habitat perspective offer excellent prospects.

If we relate these very complicated health scenarios to urban planning and governance, it is time to ask ourselves: What type of governance and what type of government are needed to address such serious situations? What type of society do we need in order to move forward? The answer lies in a governance approach that holistically incorporates health into urban planning and the development process as a whole.

NOTES

1 The pioneer in developing and promoting such studies since the 1980s was archi-

3 The project was supported by a grant from IDRC (International Development

CHAPTER 5

CAROLYN STEPHENS
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine

INTRODUCTION: THE POLICY CONTEXT

Urbanization[1] is now acknowledged to be one of the most important trends in recent human history even by international agencies outside the traditional "urban" sphere.[2] The majority of people will soon live in cities of countries formerly defined as "developing." This alone makes "urban" health an international issue.[3]

Another important element in this international context is that, despite enormous economic growth in the twentieth century, huge proportions of the world's population still live in "poverty"[4] and there is a controversial but general trend toward higher levels of social and income inequality.[5] These trends in urbanization and inequality exist in a period of widespread political and environmental change, with so-called "good governance" being promoted internationally, and the rhetoric of "sustainability" touted routinely. Good governance is often constructed as a form of "restructuring" or rationalizing systems of service delivery or policy processes and with some form of citizen involvement in decisions concerning the social, physical, and political environment.[6] Sustainability has been defined as the means of achieving the well-being of people today without compromising that of the people of the future.[7] If evidence is to be believed, most towns and cities are neither sustainable nor well governed.

There is also a trend that could be described as "sociopolitical." It is part of "globalization," a concept often defined in economic terms, but which also encompasses paradoxical trends in both sociocultural integration and individualism.[8] Thus, while globalization often signifies a level

of integration among people, places, and policies loosely conceiving of a world as one giant global village, it also conceives of one giant urban community, because so many people now experience the same economic and ideological processes. This includes a drift toward individualism, which is linked, in part, to growing levels of economic and social insecurity and to a Western ideological emphasis on individual rights at the expense of collective rights and responsibilities.[9]

eracy, and thus constitute islands of the "South" in the heart of the "North." Likewise, the narrow [stratum] of the privileged that one sees in many cities of the South, whose standard of living compares with that of their counterparts in the rich countries, forms an archipelago of the North in the midst of the mass misery of the South.[14]

income countries. Inadequate living environments for the majority join with unhealthy work environments, through a combination of poor or absent services and dangerous polluting work the so-called double burden on urban health in much of the world.[19] Studies show that disadvantaged urban communities live in a poor sanitary environment resulting in high rates of mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases, but also that these same communities experience high rates of death from outcomes such as violence, traffic accidents, and cardiovascular disease. The rates are higher for poorer communities *within* cities, and poorer *cities* have worse health conditions than richer ones. But a crisis also prevails in urban centers in high-income countries where air pollution from affluent car-owning lifestyles combines with affluent eating habits, and violence related to social fragmentation.[20] A major crisis exists when pockets of urban

prevalent in much of Latin America and in the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.[25] But privatization has also been justified as a post-hoc formalization of an extant informal policy private providers already service most of the unmet needs of urban areas; formal advocacy of private sector involvement simply recognizes/legitimates a real situation.

Evidence of the impacts of privatization on urban services and on health is gradually accruing, as studies point to issues of focus and distribution, as well as costs of and access to services such as water, health, solid waste disposal, and telecommunications. As early as 1988, a study of the privatization of South African health services concluded that "it may exacerbate the urban-rural imbalance in health status and health services, promote growth of hospital-intensive curative services rather than needed expansion of community-centered preventive and primary care, and create financial barriers to access for low-income patients. [26] A Turkish study argued that, following the privatization of many sectors, "Infectious diseases including tuberculosis increased, nutrition worsened, occupational diseases and work accidents rose to be the highest in Europe. [27] Studies from Tanzania, Korea, China, Vietnam, and India[28] suggest problems with location and costs of private services, ethics and skills of private practitioners, segregation of services, and the growth of elite "corporate services.[29] From water privatization, evidence has been gathered on the poor quality of water often provided by private wells or distributors and on the costs, access to, and gradual declines in local control over location and pricing of water supplies.[30] Authors also highlight the complexity of foreign ownership of local services, pointing to issues of "denationalization of public services as they move into the hands of foreign investors.[31] Finally, and perhaps most importantly for urban health, analysts argue that privatization of essential services such as water, sanitation, and waste management leads to a fragmentation of service delivery and undermines protection of public health.

Despite concerns, privatization of urban services is now a policy pursued in most parts of the world. However, this is linked to another strong trend increasing participation of people in service management and delivery. This generally, as in Tanzania for example, emphasizes local communities and NGOs, the formation of stakeholder funds and organizations, and the involvement of the private sector.[32] It also raises a key

policy question in relation to governance: can participation provide ways to improve the health of urban people?

Participation: The Strengthened Contract for Urban Health

Participation of citizens in making decisions over their lives is a major element in a package of ‘good governance at least according to most current dogma. With gradual democratization in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the former Soviet Union and progressive decentralization in Europe, interesting experiences are emerging of the ways in which such increased participation can change urban lives. At one level, increased participation in identifying problems, the first stage of the policy process, can increase self-esteem of disenfranchised groups, reduce the sense of anomie, widen professional understanding, change agendas, and increase the capacity of people to negotiate for their rights.[33] Studies have also shown diverse health benefits of more clear, transparent, and participatory approaches. These apply not just to changing the ways in which urban services are developed and delivered, but to the ways in which professionals understand and help address key health problems that communities face, such as urban violence, lack of access to health services, and support in post conflict situations. Many studies highlight the complex empowering role played by more active participation of disenfranchised or excluded groups in analysis of problems, in decisions, and in actions. This ranges from post conflict resolution in inner city Northern Ireland to improved bed net production in Benin to health service delivery in a Bombay *basti* (low-income settlement).[34] Perhaps the final interesting benefit participation is seen to have is its impact on powerful groups it can change professional values and views and can reduce clientelism by increasing transparency of decisions.

However, enhanced participation is not something that local governments will always be able to simply choose or ignore. New international and regional legislation is emerging under the banner of ‘environmental justice pushing for increased access to information, decision-making, and the law. For example, European legislation pushed through by Eastern European NGOs shows great promise of enhancing local democratic processes and facilitating the rights of people to control over urban necessities such as water, transport, waste management, and housing. The

Aarhus Convention of 1998 to which all the states of the European Union are signatories grants the public rights and imposes on governments and public authorities certain obligations. It recognizes substantive rights every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, but its main pillars are three enabling rights: (1) the right to know rights to environmental information; (2) the right to participate in decision-making processes the right to be consulted and participate in proposals, plans, or activities; and (3) the right to access to justice a guaranteed right to the enforcement of the above rights via access to courts or other independent bodies.

The convention also provides that national legislation not in line with the convention will need to be changed before a country can ratify it. This may not seem like urban law at the moment, nor like law that could benefit countries of the South, but it could provide an enabling framework for changing non-participative systems and offer a model broad enough to be used internationally. It is proving to be a challenge even to countries that believe they have a strong participative democracy; for example, UK ratification will mean having to review the Freedom of Information Act and, as a member of the European Union, the Directive on Freedom of Access to Environmental Information.[35] Such new laws can be used internationally to challenge decisions on important urban services such as water, waste management, and transport, obligating more open information and decision-making processes.[36]

Participation of citizens, particularly those who have been excluded from decisions routinely, is not a panacea for the problems of urban inequality and unsustainability, but it does open the doors of the policy process a little wider and allow a few more voices to be heard. When these voices are heard, it may be a little more difficult to privatize essential services without providing space at the table for the solutions local communities want for themselves.

