GLOBAL URBAN POVERTY: SETTING THE AGENDA

Edited by

Allison M. Garland, Mejgan Massoumi and Blair A. Ruble

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Allison M. Garland, Mejgan Massoumi
and Blair A. Ruble

THE URBAN CHALLENGE

This year, for the first time in history, the majority of the world's people will live in cities. According to the United Nations, the global urban population will grow from 3.3 billion people in 2008 to almost 5 billion by the year 2030 (UNFPA 2007, 1). This urban expansion is not a phenomenon of wealthy countries. Almost all of the growth will occur in unplanned and underserved city slums in parts of the world that are least able to cope with added demands. The pace of urbanization far exceeds the rate at which basic infrastructure and services can be provided, and the consequences for the urban poor have been dire. Failure to prepare for this unprecedented and inevitable urban explosion carries serious implications for global security and environmental sustainability.

Over the past two years, the Wilson Center's Comparative Urban Studies Project (CUSP) organized a seminar series to bring these trends to the attention of international decision makers. With the support of the Urban Programs Team of the Office of Poverty Reduction in the Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade at the US Agency for International Development, CUSP commissioned research to examine the multidimensional problem of urban poverty, identifying innovative approaches to urban health, water, sanitation, crime, youth, migration, planning, land markets, and housing. The seminar series brought togelti3 bilDolas. ploicayaks. pnd hlocl pommi15(ulnty aeaser)-20(se]TJ0.027 Tv

ease. Insecurity permeates all aspects of life for slum dwellers. Without land title or tenure, they face the constant threat of eviction. Crime and violence are concentrated in city slums, disproportionately affecting the urban poor. Most slum dwellers depend upon precarious employment in the informal sector, characterized by low pay and poor working conditions. Illegal settlements are often located on hazardous land in the urban periphery. Perhaps most alienated in city slums are growing youth populations whose unmet needs for space, education, health, and jobs can lead to social problems, further undermining security in urban areas.

Marginalized from life and opportunity in the formal city, the urban poor are in many ways invisible to their governments. They live in irregular settlements where there are no schools or health clinics, and transportation to jobs is inadequate and costly. They are forced to pay considerably more to private vendors for services and infrastructure that are not provided by the government. Statistics often mask the severity of conditions for the urban poor. While demographic indicators for quality of life of urban dwellers can be higher than for their rural counterparts, disaggregated data reveals differences within levels of access to services and stark inequalities, for example in child malnutrition and mortality rates. Highly visible disparities, spatial segregation, and exclusion create the breeding grounds for social tensions, crime and violence.

Global poverty has become an urban phenomenon. In the year 2002, 746 million people in urban areas were living on less than $2.00 a day (Ravallion 2007, 16). The absolute number of urban poor has increased in the last fifteen to twenty years at a rate faster than in rural areas. Rapid urban growth has made Asia home to the largest share of the world's slum dwellers (Halfani 2007). But nowhere is the threat of urbanizing poverty more grave than in Africa, which has the fastest rate of urban growth and the highest incidence of slums in the world. In her contribution to this volume, Vanessa Watson writes that rapid urbanization in Africa has been decoupled from economic development. In the last fifteen years the number of slum dwellers has almost doubled in sub-Saharan Africa, where 72% of the urban population lives in slums (UN-HABITAT 2006, 11).

POLICY RESPONSES BASED ON URBAN REALITIES
Urban poverty and slum growth are local problems, but their nature and scale demand a global response. The chapters in this volume universally equate slum growth with policy failure. Market forces alone cannot resolve the chal-

lenges of urbanization. In fact, old approaches to urban development and unregulated private sector activity have exacerbated urban disparities.

Rather than planning for urban growth and working to provide land, infrastructure, and services for the poor, misguided policies have focused on slowing the process of urbanization and unsuccessfully trying to stem the tide of rural-to-urban migration. At least two million slum dwellers are forcibly evicted from their homes each year to make way for infrastructure projects and private development (UN-HABITAT 2007). In a UN survey of government leaders from developing countries, only 14% were satisfied with the urban–rural mix of their populations. "Most of those who were unsatisfied bemoaned the increasing urbanization taking place in their countries. About 73% of respondent governments had policies to slow down urbanization, whereas only 3% had policies to accelerate the process" (Bloom and Khanna 2007, 13). Anti-urban and anti-poor policies are based on a misunderstanding of the demographic roots of urban growth, 60% of which is a result of natural increase, not migration. "Policies that aim to slow urban growth should shift their attention to the positive factors that affect fertility decline— social development, investments in health and education, the empowerment of women, and better access to reproductive health services" (UNFPA 2007, 13). Existing migration policies are shaped by fear and the absence of adequate information and institutional capacity, writes Loren Landau in this book. Combating poverty requires a policy framework based on a better understanding of the relationship between migration and urbanization, linking together urban and rural development policies.

Another trend in urbanization that has been neglected is growth in small- and medium-sized cities. While megacities receive a great deal of attention, more than half of the world's urban population currently lives in cities of less than five hundred thousand people. Smaller cities are expected to absorb half of urban population growth between 2005 and 2015, yet their capacity to manage this process with services and policies is weak (UNFPA 2007, 9). National governments and the development community must respond with planning and investment that will help smaller cities to manage growth at the local level.

Integrated Approaches and Appropriate Goals

The contributing authors to this book call for a better understanding of the complex relationship between cities, growth, and poverty to give policy-

Approaches to urban development are too often fragmented and sectoral. Successful urban development requires an integrated approach based on solid

Research and exchange devoted to successful local initiatives, including community-driven approaches such as the OPP-RTI and public-private partnerships, offer models of urban development that are appropriate for cities of the South. In his chapter on urban assistance, Richard Stren writes about the importance of South–South networks and the benefits of a comparative approach to policy formulation.

Inclusion and Governance

The chapter authors also reach consensus that inclusion is not only a condition upon which economic and political stability rests but it is also a means to effectively combat urban poverty. Slum dwellers have been denied civic engagement and have no effective means to protect themselves, to make demands for goods and services, or to force accountability of those who represent them (Halfani 2007; UN-HABITAT 2006). Vulnerability and insecurity have weakened the links between citizens and their city. Including all stakeholders—especially the urban poor—can make a vast difference in the effectiveness of urban planning and management. Good governance does more than provide needed services and infrastructure to city dwellers. Effective urban governance can be used as a powerful tool to deal with urban growth, poverty, and inequality by allowing for popular participation in decision making, creating connections between civil society and the government, and ultimately fostering the articulation of a common vision for the city (Garland, Massoumi, Ruble, and Tulchin 2007).

HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF URBAN GROWTH

The chapters in this volume describe the challenges that accompany rapid urban growth, but they also point to opportunities found in the urban transformation. Cities have always attracted investment, wealth, and people in a process that has been amplified by globalization. The success of nations increasingly hinges upon the efficiency of their urban areas. Cities today generate from 55% of GNP in low-income countries to 85% of GNP in high-income countries (UN-HABITAT 2006, 46). As cities have engaged directly with the global economy, the gap has widened between those who benefit from international competition and those who are left behind. Increasingly, cities are places where prosperity and poverty exist side-by-side, yet urban centers of political energy and social interaction can be powerful instruments of change. The challenge to policymakers is to provide opportunities for the urban poor to access material and political resources that allow them to benefit from booming urban economies.

the essence of what a city is and how it works or not. Investment in infrastructure is a crucial component of any effort to plan for urban growth. The urban poor have responded to the failure of state and local government with innovation. The challenge to policymakers is to build upon and scale up these success stories, incorporating into the agenda-setting process those who suffer most from the lack of access to services.

Looking at water and sanitation, Gordon McGranahan emphasizes the importance of local organization within deprived neighborhoods to engage collectively with public authorities and utilities. Successful measures led by residents and their organizations have combined self-help with constructive engagement. McGranahan reflects upon misleading statistics being used to monitor progress towards international water and sanitation goals. Good information, developed locally and used to drive local action, can make an enormous difference.

Although this approach might seem to devolve government responsibility to the communities, in practice it has changed the way governments operate, writes McGranahan citing the success of the OPP-RTI. It has made it more difficult for governments to accept loan-based megaprojects that create large debts and rarely reach deprived settlements and it has made it easier for governments to complement the efforts of the urban poor to solve their own problems, concludes McGranahan. Detailing an international model of success, Arif Hasan describes how the OPP-RTI used local resources and developed local expertise to create partnerships with government, directing government resources to support the sanitation program. CBOs, NGOs, activists, and educated young people share responsibility for infrastructure in their settlements with the state rather than just lobbying for it, explains Hasan.

Examining housing for the urban poor, Diana Mitlin reviews past and current initiatives to provide adequate shelter. When formal programs "map" themselves onto informal shelter strategies, underlying tensions emerge, influencing future generations of interventions. Mitlin identifies and analyzes new directions in housing policy that are helping programs reach some of the lowest income urban citizens.

Any approach to housing must be part of a broader set of public policies that address insecurity of tenure, argues Edesio Fernandes. "Informal development has become c polW-24(uctlof)-40361ccess to sencome 5glmh to c5erge

need to integrate regularization programs with other land, urban, housing, and fiscal policies, to involve all sectors and stakeholders in the process.

Victor Barbiero describes the urban setting as a crucible in which various elements of ecology and environment collide and interact to form new cultural, social, epidemiological, economic, and organizational processes. Within this urban crucible, slum populations in particular suffer from infectious diseases as well as chronic and noncommunicable illnesses resulting from environmental and social conditions. The donor community must acknowledge the health challenges and opportunities that accompany urban growth, says Barbiero, calling for a vision of urban development that is anchored in better health, but transcends health to include other sectors such as infrastructure, governance, and housing.

Section IV. Looking to the future: New approaches to urban development and assistance

The final section of this volume looks forward, outlining trends and innovations in urban development policies and programming. Old systems of top-down, master planning have been used as tools by political and economic elites to reinforce social and spatial exclusion and entrenched inequalities, writes Vanessa Watson. Models and experts from the North have little understanding of the dynamics of rapid urbanization, poverty, environmental damage, and informality. Watson describes new directions in urban planning that address growth through pro-poor and inclusive policies and include a wide range of stakeholders in decision making.

The final chapter of the volume by Richard Stren traces several factors that have contributed to the decline in urban assistance. Stren offers important insight about urban development gained from past approaches. Urban assistance is still needed, he argues, recommending four basic objectives for future programming: support research and local problem solving, support South–South networks, continue to focus on pro-poor policies, and act as responsible local stakeholders.

CONCLUSION

Just as the world's population is becoming urban, we are seeing a serious decline in urban assistance. Even when donors have been working in cities, it has not been enough. Successful policies must encompass the complexity of urban areas, viewing cities as more than the sum of their parts and

responding to the multifaceted problem of urban poverty with a holistic approach. Policymakers and academics alike agree that we need the intellectual tools to deal with the challenges of urbanization. There is a serious absence of reliable data on urban populations, growth, and development, especially sound scholarship that draws upon local knowledge to inform policy. As the chapters in this volume attest, we must begin to view cities and their residents as part of the solution, not the problem.

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WHAT (LITTLE) WE KNOW ABOUT MIGRATION AND POVERTY IN AFRICAN CITIES

The data on migration and urbanization in Africa are far from complete and often overlook important sociopolitical factors. That most urbanization is a result of domestic or "irregular" international migration (i.e., undocumented and uncounted) means it is effectively invisible to government statisticians' offices and planners. Although many regions face paucities of reliable migration data, information on African migration is almost always inconsistently collected, irregularly available, and highly politicized (see Samers 2002; Crush and Williams 2001; Zlotnick 1998; Crisp 1999). For these reasons, key variables such as ethnicity are often excluded from censuses to avoid exacerbating communal conflicts. In South Africa, where statistics are probably as good as they get on the continent, official estimates for the number of non-nationals in the country range from the approximately 300,000 found in the 2001 National Census to 5.1 million

tions. These and other negative assessments also appear regularly in political discourse, a result of government officials who capitalize on antimigrant sentiment or the fear of being swamped by peasants and refugees. Tanzania is so bold as to report that the "common hazards in Tanzania include epidemics, pest infestation, droughts, flood, major transport and industrial accidents, *refugees* and fires" (Tanzania 2005, 31; emphasis added). Indeed, Malthusian projections about population growth and economic/environmental disaster are almost ubiquitous in the literature on migration and urbanization in developing countries (see White 1996).

Although the literature is dominated by warnings about migration's negative developmental effects, a panel of experts assembled in the mid-1990s by the National Academy of Sciences found that there are generally beneficial effects of urbanization in the process of development (National Research Council 1996; also Livi-Bacci 1994). White (1996, 167) is even more mea-

ISSUES AND EMERGING CONCERNS OF MIGRATION AND URBAN POVERTY

Investment, Employment, and Economic Development

A great deal of the academic and policy literature on migration and poverty centers on the short-term impact of mobility on labor costs, skills, and job creation. Reflecting the sentiments of anti-immigration advocates in Europe, Australia, and North America, African leaders regularly offer a zero-sum assessment of this relationship: every job filled by an immigrant is one less job for a citizen.

World Bank 2006; Landolt 2005, 61; House of Commons 2004, 3). Movements of highly skilled Africans and others have certainly provided key human resources for European countries, but remittances do not necessarily solve the problems of migrants or their families (see Cornelius, Espenshade, and Salehyan 2001; Funkhauser 1992; IRIN 2006). In some instances, remitted funds simply allow for survival, not long-term poverty reduction. Moreover, it is often relatively prosperous families that can afford to send migrants to cities. There is an even more pronounced selection bias for those leaving their countries of citizenship or moving into cities outside the African continent. Remittances, therefore, risk heightening economic polarization by channeling resources to the relatively wealthy. This may create jobs, but is unlikely to provide the schools, water and sanitation systems, other social services, or improved infrastructure needed to combat generalized poverty.

When viewed from within the cities that are most likely to send international migrants, there are also considerable social and economic costs: lost productivity and skills and absent parents and other leadership figures. Such people may be underemployed in their countries of origin, but they nevertheless represent a key resource in fighting poverty: more doctors does not automatically translate into better health care, but the absence of more than 30% of doctors from Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, and Uganda and upwards of 50% from Ghana undermines the possibility of an effective health service (WHO 2004, 31; Skeldon 2005, 22). There may be replacement others from elsewhere in the continent or rural areas, but as long as there are regional scarcities, such movements will only transfer poverty elsewhere.

Of course, African cities are not only sites of departure, but also serve as destinations for international and domestic migrants seeking protection and prosperity. Here, too, the issue of remittances appears as both a resource and a liability in addressing poverty. Resource transfers from newly urbanized populations may help combat poverty in rural areas by keeping children in school, promoting small-scale investment, or enabling people to access social services. Viewed from within the city, the magnitude of these remittances, and the social value attached to them, are obstacles to poverty alleviation. Because material transfers are often tied to emotional investments and translocal investment strategies, they are a further indication that many migrants do not to see themselves as a permanent part of the cities in which they live. At the very least, such transfers mean they have limited resources for investing in their communities of primary residence. Rather, they strive for usufruct

rights that allow them to use the city without the responsibility of ownership and belonging. As discussed in later sections, the lack of financial and psychological investment in sites of residence have potentially significant political consequences that affect urban planning for poverty reduction.

Health, Education, and Accommodation[2]

An urban population's skills, education, and physical health are critical capital for improving individual and collective welfare. Not only are healthier and better skilled people more economically productive and more likely to generate tax revenues, they are better able to innovate and dedicate energies to social reproduction. Moreover, a better educated and healthier population is less likely to need social assistance or seek costly emergency services, allowing both public and private resources to be dedicated elsewhere. Accommodation is both a productive resource in its own right and critical to promoting health, education, and human security. However, while migration is often posited to spread infectious diseases and heighten pressure on schools and accommodation, we understand little about the intersections of migration and access to basic social services. For present purposes, I wish to (superficially) raise three concerns affecting migrants' ability to access needed services and accommodation: economic and linguistic exclusion, sociolegal discrimination, and institutions designed for stable populations.

Migrants, especially "irregular" international migrants, are physically within cities but often remain socially, economically, or legally excluded from access to education and public health services such as medical care, water, and sanitation. Some of the obstacles are linked to the relatively poor or undeserved areas in which they live, but there are also other factors tied specifically to their outsider status. Probably the most obvious factors are technical ones: the inability to pay service fees—often higher for those without citizenship or documentation—and language. The latter is particularly damaging in preventing effective communication between migrants and service providers. This may result in the a priori dismissal of a claim to service or harmful misdiagnoses. In terms of education, international migrants may also be considerably older than the mean age for their skill level, a justification for

There are also potentially significant long-term consequences of excluding migrants from education, health services, and accommodation. Most

more productive population. This is especially true in environments where residences are not only sites of social reproduction, but are key resources in economic production: petty industry, restaurants, shops, and offices. For students, adequate space also allows opportunities for studying; a rare luxury for those in overcrowded and poorly lit rooms. Well-housed people are also better able to protect themselves and their belongings from the predations of criminals and corrupt police. As the following section suggests, insecurity is one of the key obstacles to fighting poverty in African cities.

Human Security

The global discourse linking migration and security is reflected in public responses to immigration across the African continent (see Landau 2005a; Faist 2004). Although many host populations fault newcomers for increases in criminality and insecurity, there is little evidence of a direct causal link between migration and crime. Without denying some migrants' involvement in petty theft, internet scams, human trafficking, and other crimes, there is little evidence that they are disproportionately prone to criminal actively (see, for example, Landau 2003). This does not, however, stop police officers and vigilantes from targeting immigrants and recently urbanized citizens. However, instead of improving safety, such initiatives often heighten insecurity and economic marginalization. In Johannesburg, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, and Accra, the police have made unsubstantiated public statements linking foreigners to crime. In Durban, the police targeted West Africans for drug dealing and then, based on their arrest statistics, spurious-

easier target than someone working in a factory or office block. Similarly, a person sharing a flat with ten strangers is far more vulnerable to crime than someone living with close family members or surrounded by familiar and

isolation and transience is deeply problematic. First, it may limit their interest in investing in the cities in which they live. People preparing for onward journeys will not dedicate themselves to acquiring fixed assets and may maximize immediate profits at the expense of long-term planning. Those who do not feel welcome are also less likely to respect the rules and institutions dedicated to governing the cities they inhabit. This may become visible in efforts to dodge tax regulations, avoid census takers, or subvert regulatory agencies they feel are more likely to prey on them than to promote their interests. Those who feel excluded are also unlikely to join in participatory planning exercises or elections, even when they are legally entitled to do so. This prevents planners from seeing or hearing from these often subterranean communities. Without their voice, they have little choice but to learn of these populations through the media or rumor. Policies based on such accounts are unlikely to address city residents' priorities and needs; rather, they will respond to stereotypes and elite interests. Ignoring a significant minority in policy-making will, however, ensure that even these interests are poorly

curity and unemployment, or for declining quality of health services distracts people from the fundamental structural and institutional issues behind these pressing social concerns. Migrants do not cause most urban problems, but

When speaking of migration, however, we must not assume it is primarily a South-North phenomenon or a series of one-off events. Policies need to be shaped by an understanding of migration's multiple facets including temporary, circular, and seasonal movements within and between developing countries, as well as from South to North (House of Commons 2004, 17). Whenever possible, these must be disaggregated and their effects on poverty carefully parsed. Even within specific spaces, it is important to reflect on the diversity of experiences and explain divergent outcomes. Measures of poverty must also be carefully considered in ways that move beyond individual-level attributes and strategies to include the presence of a shared purpose/trajectory, accountable institutions, and government capacity. These are all primary resources in countering poverty, and anything that fosters fragmentation or prevents the creation of common objectives and rules of engagement should be seen as an obstacle to poverty alleviation.

In line with the multilevel analysis called for above, there is a need to understand the reactions of host populations that result in discrimination, exclusion, or lack of opportunities. Accepting that migration does not happen in a vacuum, our analytical lens should include "host" populations and other categories of migrants. It should also include a critical focus on policy frameworks at the local, national, and regional level. Along with documenting laws and institutions, these should include detailed analyses of how policies are translated into practice and their effects on the behavior of and relationships among employers, host populations, and migrants (see UNFPA 2005, 9). As indicated above, many of the policies designed to control or prevent migration do little to halt or even slow migration and urbanization. Instead, they generate responses that do little to alleviate poverty (see Landau 2005a, b). Building common and accountable institutions also means considering the institutional frameworks that facilitate or prevent newcomers and noncitizens from participating in the planning process. Continuing to exclude any group may have "devastating consequences for many people in the city, especially the poorest in terms of service provision, equality of access and redistribution" (Robinson 2002, 162).

In addition to the proactive suggestion above, there are a number of pitfalls that may hinder effectively responding to migration in ways that counter poverty. First, although I argue in favor of incorporating migrants into planning processes, we cannot assume that they and others seek a closer relationship among citizens, migrants, and state institutions. Social and legal

exclusion can facilitate informal trade and other forms of social interactions while avoiding the obligations that come from denser social networks. For these and other reasons, people may actively resist even the most well-meaning efforts to include them in planning exercises. Given their exposure to Africa's corrupt and predatory state institutions and agents, one can hardly fault them for being so evasive.

There is also a need to consider local governments' complex roles in responding to migration and reducing urban poverty. On one hand, efforts to maximize the benefits of migration will not be successful when local governments ignore the social dynamics occurring within their cities. However, effective advocacy and action vis-à-vis migration may mean challenging national immigration and migration policies if they promote poverty and marginalization. Elsewhere in the world, subnational administrations have begun issuing identity documents, translating legislation and polices into appropriate languages, and reaching out to communities that national governments deem illegal. But taking on this advocacy role represents a significant break from the centralized ethos and party structures that still dominate many African polities.

Although local and national governments can play an important role in shaping and implementing migration-oriented policies, we must also be cognizant of the severe limits they face in addressing migration and urban poverty. These limitations take several forms. First, the growing informality of many African cities means that that much of what takes place within them already exists outside direct government influence or control. Moreover, there are often powerfully institutionalized interests that will resist the expan-

effective migration policies." Since the effects of migration are most pronounced in urban areas, this is where assistance is most needed. Last, and most fundamentally, the continued marginalization of most African countries in global trade and policy-making limits the ability of cities to accumulate the financial and human resources needed to tackle poverty.

Those interested in fighting urban poverty must reconsider models of urban planning and governance in ways that account for human mobility. This means rethinking what we mean by urban community to include people who do not—and will not—see their city of residence as their home. This means that local and national governments, together with donors, international organizations, and scholars, must find new ways of building a sense of a shared future among all urban residents. Promoting such emotional investments—to be followed by physical and financial inputs—in Africa's cities is an acute challenge, but essential if migration is to coincide with or promote poverty reduction.

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Finding a Place for Youth: Urban Space and Citizenship in Lusaka, Recife, and Hanoi[1]

Karen Valentin, Anne Line Dalsgaard, and Karen Tranberg Hansen

What do changing demographic conditions mean for transitions to adulthood and young people's attainment of citizenship in specific urban contexts? Constituting almost half of the current global population under the age of twenty-five, young people today comprise a major part of the urban populations of the rapidly growing cities in the developing world. Judging by demographic projections, the total number of youth worldwide is expected to increase from 1.2 billion to 1.8 billion within the next generation (UN-HABITAT 2005). In 2000, 47% of the world's total population was urban. According to recent projections, the world's urban population will reach 60% by 2030. These observations hide striking shifts in the age composition of urban populations. The combination of growing youth and urban populations demands our attention for demographic reasons that have cultural, socioeconomic, and political consequences, both from a societal point of view and from the perspective of young people themselves.

This chapter examines young people's access to space in Lusaka in Zambia, Recife in Brazil, and Hanoi in Vietnam, and the meanings and consequences of this access and its restrictions. Drawing on anthropological research, we discuss how young people's appropriation of specific places is part of wider processes of social in- and exclusion that accompany their gradual acquisition of rights and responsibilities. In each ethnographic example the vulnerable position of young people is a result of, among many other things, their difficulties in gaining access to urban space because of poverty, social stigma, and planned restrictions that contribute to reinforce the liminal status of youth as a social category. We conclude by briefly discussing the applicability of anthropological knowledge to policy and planning in relation to youth in developing countries.

The chapter draws on observations from a collaborative research project, "Youth and the City: Skills, Knowledge, and Social Reproduction," conducted between 2001 and 2005 (Hansen et al. 2008).[2] The aim of this four-year project was to examine urban youth as both a structural and an experiential category, historically constructed and shaped by local and global forces in the three urban settings. The methodological framework of the project integrated in-depth anthropological research in each city with three topically oriented, cross-cutting studies within the areas of human geography, education studies, and media studies. The project was designed with cross-class and cross-regional comparisons in mind. This was reflected in the research methodology that in all three

formation of their citizens (Holston and Appadurai 1999). As administrative centers and seats of national power, cities—and capitals in particular—are stages for politics of a different sort than their rural hinterland. They also represent the localization of global forces in intense and highly visible ways and tend to absorb transnational flows relatively quickly (ibid.).

Urban place and placements are central to the conceptualization of citizenship and link youth and the city as analytical constructs. Transitions to adulthood, the acquisition of full citizenship, and the identity work inherent in these processes cannot be separated from the physical locality in which they occur (Hall et al. 1999, 502). When studying urban youth, this implies that we take seriously the city as a scene of action for young people (see Diouf 1999), asking what cities, as concrete physical locations and dense articulations of intersecting national and global forces, mean for the acquisition of citizenship, that is, for young people's entitlement to specific places and social placements in urban public space. As the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan (1974) has observed, the word "place" has a double meaning: it means both place as social position and place as physical location. These two meanings are interrelated, as placements in and on concrete physical locations to a wide extent are determined by placements in social hierarchies (Olwig and Gulløv 2003). By implication, young people's access to and control over space is closely related to their social position as youth with access to some places and not to others. This entails processes of sociospatial inclusion and exclusion, which tend to take place routinely without people noticing it (Sibley 1995, xiv).

LUSAKA, RECIFE, AND HANOI
Our discussion about urban youth and citizenship is anchored in a comparative framework that sheds light on urban youth life as it unfolds in different

views with young people in the three cities and our participation in parts of their everyday life we have gained insight into the experiential dimension of city life and young people's hopes and worries in relation to the future.

ly used to identify a specific set of attitudes and behavior. A playful, open, and unworried attitude towards life seemed to be a crucial attribute for a person to be classified as *jovem*. But while *responsabilidade* (responsibility) is related to adulthood, *juventude* in itself is also seen as a step towards responsibility in terms of education, work, and establishing a family.

The Vietnamese term for "youth," *thanh nien*, originally designated only young men, but today it encompasses both genders (Marr 1996, 3). A related concept, *vi thanh nien*, is occasionally translated as "adolescent," referring to the "younger youth." Seeking to come closer to an understanding of the meaning of youth in Hanoi, we asked the young people to define *thanh nien* in terms of age and to describe the responsibilities, duties, and rights associated with this particular period of life. They generally agreed that "youth" begins somewhere between fifteen and eighteen and ends around the age of thirty or thirty-five. In terms of age this came very close to what the Communist Party's youth branch used to define its members, but a more complex picture emerged when they had to describe it in qualitative terms. They explained it as a period characterized by increasing responsibilities in terms of preparing oneself for a professional career, getting married, supporting one's parents financially, observing the law, and, as citizens, contributing to the development of the nation.

In all three cities, youth was defined as a period of acquiring responsibility, partly informed by politically defined criteria, partly by culturally dominant norms. At the same time the transition in question was nowhere just a change in social position but also involved a physical change of environment. Setting up an individual household, moving in with the family-in-law, getting a new job, changing from school to higher education or a vocational training center all imply a movement from one physical location to another. Hence, movement in space is a crucial element in the normative construction of the transition to adulthood.

DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS TO URBAN SPACE

Despite a certain consensus about the definition of youth, the young people we met lived their lives in very different ways, even within the same residential areas. Access to schooling and health care varied, and while access to the global sphere of the Internet was a natural part of some lives, it was totally absent from others. But what was maybe most striking in our research were the differences in access to the city in which our informants lived. A city is not just a geographi-

cal phenomenon, a patch of ground covered with buildings; on the experiential

continue to be called "compounds" and middle- income residential areas to be referred to as "townships." Both terms derive from the colonial urban control apparatus that invoked race to segregate housing, labor, health, and domestic arrangements. Back then, "compound" referred to the racially segregated housing institution tied to employment of a labor force that was considered to be temporary and male. In postcolonial Zambia, compounds differ from townships mainly in the material sense of their deterioration, which is evident in the poor quality of buildings, dilapidated infrastructure, and absence of services and amenities. Many urban residents refer to the former white residential areas as *mayadi* (the yards, meaning gardens, i.e. *yadi* with the plural Nyajna language prefix *ma*), a term that today connotes high-income residential areas in general and is no longer associated with race.

The way young people experience and use Lusaka as a space may open up, or curtail, economic and social opportunities. The following discussion draws on our household survey in three different residential areas, interviews and conversations, and participant observation in all manner of activities to sketch different dominant narratives that frame young people's experiences of where they find themselves in class and space terms. Young people experience life in Lusaka in spatial terms, in relation to "where they are," meaning in the compounds or the yards, in distinctions that construe space in economic and social terms that invoke both consumption/life-style issues and social relations. From what they told us we identified three different scenarios of transition experienced by the young people that in shorthand terms may be called *getting stuck*

sional casual jobs largely in construction, and some young women as nannies. Both young men and women entertained desires about conducting "business," that is, small-scale trade in the compound's markets, along streets, or in front of homes. For this they need start-up capital; they often do not have access to this nor, as we shall discuss later, do they have access to places in town where they can sell their products. Young women with little education and few job skills find themselves handicapped on both the job and the marriage market because young men look for partners who can contribute economically to future livelihoods. To fulfil their consumption needs and desires, young women may get caught up in transactional sex on a trajectory that easily traps them in the compound.

The young people in the township, a middle-income area, felt that they were just *getting by*. Many had completed secondary school, and they were now particularly busy taking courses to acquire qualifications and new skills in the hope of avoiding the kind of marginalization many young people from the compounds experience. Having parents/guardians who know that education alone will not secure the transition to adulthood, these young people navigate their way through a range of courses, occasional jobs, and stints of self-employment, struggling not to "slide down" so as not to "get stuck in the compound." Several unmarried young women with children extend "youth" well into their twenties trying to acquire job skills and find responsible partners. Young men on their part court young women with education and job

In Lusaka young people's experiences of where they are in terms of resources and chances in life are framed by and large by space. The connotations of race and poverty or wealth that through history have been linked to certain parts of the city are today still active, both as real conditions and imagined horizons towards which young people orient themselves and their expectations.

Being the Wrong Kind of Youth:
"Dangerous" Young Men in Recife

Being young in the wrong places or being young in the wrong way is both a subjecti

closely related to their marginal position in the Brazilian economy. Most young men from low-income areas feel responsible for their own life and the survival of their families, but they do not have the means to act accordingly.