But the final problem, one that this new rights-based agenda can only partially address, is that of the fundamental issues of urban anomie and atomie an underlying cause of social unrest and urban violence. Such a sense of alienation can only be changed when the sense of citizenship and

Conclusion: Identity and Individualism

Perhaps the greatest challenge for healthy sustainable urban societies ism7:c the existence of processes such as privatization, but the ways in which individualism facilitates the negative sides of such a trend and creates such feelings as anomie and atomie amongst losers in the urban race. Urban centers are fundamentally public spaces with such densities of activity and population they can7:c be otherwise. Thus, it ism7:c just tragic but disastrous that cities are growing all over the world as segregated ghettos of rich and poor where urban health ismachieved by a tiny minority and ismunachievable to a majority. These are cities where people are trying to pretend they dom7:c have to be citizens. But if urban citizenry were renewed, a new discussion could begin. If all water ismprivatized into the hands of a local community of *citizens* in a town or city and they jointly decide to distribute it equitably, would thismharm health or equity? Ism7:c decentralized public local control and ownership more responsible? But if powerful groups in cities focus only on their own lives, and facilitate privatization to a transnational water company that then caters only to them this, then, may harm equity and health.

Individualism ismat the root of thismtrend to inequity and its effects can7:c be easily addressed by enabling rights or increased participation. Urban health will be achieved with urban solidarity, and urban sustainability will be ensured if that solidarity isminternational and intergenerational.

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CHAPTER 6

Walter G. Flores
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine

Good governance in health has been defined by the World Health Organization as the enabled participation of those concerned in the formulation and deployment of policies, programmes and practices leading to equitable and sustainable health systems. [1] It is required if we are aiming to construct more egalitarian health systems that deliver effective care. Yet, most studies of governance in health only reveal the corruption in the health sector, providing evidence of the large misuse of resources and abuse of power, particularly at public hospitals.[2] Governance also involves issues of management, staff development, communication, and social participation,[3] yet there is still a void of in-depth studies on these issues.

Good governance in health is also affected by several factors that fall outside the health sector itself. This paper will briefly analyze three major factors within the urban context of Colombia and Central America that present seriouser K constr53 .R.

A major expectation was that local authorities' responsiveness to public health outcomes would improve due to newly allocated resources from the central government. But experience so far has shown that having extra resources does not necessarily improve the overall performance of local governments in achieving public health goals.[4] Local governments are still in great need of central support, particularly in relation to technical and managerial issues. After many years of highly centralized government, it was unrealistic to expect that local governments could be effective within the short span of five years. A longer period is therefore needed to see the full potential of decentralization to improve overall governance, including in the health sector.

It has also been difficult to make local governments accountable, as they are authorities in themselves. Self-regulation has not been the norm up to now, and civil society groups have had to play an important role in pressur-

risk of being exposed to such illness is covered, in most cases, by health insurance, but this mechanism is nonetheless difficult for the urban poor to access. The lack of insurance leaves them with little chance to bear the economic cost associated with suffering chronic and catastrophic illnesses.

The concept of citizenship can help us to understand how the vicious cycle of poverty and social exclusion affects governance. This concept is based on the notion that there are civil, political, and social rights underpinning the relationship between the individual and the state and between the individual and society.[10] Persons who are materially deprived or poor are also poor in citizenship, which can be understood as a lack of the material conditions (such as education, housing, employment) for the fulfillment of one's rights, together with poor participation in society toward achieving common social goals.[11] In other words, poverty affects both people's ability to make themselves heard in society and their capacity to actively interact with other groups in society. A multi-country study of poor people's perceptions of the causes and effects of poverty found that powerlessness was the major negative result of being poor. This perception was constant across study participants regardless of cultural or political contexts.[12] Poor people also perceive themselves as lacking social capital.[13]

It has been said that civil society together with an independent media are among the most important factors in promoting good governance.[14] However, groups represented in civil society are usually traditional groups (labor unions, entrepreneurs) with well-defined individual interests that do not necessarily represent those of the urban poor. Who, then, should fight for the poor's interests? One would expect that local governments would. However, there is evidence that local governments are lagging far behind in terms of representing the interests of the unprotected,[15] especially indigenous population groups, which have strongly expressed their dissatisfaction in several Latin American countries.[16]

Violence

The types of health problems faced in urban areas are becoming less and less related to infectious diseases. Epidemiological situations in most cities now show a clear pattern: a constant increase of noninfectious diseases as the main causes of morbidity and mortality, with cardiovascular diseases and violence at the top. Of the two, violence is the most worrisome. It is estimated that one out of every three families in the Latin American

region is the victim of a criminal aggression every year.[17] On average there are thirty homicides per one hundred thousand inhabitants per year (higher in Central America, where the average is fifty-two homicides per year).[18] This rate is six times higher than in countries considered moderately affected by criminality.[19]

Different socioeconomic groups experience the effects of violence at varying degrees, with the poor often the hardest hit group.[20] Political violence has been the main reason for migration from rural areas to cities in Central America and Colombia for the last twenty years.[21] A recent study in poor urban cities in Guatemala found that the population perceives violence as the single most important problem they face.[22] Violence also carries high economic costs. It is estimated that the losses in human capital due to violent events in the region reaches up to 5 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). Countries also allocate major resources to security and crime reduction: Colombia spends approximately 25 percent of GNP, Brazil 11 percent.[23]

To exercise good governance, minimal conditions of social, political, and economic stability should be met.[24] Violence is a destabilizer of government and its consequences penetrate deep into the social tissue. Violence is therefore the most serious threat to overall governance in the urban setting, and effective programs are needed to control its spread.

Actions to Enhance Good Governance in Health

In relation to the three factors addressed above, there are two key actions with a potential to improve governance in health: building institutional capacity and strengthening citizenship of the urban poor.

Capacity building relates to expanding and upgrading human and institutional capabilities in a specific context (program sector or organization), and a certain capacity must be achieved before an organization can become effectively and efficiently managed.[25] Capacity building of local governments is therefore central to governance. Work in this area is already being pursued in many countries and supported by most international organizations.[26] However, good laws do not necessarily lead to good health.[27] This is why working only on institutional strengthening will not suffice. The reality in Latin America is that there are some politicians looking only to further their own interests and to benefit once

in power. The balance needed to achieve good governance, therefore, can only come from a population informed and educated about its own rights and responsibilities. Recent studies provide evidence that the existence of an informed public is highly correlated with reduction in both corrupt practices and governmental ineffectiveness.[28]

Although experiences of social participation in the health sector are increasing in Latin America, few of those experiences have influenced key political decisions.[29] A major challenge will be to strengthen citizenship among the poor to help them to exercise their demands for governance within the health sector.

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PART III

A NEW GOVERNANCE AGENDA?

people and a Shanghai of eighteen million. Although only about 3 percent of people currently live in megacities, these agglomerations play a very important role in national development. They serve as the engines of economic growth, the main markets for domestic and imported goods, the primary locus of political and administrative power, the disseminators of modernizing information, and the mediators of cultural influences. City-regions, therefore, are important, not because they are supplanting the nation-state but precisely because they play such a crucial role in the development of the nation-state. It is because of this nation-building role of city-regions that their planning and governance deserve the closest attention of scholars.[3]

Most of the recent literature on urban governance has been mainly focused on how the city-region may be managed effectively and efficiently. This is probably due to the fact that many studies have been conducted in technologically advanced countries where the main concern is provision of urban services. In most developing countries, however, city-regions are usually seen in terms of their national roles. Top political officials in megacities like Beijing, Jakarta, Manila, and Seoul are big national actors. The issues they deal with are not purely local ones. Their role in urban governance, therefore, is of great significance because the performance of the city-region heavily influences the development of the nation-state.

Urban governance is defined here more broadly than the concept of local government that has received a lot of attention in recent years in studies of metropolitan reforms and decentralization schemes. It goes beyond the field of urban management, which focuses primarily on the effective execution of formally adopted governmental policies and programs in order to achieve service delivery goals. As proposed by Patricia McCarney, Mohamed Halfani, and Alfredo Rodriguez, urban governance refers to “the relationship between civil society and the state, between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed. [4] Thus, urban governance thinking has shifted away from the state-centered perspective and it now encompasses activities by community-based associations, nongovernmental organizations, civic groups, and other members of civil society that in the past had been considered outside the policy process realm.