In their own neighborhoods they are easily recognized; here they have their families and friends, their fame as football players, and their girlfriends. But standards of respectability are set far away from the poorer neighborhoods, interfering with and at times disrupting the comfort and recognition provided by personal networks. When looking at the affluent residential areas, youth from low-income areas see the periphery—the center of *their* world—as an empty space in which they experience the lack of all kinds of services and com-

rationale behind the Youth Union is, as it is for state-organized youth associ-
ations in other authoritarian, centralized societies, to provide "meaningful"
and politically correct leisure for young people. Youth Union activities priv-
ilege community development and social work, physical exercise and com-
petitive games, and participation in national celebrations. Such activities not
only occupy members' spare time, but are also expected to keep them away
from what are considered dangerous places and activities in the city by estab-
lishing new, morally legitimate places for them.

Young people's engagement in community development is a key element
in the work and legitimacy of the Youth Union. It aims to involve young men
and women in organized programs of street- and canal-cleaning, whitewash-
ing walls that have been illegally painted with graffiti, and planting trees. Youth
Union members also contribute to the maintenance of local security. These
goals are expressed in the collaborative volunteer programs established
between Youth Union branches in wards and universities, encouraging stu-
dents to contribute to community development in both rural and urban areas.
Emphasizing social responsibility and solidarity, such programs are driven by a
concern to engage young people in activities aimed at distracting them from
the temptations of the so-called social evils, meaning forms of supposedly
immoral behavior such as drug use, prostitution, and gambling. The programs
make it possible to control the social environment of the ward and, if neces-
sary, reorient young people who have gotten on the "wrong" track—for
example, spoiled young men from better-off families who have fallen into
drug use; poor kids who roam the streets without control; or young women
who are accused of prostituting themselves behind the facades of the many
karaoke bars. The Youth Union offers young people "meaningful" leisure, that
is, a set of formally organized and politically informed social activities. Doing
so, it aims to turn young people into socially responsible persons and active
participants in urban community development and other collective events.

As an integral part of the Communist Party, the Youth Union also pro-
vides a basis for the current one-party system to reproduce itself by recruit-
ing new party members and by fostering future citizens who are loyal to the
existing political system. However, maintaining the power of the party is a
challenge in a society that is undergoing such profound transformations. The
difficulty in recruiting new members is evidence of the Youth Union's
declining legitimacy in the eyes of the young themselves. It is an open ques-
tion whether this has to do with ideology or the kinds of activities the union

offers. Although most of the young people in this study were dedicated Youth Union members who acknowledged the advantages of membership, some complained that the kinds of activities it offered could not attract "modern" youth. Judging from the huge number of young people in the streets, cafés, karaoke bars, shopping centers, and discos, it is clear that Hanoi offers young people a wide range of opportunities for consumption and leisure that may challenge the centrality of the Youth Union in their everyday lives. Yet membership in the Youth Union and participation in consumer-oriented leisure activities are not mutually exclusive. This is especially the case for young people from better-off families with the purchasing power to position themselves in the cultural space of the emergent, consuming middle class, who certainly know how to seek out the upscale cafés around Hoan Kiem Lake yet still remain loyal to the Youth Union.

In Hanoi, norms and values of the "right" kind of youth are manifested in the Youth Union and the role it plays in placing young people socially and physically. But these norms and values are contested by new trends and aspirations among youth. As long as young people manage to combine Youth Union membership and consumption, the two domains may reinforce each other, excluding those who can neither be members nor consumers—that is, those at the bottom of society.

Access to urban space is access to citizenship; however, as we have now seen in Lusaka, Recife, and Hanoi, access is not just something one takes, but also something that is allocated to one according to economic conditions, implicit or explicit moral standards, and political control. Some young people are considered dangerous or "stuck" while others are considered to be "proper" and in transition. It is our impression that city plans are generally made for the latter category of youth.

YOUTH, URBAN PLANNING, AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Urban planning is the result of officially formulated policy frameworks aimed at reconfiguring social space. Still, people appropriate and respond to policy initiatives in unpredictable ways that may question or even work counter to politically defined goals. Although planning may result in specific physical transformations of the built environment, it may also have unintended consequences for social organization and human use of urban space. What is more, sociospatial transformations are not always the result of planning but

may take place unexpectedly as a consequence of changes in the structural conditions of society.

Constituting a significant proportion of urban populations, young people belong to all segments of urban society. They therefore relate to and depend on

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Urban Violence, Quality of Life, and the Future of Latin American Cities: The Dismal Record So Far and the Search for New Analytical Frameworks to Sustain the Bias Towards Hope[1]

Diane Davis

THE STRUCTURAL ROOTS OF THE VIOLENCE–INSECURITY NEXUS: IS THERE A WAY OUT?

The depressing fact of growing violence across major cities of Latin America is hardly news to scholars and practitioners in the region.[2] In recent years, the number of reports and publications devoted to violence or insecurity and their impact on urban quality of life has grown exponentially. Most of this work falls into three categories: those that examine the social, political, and economic origins of the rising violence and insecurity; those that examine the ways that violence and insecurity derive from or interact with other key livability challenges facing residents of Latin American cities, namely unemployment, income inequality, drug abuse, and poverty; and those that diagnose or evaluate possible policy or programmatic solutions to these problems.

My own work tends to fall into the first category. I have traced growing problems of urban violence and insecurity in Latin American cities to a variety of structural forces and conditions linked to processes of contested state formation, the rise of authoritarianism followed by a limited demo-

widely from the second and third category of studies, what unites most of us is pessimism if not outright despair about the near intolerable conditions for large swaths of the urban population in Latin American cities. Even

Part of the problem owes to structural constraints, including the fact that a corrupt police force and a weak judicial system are interrelated problems that together undermine the rule of law, further fueling the likelihood of violence and insecurity. When one factors into this equation the globalization of illegal trade activities (in guns, drugs, etc.) that foster or sustain new forms of criminality, and a neoliberal environment in which income inequality is on the rise and poverty continues unabated, the deck seems almost completely stacked against tangible progress. It should also be remembered that police or juridical reform and effective crime fighting generally entail concerted, labor-intensive actions that involve bureaucratic restructuring, individual retraining, new forms of recruiting, and daily (not to mention costly) vigilance to assess the robustness and permanence of these programs and institutional modifications (Ungar 2002).[5]

Given all these constraints, even in those few situations where high-profile reform efforts have been universally recognized as relatively successful in eliminating the sources of violence and insecurity, they generally have had a short shelf life. In El Salvador, for example, which is considered a model case of police reform because it was actively coordinated and overseen by the UN and a bevy of international NGOs all working toward the same aims, initial gains pretty much disappeared within three years of completion (Call 2003, 828–29), with insecurity and impunity returning to preform le[(m)1ÅOs e rsultd, th isstepatin- conment andse[(m)eps of   polily htane(s ineunddg toer)20(e)19([(m)or) violenc8(insecur)-44(itynexusm ar)20(emoer)19(e imoar)-24(aent insymbpolis then insubs(aendi)

towel? How might scholars of violence in Latin American cities help produce the basis for real as opposed to symbolic optimism about progress and change, despite or perhaps even because of the debilitating problems of rising insecuri-

balanced and accurate picture of the myriad changes associated with the violence–insecurity nexus. It also allows an assessment of whether measurable progress has been made—and conversely, whether there is still more work to do. By distinguishing among positive and negative urban developments of recent years, a policy framework can be offered for identifying which urban transformations might be deepened or developed (as opposed to reversed or remedied) with additional public measures or institutional support.

Second, I consider the *permanence and sustainability* of recent changes, that is, whether the urban transformations inspired by the violence–insecurity nexus in Latin American cities can be considered temporary—that is, ephemeral or conjunctural responses to current insecurity challenges—as opposed to well-entrenched, because they are a consequence of larger social and economic changes. To be sure, distinguishing between these two categories of change can be difficult, especially without knowledge of the *longue durée*, and given the fact that future policy actions might modify changes that in the present seem to be permanent, or vice versa (i.e., reinforce or institutionalize long-term transformations that may appear temporary). To make this assessment calls for judgment and interpretation, not merely facts. However, the mere exercise of trying to distinguish between ephemeral and lasting changes in crime-ridden Latin American cities is valuable because it underscores the importance of cultivating a deeper appreciation of the institutions, actors, larger socioeconomic conditions, and processes involved in transforming the urban landscape, as well as the likelihood that they will continue, as opposed to being reversed or thwarted.

Third and perhaps most important, I analyze recent urban transformations along several distinct dimensions of urban life, rather than trying to assess the city as a whole. Specifically, I develop a four-fold focus on the *physical*, *economic*, *social*, and *political* aspects of life in Latin American cities, and how greater insecurity and violence affect them. All four of these domains have shown change, but in different ways for different reasons. By analyzing and disaggregating urban changes through this sectoral lens, we can widen our understanding of the impacts of violence to include changes that are not frequently studied in the violence literature. We can also assess in which domains most progress has been made, and in which domains quality-of-life conditions are deteriorating most. Again, the hope is that this knowledge will be helpful in targeting policies and arenas for further action, even as it allows us to see which aspects of urban life have been most egregiously transformed by the violence–insecurity nexus.

Before beginning, a few words about methods and evidence are in order. The chapter draws on data, ethnographic materials, primary and secondary documents, and personal interviews collected through my own long-term studies of crime, violence, and urban development in Mexico City. Although Mexico City may have its own historical peculiarities, it does share with many other major cities of Latin America the terrible problems of crime and insecurity. With the possible exception of changes in urban politics and governance strategies, which still remain affected by the administrative and political legacies associated with decades of one-party rule and tensions between the capital city and the federal executive in Mexico, the chapter proceeds under the assumption that some general insights can be drawn from more focused examination of a single city, and that the conclusions reached will be relevant to policy makers in other Latin American cities.

The chapter starts by examining transformations in the urban social infrastructure, offering an overview of the social consequences of the violence–insecurity nexus for residents of Mexico City. It then looks at the three other domains of urban life (physical, economic, political) in turn; each examination begins with negative and then moves to positive developments. After examining all four sectors, the next section takes a step back and offers overall assessments of the aggregate picture presented in the narrative, both with respect to the positive and negative character of urban transformations in the city as a whole, as well as with respect to their permanent or ephemeral nature. This exercise leads to a final section on policy recommendations, building on the understanding of where the recent violence/insecurity-led urban transformations have been most positive. The final section considers whether further advances can be made in reinforcing positive changes (and reversing negative ones), even without clear progress on crime and insecurity, and concludes by discussing several promising avenues for further innovation and action, especially those that might indirectly feed back on the violence–insecurity nexus in unexpected but positive ways.

URBAN SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
## OF THE VIOLENCE–INSECURITY NEXUS

Among those who study the urban social consequences of the rising rates of violence and insecurity in Latin America, there seems to be overwhelming consensus that the picture is extremely negative. Several of the most harmful and socially destructive changes in Latin American cities that have sparked most discussion and concern are the acceleration of a climate of fear, both in

terms of physical and psychological well-being (Rotker 2002), the increasing turn to violence as a means for routine problem solving—whether at the level of the family, the neighborhood, or across the city as a whole (Moser 2004), and an attendant reduction in the quality of public life, neighborliness, and community cooperation (Concha-Eastman 2002). According to one scholar of the subject, "violence generates changes in social behavior [and the] production and erosion of social capital," which in turn makes it more difficult to sustain cooperation and collaboration within families, communities, and at other levels of society (ibid., 49; see also Ratinoff 1996).

Although these changes are often considered to be individual responses to pervasive violence and crime in Latin American cities, one must not forget that other mediating institutions and practices play a role in exacerbating fear among individuals and thus in cultivating an urban social climate in which violence may become relatively "normalized" for all citizens. Two sets of actors and institutions are key here: the media and the police. Recent studies have shown that media attention to violence and crime, although grounded in real statistical evidence, can accelerate the perceptions of fear, thereby driving the vicious cycle of insecurity and social withdrawal (Martín-Barbero 2002). This dynamic owes much to the logic of media production and consumption (i.e., the types of stories selected for presentation; their framing as news, which drives sensationalism; the inability of consumers to differentiate the ordinary from the sensational; etc.). Moreover, the routine reporting of crime-related occurrences in newspapers and on television can give the sense that such actions are the norm, which may help foment a habitual recourse to violence in all domains of social life.

Police also play a mediating role in producing a climate of fear and in privileging the use of force as the single most legitimate means for remedying the problems of criminality, thereby "normalizing" violence as a response to violence (de la Barreda Solórzano 2007). To a great degree, police involvement in criminal activities, either in collusion or in crime fighting, is as much the effect as the cause of further violence and insecurity, and this is true for both the public and private police. On the public side, the problems of crime have accelerated so rapidly that police and citizens alike have begun advocating for greater arrest powers, tougher crime-fighting laws, and reduced restrictions on police discretion. In Mexico, upon the advice of Rudolph Giuliani, a form of "zero tolerance" was recently adopted leading to the criminalization of a wide variety of behaviors long associated with urban street life, including the activities of "squeegee men" who cleaned car windshields at stop signs, and the

This picture is depressing. But there are also some clear positives in the social arena of Latin American cities, especially if we look for collective and not merely individual responses to violence and insecurity. For one, growing concern about the deteriorating conditions has fostered new forms of citizen participation and new incentives for social mobilization. With support from global and/or local NGOs, citizens are developing new ways to work together at the level of the community, ranging from "mapping" local delinquency and crime patterns to new forms of interaction with police. Although the idea of community policing is not new, it is coming to Latin American cities with great fanfare, and many of these programs offer new ways for citizens to know intimately how local police departments work. Police corruption and crime remain a problem, and many citizens involved in community policing initiatives still complain about lack of police responsiveness and accountability, but new doors for greater understanding are opening.

On the social mobilization front, we also are starting to see collective action among wide swaths of the urban population. In Mexico two years ago, the civil society organization called México Unido Contra la Delincuencia was successful in organizing a march of over two hundred and fifty thousand people from all classes and locations in the city to protest the growing crime situation and repudiate local authorities for not making greater progress. It has been a long time since an issue of Latin American urbanism has united such a broad range of citizens behind a common front. In the postdemocratic environment in Mexico and other recently "transitioned" Latin American countries, cynicism is on the rise as citizens find that formal democracy does not make a major difference with respect to many of the quotidian problems of urban and national life. Most democratic governments' strong commitment to economic liberalization, which increases inequality and limits employment prospects for many (in some ways, driving delinquency and criminal activity), has also fueled questions about what alternative paths might be taken that could better the situation and prevent a return of the failures of the past. With little room 5itwaag29(.)of

the point of bringing middle classes together with the rich and poor in a single coalition around similar complaints. This type of alliance is good for the strengthening of democracy, because it holds the potential to unify diverse classes around a common aim, and thereby avoids the risks of class polarization that frequently eat away at the foundation of democracy. It also can form the basis for a new social project in an era of social and political transition, by uniting citizens around issues that are less divisive and polarizing than those associated with the ideologies and models of politics that dominated in earlier eras. This means that, at minimum, elected officials and political leaders are now being forced to move beyond old ways of doing politics, whether it be clientelism or state-centrism or a myopic preoccupation with economic development, and compelled to find programs, languages, ideas, and alliances that will address some of the strongly articulated concerns about insecurity advanced by the urban citizenry.

URBAN SPATIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE VIOLENCE–INSECURITY NEXUS

On the physical spatial front, violence and insecurity have transformed Latin American cities in a variety of visible ways. From the point of view of classical urbanism, most of these changes are considered to be negative if not out-and-out horrifying. The list of questionable physical transformations seen as a response to unprecedented levels of crime ranges from the rise of gated communities and other guarded urban and suburban enclaves, where citizens fortress themselves in order to keep out the forces of crime, to the increased use of cars and other private modes of transport (owing to the high rates of robbery and rape on public transport), to the reduced availability and use of

long dominated by informal and illegal activities. Many of the recent urban renewal projects in major cities of Latin America have been undertaken with an eye to property development pure and simple, especially given the desire to achieve global city status that now prevails among so many boosters in Latin American cities. But much of the political and fiscal support for urban redevelopment owes directly to the perception and reality that crime is most likely to occur in dilapidated areas, and thus one way to fight crime is to restore and beautify ugly areas. This was part and parcel of the "broken windows" strategy used in New York, and many Latin American cities, including Mexico City, have jumped on the bandwagon (Davis forthcoming).

The recent program to "rescue" or redevelop downtown Mexico City, with support from purveyors of iconic architecture and one of the world's richest men, Carlos Slim, is a case in point (Davis 2006a). Mexico City's problems with growing crime, delinquency, and violence began to accelerate dramatically in the mid-1990s. Between 1990 and 1996, reported rates of rob-

generated kudos from professional urbanists and residents alike. Others have gone so far as to suggest that these urban transformations, by reinvigorating

cially for unskilled and minimally educated workers whose prospects of employment have declined as economic globalization has changed the character and traditional industrial options for low-wage employment in Mexico.

Likewise, consumer and business acquisition of new technologies that offer surveillance or protection is also on the rise, with many innovations being incorporated into cars, houses, and street "furniture" in ways that drive the production and consumption of security services. These new technologies, product innovations, and services are fueling local employment and economic growth in ways that bring positive gains to the local economy. The potential downside, of course, is that the growth of the security industry feeds itself to a great degree, with the proliferation of firms offering security services and technologies driving the perception that crime and violence are out of control. Even so, the economic domain is one area where the balance sheet may be stacked toward the positive.

URBAN POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE VIOLENCE-INSECURITY NEXUS

The final sector to assess is the political, a domain to which surprisingly little attention has been paid. How have the violence- and insecurity-led transformations in Latin American cities affected local and possibly even national politics? If we defined politics from the point of view of civil society, we would highlight the emergence of new forms of collective organization that empower citizens to engage with the state about solving security issues, a trend already noted above. But has the crime and security situation affected politics "from above," not just from below? Has it impacted the activities and orientations of political parties and elected officials? In Mexico it surely has, but not always in positive ways. One of the most visible consequences of the growing problem of insecurity is the acceleration of internecine political conflict between the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) over which is the most effective party in rooting out crime and impunity. Likewise, the fact that crime and insecurity conditions tend to transcend formal territorial jurisdictions has brought new intrastate political conflicts and tensions, which either map with partisan tensions (when different parties control different jurisdictions) or exacerbate policy-making tensions within the same party. Both situations bring organizational stalemate and/or conflict, which in turn limit the capacity for successful reform and the implementation of effective crime-fighting programs (Davis 2006a).

Evidence of all this is clear from a closer look at partisan infighting and political conflict over crime fighting in Mexico City over the last decade. In 1997, three years into the city's unparalleled upsurge of crime and violence, the newly elected PRD government of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas sought to assert greater control over Mexico City police, seeing them as a key to impunity and crime fighting. But political conditions and institutional goals on the national level did not follow suit, because a different party (PRI) maintained its monopoly on the national executive. The PRI then used its reservoir of institutional capacities to undermine police reform efforts in the capital, leading to partisan conflict.[11] And even when the PRI lost on the federal level, and yet a third party (PAN) came into power nationally, political conflict continued, coming to a head in a particularly high-profile case of vigilantism, in which federal police were

President Vicente Fox and Mexico City Mayor Manuel López Obrador, turned this troubling event into a pre-presidential electoral dogfight. Rather than uniting forces in the common search for a policy solution to the problems of police conflict and citizen vigilantism, these bitter rivals—from two competing political parties, controlling the two most significant levels of governance in the nation, and locked in a treacherous struggle for the hearts and minds of Mexico City's residents and the national electorate more generally —sought to use the situation to humiliate each other sufficiently so as to

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means—ranging from the privatization of policing to vigilantism—to address security problems, all of which have been discussed above.

In light of these developments, it is hard to be optimistic about a way forward with crime fighting and guaranteeing security, at least in a way that strengthens rather than undermines competitive party politics. Even so, there are also recent signs of hope on the horizon in Mexico City, the locale that has suffered so greatly from these problems. The current administration of Mayor Marcelo Ebrard has built on prior efforts at police reform, many of them imposed under his watch as police chief during the prior administration, to break the stranglehold of corruption and introduce new means of making police more accountable. He has done so by creating new programs and political alliances that wreak havoc on old hierarchies of political power in long-standing governance and police institutions, while also linking together previously antagonistic state and civil society actors in a common project of reducing crime.

Specifically, a few months after coming to office, Mayor Ebrard established

accrues to other public services offered in this area, which in the past were coordinated sectorally and at the level of the city (i.e., the Distrito Federal) or possibly even the federal government, but not at this subterritorial level. Finally, the coordination and regulation of these public activities is undertaken in conjunction with private sector developers and NGO activists who are driving new investment and cultural or social projects in the area.

So far, this experiment has been moderately successful in eliminating old institutional practices in urban public service delivery, and in bettering the conditions of public security in this highly troubled area. In the past year, citizens have come back to the historic center to shop, eat, and live in ever greater numbers, and the general sense is that crime in the area has stopped accelerating. But more important, this experiment has offered a new model for enhancing police accountability, vis-à-vis citizens and authorities, as well as local businesses, leading to a less corrupt police force and greater confidence in the local police. Much of this owes to the fact that a special police force designated only for the historic center has special institutional oversight of this circumscribed territory, as well as the fact many of these specially designated police personnel have personal ties to the mayor. This not only insures them higher salaries and special privileges, which help mitigate against the temptation to corruption; it also means they are politically tied to a political team that wants this experiment to succeed.

ASSESSING THE OVERALL PICTURE: GAINS AND LOSSES IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERMS

Through this narrative analysis of sectoral transformations in crime-ridden Mexico City over the past decade, we can observe both gains and losses in terms of urban quality of life—understood in social, physical, economic, and political terms. It would be difficult to say whether the overall urban balance is positive or negative. There have been some clearly beneficial changes in land use, urban redevelopment, employment, social mobilization, and economic growth, but these changes have not eliminated social anxiety: they are still accompanied by political dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement, and they have unfolded in an environment where the growth of the "security–industrial complex" has brought more individuals into a world of criminality while further reinforcing a public sense of fear and insecurity rather than eliminating it.

In terms of whether these changes will have short- versus long-term impacts on the Latin American city, the jury is still out, partly because immediate changes in one sector can produce longer-term changes in another, some of

which may exacerbate rather than eliminate insecurity and crime. This is clear with a focus, first, on the rise of private security forces, a phenomenon related both to citizen dissatisfaction with public police and the growth of the security industry as a source of employment and technological innovation.

With a growing market for the production and consumption of security-related goods, the future of these activities is practically assured. In fact, private security services appear to be making a long-term mark on Latin American cities because they are bringing new corporate investors, new technologies, and new patterns of employment into an environment where other options are limited. This also means that the private security industry is unlikely to disappear on its own, even if crime and insecurity conditions were to improve automatically. And to the extent that the proliferation of these activities can reinforce citizen fears by their very presence, and thus help cultivate an environment of insecurity, their persistence—although good for the economy and unemployment—may have unanticipated but long-term negative consequences on the urban experience and quality of life. In order to balance the gains and losses, both short and long term, policy makers need to pay more attention to the security industry and its present and future role in Latin American cities. At present, the trend suggests problems ahead, and a call for policy makers to think more carefully about regulating, monitoring, and taxing private security services in ways that mrin w0.004yv8Violen(itoes,)-396(both shorav

a closer look at the larger spatial and developmental context in which revitalization plans generally emerge.

Because few public or private investors have the resources to totally transform more than a few buildings or streets at a time, partial efforts are necessary, which in turn means that heavy policing or surveillance strategies to protect a few redeveloped pockets of space will also be scattered and targeted. This means that persons or activities in properties or areas outside the redeveloped parcels will most likely be subject to excess policing, surveillance, and, most probably, social exclusion if not extreme insecurity (both relative and actual), owing to the spillover effects in contiguous areas of keeping criminals outside of a few protected areas. On the citywide level then, and despite some gains in a few circumscribed areas downtown, insecurity is by no means eliminated. Sometimes, in fact, it merely crops up in a new location, where a different set of residents will suffer. This further means that even those citizens living in privileged properties with heavy security may continue to feel imprisoned by their own fear, which often prevents them from venturing into public spaces on their own, or at least without some form of private security, primarily because citywide crime has not been eliminated. In contrast, those who do venture freely (if that is the word) on city streets, through urban parks, or in other public spaces are more likely to be low-income people, who cannot afford the luxuries of private security and automotive services and who rely on public transportation.

The longer-term result of this dynamic may be a more diminished or at least narrowed or segmented public sphere, in the sense that in the city's overall high-crime environment, those public spaces that are used are also less likely to host class and income diversity. One might even go so far as to say that with targeted urban redevelopment, a city is more likely to host two "publics" in its domain: one comprised of those citizens who use streets and other public locales (even though problems of crime and insecurity put them at risk when they go public, thereby limiting their freedom of movement); and another of citizens who move through a semiprivatized urban world accompanied by surveillance cameras, security personnel, and private armored cars, all of which allow them free movement in public space to a degree, but keep them physically or technologically separated from other publics.

All this will unfold, moreover, in a city that still suffers from violence and insecurity, thereby suggesting that more policy attention be paid to the larger social and spatial consequences of successful urban redevelopment projects. Can the positive gains associated with urban renewal programs be scaled to

the city as a whole? Will security conditions be improved if redevelopment only remains partial? What are the limits, in short, of targeted urban redevelopment when most of a city remains poor, dilapidated, and socially excluded from these areas?

As regards social exclusion/inclusion, a third arena in which more thinking about long- and short-term gains and losses would be valuable is precisely the new social conditions of Latin American cities. As noted above, one

organizations that operate on this scale tend to work in collaboration with private sector businesses.

In Mexico, one such high-profile organization funded by the private sec-

are increasingly following the lead set by citizens and local police. The current administration of President Felipe Calderón has empowered the military to work in the arena of crime fighting, giving them unparalleled powers to use military weapons and techniques to confront crime and insecurity, no matter the human rights consequences. The situation has gotten so tense in Mexico that several police have, themselves, filed petitions with the national human rights commission about military violations of their own rights.

Other political parties have also stepped into the fray, but not as arbiters or protectors of rights so much as purveyors of ever-harder-line tactics. In the

tor actors, or to the mayor's personal capacities to reduce corruption among the city police. Both were significant, to be sure; but the program's short-term successes also owed to the organizational innovations in local governance introduced by the mayor, which brought new forms of politics capable of transcending old patron–client practices by offering new vertical connections as much as horizontal ones. This organizational innovation centered around the establishment of an entirely a new type of authority, the Autoridad del Centro Histórico, which bounded a territorial entity for policy action that allowed for new forms of coordination and self-reinforcing commitments to reducing crime from among a variety of stakeholders.

It would be logical to analyze this experiment's successes through the lens of some of the other innovations noted earlier in the paper, not just personal and political control of the police by the mayor, but also the installation of surveillance cameras that have been used to monitor criminal activity. Even so, it is the use of technology by governing officials against their own corrupt employees (i.e., monitoring the police for bad behavior), and not just as a way to protect citizens, that qualifies as one of the innovations that helped establish this program's success. Some of the program's success also owes to the fact that the new head of the Autoridad, Alejandra Moreno Toscana, is a respected scholar and historian with a long resume of accomplishments in the city, whose loyalty to the mayor is unquestioned, who has strong personal relations with the private sector, and who has few partisan or personal political ambitions herself (*Milenio* 2006).[13] She has legitimacy and authority because she is not a typical "political operative."

Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to say that institutional volition, personal commitment, social capital, or private sector connections *alone* are the main source of the program's success, although they clearly have laid a strong foundation for positive action. Rather, what is more important about

developers, the police, and other service and culture providers—in a common project to create security, reduce crime, and physically transform a key but manageable territorial location in the city also is important to the success of the experiment. This has meant that old vertical hierarchies of patronage and politics that developed within the formal political sphere have been partly demobilized, at least with respect to servicing decisions about this central part of the city. They have been replaced by new horizontal networks of reciprocity linking the public sector (or political domain) with the private sector (or market domain), all of which help keep city officials from falling into the cracks of those old alliances and relations. This new situation allows authorities and a variety of interested parties to engage in new forms of dialogue and reciprocity, making more likely the implementation of reform efforts to promote the shared objectives of transforming this specific part of the city.

In many ways, this new arrangement provides the ultimate accountability: a horizontal set of networks and reciprocities established among a wide range of divergent institutional and political actors who are all concerned with a particular, well-circumscribed space. Because police—and even government officials—are merely one of the many "horizontal" actors in this experiment, they are no more significant than the others, and thus are unable to impose their own constraints on reform. Put another way, the police and old-time patronage leaders are less capable of demanding impunity or political favors, and more compelled to act accountably, even if it is just with respect to the other key actors in their horizontal decision-making networks.

To be sure, such an experiment has its limits, in terms of the breadth and extent of overall accountability as well as how much real or lasting impact any gains in the historic center of Mexico City will have on the problems of police corruption, crime, and insecurity in the metropolitan area as a whole. After all, to a certain degree this experiment could be seen as a glorified version of a business improvement district (BID), a program that has been widely criticized in the United States and elsewhere for its protection of the private sector and the social and class exclusivity that often results. Thus, we must ask whether this new Autoridad and its horizontal network of partners, including the police, are really more accountable to the local residents; or are they merely responding to their business investment partners and their urban redevelopment concerns? Moreover, how big an impact can changes in just one small area of the city have on the larger problem of lack of police accountability in the overall system of policing, which remains massive and fragmented?

These are tough questions that need further attention and policy. On the one hand this program is clearly no magic bullet for change, but on the other, the symbolic, economic, and political importance of the historic center also mean that any successes in this area may actually have a demonstration effect for the public and for the city as a whole. Even more significantly, because of the history of this area and the important actors and institutions involved, ranging from the police to the private sector, these small-scale changes may produce a ripple effect in citywide political networks, hierarchies, and jurisdictions that held dominion in the past. Maybe challenging power structures and creating new room for maneuver within these old structures and institutions, while also providing a physical space for creating new relationships and reciprocities in which police are merely another "interest" group, is enough to lead to the delegitimization of old corrupt practices and to increased overall urban accountability when it comes to crime and insecurity. Although changes in conditions of crime and insecurity may not be immediate, they might be slow and steady enough to reinvigorate a sense of hope and optimism about reversing impunity and jump-starting its eventual demise in a city where such sentiments have been in short supply. And a symbolic victory is better than a defeat, with any positive gain an improvement in a system where conditions have only worsened over time.