Even as urban governance is considered in a wider perspective to include civil society activities, however, its main focus is still the exercise of power what Harold Lasswell has called “politics as being made

up of who gets what, when, how.[5] This is especially important when

as the province of good urban management. In these largely technocratic and procedural activities, the need for professional knowledge and expertise is of great significance. However, good urban outcomes lie way beyond the achievements of good urban management. The lessons that can be learned in good urban governance can be found more in the complex political processes where the activities of local governments interact more closely with those of interest groups, political factions, community organizations, and civil society activists.

The literature on urban governance has focused on a number of areas where good outcomes and lessons learned have been highlighted. For purposes of this chapter, however, specific examples are given in only a limited number of areas as follows: (a) the promise and pitfalls of decentralization; (b) the search for regional governance systems; (c) the usefulness of comprehensive and strategic area-wide planning; and (d) tapping the democratic potentials of civil society. The lessons learned are analyzed in the context of case studies researched by the author. As such, it may not be possible to generalize too broadly from the case studies as the governance outcomes cited are grounded in the specific realities of the case situations.

The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization

In many countries, decentralization programs have been launched through constitutional enactments, statutes, executive orders, and administrative reforms. With the active encouragement of multilateral and bilateral development agencies, international financial institutions, philanthropic aid donors, and civil society advocates, central governments have been encouraged to extend autonomy to local government units and to devolve more authority and responsibility to such units. In some cases, decentralization, in the hope that it fosters and enhances the attainment of democratization, has been used as a conditionality by international donors before they provide foreign aid or technical assistance.

Decentralization movements have been particularly popular in formerly colonial countries where governments had traditionally relied on central government powers to impose public order, collect taxes, build infrastructure, or conduct monopolistic enterprises. Even after the collapse of colonial governments, local national leaders have tended to continue central dominance, justifying hegemony as a prerequisite of rehabilitation

Urban Governance: Some Lep 00Some GS2rned

hoped that as experience is gained with democracy at the bottom, similar elections will be required at the far more significant levels of the township and gradually move up the ladder to provincial and national levels. [8] If past reform movements in China are to serve as guides, it does not look like this bottom up approach to democratization hoped for by liberal democrats will catch on in the near future. Even as the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had supported the holding of village-level elections, it had ruled that election of officials at the township, prefecture, and higher levels would not be allowed. As headlined by the *New York Times,* Chinese Villagers Vote, But Its Party Rules.

The practice of decentralizing authority to village-level governments has been carried out for some time by many governments that have found it convenient to devolve responsibility and power to the weakest governmental units. During the 1960s, for example, the Philippine government passed the Barrio Council Law that gave local autonomy to the village (now called the *barangay*). The law declared the village as the basic unit of governance so people could directly participate in grass-uppor

“empowerment and “enablement of the urban poor. It was argued in the development literature that the government was not a good producer and provider of urban services. Solving urban problems, therefore, could be better effected if the government shifted to the role of an enabler by encouraging the efforts of people themselves, actively supported by NGOs and other civil society groups, to solve their own problems. In 1995, the Urban Management Programme of the United Nations observed, however, that “Some governments experiencing acute economic and financial crises see decentralization as a means of dumping their responsibilities for the management, regularization and servicing of illegal settlements on to local governments [but] they are not given the resources to discharge their duties. [10]

The main lesson learned from the cases noted above is that decentralizing authority and power to local government units does not necessarily result in positive development. In some countries, central government authorities may actually pursue policies that allow them to have their cake and eat it too they can claim to be pursuing liberal democracy by decentralizing powers to the smallest local government units but their actions actually strengthen their powers by emasculating provincial, metropolitan, and municipal units. In fact, one author has observed that “The problems central governments tend to transfer to local authorities are the problems that they cannot solve. [11]

Another lesson learned from the mixed results of decentralization programs is the need to decentralize authority and power to the level of local government that has the necessary human, financial, organizational, and institutional resources to effectively deal with those problems. This “mismatch of direct functional responsibility over urban functions on the one hand and the lack of financial authority and capability on the other has been noted by Richard Stren and other authors in the case of African countries.[12]

In other parts of the world, especially in Asia, there has been an observed reluctance on the part of central governments to establish metropolitan or regional governance structures. In view of the rapid growth of metropolitan areas and megaurban regions, the need for area-wide approaches of planning and governance in these areas is most obvious. Unfortunately, in both developing and more developed countries, the problems of megaurban regions have not been given adequate attention up

to now. There are very few examples of government reforms that establish planning and management structures that encompass whole city-regions.

All over the world, and in North America in particular, the commitment to local autonomy and decentralization also works against the establishment of higher tiers of local governance at the metropolitan level. This is very difficult to understand in the light of the recognition that local government fragmentation makes the efficient delivery of area-wide urban services extremely difficult. Experience has also shown that decentralization does not necessarily make local governments more representative. Patricia McCarney, in fact, has observed that decentralization does not automatically instil a system of local government which is accountable and responsive to the needs and demands of the local citizens. [13]

Another reason for metropolitan or regional governance reform has been the recognition of the important role of urban areas in national development. If city-regions, in fact, are to serve as the engines of economic growth, then they have to be more efficiently managed. This was certainly the motivation of the Chinese government when it decided to consolidate the various local government units in the Shanghai-centered region into one municipality. At the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1992, it was decided that Shanghai would be the "head of the dragon" that would lead the development of the whole Yangtze River delta and of China into the twenty-first century. Under the scheme, Shanghai was to become the economic, financial, and

port development was approved, designed to construct a 100 km deep-water embankment along the Huangpu that would allow Shanghai to challenge Hong Kong as China's international container port. Although the administrative jurisdiction of Shanghai Municipality is confined to the metropolitan area, the city has taken the leadership in the formulation of a regional development plan for the whole Yangtze River delta that encompasses the cities of Nanjing, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Wuxim, and surrounding counties, an area that contains nearly three hundred million people.

Supporters of liberal democracy might fear that the concentration of so much power in a unified structure such as Shanghai Municipality might result in arbitrary action. Some observers of the Shanghai case have noted, however, that there are a number of factors that serve as countervailing forces to prevent this. First, there is the so-called bureaucratic bargaining approach, in which officials enter into negotiations and strike mutually advantageous bargains in order to find optimal solutions to questions of turf, authority, and power. In reality, bureaucratic decision-making in Shanghai is not a hierarchical process where orders are given from the top and those at the bottom follow. Top officials leading individual powerful agencies have their own power bases, and in order to avoid all-or-nothing contests, they tend to negotiate and bargain to achieve what they want. Since no one official has all the power in the system (not even the mayor), bureaucratic bargaining has to be carried out endlessly in order to achieve common goals.

Another mechanism used to temper arbitrary power is the so-called clientelist approach, in which top officials in Shanghai use their personal influence and connections (what the Chinese call *guanzi*) to full advantage. In this regard, the fact that two former mayors of Shanghai are in key power positions in Beijing (President Zhang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji) is very significant. In the endless bureaucratic bargaining process among top Shanghai officials, the access of any one of them to these influential actors is an important asset in the performance of their duties.

What the Shanghai case shows, therefore, is the fact that meaningful participation in the political process is not confined to formal governance structures and processes, such as periodic elections, competing political parties, referenda, recall, official advisory bodies, and other mechanisms common in so-called democratic systems. Every political culture has its ways of resolving political conflict and it usually evolves

certain "rules of the game" that make decision making possible without resorting to violent means.

A key issue in China in the near future is to see how certain governance structures such as Communist Party cells, work units, neigh-

amalgamation would enhance democracy by making key officials directly elective and by simplifying the issues related to regional governance.