So, where should policy makers concerned with crime, insecurity, and urban quality of life look for guidance? First, they need to pay closer attention to urban scale and the spatial interconnectedness of divergent developments, especially within certain key areas of the city, as well as to think about the most appropriate territorial scale for policy action. To do this challenges the principal point of entry used by policy makers and practitioners in Latin American cities, which is either the city as a whole (if it is a single political jurisdiction), the metropolitan area (if the city spills beyond its political borders), or the community/neighborhood. The latter has been the starting point for considerable policy action, particularly in the decentralized world of Latin American urbanism. But maybe the most policy success can come from bypassing long-standing or traditional territorial units, and creating new ones that are not just manageable but also spatially distinct.

Second, policy makers must pay more attention to the sector-specific trade-offs that might result from crime-fighting efforts. Gains in one arena—as with growth in the security industry, new innovations in technology, or success in urban redevelopment—may lead to losses, or to new and unanticipated problems, in another sector. This in turn means that policy makers

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utilities, bringing ever-more-distant water resources to cities, and connecting all residents to affordable piped water and sewerage networks. Now proponents of public provision are set against proponents of more private provision or self-help. Advocates of subsidies are set against advocates of full cost recovery through user fees. Adherents of supply-side water investment are set against adherents of demand-side water management. Backers of ecological sanitation are set against backers of water-borne sanitation. What is particularly disturbing about these disagreements is that they are debated in the international arena, as if they could be resolved at that scale, when such decisions ought to be made locally, preferably in political arenas where the intended beneficiaries have an influence.

The disagreements clearly reflect the fault lines of a great deal of international debate outside of the water sector: they center on public versus private control, and environmental versus developmental goals. They also clearly relate to vested interests within the water sector, both economic (e.g., private companies versus public sector workers) and disciplinary (e.g., engineers versus ecologists). What is less clear is whether they are especially relevant to the interests of water- and sanitation-deprived urban populations. Is more (or less) private sector participation inherently more likely to result in improved services in deprived communities? What about more (or less) water resource management?

This chapter argues that the very attempt to identify internationally the best institutional means for extending water and sanitation services to the urban poor is misguided. It contributes to the fads that sweep through the development arena, and diverts international attention, and indirectly support, from locally driven initiatives. Since the internationally favored approaches reflect international political trends, rather than changing experiences in the practicalities of urban water and sanitation provision, it should come as no surprise that their impacts are ambiguous at best. Thus, the decline of the Soviet Union and its centrally planned economies helped to fuel the promotion of private water and sanitation provisioning in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Alternatively, the international environmental movement helped to draw international attention, if not funding, to a global water crisis implying a need to prioritize water resource management. The call to move from words to action, understandable in an international arena where rhetoric far outpaces practice, can reinforce a tendency to make specific claims about what ought to be done locally, partly to avoid the awkward admission that "it depends" (on, among other things, the local context).

When the governments of the world signed up to the Millennium

friends' homes. Shared child care or even children playing together can easily spread water- and sanitation-related diseases. Thus, some sort of collective response is required. The residents of wealthier parts of the city are no longer at much risk, however, and as such the local governments rarely face much pressure to respond.

Futhermore, many urban planning systems actively undermine the economic and political influence of residents who lack adequate water and sanitation. Thus, a large share of urban residents without access to basic water and sanitation facilities lives in what are termed informal settlements. These settlements may have been developed without the landowner's permission, in areas zoned nonresidential, or in ways that contravene other regulations. Public utilities are often prohibited or discouraged from providing infrastructure for such settlements, and the same is likely to apply to privately operat-

borhoods. The incorrect positioning of these targets reflects a more general tendency in the policy literature on environment and development to conflate the environmental burdens of affluence and poverty (though the more common mistake is to blame the burdens of affluence on the poor).

Other contradictions are evident in the changes the water target went through between the adoption of the Millennium Declaration by the United Nations General Assembly and the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals within the international donor community. The original target did not mention sanitation or sustainability, but was simply to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people "who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water" (United Nations General Assembly 2000). The term "sustainable" was presumably added in an (unsuccessful) attempt to justify placing the target under the goal of environmental sustainability. The initial neglect of sanitation probably reflects the fact that politicians and bureaucrats tend to focus unduly on drinking water, and assume incorrectly but understandably that contaminated drinking water is the predominant cause of water-borne diseases (when, in fact, virtually all "water-borne" diseases can also be spread as the result of bad sanitation, insufficient water for washing, and unhygienic behavior). Two years later, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, a companion target for basic sanitation was adopted, and the two are now often combined as one MDG target (UN Millennium Project Task Force on Water and Sanitation 2005). However, there is continued neglect of water for personal uses other than drinking, and of other hygiene deficiencies that can contribute to water-borne diseases.[1]

A further contradiction is that, although access to safe water and basic sanitation are attractive targets because they are perceived to be well-defined and easy to monitor, at the international level they are neither. Attempts to monitor progress towards the water and sanitation targets are fraught with difficulty. Prior to the MDGs, monitoring access to water and sanitation relied on notoriously unreliable government estimates. A serious attempt has now been made to bring empirical evidence to bear. For the *Global Water Supply and*

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1. The reason for the focus on water (with sanitation as an add-on), rather than on the complex of environmental hazards that threaten people's health and well-being in so many deprived settlements, lies not so much in the nature of the problem as in the anticipated solution. Piped water and sewerage systems can, at least in principle, be implemented and controlled centrally, using standardized technology. Alternative approaches, adapted to local conditions, may be more cost effective, but are harder to advocate and monitor internationally.

Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report (WHO and UNICEF 2000; hereafter *Assessment 2000 Report*), this involved providing governments with statistics on water and sanitation from household surveys (e.g., the demographic and health surveys undertaken by Macro International). Unfortunately, such internationally available statistics do not provide the basis for estimating population shares with and without access to safe water and sanitation. Indeed, the *Assessment 2000 Report* referred to the indicators in terms of "reasonable" access to "improved" water and sanitation, noting that "access to water and sanitation, as reported below, does not imply that the level of service or quality of water is 'adequate' or 'safe.'" (WHO and UNICEF, 2000, 78). Furthermore, the report clearly states that many countries have not had such surveys recently—and even fewer countries have such surveys sufficiently regularly to monitor progress towards achieving the target by 2015.

Not only do such statistics systematically underestimate the population without reasonable access to adequate water and sanitation, but the extent of this underestimation almost certainly varies systematically between countries and between urban and rural areas. The latter can be seen as part of a wider tendency to underestimate urban poverty (Satterthwaite 2003), arising in part from the failure to consider the costs and burdens specific to urban living. Thus, for example, the criterion for reasonable access to a water source is that one does not have to travel more than a kilometer to collect the water, while for sanitation a simple pit latrine is defined as "improved" sanitation. Although one might defend such criteria in rural areas, they are not at all appropriate to densely settled urban areas (McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2006a). If residents of a dense urban slum have to travel a kilometer to collect water, then either the queues will be exceedingly long or the prices exceedingly high. Similarly, sharing a simple pit latrine is hardly adequate in rural areas, but it is clearly inadequate in a crowded urban slum. If, as UN-HABITAT estimates, about a billion urban dwellers—roughly one in four—live in slums, this is potentially a major source of bias. These and other considerations suggest that the official urban coverage estimates in the *Assessment 2000 Report* seriously overestimated coverage, at least in urban areas.

Table 1 compares the estimates of the population without "improved" provision for water supplies and sanitation from the *Assessment 2000 Report* with estimates of the population without "adequate" provision, based on an ad hoc review of local water and sanitation studies. The differences are striking, as is the level of uncertainty in the indicative estimates, which are not

more widely and regularly applied, and far more detailed. Even then it is doubtful whether international comparability could be achieved, given the enormous diversity of water and sanitation technologies and service qualities.

Perhaps more important, it is not clear that the statistics have had much effect one way or the other on progress towards the water and sanitation targets. Indeed, it is likely that no more than a handful of people who were not actually involved in the MDG process have even noticed the ten-year shift in base year, or the fact that in Africa changes in estimation procedures have created more than twofold changes in the estimated urban population shares without access to improved sanitation for any given year (while almost no changes have been detected over time). If the international statistics on improved Imfnalu

two are closely correlated (see Hinrichsen, Robey, and Upadhyay 1998, reported on in *Science* 281, no. 5384, p. 1795). The lead paragraph on British Br

The public–private debates – hotly contested decisions that make little difference to water and sanitation provision in deprived areas

If the international promotion of water resource management has been linked to a misleading narrative about a global water crisis, the international promotion of private sector participation in water provision has been linked to an equally misleading narrative of public sector crisis. The basic message was that public utilities are underfunded, inefficient, overstaffed, unresponsive to their customers, easily manipulated by politicians to serve short-term political ends, and, in low-income settings, often end up providing subsidized services to the relatively well-to-do while the poorest residents go without. Private sector participation, its proponents claimed, would bring finance, efficiency, and attention to the demands of customers rather than politicians (Segerfeldt 2005). Increased private sector participation was heavily promoted by the World Bank and various other international development agencies (Finger and Allouche 2002; Haughton 2002).

But the targets are as unlikely to be met by more private sector participation as by more water resource management. There have been private utility operators and public–private partnerships in the water sector for centuries, and there is little in this history to suggest that more private sector involvement can ensure that water, let alone sanitation services, reach the poor (Budds and McGranahan 2003). The few large multinationals that dominated the market during the 1990s provided little basis for competitive bidding, and were not easily managed by public agencies that had had trouble managing their public utilities. These large multinationals showed more interest in working in large cities with significant middle classes, than in the economically depressed towns and villages where most of those without adequate access to water and sanitation actually live. As critics have pointed out, private operators did not bring in the private sector finance anticipated by proponents (Hall and Lobina 2006). In any case, many of the obstacles that prevent public utilities from delivering adequate services to depriveds

Increasing private sector participation, also known as privatization although it almost never involved transferring the water and sanitation networks to private ownership, was extremely controversial, however. If proponents oversold the private sector as a panacea, detractors overcriticized it as a pariah. Critics not only pointed to the dangers of monopoly pricing and the lack of private incentive to provide public goods, but some presented privatization as "corporate theft of the world's water," often linking it back to the global water crisis (Barlow and Clarke 2003). In many countries, popular opinion turned against privatization, and in some the result was demonstrations and political unrest (Finnegan 2002).

Although the full-on push for privatization has eased off, in many countries the water sector is still undergoing internationally supported reforms, and many of these reforms involve shifts towards commercial principles, and a regulatory environment that is more open to private sector participation. Moreover, while the multinational water companies may be less active in pursuing concessions, other contracts and other private enterprises are increasing in importance. In parts of Asia, for example, local and regional companies are reportedly becoming more important, and companies run by members of the Chinese diaspora in Asia seem to be securing a growing number of contracts for water and sanitation in mainland China (McGranahan and Owen 2006). Moreover, it is noteworthy that the World Bank's web site on Urban Water Supply and Sanitation still states that "where public delivery fails, the World Bank Group supports private entry" (World Bank 2007), ignoring the fact that public failure is a poor recipe for private success.

A large part of the privatization controversy stemmed from the fact that powerful institutions like the World Bank were promoting it internationally,[3] and multinational companies were winning the contracts. It is one thing for a country or city to go through its own political debate and decide independently, and perhaps even democratically, to give a concession or management contract to a private company. It is quite another for the political pressure to come from international finance institutions that are certainly not democratic, and that are widely held to have vested interests in the sector. Also, as described above in relation to the MDGs and water resource management, the international arena is not the

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3. The World Bank also funded or undertook a significant share of high quality but suspiciously favorable research on privatization, and it is indicative that high quality but critical research later came from studies funded by public sector unions.

appropriate scale at which to decide how to improve water provision locally, and

Residents will be less willing to invest in improving water and sanitation provision if they expect to be evicted. Similarly, providers will not be willing to invest in water and sanitation infrastructure in settlements at risk of eviction, particularly if the providers rely on income from selling water or sanitation services, or if providing such services is illegal. On the other hand, if illegal connections are made, officials may be loath to disconnect them, or may see them as an opportunity to collect illicit payments. Itinerant vendors,

In developing standards and regulations that favor deprived residents, it is critical that relevant authorities and politicians are responding to requests from the residents and their organizations. It is one thing for government officials to evoke the interests of the urban poor as they arbitrarily decide to lower the standards required for housing, water, and sanitation, and quite another for them to respond to legitimate demands from within the deprived areas. The context is also critical. In an urban settlement where water and sanitation provision meets the prevailing standards for 80% of the population, enforcing these standards may be the best means of bringing up the remaining 20%. Where only 20% meet prevailing standards, enforcing these standards is more likely to interfere with attempts to improve conditions in the most deprived areas. Unfortunately, the temptation to negotiate standards informally can easily reinforce clientelist politics, again making it difficult for deprived groups to engage effectively in the broader political arena.

Getting deprived residents more influence over formal water and sanitation providers

Even with more favorable urban planning and regulations, bad relations with local authorities and formal water and sanitation providers can prevent services from reaching deprived neighborhoods. Some efforts to use development assistance to overcome the resulting failures actually make matters worse. Donors have promoted participatory processes, but participation does not give residents more influence in negotiations with more powerful groups and organizations unless it is accompanied by some countervailing power. In some cases, participatory processes may have made matters worse by providing the illusion of open engagement, when critical decisions—such as whether the project should be continued—are being made behind closed doors far away (Katui-Katua and McGranahan 2002). Alternatively, supporting NGOs to provide parallel delivery systems can reduce the need for good relations between deprived communities and their governments, but only so long as this external support is forthcoming. Perhaps it is for these reasons that the more successful measures to give residents more influence through increased participation have involved clear links to financial decision making (e.g., through participatory budgeting), while the more successful measures led by residents and their organizations have combined self-help with constructive engagement with public authorities and utilities.

For utilities facing difficulties running what they consider to be their core business—serving "conventional" customers with piped water and sewer connection—working in deprived communities is likely to be a daunting challenge. At the best of times, special pressures are likely to be required. Such pressures can come from various quarters, and need not be via the two conventional routes—demands on the part of users and commands on the part of the state (World Bank 2003). In practice, pressures often arise in a somewhat arbitrary fashion (Connors 2005). They can, however, be brought to bear through the collective action of organizations of the urban poor, either working on their own initiative or through processes set up by the government.

Again, the sanitation program of the OPP-RTI provides an excellent example of how organized communities, supported by professionals, can bring pressure to bear on public utilities, even as they work towards solving their own problems. The approach OPP-RTI developed was built around an external/internal distinction, with lanes of households taking responsibility for the sanitation and drains within the lane, and the government taking responsibility for trunk sewers and treatment plants. Although this approach might seem to devolve government responsibilities to the communities, in practice it has not only spurred action on the government side, but has changed the government's ways of working. On the one hand, it has made it more difficult for the government to accept loan-based megaprojects that invariably create large debts and rarely reach deprived settlements. Second, it has made it far easier for the government to complement the efforts of the urban poor to solve their own problems.

Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDIjtfown peAets(the nr)- l (SDIl/sb0hatan

without minimal water and sanitation. Thus, urban poor federations and women's cooperatives in India have, with the support of the NGO SPARC, collaborated with local authorities to provide hundreds of toilet blocks in Mumbai and Pune. This has not only helped meet critical needs, but has demonstrated the capacities of organizations of the urban poor, and changed their relations to local authorities (Burra, Patel, and Kerr 2003).

Participatory budgeting can also provide a means through which deprived

plaints about its implementation, about the limit of six thousand liters, and about how the quantity controls have helped to commodify water, deprived communities have been able to use the rights debate to negotiate water supply improvements (Loftus 2005).