The major objections to amalgamation in the New City came from the municipalities, especially from local officials who were going to be displaced from their positions. Strong objections were also raised by civil society groups who feared that the creation of such a huge bureaucracy like the New City would limit citizen access to local officials (it was estimated that, under the reorganization, there were would be 85,000 persons represented by two councillors elected per ward under the new scheme). Jane Jacobs, for one, a virtual icon in Toronto politics, campaigned against the amalgamation because she feared that it would destroy the "neighborhood character" of Toronto's communities. The thousands of civil servants who would lose their jobs after amalgamation also lobbied mightily against the reform.

Initial evaluations of what has been achieved in the New City of Toronto have been quite positive. The monetary savings from amalgamation, originally estimated at around $865 million over three years, were more realistically set at about $150 million; but to tax-paying citizens, these were still substantial. The profile of the New City officials, espec-

wide services, such as public transportation and effective management of air, water, and soil pollution, call for a wider territory. Even as New City of Toronto begins to manage area-wide development, therefore, there are already some suggestions that a much larger structure covering a wider

thing, it has helped to limit the population growth of the city of Jakarta (about 1.5 million people have moved from Jakarta proper to the neighboring municipalities and districts of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi). The growth nodes have also attracted millions of migrants from other parts of Java and Indonesia (almost 70 percent of laborers in Bekasi, for example, were found to have migrated from other parts of Java).

Another positive development that could be traced to the plan was the rapid rate of housing development in selected parts of the region. A

drawn from. The massive generation of grey water and other wastes has polluted Jakarta's main rivers and streams. The water situation in Jabotabek has become so serious that by the year 2005, it is expected that the three major reservoirs will not have sufficient supply to meet all needs. The situation in the region is made worse by the rapid destruction of the forested upland areas around Bogor, Puncak, and Cianjur, which threatens to reduce the supply of water for the region even more.

The main lesson from Jabotabek, then, is that although the use of a comprehensive development plan can create some positive influence on the pace and direction of development in a city-region, quite a bit of slippage can occur if there is no area-wide governance mechanism to authoritatively coordinate development. The seven administrative and political units in Jabotabek could not effectively act together to achieve the objectives of the plan. In fact, the local units were in direct competition with each other for extracting resources from the central government and attracting local and foreign investors within their territories. Central government agencies and special function authorities were also not able to pursue coordinated actions despite the clear objectives indicated in the plan. Engrossed in protecting their bureaucratic turf and led by officials who often engaged in rent-seeking activities, these agencies were not able to rise above their petty concerns to actually implement the provisions of the plan.

It is clear from the Jabotabek experience that some advantages can be achieved in the formulation and adoption of a region-wide comprehensive plan. Certainly, the Jabotabek plan, despite the problems noted above, has exerted some influence on the development of the Jakarta-centered region in Indonesia. It may be said, however, that more positive achievements could have been possible if a unified regional

cent of the region's population in the city of Vancouver and the adjacent municipalities of Burnaby, New Westminster, North Vancouver City, North Vancouver District, West Vancouver, and Richmond. Ecologically, the GVRD is part of a much wider region referred to as Cascadia, which stretches all the way from Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, in the United States to Vancouver, British Columbia, in Canada.[17]

Essentially, there are four levels of government in the Greater Vancouver region. First, there is the Canadian federal government, with jurisdiction over some economic development initiatives, fiscal policy, immigration, and security. Second, there is the British Columbia provincial government, which, under the Canadian federal system, wields most of the authority and power over local affairs. Third, there is the GVRD, a regional government structure with jurisdiction over land use planning, transportation, parks and open spaces, water and sewerage, and solid waste disposal. Finally, there are the cities and districts that look after purely local functions such as fire protection, police, local schools, and so on.

In 1996, a Greater Vancouver regional plan was adopted by the British Columbia provincial government. The main provisions of this “Liveable Region Development Plan for 2021” were as follows: enhance more dense development in the “central metropolitan region” composed of Vancouver City and the municipalities and districts; develop “regional town centers” in seven surrounding areas that would concentrate development in such nodes; develop a mass transport system that would link the

In implementing the Liveable Region Plan, the GVRD has had to strike a delicate balance between attempting to achieve efficient service delivery through regional action and participative decision-making by

In the Philippines, a strong ideological commitment to liberal democracy and people power has seen the flowering of civil society, represented by almost fifty-eight thousand nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), people's organizations (P0s) and community-based organizations (CBOs) that are officially registered as legal entities with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Most of these civil society groups were formed during the dictatorial regime of President Ferdinand Marcos; they led the opposition that eventually toppled the dictator in 1986. Since then, these groups have been credited with the impeachment, arrest, and incarceration of former President Joseph Estrada for plunder, graft and corruption, perjury, and culpable violation of the Philippine Constitution. Although many civil society groups initially supported Estrada when he ran for president in 1998, they have now actively campaigned for his conviction on the serious charges against him.

The political importance of civil society in the Philippines has been recognized in the 1987 Philippine Constitution that has the following provisions: the state shall encourage nongovernmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the general welfare of the nation (Article II, Section 23); the state shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means (Article XIII, Section 15); and the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision making shall not be abridged (Article XIII, Section 16).

Translated into actual civil society activities, the constitutional provisions noted above have taken the form of participation in the electoral process; participation in legislation and policy formulation; advocacy and lobbying for specific interests on issues affecting the public good; participation in program and project implementation, including financing and management; and monitoring and evaluation of governmental programs and projects, particularly in attempting to curb graft and corruption.

Civil society groups have been most active in Philippine elections with the purpose of keeping the electoral process open, free, and clean. Foremost among the civil society groups is the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel), which at every election conducts massive information campaigns to encourage people to register and to get out and vote. Namfrel, with the cooperation of private business, community groups,

benefits and privileges to women workers, and for the passage of legislation related to reproductive health. Labor groups have also lobbied for the passage and implementation of regulations protecting the rights of workers. Associations of small traders and retailers have waged public relations campaigns encouraging people to patronize their businesses and buy Philippine products.

Government agencies have found it useful to enter into partnerships with civil society groups in managing specific programs. For example, the Community Mortgage Program of the National Housing Authority has been mainly managed by NGOs and CBOs that organize the urban poor into housing cooperatives. The civil society organizers train community leaders in project management and work closely with them in the formulation and implementation of community development plans. Two outstanding Philippine NGOs, the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), have entered into management contracts with the government to manage and co-finance projects even in urban slums.

Under management contracts or on their own, many Philippine NGOs monitor and evaluate governmental programs and projects. The Social Action Center of Ateneo de Manila University conducts community-level research that monitors the implementation of the government's housing program. Militant organizations like Mine Watch and the Organization of Indigenous Peoples also monitor the activities of government in relation to awarding mining concessions and the implementation of governmental rules and regulations related to environmental pollution.

A very important concern of civil society groups in the Philippines and elsewhere is graft and corruption. This issue is most important in large urban areas because the execution of very large infrastructure projects that involve huge sums of money usually involves graft. Research carried out by civil society groups have pointed to the complex cultural basis of graft and corruption. It has revealed that a number of variables, such as the kinship system, the tradition of gift giving, and the very low salaries of government officials in developing countries, are closely associated with corruption.[21]

In Hong Kong, civil society groups, in close cooperation with the private business sector, have actively campaigned against corruption in city government. An agency meriting the government's special attention has been the police department, where cases ranging from fixing of traffic

tickets to more serious crimes related to drugs and smuggling have been exposed. Research on corruption in Hong Kong has highlighted the cultural context of corrupt practices. The studies found that one of the main reasons for corruption was the overly cumbersome process of decision making in city affairs. The study concluded that “if the bureaucratic procedures require too many steps or if there is always a long waiting list, clients will not mind paying ‘speed money’. Bureaucratic corruption was found to be closely associated with such processes as the allocation of housing units, the construction of infrastructure, and the granting of licenses and permits by the police department.[22]

Studies of corruption in Hong Kong have focused on the importance of certain measures designed to effectively identify and define corrupt acts, the establishment of independent bodies to control corruption, the passage of laws providing for certainty of punishment for corrupt officials, and the mobilization of private business and civil society against graft. In particular, the organization of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which was placed under the jurisdiction of the governor of Hong Kong, was a very crucial tool in the territory's fight against corruption. So effective has ICAC been in weeding out corruption, that it has become a model of how urban governments can effectively solve this pernicious problem.