The scope for replicating these comparatively successful strategies is limited, again partly as the result of regional and international variability. What works depends on existing coverage, resource availability, the extent and forms of corruption and clientelism, settlement size and income, and a host of other factors. The South African government was in a better position than most sub-Saharan governments to respond to demands from deprived communities for free basic water supplies. Participatory budgeting is an important innovation, but is not feasible and effective everywhere. Although the federations of slum/shack dwellers linked to SDI have adopted somewhat similar strategies in countries of Asia, Africa, and most recently Latin America, they cannot claim to have found the universal solution in their particular combination of community organization, NGO support, and engagement with government. Indeed, one of the lessons that stands out is the importance of building on successful local initiatives, and designing measures that suit the local physical, economic, and political situations, rather than trying to decide what works in international forums or institutions.

Improving informal water and sanitation provision

As described above, only a small share of the people without access to the water network or to basic sanitation facilities typically benefit from upstream water management or changes in the role of the private sector in utility operations. Many, on the other hand, are affected by the changing quality and quantity of the local groundwater resources, and the operations of small private water vendors and sanitation workers. Since these water sources and providers are typically considered unacceptable by definition, it can be difficult for governments to work to improve their quality or reliability. In a recent study of small water enterprises in Accra (Ghana), Khartoum (Sudan), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), and Nairobi (Kenya), it was found that the governments were becoming more accepting of the role of both vendors and, in all but perhaps Nairobi, groundwater (McGranahan et al. 2006). On the other hand, comparatively little was understood about the quality and quantity of the groundwater resources, and 2 p02(m), 7 Tam deletet the locat quifderSimilalty, rerationsbnetwendors and local u blc aoutfor

A review of possible measures to improve water and sanitation provision from informal providers or urban groundwater supplies is beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth reiterating, however, that neither the water resource measures nor the private sector participation promoted internationally has engaged with these issues, despite their clear importance to deprived urban residents. Moreover, the local barriers to action are similar to some of the barriers described above in relation to creating regulations and planning systems more favorable to the urban poor. High standards can easily mean that the government cannot engage with small water enterprises or groundwater supplies without either threatening to close down the supplies or ignoring practices that are not officially allowed. Moreover, there is only a fine line between benevolent neglect and pernicious negligence, when it comes to allowing the use of urban groundwater and sales by itinerant vendors with minimal equipment and no formal hygiene controls.

CONCLUSIONS

Improving water and sanitation provision in deprived urban and rural communities deserves to be an international priority. The Millennium Development Goals should be used to focus on those without adequate provision, and ensure that support does indeed reach those in need.

It is important not to be diverted by international debates over the relative severity of rural and urban deficiencies, the relative merits of markets and plans, or the scale of emerging water resource crises. While the statistics being used to monitor progress towards the international water and sanitation targets are seriously misleading, getting information that can drive local action is far more important than searching for internationally comparable statistics on access to water and sanitation. The international promotion of private sector participation has probably caused considerable damage, but this is because such institutional decisions should not be made internationally or under the influence of international agencies or corporations. It is not because of any inherent defect in private utility operators. Alternatively, even if fears of a global water resource crisis are justified, local deficiencies in water provision to poor urban dwellers are unlikely to be addressed by internationally promoted water resource management.

In many settings, the solution to urban water and sanitation deficiencies lies outside the water sector, narrowly defined. Urban authorities may feel that there is little point in improving "slums," as this will just attract more migrants,

and they may even prohibit formal water and sanitation provision on the grounds that the settlements are not legitimate. Such anti-urbanization policies cannot be addressed within the water sector. On the other hand, there are circumstances in which better water and sanitation provision can help to resolve underlying land issues and improve relations between urban poor groups and local authorities. Much depends on local politics and economics.

Some of the most successful improvements in water and sanitation provision have involved deprived residents securing more power over the formal provisioning system, either through participatory budgeting processes or through organizations of the urban poor negotiating constructively with local authorities. Such approaches are quite different, however, from the sorts of participatory projects international donors can easily design, or the sorts of community organizations that conventional NGOs set up to run their projects.

If neither public utilities nor private operators can easily provide the solution to water and sanitation deficiencies, neither can self-help or participatory approaches. But in any case, the real challenge is not to design approaches that can be applied in diverse situations around the world, but to find the means to support approaches that have been adapted to local conditions, and are already yielding improvements, even if they are not providing the sort of water and sanitation services people everywhere deserve.

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The Sanitation Program of the Orangi Pilot

abadis whose population is now over six million. Between 1992 and 2003, 25,438 housing units were demolished as a result of megaprojects and to sat-

of the problem is so enormous that not even a fraction of the requirement can be tackled through loans. In addition, loans come with conditionalities, foreign consultants, and, often, international bidding for implementation. All this can increase costs by more than 300% as compared to ordinary government projects. In addition, local governments do not have the financial and/or technical means to effectively carry out the subsequent operation and maintenance of the systems.

It was clear to OPP-RTI from the beginning that foreign loans could not solve the sanitation problem. It was necessary, rather, to raise local resources and develop local expertise. Part of this could come from the community, provided the cost of construction could be reduced by eliminating contrac-

OPP-RTI LOW-COST SANITATION PROGRAM

The Internal–External Concept

The OPP-RTI divides the project of sanitation into "internal" and "external" development. Internal development consists of sanitary latrines in the house, underground sewers in the lane, and neighborhood collector sewers. External development consists of trunk sewers and treatment plants.

Results in Orangi and in 284 other locations in Pakistan have demon-

Through Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs)

The scaling-up of the program through NGOs and CBOs has led to the creation of partnerships between them and local governments. The OPP-RTI strategy for supporting NGOs and CBOs wanting to replicate its program evolved over time and after many failures. The process consists of:

- CBO/NGO or community activists contact the OPP-RTI for support

- OPP-RTI invites them for orientation at the OPP-RTI office in Karachi or directs them to one of its partners

- After orientation CBO/NGO or community activists convince their community to adopt the program

- They create a team composed of a community organizer and a technical person who are trained at the OPP-RTI and/or on site in their settlements through visits by the OPP-RTI staff

- The training offered is in surveying, mapping, estimating, construction supervision, documentation, and accounting. Training does not have a specific period, but continues throughout the life of the project

- OPP-RTI arranges financial support for the team and related expenses through WaterAid or from its own funds; initially, this support is about Rs 200,000 (US$3,500) per year

- Invariably the CBO/NGO or community activists come into contact with local government departments as its work expands

- Local government representatives are then invited to the OPP-RTI for orientation

- If they are convinced they send their staff for training

- New settlements contact the CBO/NGO or community activists for help in replicating the program when they see how conditions have changed in their neighboring settlements

Outside of Orangi, 46,821 houses in eleven Pakistan towns at 284 locations

Reasons for the failure of NGOs and CBOs to replicate the OPP-RTI program:

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Reasons for success:

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(US$2,330) for documenting ten katchi abadis was provided by SELAVIP. However, a total of fifty katchi abadis were documented as a result of this support and in the process a number of young men from these settlements became associated with the OPP-RTI programs. (Two of them independently promoted the sanitation program in their settlement and later established a school, which has become a major Qasba institution. Its work is described in Box – 2.)

The documentation of the Qasba katchi abadis consisted of identifying existing infrastructure, schools, clinics, sewage disposal points, *thallas* (building component manufacturing yards), the slope of the land, the number of houses, and the approximate investment made by people and government in infrastructure development. This documentation showed the OPP-RTI management that even people outside of Orangi and without OPP-RTI's support had made major investments in attempts to improve the physical and social environment of their settlements.

After the documentation of these fifty katchi abadis, the OPP-RTI felt that there was a need to document the katchi abadis all over the city. This would also establish contacts with community activists, NGOs and CBOs outside of Orangi and give a larger base to OPP-RTI's community and advocacy work. In addition, it would train people in informal settlements to help in the replication of these programs.

As a result of this work, a Youth Training Program was initiated in 1994. The students at the program are matric and/or intermediate (10 to 12 grade at high school) graduates and most of them are also studying in schools and colleges. Training is provided for sanitation and the main focus is on surveying, drafting, documentation, levelling, designon, drafithem4(mediaa 12 9a12 T9r)39ver the city

Initially, whoever applied for training to the YTP was given a three-month probation period during which he was given a daily stipend, not a regular salary. As a result of this policy, there was a high drop-out rate. Now the Technical Training Resource Centre (TTRC), set up by graduates of the YTP, runs a twenty-six-day training program for applicants and those who are successful become students at the YTP. The training for housing has also been taken over

The survey of the 334 katchi abadis shows the extent of people's work. There arveork.

upgrading, planning concepts in local government, and community managed development work.

• Documenting the katchi abadis showed people's involvement and investment in development in clear terms. As a result, planning agencies and local governments have realized the need to support this work rather than duplicate it or simply go out and build schools (often without teachers), clinics (often without paramedics), and water and sanitation systems that are often not properly designed, maintained, and operated.

• Persons in the communities were trained in skills and knowledge that communities require to establish a more equitable relationship with government agencies, improve their settlements, and build local institutions.

• The documentation laid the basis for questioning government and IFI planning policies and development projects and for promoting viable alternatives that were based on a sound knowledge of ground realities that government agencies and their foreign consultants often do not have.

• As a result of the documentation, OPP-RTI's concepts were reinforced by statistics and maps at an all-Karachi level and not just limited to Orangi. This has increased OPP-RTI's standing and credibility to the extent that its advice is now sought at the national, provincial, and city level in matters related to sewage and katchi abadi upgrading.

Work with SKAA
In 1994, SKAA decided to follow the OPP-RTI proposed methodology for upgrading katchi abadis. This consisted of documenting and integrating infrastructure funded by the community and the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) into an overall plan for each katchi abadi. It was also decided that SKAA would only build external development and leave internal development to communities. Financing and contracting of external development is arranged by SKAA either by conventional contracting or through departmental work.[1]

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1. In departmental work a people's committee of the neighborhood where the project is to be implemented is formed to manage and construct the project; the OPP-RTI becomes its advisor; and the local government funds and designs the project with OPP-RTI and community involvement.

OPP-RTI's work as consultant to SKAA has consisted of:

- Documenting existing sanitation and water supply in the settlements and identifying external sanitation and water supply projects. Community activists assist the OPP-RTI and SKAA teams in both these activities

- Reviewing detailed designs and estimates by SKAA engineers

- Obtaining approval of the project by community members before finalization

- Supervising and monitoring work by SKAA engineers and community activists

- On completion, testing the infrastructure and, if approved by the community, issuing a "no objection" certificate with the community before final payment to the contractors.

The most important aspect of this entire work is the documentation of the katchi abadis leading to the identification of external development and an overall plan that integrates existing informally built infrastructure. This entire work has been done by the YTP under OPP-RTI supervision. As a result, SKAA, which was completely dependent on ADB funding, has become solvent and now has considerable surplus funds derived through lease charges from the communities it has partnered with (SKAA 2004).

## OPP-RTI Alternatives for the Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan

The documentation of the katchi abadis by the YTP showed clearly that the OPP-RTI concept of internal sanitation being built by communities and external sanitation being built by the government was valid and workable. In addition, SKAA's work on these principles, supported by the OPP-RTI, has also been very successful. However, the Karachi Water and Sewage Board's (KWSB) Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan (GKSP), which tries to provide both internal and external development and take the sewage to its treatment plants, has been unsuccessful and its investments, provided through international loans, have not even begun to be recovered, putting considerable strain on the economy of the city and the province. KWSB owes Rs 42 billion (US$700 million) to the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

OPP-RTI mapping established the reasons for the failure. The GKSP ignores the existing reality that sewerage systems are already in place and are discharging into the natural nalas of the city. Documentation of much of this work is not available and, even if it were accepted that it exists, it is considered "substandard" by IFI consultants. The GKSP tries to take sewage to the three treatment plants it has built by constructing trunks along the main roads. In the process, however, it does not pick up the existing sewerage systems that discharge into the nalas and so the trunks remain dry and the treatment plants function at no more than 25% of their capacity (OPP-RTI 1999). To link up Karachi's existing infrastructure with the treatment plants and the KWSB trunks, the sewerage infrastructure of entire neighborhoods would have to be dug up and re-laid. This is simply not possible. To support its view, the OPP-RTI made a case study of the ADB-financed Baldia Project in which the KWSB methodology was followed; only 1,744 houses out of 25,000 could connect to the system. The old system of discharging into the natural nala of Baldia continues to function. As such, more than Rs 400 million (US$6.7 million) spent on the project have been wasted (OPP-RTI 1999). These facts have been brought to light by the OPP-RTI documentation of katchi abadis through the YTP.

After studying its documentation the OPP-RTI proposed that the existing sewerage systems, laid formally or informally, should be documented and accepted; that the natural nalas of Karachi should be converted into box trunks; and that treatment plants should be placed at locations where they meet the sea or other natural water bodies (see OPP-RTI 1999). Research also showed that in 1998–99, the KMC subsidy to the KWSB was Rs 329 million (US$5.5 million). With these finances 35 kilometers of nalas could have been converted into box trunks and in six years all of Karachi's 200 kilometers of nalas could be developed except for the Lyari and Malir Rivers and the Korangi Creek (funds for treatment plants would be in addition to these costs).[2]

On the basis of its proposals for Karachi, the OPP-RTI also offered alternatives for the planned Korangi Waste Water Management Project (KWWMP), which was being financed by a US$70 million loan from the ADB and counterpart funds of US$30 million from the Sindh government.

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2 The KWSB planners and engineers objected to this proposal because they felt that sewage and rain water flowing together was against good engineering practice. However, through its contacts with academics, the OPP-RTI found that this practice has been followed in Japan.

Development of Orangi Nalas into Box Trunks

As a result of OPP-RTI's presentations of its documentation of katchi abadis and the alternative proposals to the KWSB's GKSP, the governor of Sindh gave a directive in March 1999: "KMC should develop and upgrade main nalas/drains as sewage and rain water drainage channels, for which budget would be allocated annually." As a result of this directive, the KMC started work to convert tertiary nalas into box trunks on the basis of OPP-RTI surveys and designs. Since devolution in 2001, the city government has continued with this process. The OPP-RTI has developed designs and estimates for seventeen tertiary and one main nala in Orangi based on its surveys. The total length of these nalas is 33.7 kilometers. So far eight branch nalas have been

BOX – 7:

- Maps of the entire UC and of individual settlements within each UC

- Documentation of existing social and physical infrastructure related to sewage disposal, water supply, health, education, parks and playgrounds, and solid waste disposal

- Identification of development needs on the basis of the documentation and the role of the community and governments in planning and delivering this development

A number of UCs have used this documentation effectively. Development in those that have not has been ineffective, inappropriate, and substandard leading to a considerable misuse and waste of public money. UC-6, a model UC, has used the plan book for:

- Developing external sewerage and water supply, which has included repairing water mains and desilting blocked sewers. The location of the leakages and blockages was identified by OPP-RTI surveys

- Helping the nazim and area activists to organize the pick up of solid waste from the main bins. The UC plan book, with a map showing the disposal points, has helped in this work. People are responsible for disposal of solid waste from the house and lane into the main neighborhood bin, which a government van picks up. Four thousand houses and 450 shops are organized to do this work and they pay the sanitary workers employed for this purpose Rs 20 to Rs 30 per month per shop or per house

- Where people have laid lane sewers on a self-help basis, the nazim finances paving the lane

- Developing tree plantation and electrification on the internal–external model

- Mapping, which has been done by the YTP and the UC has been assisted by the TTRC in its development planning and implementation work.

Requests from UCs and towns from all over Karachi have been received for the preparation of similar documentation and advisory support. This is being provided to UCs in eleven out of eighteen towns of Karachi. These towns are now in the process of converting their nalas into box trunks. However, the process of building treatment plants at the end of the nalas has not yet begun, although the OPP-RTI is in the process of researching low-cost options.