In the Philippines, a significant role has been played by the mass media in monitoring and evaluating governmental policies and programs. Of particular interest is the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) that conducts research, investigations, and expos s of governmental activities. The PCIJ's detailed and amply documented reports on corruption in the Estrada administration have been the main documents used in the trial of the former president and were largely responsible for turning public opinion against him.[23]

Despite the many positive accomplishments of civil society groups in the Philippines and other countries, a number of questions have been raised about their role in governance. One commonly observed fact is that civil society groups are often mostly drawn from upper and middle classes, which have higher educational levels and literacy and have greater access to the mass media. In the case of the ouster of former President Estrada in the Philippines, the question has been raised whether this was truly a manifestation of “people power or the thwarting of the people's popular

will by an alliance between elitist civil society groups and the military. After all, supporters of Estrada argued, the former president was elected by more than ten million votes in the 1998 elections. Was it right that he was ousted from power by the mass action of less than half a million people in Metro Manila who, with the support of the military, kicked the former president from the presidential palace? Was the ouster of Estrada a manifestation of "direct democracy" or was it an "elitist coup" by a group of self-appointed guardians of the public good?

In many countries there is a widespread belief that civil society promotes democracy because it questions the status quo, engages government officials in discussions of public issues, disseminates information, and mobilizes support from various groups to work for or against specific policies, and makes its views clearly heard on various controversies. It is widely believed that civil society activism protects the public against the abuses of selfish interests. However, what is to prevent civil society groups from abusing their powers? When civil society activism itself becomes the problem, who is going to protect the public against its protectors?

CONCLUSION

that authority to make independent decisions should be vested in governance structures that have the needed resources. In most countries, this

more participatory modes of policy formulation, effective program implementation, and the monitoring and evaluation of public programs. However, civil society may also create problems because of its confrontational, critical, and sometimes overly ideological stand on issues. Some civil society groups can cause delays and paralyze governmental programs by their inflexible stands. When civil society groups become openly partisan while claiming to speak for the general welfare, who is going to sort out what they really stand for?

A key issue involving civil society in urban governance is the need to scale up civil society efforts in order to make them more effective. Local-level and community-based efforts, especially those by POs and CBOs, are effective only up to a certain point. Institutional arrangements, therefore, have to be evolved to deal with problems at the community, municipal, city, regional, and national levels. Adequate devolution of authority and power to the correct level is a key factor in successful urban governance.

Graft and corruption.

Urban governance has to deal with the issue of graft and corruption. Specifically, the cultural aspects of corruption need to be more clearly understood in order to find more effective ways of dealing with it. Important lessons, such as the creation of special anticorruption agencies, the certainty of punishment for corrupt public officials, and the key role played by civil society and the mass media in exposing and controlling corruption need to be known and disseminated more widely to assist many local governments confronted with this problem.

Globalization and urban governance.

The effective and efficient governance of city-regions is of great significance at this stage of world development not because global cities are starting to supplant nation-states as major influences on the economic, political, and social spheres but because city-regions play such an important role in nation building. Improving the performance of regional governance structures is important because it optimizes the developmental role of urban centers in development. The rapid expansion of global city-regions calls for the institutionalization of urban governance processes at the appropriate levels where the human, financial, and organizational resources are found.

Notes

1 See, for example, Michael Douglass and John Friedmann, eds., *Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age*

12 Richard Stren, “Urban Local Government in Africa,” in Richard Stren and Rodney White, eds., *African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid Urban Growth* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 20-36.

13 Patricia McCarney, “Considerations on the Notion of ‘Governance’ -44(23m0 Tc0 Tw[((Bou

how the good practices of leading cities can be sustained and promoted in order to consolidate and expand improvements in professionalism, participation, fiscal management, and services on behalf of city residents. Many of the lessons from Latin America's recent past may have relevance to the agenda of decentralization in other nations.

All of the lessons from the quiet revolution run counter to the conventional policy wisdom about decentralization, not only in Latin America but in many other regions as well. Institutions like the World Bank and the Inter American Development Bank in Washington promulgate policies that emphasize greater regulatory powers by central governments over the subnational system in the interests of maintaining fiscal stability.[4] But political and institutional actions are needed to strengthen the system of incentives put into place by the quiet revolution. These actions should lead to shared responsibilities and a more important role for cities, not just to greater control and suppression of innovation that is often the case at present. Clearly more effective regulations are needed, but excessive central government controls can smother the embers of innovation and renewal that were produced in the quiet revolution. Furthermore, major changes in the external environment changes in the conduct of international business and finance, and changes in the assumptions on the part of city leaders about their own role in their nations' fortunes mean that a broader approach is needed, one more suited to the emerging environment for cities in international business. This chapter will outline the directions of this new approach and summarize the lessons for cities and nations now facing decentralization in a globalized environment.

Lessons from the Quiet Revolution

What can we learn from the Latin American experience that might be of use in the future to consolidate and strengthen local government? A review of decentralization problems and issues in the quiet revolution provides a large harvest of lessons. Issues of power sharing, fiscal reform, and participation in governance that has occupied so much of city policy in Latin America are similar to the agenda before cities and nations.

Political Power Sharing in Stages

More caution and selective devolution of power sharing may be advisable

to sharpen those powers already devolved and to deepen the devolution to

to maintain fiscal balance at the local level in Latin America as in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe but restrictions should not shortcut the opportunity nor smother the creative energies of cities that show promise to achieve credit worthiness. Colombia and the Philippines have both devised systems to complement financial market forces by rationing credit to subnational governments based on categories of municipal capacity. Yet, it does little good to set rationing systems in place only to have central governments break a fiscal accord by irresponsible spending of their own, as Colombia did in 1996 and Argentina more recently.

Devolving Functions and Finance

Most central governments shared revenues with local governments faster than they spelled out local spending responsibilities. This practice might have contributed to excesses in spending, but it also consecrated power-sharing arrangements and made local governments real partners in national systems of government. We might speculate that, in the long run, this "finance first" strategy might prove to be wiser than the rational dictum of "finance should follow function" often espoused by international financial assistance agencies like the World Bank. Ready access to shared finances breathed real life into the new spending powers given to local governments. Newly decentralizing governments might wish to look for more controlled, more measured ways to achieve a similar "buy in" from local governments. For example, governments that can meet eligibility criteria like those suggested earlier, or those in the upper tiers of size, responsibility, and capacity, might be rewarded with greater discretionary income from transfers, as a step in the transition to full devolution.

Cities Kept Off Balance

The laws on revenue sharing, particularly in Latin America, have also not been implemented fully, and uncertain size and timing of revenue sharing keeps local governments off balance in financial terms. In many countries, local governments are given shared revenues, usually for help with capital investment. But most local governments cannot predict the amounts they will receive from period to period in what is supposed to be automatic revenue sharing.[6] First, most governments have at least three, some as many as twelve, variables that are a part of the revenue-sharing formulas used to calculate the distribution of shares. The problems of calculation

are exacerbated by uncertainty and sometimes macroeconomic shifts that affect the base upon which revenue sharing is calculated, usually the total amount of public revenues to central governments. The upshot is that just when local governments are expected to do more long-term thinking for capital investment purposes, they are subjected to short-term variations in the income needed to finance the largest public works. Nations and development assistance agencies should work to make income flows as predictable as possible, especially for capital investment purposes.

Metropole and Municipality

One of the curious features of virtually all national legislation on local government enacted during the quiet revolution is that as municipalities were strengthened by legal and regulatory frameworks, whereas amalgams of municipalities, particularly metropolitan areas, were weakened, at least in relative terms. Legislation in nearly every counth(n)1(ng the qu)40(estme)20(v)41b

public decision-making. Many mechanisms can encourage innovation, ranging from basic tools of planning to more sophisticated incubation of ideas, leadership, and education of the public. But few governments pay attention to the many sources of renewal lying dormant among their cities and towns.

Contract of Governance

The most striking of these innovations is the reconstruction of a contract of governance between elected officials and voter-taxpayers.[9] In this reconstruction, the contract of governance has been renewed and reinvigorated by voter-taxpayers who have shown willingness to allow local, elected leaders to take actions on their behalf in areas of public life in which the same voters show much less trust in national officials. In cities all across the region, voter-taxpayers have generally agreed to new tax burdens when elected officials can demonstrate through concrete improvements that tax revenues are at work in visible and verifiable ways. The essence of this governance innovation is fiscal decision making through participatory democracy at the lowest level. Engineering this change could not have been accomplished without the quiet revolution. But it can be encouraged and started by allowing local governments in newly decentralizing states to take part in the dynamic process of laying plans and spending money to implement change on a small scale in carefully selected places. Mechanisms of control and staging will need to be tailored in each institutional setting to discourage or control irresponsible spending. Implementing local spending will require careful accounting of the cultural factors that determine the nature of government and pace of

Municipios des Istmo Centroamericano (FEMICA) in Central America. These "natural" networks are the most obvious route by which to leverage the relatively small national and international assistance being offered to local governments for capacity strengthening.

Sharing Lessons

Political leaders in Latin America drew inspiration from Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as from each other, in charting out the shifts in power that have led to a quiet revolution. In a similar way, newly decentralizing countries will have much to learn from Latin America as well as from each other. The strategy is to focus on a few and spread the message widely, giving more emphasis to spreading the word and demonstrating support for good performers while implying a threat of withholding support unless local governments show good behavior. Latin American ministers of finance had few formalized channels and virtually no systematic way to share lessons of reform and change. A fresh focus on leadership and the mechanisms of learning by local authorities much of it done efficiently through associations is one way by which the speed of learning might be increased. Authorities in the new vanguard of decentralizing nations would be well served to exchange ideas with their counterparts in other countries. International lending and technical assistance organizations could play a very useful role by organizing a system of learning for local and national authorities in the lessons and good practices in decentralization.

Looking to Future Stages of Reform

Contextual factors are decisive in how much or little of this experience is transferable to future stages of reform, and indeed, to other countries. The scope of these considerations stretches beyond this chapter, but two or three of the more important contextual factors can be named. In the first place, past experience with government, i.e., the traditions of exercising power and delivering local services, influence the environment of governance. Ideas such as a "governance contract" and "fiscal bargain" will not be recognizable to citizens or policymakers in most countries. But local leaders, elected and community alike, recognize the power of control over spending and the value of fitting infrastructure and services to local needs. Reform can begin by focusing on small-scale works in

neighborhoods where citizens have an important role to play in partnership with their local government. These common grounds are the starting place for decentralized democratic government.

Past experience with governance is an important contextual factor in the so-called transition economies. Many former centrally planned economies are in transition away from central planning toward market-based democracies. The move away from the central state involves the shedding of political ideology and way of life much starker than any seen in the Latin American experience. Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Hungary, and Vietnam are decentralizing as they move to market economies, and each has found a way to begin recasting the idea of governance.

In Vietnam, for example, national and local officials began the Doi Moi reform process in 1993.[10] Reforms were intended to liberalize the economy and make it more subject to market forces. But even before the Asian economic crisis of 1997, these reforms were out of sync with the processes of urban development in Vietnam, particularly in the largest cities. As liberalization of trade is deepened and state-owned enterprises convert to private, market-oriented principles of operation, private sector investors are breaking free from national constraints only to be hampered by city bureaucracies still operating under obsolete regulations, such as having to pay unauthorized fees and charges in order to do business. Many regulations originate with national policy or administrative requirements. Administrative regulations and political controls make local governments sluggish and penalize them in comparison to their competitors in the region. Thus, the transition to free-market economy is difficult to separate from the logic of cities acting as more sovereign players in a decentralized system of government. Nevertheless, the basic functions of local government identifying need, setting priorities, delivering services at the local level are the basic entry points for reform.

In still other countries, decentralization policies are being promulgated after the initial waves of globalization, liberalization of trade, reduction of the effectiveness of national boundaries, the onset of a perception of vulnerability. Unlike Latin America, where decentralization was launched before most of these effects took hold, most of i0(e e9(erJT★118(,)]TJT★00.003 Tc0.0

globalization will make the stakes of decentralization much greater. Responsibility for economic development, trade, and infrastructure needed for local development may be harder to leave to cities.

Conclusion: Banking on the Future

In key areas of development fiscal responsibility, efficiency, good governance, and economic development the leading cities of Latin America have demonstrated a systematic response to new incentives generated during decentralization. The quiet revolution is essentially a change in the extent and impact of participation in government at the local level. The conventional wisdom of policy and practice in managing urban and municipal development is constrained in many ways and may be blocking important sources of growth.

For one thing, conventional approaches are constrained in the way local governance is conceived by national (and many international) authorities because local governments have not yet reached the status of fully responsible partners in national systems of governance. In the past, local governments had been kept weak because it was in the interest of the central government to maintain strong controls. Now, with decentralization, it is in the nations' interest to strengthen local governments.

Part of the tension in the region is caused by an intergovernmental impasse. To go further with decentralization means that municipal voter-taxpayers and national governments must trust local officials to succeed in their duties. The impasse arises, because for the most part, national governments have not given local governments either the political space or the financial resources to discharge new functions, even when they have shown promise to do so. If anything, more reticence is being shown by governments in newly decentralizing nations.

To break this impasse, the system of governance national and local governments and their electorates must reach a new level of mutual trust. Local governments must be encouraged, and allowed, to manage their affairs. This autonomy must be buttressed by a partnership with central authorities. Creating these assurances can be achieved in many ways, for instance, by improving choice making, managerial skills, professional capacity, and by strengthening political and economic incentives among office holders. These items are among the highest priority issues on the agenda of decentralization in the region. The present conditions short terms of political office, fluctuating revenues, restrictions on spending may succeed in limiting fiscal mischief, but they also propel the revolving door of municipal leadership and personnel.

New overtures in international lending and technical assistance organizations are beginning to direct more attention to issues of urban and municipal development. The World Bank's Strategy for Urban Development and Local Governance and the Cities Alliance are two institutional overtures that seek to achieve a coherent effort among donor institutions and to focus attention on cities. However, much remains to be done with partner institutions in client countries in order to make efforts like these effective.

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5 William Dillinger and Steven B. Webb, "Macroeconomic Management in Decentralized Democracies: The Quest for Hard Budgets Constraints in Latin America, *PREM Latin America* (Washington, DC: World Bank, May 1999).

6 G. Peterson, "Learning by Doing: Decentralization and Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean," *World Bank LAC Discussion Series Paper,* sponsored by the LACTD (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997).

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9 The term draws on ideas of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to descres/F19oh 18319(son,)

CHAPTER 9

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Oriol Nello
Autonomous University of Barcelona

For the past two centuries, Barcelona has essentially been an industrial city. Spain's first steam industry was established there in 1832; its first railway line in 1848; its leading textile center was there, as well as its most active port; and it had the largest working-class population. So much so, that for many years the city's image was directly related to industrial activity as well as to the social conflicts entailed by its development: Spain's factory, the city of bombs, the rose of fire.

In 1970, a resident of Poblenou the most industrial neighborhood in this Catalan Manchester, cradle of the proletariat and anarchist movement would have had a very hard time believing that, in a mere thirty years, the biggest factories (Titan, Motor Ib rica, la Maquinista Terrestre y Mar tima) would completely disappear and the area would be a tourist, residential, and cultural district. And yet, this is exactly what has happened. In the last quarter century, Barcelona has undergone a radical transformation: its economic base, its social and physical structure, its people's habits, and even its image have experienced a decisive and, in general terms, positive change.