Formulation of National Sanitation Policy

In August 2005, the federal government asked the OPP-RTI chairman to prepare a sanitation policy for Pakistan. After a number of provincial-level workshops, a background paper and policy have been prepared that promote the OPP-RTI component-sharing model based on the internal–external concept. A stakeholder workshop endorsed the policy document and the federal cabinet approved it in December 2006.

Funding Mechanisms

OPP-RTI was funded initially by Infaq Foundation, a Pakistani charity. Together they decided that there would be no targets but that the program would be an exploration into finding alternatives to the existing development paradigm for the katchi abadis. This funding has been used for administrative purposes, research, documentation, training, and extension but not for development. The funds for internal development have been generated by the community and organized at the lane level.

Plans and estimates for external infrastructure were developed by the OPP-RTI and/or its NGO/CBO partners in the replication projects. With these the NGOs and CBOs have negotiated with local governments to fund external development. In cases where disposal points are not available, a

that would previously have been spent on internal development. This has been a major achievement.

Impact

The OPP-RTI programs have had an impact on Orangi, on the OPP-RTI replication areas, on civil society and NGOs, on government projects and policies, on donors and donor-funded programs, and on academia.

Because of the sanitation programs in Orangi, "the availability of cleaner and extended space in front of houses had a significant social and recreational impact as well. New and relatively safer play areas for children emerged. Women were able to move around more freely and be visited by friends and relatives leading some to comment that it had improved marriage prospects for young women" (Zaidi 2001). These findings are similar to those of other surveys in which residents have also said that as a result of the work they have done in the lanes, the value of their properties has increased by up to 30%; they have been motivated

scientifically on this basis. They also have active citizen's organizations that can monitor and support the work of the UCs. A strong desire has emerged to turn Orangi into a "planned area" so that the more affluent and educated persons do not leave.

In the replication areas, the sanitation program has produced the same

Resource organizations and NGOs have also been able to identify reliable community organizations with whom they can work. There is a downside to this as well; as a result of all this, Orangi has become the beneficiary of much attention, which other Karachi informal settlements have not.

Donor agencies have also adopted the OPP-RTI models. The World Bank's Strategic Sanitation Approach (SSA) is borrowed from the OPP-RTI's sanitation program. UNICEF's work with the OPP-RTI in Sukkur and the World Bank-SDC's work in Hyderabad both promoted the OPP-RTI model. The Department for International Development (DFID)-funded Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project (FAUP), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme of the Sindh Pilot Project are also based on the OPP-RTI model. In all of these programs the OPP-RTI has acted as a consultant and/or trainer, except for the DFID-funded FAUP. In addition, the proposed ADB-fund-

- Community organizations exist all over Pakistan. However, their main function is to lobby government agencies and politicians for development. This development is often handed out as patronage and without proper planning and implementation. It is often substandard and inadequate, and, more often than not, does not materialize. People have lost hope in the lobbying process and are looking for alternatives.

- A map of the settlement or the small town in which replication is to take place is an essential prerequisite to planning. The process of preparing a map and identifying existing infrastructure and problems is in itself a motivational exercise. The map changes perceptions about what is required for the settlement or city and relates that to ground realities. It has been observed that government agencies often do not have such plans or the expertise to prepare them and as such their planning perceptions and assumptions are inaccurate.

- In smaller towns, municipal authorities have access to sufficient funds for external development if the OPP-RTI model is accepted. Local government agencies also have basic engineering expertise and this can be further enhanced by training at the OPP-RTI. A partnership between people and government agencies, as has been demonstrated on a large scale, is possible in these towns. In larger cities where sophisticated engineer-dominated specialized agencies exist, such a partnership is not possible to begin with. However, as sanitation work in a settlement expands, contact between the NGO/CBO carrying out the work and the government agency in charge of water and sewerage becomes inevitable. If the replication project is large enough and successful enough, this contact develops into a dialogue and subsequently into mutual understanding, if not collaboration.

- The creation of surveying, levelling, mapping, and documentation and planning skills within a community leads to a more equitable relationship between government agencies and CBOs. People who acquire these skills move on to create institutions around them and this in turn leads to development within the settlement. These institutions become a gathering place for people and activists and a space for dialogue.

- In Karachi, where a large number of replication initiatives have been consolidated, CBOs have gone on to do other things and have taken control

of their neighborhoods and settlements. If they are put in contact with each other, they learn from each other and expand their work. If a network of these CBOs is created, and supported by city-level NGOs, academics, and concerned citizens, it can become a major force in determining policy directions, especially if it can put across its views on the basis of scientific research and planning alternatives. This process is taking place in Karachi in a big way but for it to become irreversible policy it has to be nurtured.

- Once the work of CBOs consolidates they realize that many of their problems are related to larger city planning issues. However, understanding these city planning issues and participation in promoting pro-poor solutions to them can only become possible if there is an active NGO in the city that carries out research on these issues, promotes alternatives, and involves CBO activists in it. Karachi is lucky that the Urban Resource Centre performs this role for the city and is in constant dialogue with the technical departments of the city government. A similar center has been set up in Lahore and more are in the offing.

- Government officials and agencies respond positively if research findings and development alternatives are supported by large-scale on-site work and large-scale public involvement, even though they may have serious reservations regarding the alternatives. Where powerful contractors, consultants, and the interests of international loan agencies exist, the reservation regarding the alternatives can turn into active opposition, as in the case of the ADB-funded KWWMP in Karachi.

- The informal sector is an important player in the delivery of services and financial and technical support to poor communities. This sector operates on a very large scale. Government and donor programs cannot replace this sector except at the project level. However, they can support this sector through research and extension of technical advice, credit, and managerial training. If this is accompanied by increasing the awareness of communities regarding what should be their relationship with the informal sector, then a more equitable relationship between communities and the sector can be achieved. This is what the OPP-RTI programs have succeeded in doing in Orangi and in the replication projects.

- Through its work with other NGOs, the OPP-RTI has learned that large funds for small NGOs can result in destroying those NGOs since they may not have the capacity to utilize those funds properly and also because the availability of such large funds is seldom reliable. Once they have stopped, the NGO can no longer function and its activists and staff have to search for other livelihood. In addition, there are always donor agencies and large NGOs searching for smaller grassroot NGOs and CBOs that can promote their programs. In OPP-RTI's experience these smaller NGOs often become implementers of the programs of the donor rather than developing and sustaining their own programs.

- It can also be easily seen that government functionaries who are associated initially with the development of innovative projects have considerable loyalty to them. However, their replacements can be indifferent, if not openly hostile, to such initiatives.

- The manner in which government agencies function is deeply rooted in

New Directions in Housing Policy

Diana Mitlin

INTRODUCTION

Four years ago, the publication of the *Global Report on Human Settlements 2003* (UN-HABITAT 2003) highlighted both the present and anticipated scale of shelter inadequacies and suggested that one in every three people in the world would live in "slums" within thirty years. It further estimated that 940 million people—almost one-sixth of the world's population—already live in squalid, unhealthy areas, mostly without water, sanitation, public services, or legal security. The significance given to these problems is indicated by the inclusion of shelter, through "slum" settlements, in the Millennium Development Goals and the aspiration to "Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020" (Goal 7; http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). In addition, the importance of the lack of access to basic services for health and well-being has resulted in specific goals with respect to water and sanitation.

Lying behind such aggregate assessments and generalized objectives is an appalling state of affairs. Shelter deficiencies are numerous, with the most significant being insecurity of tenure, inadequate provision of basic services (notably water and sanitation), and excessive residential densities. Insecurity of tenure is widespread as there is insufficient land for urban growth to take place within the legal framework. In the search for plots, available land may be squatted; and/or land that is not zoned for residential development, typically agricultural land, may be subdivided into residential plots. These informally developed areas are not provided with public services. Families may organize access to water either through investment in water pipes (often illegally tapping main pipes), digging wells, and/or through purchase from informal vendors. Sanitation services are often very limited and it is rare to have provision for sewerage. High densities are a particular problem in central city areas where the locational advantage encourages low-income individuals and families to come in the hope of finding work. In these circumstances, residency may be insecure, or residents may rent rooms in subdivided existing buildings; again, service provision is likely to be inadequate as the number of people accessing these services significantly exceeds the number for which they were originally planned.

In this context, the options for legal accommodation are limited. Even the lowest-cost options exceed the affordability of a considerable proportion of the lowest-income households. Hence there is the widespread use of incremental housing strategies that make shelter more affordable by spreading the costs over a number of years. For higher-income households, some form of legal land purchase may come first, with further investments being made in shelter and services as incomes increase and assets accumulate. For lower-income families, the first investment may be a very basic shelter made from wood or scrap materials on a piece of land with uncertain security of tenure. As security increases, additional investments are made. Infrastructure may be installed once connections to public networks have been negotiated. Over time, the shack will be transformed into a more robust dwelling, with rooms added and flooring and roofing improved with the use of permanent materials. Incremental development is more affordable because the considerable investment required for adequate shelter can be made in small steps as finance becomes available, and without having to pay the interest costs associated with large loans. Investments frequently do not comply with building regulations because of the high costs of compliance. Financial investment is only one component of the household strategy for shelter acquisition, and the collective action of residents helps to achieve tenure security and also secure state investment in infrastructure improvements and connections to bulk services.

The urban poor's uncertain legal status (for multiple reasons) in terms of land occupation and construction means that they live with the risk of eviction. As well as the many large-scale evictions, there are small evictions that take place on a daily basis in the towns and cities of the global South. The relationships between building rules and standards and the bigger issues of city planning and development are highlighted by events in Zimbabwe in 2005 and other smaller eviction programs (COHRE 2006; Tibaijuka 2005).[1] For many, the illegality associated with incremental housing development simply reinforces their status as second-class urban citizens. Illegality compounds the problems of informal shelter, increasing vulnerability as a result of eviction threats and giving rise to bribes and coercive payments. Lack of legal tenure is the ostensible reason for governments not providing, or underproviding, services, but this further exacerbates the problems faced by those with low incomes. Illegality creates the feeling of being "other" and secondary, a feel-

1. For examples from Karachi see http://www.urc.org.pk

ing reinforced by the stigma of living in certain neighborhoods and their association with crime (Lall, Suri, and Deichmann 2006; Henry-Lee 2005). The eviction of residents from low-income settlements occurs within a discourse that emphasizes formality as a necessary condition for urban "citizenship." The problem of low income (one dimension of poverty) is compounded by social exclusion based on residency in a particular neighborhood and accommodation in a particular type of dwelling.

The scale of such problems is immense. Looking first at Asia, in Bhopal,

reduced for at least some families. There have also been attempts to increase affordability by reducing housing and housing finance costs. In some cases, this

Unified Home Lending Programme (UHLP). . . . [T]he

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Unified Home Lending Programme (UHLP). . . . [T]he

only ever intended for limited groups of workers; government agencies offered directly built complete public housing units to these workers, often at a considerable price discount, with loans that were never repaid (Ogu and Ogbuozobe 2001, 477; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 107–11; Alder and Mutero 2007).

What is of particular note is that, even when some success has been achieved, little consideration has been given to those with the lowest incomes. In El

NEW STATE STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS HOUSING NEED

During the 1980s, the role of the state was reconceptualized. Both as a result of economic problems in some Southern countries, and under pressure from international development assistance agencies, structural adjustment programs were widely adopted. This shift was promoted in part by the fact that the kinds of problems faced by housing agencies were being widely replicated within other state agencies. Whatever the reasoning, stabilization and structural adjustment programs sought economic stability and the restruc-

It is perhaps surprising that despite this generalized shift away from state

> This came about as government planners realized that there is no way that government would be able to finance all the requirements in the housing sector, especially given the huge losses under the formula lending approach and the inappropriate incentives that misdirected housing subsidies could create.[5]

This approach is self-evidently close to the broader emphasis on neoliberal economic and political policies.

These attempts to improve the functioning of the mortgage market are oriented primarily towards those with formal sector employment who are able to afford complete housing units. For a number of reasons, including higher real incomes, a more efficient financial sector, and affordable construction techniques, more people can afford to make use of mortgage finance. Generally, there does appear to be more money for housing finance in most regions of the world, with the notable exception of sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). Although there have been initiatives in this region (e.g., Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria), they remain small in scale and relatively insignificant; in Kenya, for example, it is estimated that in 2004, the banks and mortgage institutions only offered nine thousand loans (UN-HABITAT 2005). However even in Asia and Latin America limited efforts have been made to reach the informal sector, such as in Mexico (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2004, 35), and the inability of lenders to deduct repayments directly from salaries

to the target group, it can be difficult for the lowest-income households to participate due to the need to accumulate savings. In relation to the building process, the scale of increased demand (through capital subsidies) has an

There has been some interest in investing in similar programs in Africa, although economic conditions there are less favorable.[6]

Shelter microfinance supports the incremental development process for households with reasonably secure land tenure. Most housing loans are between US$ 500 and US$ 5,000, repayable over one to eight years (CGAP 2004). Loans are generally taken to build additional rooms, to replace traditional building materials with concrete blocks and tiles, to otherwise improve roofs and floors, and to add kitchens and toilets. Lending for land purchase is very rare because of the high costs and other problems with individualized solutions to tenure and infrastructure needs; and also because some degree of land security is generally a prerequisite for such loans. Lending for service development is rare because it requires a collective loan.

The contribution of shelter microfinance to addressing housing needs is limited by the focus on those who are able to afford microfinance investments and who have reasonably secure tenure. However, its value remains significant, as it speeds up the improvement process thus enabling the consolidation of housing assets. In many cases, microfinance agencies provide loans on a commercial basis, demonstrating the potential for expanding financial services in this area. There are an increasing number of formal financial institutions interested in lending for shelter; for example, the Colombian Banco Davivienda (Forero 2004, 41) and ICICI in India (Satyanarayana 2007).

Neighborhood upgrading and the provision of serviced sites

The upgrading of existing low-income settlements that have insecure tenure and inadequate services is a well-established strategy for shelter improvements, and interest appears to be growing. For example, IDB has recently signalled interest in increasing support for neighborhood upgrading (Green and Rojas, forthcoming). Recent evidence of its growth in popularity is indicated in country reviews that identify emerging programs in the Philippines and Malawi and established programs in Central America (Llanto 2007; Gly a iM uec(i [(estab)1[[g)-2rl.n

Neighborhood upgrading requires building a relationship between low-income communities and the state. The state has to engage with low-income communities through issues related to both the legalization of land tenure and the regularization of plots, so that they comply with regulations and other legislation. The provision of subsidies (for infrastructure improvements and, sometimes, other investments) also requires involvement with the state to establish beneficiary rights and entitlements. The growth of participatory planning mechanisms has helped to consolidate positive relationships between the residents of low-income settlements and their local government. Neighborhood upgrading programs offer secure tenure, which encourages residents to upgrade their housing with greater confidence that they cannot be removed. Basic services are provided with the expectation that residents will be able to cover the costs of service delivery and that health standards will improve when water use increases and sanitation is provided. Programs have now become linked with microfinance for shelter to enable higher-income households to improve their dwellings at the same time as their neighborhoods are being upgraded.