The object of this paper is to provide some data and observations on

emerging residential and tertiary centers (Sant Cugat, Mollet, Cerdanyola, Sitges, Calella).

The Dynamics of Urban Transformation

The Barcelona metropolitan area is currently going through an accelerated process of change. Three characteristic tendencies of this transformation greatly correspond with the transformation dynamics of most large cities on the Iberian Peninsula and in Western Europe: ***dispersion*** after a process long characterized by concentration, both population and activities now disperse across the metropolitan area; ***extension*** simultaneous with urban sprawl across the area, there tends to be an expansion in order to integrate an increasingly large area within the metropolitan boundaries; and ***specialization*** this dispersed and expanding city also tends toward the functional and social specialization of each of its areas.[2]

Dispersion: Population Sprawl and Economic Activities

The spatial structure of the metropolitan region today is the fruit of a long process of concentration of both the population and its activities within the Catalan region. Throughout the agricultural and commercial revolution of the 1700s, the industrialization of the 1800s, and the modernization of the first three quarters of the 1900s, this process brought population from remote areas of Catalonia and even from other regions of Spain to concentrate along the coastline and, specifically, in the plain of Barcelona. The products of this process of concentration in Barcelona are both the inequalities in the distribution of the population (referred to above) as well as an extremely high density (fifteen thousand inhabitants per km^2), for which it is hard to find parallels in other European cities.[3]

This process of concentration reached its zenith in 1981, when Barcelona attained its highest demographic density in history (1,752,627 inhabitants). Since then it has shown a certain decentralizing and dispersing ripple that has been affecting the entire metropolitan area. Thus, in the last twenty years, the city of Barcelona has lost close to two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants and has gone from containing 40 percent of the metropolitan population to 35 percent. Meanwhile, the first metropolitan ring remains stable, from a demographic point of view (both in absolute as well as in relative terms), and the second is growing

rapidly.[4] This decentralization, with net losses of population in the metropolitan center, also affects the municipalities conurbated to Barcelona (like l'Hospitalet, Badalona, and Santa Coloma, each of which has experienced population loss). This phenomenon is not unique, since it also affects a large number of other Spanish metropolitan areas (Madrid, Valencia, and Bilbao have all experienced net population losses in their central municipality in the last intercensus period).[5]

The configuration of the metropolitan space has passed from being narrowly conditioned by interregional migrations associated with work (prior to 1975) to depending, above all, on intermetropolitan migrations associated with housing. This phenomenon is not simple decentralization, but rather a real process of dispersion of population and activities throughout the space a process through which practically all of the nuclei with highest population and density (independent of their placement) are tending to lose relative weight and, in many cases, population in absolute terms to other more dispersed and less densely populated locations.

Extension: Urban Area Expansion

The second characteristic of the evolution of this metropolis is its spatial

tutes the sixth largest metropolitan region of Europe, surpassed only by London, Paris, the Ruhr, the Randstad, and Madrid.[11]

The relative balance of income levels.

There has also been a certain convergence among income levels in the city and in the metropolitan rings: the mean income level of the first metropolitan ring that, in 1989, was equivalent to 77.1 percent of the central city's, had reached 85.3 percent in 1999. In the same period, the second ring went from 79.8 percent to 96.8 percent with respect to the mean income level of Barcelona.[12]

THE CHALLENGES OF URBAN TRANSFORMATION

It is undeniable that these advantages have been accompanied by important problems. Thus today, the city, and the metropolitan area as a whole, must face challenges of an environmental, functional, and social nature.

The Environmental Problem

The most outstanding problem in terms of the environment is land

functions that used to be restricted to a smaller area residence, work, shopping, enjoying leisure time are now carried out over an increasingly larger space. This is clearly seen in the evolution of the municipalities' capacity of self-contention (that is, their capacity to retain the mobility that is generated within their own boundaries). Thus, in the 310 municipalities in the province of Barcelona, those retaining less than 50 percent of their labor mobility have gone from 102 in 1986, to 151 in 1991, to 208 in 1996.[14]

In this way, in four of every five municipalities of the Barcelona metropolitan region, at least half of those who work do so outside of their own municipality; the mean rate of self-contention dropped from 67.6 percent to 55 percent between 1986 and 1996. Data from the Metropolitan Survey 2000 show a new drop of 7 percentile points between 1995 and 2000.[15]

This growing need for mobility has entailed an extraordinary increase in the demand for road infrastructure and public transportation. However, since investment in the latter is much less, there has been a radical move in favor of journeys taken in private vehicles. In the city of Barcelona and in consideration of the displacements associated with the city's growth, however, public transportation is still strong, accounting for slightly over one-third of journeys taken.

This situation is the result of policies (public and private) that have given priority to investments in the road network to the detriment of public transportation. But it is also a consequence of the way land occupation has taken place in recent years. Thus, according to data from the planning agency Barcelona Regional, 44 percent of compact residential land is within the area of direct influence (500 meters) of a station, whereas only 6 percent of dispersed residential land and 11 percent of industrial land enjoy this situation.[16] Thus, in the last few years sprawl has entailed that a higher percentage of the population and economic activities are now established in low accessibility areas.

The new patterns in land occupation, along with scarce investment in public transportation, are leading to problems in metropolitan mobility, which are expressed in traffic congestion, increased commuting time (affecting mostly low-income groups and, within each household, women, children, and the elderly), growth of pollution and accidents, and increased energy consumption per worker and per place of work.

Social Segregation

The housing market acts as a powerful motor for social separation, in particular, for the emigration of medium-income groups from the central city toward the metropolitan rings. This could lead to polarization of the city, in the sense that it could become a place inhabited only by the very rich or the very poor. Fortunately, statistical evidence contradicts this hypothesis. As explained above, differences between the central city and the metropolitan rings, in terms of mean incomes, have tended to diminish over the last fifteen years. Furthermore, in the central city, the ratio between the first and last population decile in terms of mean income has decreased from 15 to 1 in 1985 to 10.5 to 1 in 2000. Similarly, total income distribution, both in the central city as well as in the metropolitan rings, has tended to become more equitable (as analysis based on the calculation of Gini indexes shows).

municipal government has defended the model of a compact, complex, and integrated city, understanding compactness, complexity, and cohesion as essential prerequisites for efficiency, sustainability, and equality. The unrestrained sprawl, the dispersed city, is not a city; at most it is an urbanization in which those elements that make contemporary urban life attractive and desirable innovation, richness of uses, capacity to com-

rehabilitation over demolition, link land uses to accessibility, and regulate traffic. In a nutshell, the future of the central city depends on its ability to create, stimulate, and maintain activities in innovative and emerging sectors, without loosing its roots.

The centrality of politics.

In order to advance toward this urban configuration there must be values and collective projects capable of conditioning and contradicting market forces whenever necessary. This requires attention to the central role of politics in the construction of urban space. To go with the flow is not to govern. To govern means to make something happen that would not occur without decision and collective will. This does not mean being slaves to old plans, to fixed schemes. Any urban policy that remains fixed quickly becomes obsolete. Thus, the defense and stimulation of urban renovation must include flexible planning that is more engaged in the process of construction of the city than in following some image-objective; administrative and strategic planning that is capable of considering the decisive options for economic and social transformation, along with the physical content; and participatory planning, which includes electronic interaction, simulation exercises, and citizen input planning, in short, that inscribes sustainability, efficacy, and equity as essential objectives.

The city of quality is not one that tries to deny its conflicts and reach equality in such an unreal way but rather one that is able to administer these contradictions through democratic processes and collective action.

The Role of Emerging Sectors: Three Examples

Three examples are offered below of the way in which urban renovation policies that are trying to put these values into practice have been applied in the city of Barcelona. Because of their magnitude, they have implications for all aspects of the lives of citizens; because of their characteristics, each one has, respectively, a special impact on compactness, complexity of uses, and the city's social cohesion that is, each one of the values they are meant to preserve.

Tourist/Cultural Activities and New Leisure Centers

Although Catalonia, particularly the coastal areas of the Costa Brava and

the Costa Dorada, has been one of the main tourist destinations of the Mediterranean, Barcelona had remained relatively outside major tourist flows. It was visited mostly for business, and in particular for conferences; fair organization is one of its traditional occupations.

This changed radically after the celebration of the Olympic Games in 1992. They were a colossal promotion for the city and allowed it to project an image based greatly on its cultural and architectural charm; they also attracted public and private investment in the city, which had very noticeable effects in the area of infrastructure and facilities (including the carrying out of a Hotel Plan under which the city went from 118 establishments and 18,569 beds in 1990 to 148 establishments and 25,055 beds in 1992, and 187 establishments and 31,338 beds in 2000). Simultaneously, there has also been a sharp increase in demand from 3.8 million overnight stays in 1990 to more than 7.7 million in 2000, doubling in one decade. The reasons for these visits have also changed: at the beginning of the 1990s, business was the purpose of more than 50 percent of total visits; in 2000, this dropped to 36.7 percent, while tourism reached 43.9 percent.[19]

This increase in exterior demand is complemented by a noticeable increase in domestic demand. A substantial part of the population of the Barcelona metropolitan region considers that it enjoys a lot of free time. Among the adult population, leisure time activities that are frequently practiced are going to the beach (42.2 percent), to the movies (19.9 percent), to restaurants (16 percent), and to museums and exhibitions (8.6 percent).[20] Urban policies have tried to associate the emergence of this demand with the creation of new centers for leisure activities within the city. These centers have also been used as instruments to rehabilitate some areas and invigorate others. On the whole, the city has bet on tourism and urban cultural and leisure activities, in contrast to the land consumption

Scientific Research, – i.e. some of the main cultural facilities of the city and of Catalonia – have been placed in the middle of a historical part of the city, and in the heart of a neighborhood with intense deterioration problems

The waterfront.
Close to five kilometers of urban coastal front have been recovered and adapted for swimming and leisure activities, with the construction of a seaside promenade, the Olympic Port, and the establishment of numerous restaurants and bars. This opening of the city to the sea, one of the main legacies of Olympic planning, has radically changed the city's tourism offer (it can now also offer sun and beach as products) and the leisure habits of its inhabitants (the seaside front has turned into many people's favorite beach: 27.2 percent of people who go to the beach state this one as their main destination).[21]

Port Vell.
The inner harbor of Barcelona, adjacent to the city's historical center, has also been recovered for citizen use, with the removal of the barriers that used to prevent front-line access to the sea and the construction of walkways that allow access to the old piers. Here, the Maremagnum center has been established, fully dedicated to leisure time activities, with a shopping mall (with stores, bars, and restaurants), the new aquarium, a movie theater complex, and an IMAX cinema.

New urban shopping centers.

gram in the Poblenou area, a district that has traditionally been the city's eastern industrial center. In this area there has been a modification of the General Metropolitan Plan (passed on July 27th 2000) to allow for the establishment of new activities and mixed use. Thus, the old industrial zoning has been transformed into a new category, known as 22@, to attract activities linked to emerging sectors (software production, telecommunications, multimedia, press, data processing and electronic commerce, artistic activity, and research and education centers).

It is hoped these new uses will generate over one hundred thousand new jobs, which could be combined with residential use of the same area. This is thus an attempt to attract productive activities, in both industry and service, to the city center and establish them in one area in which, by breaking the former rigid zoning schemes, they find themselves mixed in with residences and centers of artistic production, education, and investigation.

The area affected by the 22@ classification is 198.3 ha. The transformation of 1,159,626 m^2 of industrial land is foreseen, with a total potential of approximately 3,500,000 m^2 of new construction (excluding equipment). The 4,614 homes that currently exist on industrial land will be integrated into the planning regulations and an additional 3,500 new ones will be built. About 75,000 m^2 will be given over to green zones, and 145,000 m^2 will be destined for new facilities. This program's real estate potential, in 2001 values, is 7,813.2 million euros.[22]

Urban Renewal and Forum 2004

The interventions examined above are mostly related to compactness and complexity; Forum 2004 has an added strong social aspect: an explicit will to affect the city's social cohesion.

The Bes s riverfront area the administrative limit between Barcelona and the neighboring municipality of Sant Adri del Bes s constitutes a real compendium of urban problems: the presence of large energy and environmental infrastructures (a water treatment plant, five power stations, a waste incineration plant); the mouth of a river the Bes s, highly contaminated; extensive road infrastructure (the Diagonal unfinished; the Cintur n del Litoral); and mass housing projects from the 1960s and 1970s, with obvious social problems (la Mina, Sant Ramon de Penyafort, la Catalana).

The magnitude and diversity of these problems has led to the design of a very complex program, which combines the creation of several specific projects and the organization of an important international event called the Universal Forum of Cultures, Barcelona 2004. It is scheduled for

2 Oriol Nello, *Cataluña, ciudad de ciudades* (Lleida, Milenio, 2002), 159.

3 Josep Serra (dir.), Grans aglomeracions metropolitanes d'Europa, in *Papers. Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona,* 37 (june, 2002, English text included).

4 Mancomunitat de Municipis de l' rea Metropolitana de Barcelona, *Dinàmiques territorials a l'àrea i regió de Barcelona* (Barcelona, Mancomunitat de Municipis de l' rea Metropolitana de Barcelona, 336 English text included).

5 Oriol Nello, Spain, in Leo Van den Berg et al., *National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to the Urban Issues in the fifteen Member States* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 325-377.

6 Joaquim Clusa, Barcelona:Economic Development 1970-1995, in Nigel Harris and Ida Fabricius, *Cities and Structural Adjustment* (London: University College of London, 1996),100-116.

7 Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, *Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats* (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001), 71.

8 Joaquim Clusa & Josep Roca Cladera, Evoluci. , de l'estructura urbana de Catalunya, 1991-1996. Impacte dels canvis experimentats en la distribuci. , de la poblaci. , i la mobilitat per treball en el sistema catal de ciutats, in *Nota d'Economia*, 64, 1999 (66-94).

9 Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, *Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats* (Barcelona, Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001), 71.

10 Oriol Nel lo, *Cataluña, ciudad de ciudades* (Lleida: Milenio, 2002), 159.

11 Josep Serra (dir.), Grans aglomeracions metropolitanes d'Europa, in *Papers. Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona,* 37 (june, 2002, English text included).

12 Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, *Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats* (Barcelona, Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)

13 Albert Serratosa, Els espais oberts en el planejament metropolit : realitats i propostes, in *Papers. Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona*, 22 (pp. 37-47).

14 Oriol Nello, Joan L. ,pez &Joan Miquel Piqu , *Anàlisi de la mobilitat obligada dels municipis de la província de Barcelona, 1986-1996* (Bellaterra: Institut d'Estudis Metropolitans de Barcelona, 1999).

15 Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, *Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats* (Barcelona, Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)

16 Barcelona Regional, *Criteris per al planejament metropolità de Barcelona* (Barcelona: Barcelona Regional, 2001, multicopied).

17 Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, *Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats* (Barcelona, Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)

18 Oriol Nel lo, La ciutat de l'esperan a, in *Saló d'Esperiències i projectes urbans* (Barcelona, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2002, forthcoming).

19 *Barcelona economia*, various issues.

20 Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, *Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats* (Barcelona, Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)

21 Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, *Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats* (Barcelona, Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)

22 Ajuntament de Barcelona, *Districte 22@* (Barcelona, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2001). See, as well, the web site www.bcn.es/22@bcn

23 The official web site of the Forum is www.barcelona.2004.org

APPENDIX A

Appendix