One of the greatest advantages of such an approach is the minimal disruption to livelihoods and existing shelter investments. However, some of the most vulnerable settlements may not be entitled to support because it is not possible to upgrade them *in situ*, and relocation is required. Settlements with very high densities may also be difficult to upgrade in an inclusive fashion, and some relocation is likely to be required in order that all the residents are accommodated at legal densities without the expense of medium-rise buildings. The service charges from upgrading may be significant and may result in some of the 71 Td(165)Tj0 nd san(

cial mechanisms that enable collective investment in shelter improvement and they may support activities such as land purchase, land preparation, infrastructure installation, service provision, and housing construction, extension, and improvement. Their most distinguishing characteristic is the way in which funding is perceived. Community funds use savings and loans activities to trigger a development process—not simply to increase the access of the poor to financial markets. Through savings and loans activities they strengthen the social bonds between community members (building social capital), so that loans can be repaid and existing finance within the community can be used more effectively. The mechanism also enables other devel-

These emerge from common experiences and/or contextual factors that influence the direction of programs. In part, they exist as a result of underlying tensions, as formal state and development agency programs seek to support and hence "map" themselves onto the predominantly informal shelter strategies of

> Collective finance provides the mechanism to join people
> from all the different economic levels within the communi-
> ty, and can address the economic needs of all those members.
> A communal financial system can act as a buffer between the
> outside financial system (which is very stiff and accessible
> only to the better-off), and the internal, people-owned
> financial system (which is highly flexible, informal, commu-
> nal, and constantly making adjustments to accommodate the
> crises which are part of poverty). (Boonyabancha 2007, 2)

Money is typically a means of exclusion for the lowest-income households. It is the mechanism through which individuals and households are excluded from participating in a range of activities within capitalist economies, and this inability of low-income households to participate in financial processes limits other opportunities. In the area of shelter, low incomes mean that households cannot afford to live in formal settlements and thereby avoid the stigma associated with informal neighborhoods.

Several of these new programs seek to use finance as a means of inclusion, particularly the programming strategies of capital subsidies and community investment funds. In the case of some community funds, money is the mechanism around which residents organize. For example, the role of money within the *Baan Makong* program in Thailand is described above by Somsook Boonyabancha, the director of the program. In this case, savings is a means of drawing together members of the community so that they can develop collaborative relationships. Once communities come together, they can address some of the disadvantages they face, notably the high cost of individual shelter solutions and the need for state support. Organization around savings takes money, which is so often a means of exclusion, and makes it into something that holds communities together and enables them to negotiate with the state from a position of strength.

Finance is also a means of inclusion, albeit in a less powerful form, within capital housing subsidy programs. In this case, capital grants provide a means for low-income households to purchase housing that they would otherwise not be able to afford. The intention is that the state will provide an injection of assets that will provide improved access to shelter and catalyze a change in shelter opportunities. In this case, finance is not the means to negotiate for the transformation of relationships (as in the case with the savings groups referred

collective land purchase; plots may then be subdivided or may remain collectively owned. Dwelling units are generally individually owned under some legal agreement, with rights of transfer and sale. In the Philippines, the Community Mortgage Program is notable for its emphasis on providing land security to groups facing eviction; it is widely acknowledged to be the state program that reaches the poorest, has the lowest unit costs, and higher collection rates (Llanto 2007; Porio et al. 2004). In Thailand, India, South Africa, and Chile, collective options now form part of the state package of support provided to low-income citizens in need of shelter improvements. The interest of state programs in the collective approach reflects the value of having a local organization that is active in the management of finance and the acquisition of land and services. In addition to cost advantages, collective approaches offer opportunities to reduce individual risks and improve the available options through negotiation. In India, cross-subsidies between higher-income residential units and low-income groups have helped to secure affordable housing improvements (see, for example, the work of DAWN in Orissa). In Thailand, some communities have constructed a welfare house for the elderly or those in need of special assistance (Boonyabancha 2007). Collective development significantly reduces unit costs in infrastructure installation and housing development.

However, in the present context and despite the advantages, there is continual pressure to individualize collective housing options in the belief that the advantages associated with individualization outweigh the costs. In many cases, this is evidenced as a difference of interests, wherein higher-income residents are content to repay individual loans without having to address collective needs, while the lower-income groups, which require the additional flexibility and support of a group process, are unable to maintain the collective process although it is in their interest.

The limitations of private investment –
from private profit to public poverty

The final commonality is perhaps the least well established, but it remains distinct and deserves to be highlighted. The last two decades have emphasized the potential contribution of private finance to address shelter needs. This has been particularly strong in terms of the promotion of investment in public utilities. However, more recently, the importance of private finance being placed within an effective regulatory framework has become much more widely recognized, as have the public costs associated with unregulated pri-

CONCLUSION

Shelter remains a priority area for those concerned with addressing urban poverty. The scale of housing need is not disputed and the consequences of poor housing and inadequate access to basic services are widely recognized. At the same time, housing remains on the political agenda of many governments that are anxious to be seen to be doing something to address shelter needs. However, for many decades and despite state efforts, programs have been generally ineffectual in addressing housing need at the required scale. Rather, they have assisted small numbers of people with relatively expensive housing solutions.

A number of new approaches are now evident within the portfolio of housing programs being offered, while other programs represent more well-established strategies. The previous discussion showed how some governments are seeking to address housing need through encouraging measures to improve the affordability of mortgage finance. Conventional strategies to provide housing finance have been boosted (in some countries) by capital subsidies to help ensure affordability. Savings, subsidies, and loans have combined to enable the purchase of completed dwellings. However, in other towns and cities, incremental housing strategies predominate and the direction of programs has been to work within these constraints. Microfinance for shelter has grown very substantially in the last five years and many microfinance agencies have introduced, or are thinking about introducing, housing loan opportunities. Neighborhood upgrading programs for inadequately serviced and often run-down areas are being introduced. Community investment funds are providing new opportunities for collective organizations of low-income residents to address their housing needs with greater access to capital. In some contexts, affordable new neighborhoods are being developed, perhaps with a basic complete core unit and possibilities for further construction.

Also, as argued above, systemic failures have been analyzed by program designers and by critical development analysts. It has been widely recognized that housing interventions have failed to adequately reflect the strategies of low-income residents and their willingness to invest in shelter improvements, producing housing solutions that are ineffective. The failures of state housing policies have also been widely documented and discussed. In this context, a number of underlying directions within programs have been identified. Arguably, each direction or tendency reflects the struggle of government programs to be effective in securing a progressive transformation of

opportunities within the field of shelter. This list does not pretend to be complete but reflects some of the major issues that I have observed. Although it can be argued that there is some progress, there are also limitations and constraints. As a closing thought, there needs to be greater recognition of the need to address shortcomings in housing policy and programming. Paucity of income should no longer be a reason to exclude families from safe and secure housing; the lowest-income groups should no longer be ignored and marginalized; the effects of standards in creating illegality and compounding exclusion need to be addressed; collective decision making and implementation need to be developed to address shelter components that cannot effectively be realized individually; and the public nature of urban space within towns and cities has to be respected. The present generation of housing programs are tackling these issues and/or living with the consequences of failure. As suggested above, some limited progress is being achieved. To meet the housing needs of the twenty-first century, greater falize2nson pr

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both preventive and curative policies and programs is one of the main chal-
lenges for policy makers globally, in order to democratize the conditions of

It should also be mentioned that, especially in the context of countries where the urbanization process has already been consolidated, informal land development has involved not only the urban poor, but also other, more privileged social segments. Moreover, in these countries, the rates of informal development growth have been higher than the rates of poverty growth, thus indicating that there are other significant factors at play, beyond the traditional recourse to poverty growth as the sole cause of informality. In some cases, a true "informal development industry" has been identified, as several agents have indeed financially benefited from the phenomenon.

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES

Given the lack of acknowledgement of the phenomenon and its implications, most of the institutional responses so far have proved wanting, and there seems to be a growing, dangerous tolerance of the process of informal urban land development. In fact, institutional responses at all levels have not been adequate, generally having fundamental problems of scale and content. Important as they are, UN-HABITAT campaigns and the Millennium Development Goals, as well as existing national, regional, and/or local programs, have been only small drops of change in the vast ocean of informal land development. On the whole, governmental policies and programs have tended to be isolated, fragmented, sectoral, marginal, and seriously underfunded.

In this context, in which adequate responses are urgently necessary, policy makers and public administrators need not, and can no longer afford to, keep reinventing the wheel. Instead, they should learn from the experiences accumulated over about forty years of regularization programs, which already provide enough elements at least to indicate what should *not* be done. In particular, African, Asian, and transitional countries should look closely at Latin America, where the process of urban development has been consolidating for a while. However, even within the same financial institutions and development agencies, there is no organized know-how about dealing with the phenomenon and contradictory responses are often given. All such institutions and agencies need to take stock so as not to keep repeating the same mistakes.

Perhaps the main problem affecting the vast majority of regularization programs is that they have failed to directly confront the nature and causes of the phenomenon and, as a result, they have often generated further distortions in urban land and property markets. Such programs have not intervened in the land structure in a significant way, especially in that they have borne

little relation to other public policies concerning vacant land, underutilized properties, and public land. The programs have not been properly reconciled with the broader set of public land, urban, housing, and fiscal policies, and they have failed to reverse the long-standing, unequal spatial concentration of equipment and services. As such, these policies and programs have failed to break the vicious circle that has long produced informal land development and have failed to reconcile their declared objectives with the necessary processes, mechanisms, resources, and instruments. Very often, they have been the object of political manipulation.

After decades of public investment through regularization programs, there are no adequate assessments of their efficacy, because there are no clear indicators to be observed for that purpose. In any case, there are many elements indicating that there has been a significant waste of limited resources, and that the beneficiaries of the programs have not always been the urban poor living in regularized informal settlements. Among the many inevitable lessons that can be learned, it should be stressed that regularization programs necessarily take time, are complex—jumping stages not being an option—and are intrinsically costly. Indeed, it is easier and cheaper to prevent the process of informal land development from happening. It can also be said with certainty that, given the diversity of the existing situations, there are no automatic, magic, simplistic, or one-size-fits-all answers or solutions.

Given the scale of the problem, not to regularize informal settlements is no longer a valid policy. Moreover, given the lack of proper governmental

should informal settlements be regularized? what is regularization? and what are the objectives of the regularization programs? In this process, policy makers should take into account the need to reconcile the *scale* of intervention with the proposed technical *criteria*, the existing institutional *capacity* for action, the available financial *resources*, and the nature of the *rights* to be recognized to the occupiers.

When discussing why they need to formulate regularization programs, policy makers should determine the terms for the distribution of rights and responsibilities, onuses and obligations among all stakeholders, including the residents, who should participate in all stages of the process. A crucial aspect concerns the responsibility for financing the regularization programs; mechanisms such as planning gains, microcredit instruments, and others should be considered.

Regarding the conceptual definition of what regularization is, there is internationally a dispute of paradigms: whereas some programs have only proposed the upgrading of the informal areas, others have focused merely on the legalization of the areas and individual plots. Ideally, regularization programs should combine several dimensions so as to guarantee the sustainability of the public intervention: physical upgrading; legalization; socioeconomic programs aiming at generating income and jobs; and cultural programs to overcome the stigma strongly attached to the residents and to the informal areas.

When discussing the objectives of the programs, policy makers have commonly referred to the promotion of security of tenure and sociospatial integration as if they were the same thing, or as if one objective would necessarily and automatically follow the other. As many examples in several countries have clearly demonstrated, the recognition of individual security of tenure, if considered in isolation, can lead to the so-called "expulsion by the market" (or by other forces, such as speculators and drug dealers) and thus contribute to aggravating the conditions of sociospatial segregation; by the same token, it is possible to promote sociospatial integration without distributing titles. The challenge then is to conceive a legal-political formula that reconciles individual interests and rights with public interests and obligations, according to which individual security can be assured while at the same time affirming the collective interests to keep the communities in the upgraded and legalized areas; this would guarantee that the main beneficiaries of the public intervention will indeed be the urban poor.

THE MATTER OF LEGALIZATION

In this context, the question of the legalization of informal settlements becomes even more relevant—and complex. Legalization programs are certainly important,

but not for the reasons usually given. The existence of titles is not a requirement for the occupiers to invest in their informal houses and businesses; several studies have clearly shown that the existence of a solid perception of security, resulting from a sociopolitical pact in force, is sufficient for that purpose. Neither is there automatic access to credit resulting from legalization programs, as banks usually do not lend to the poor and do not accept their new titles as collateral; in fact, there are many official programs recognizing access to credit to buy building materials even without titles. Above all, it should be stressed that, although they have certainly improved the residents' living conditions, regularization programs have had no structural impact on social poverty. However, legalization programs are very important to provide protection against forced eviction; minimize civil law conflicts; promote some degree of economic realization of rights as well as of sociopolitical stability; allow for increased taxation; clarify legal (land) regimes and facilitate investments; and so on.[4]

Once again, the question then is *how* to legalize. Policy makers should take into account the three abovementioned questions ("why/what is/what for"), and think not only of the individual interests of the residents in informal settlements, but also of the general interests of the broader urban population. In this larger context, there is a wide range of legal-political options to be considered, individual freehold being one. Individual/collective freehold/leasehold, permits/licences/authorizations, social rental, and so forth—there are many possible choices, which of course will depend on the consideration of the existing realities in each given situation.[5] This is not to say that there is a "continuum of rights," as some rights are not intrinsically better than others—they are the best options only in a given context—and there is no automatic, incremental process leading from a more precarious form of occupation to a freehold title. Moreover, there are urban planning tools to be considered: the Brazilian experience demarcating Special Zones of Social Interest corresponding to areas occupied by the informal settlements has proved to be effective in terms of keeping land and property values low, thus making it possible for the original communities to stay on the legalized land.

Policy makers should not forget that the role and obligation of the state, as recognized in international documents and national laws, is to provide adequate social housing. This is by no means the same as recognizing ownership

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4. For a critical analysis of Hernando de Soto's ideas, see Fernandes (2002).
5. For a comparative study involving several different legal-political solutions, see Payne (2002).

titles, let alone individual titles; in fact, especially as regards settlements on public land, individual ownership may not always be the best option. Moreover, given the scale of the phenomenon of informal land development, there is no way it can be tackled only through the attribution of individual ownership titles, and collective legal solutions need to be considered.

CONCLUSION

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Urban Health:
An Inevitable International Imperative

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Victor K. Barbiero

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INTRODUCTION

The Renaissance in Europe and the industrial revolution in the United States both increased urban and peri-urban growth and influenced global economies and geopolitical power structures. Yet, urbanization enjoys only moderate traction in the global development arena, even though in 2008, over 50% of the world's population will live in urban or peri-urban areas (UNFPA 2007); and of those three-plus billion people, about 50% will be living in urban slums.

Urbanization entails a collision of forces that results in a new environment and requires a fresh look at development assistance in general, particularly in the health sector. This meeting of natural and manmade forces will shape the urban landscape of the future, creating an "urban crucible" that can facilitate or impede both general and health-specific development efforts. Defining the elements of urbanization, and its economic, social, political, demographic, environmental, epidemiologic, and biologic determinants, will enable planners to address better the formidable issues that will affect the success of developing nations throughout the twenty-first century.

WORLD POPULATION GROWTH

Almost all of the population growth worldwide will occur in developing regions (Figure 1). In fact, 97% of the increase in world population will come from developing countries. For example, even in the face of HIV/AIDS, Africa's population will triple before it starts to decline. In the mid-nineteenth century, world population growth was slow; births basically replaced deaths. With the advent of industrialization and advances in medicine and public health, death rates began to decline and more people survived to have children of their own. The widening gap between birth and death rates fueled population growth worldwide to an estimated 6.55 billion today (US Census Bureau 2006), and an expected 10 billion in the next century.

Most of the growth in developing countries will be in urban and/or peri-urban centers. Within those areas, much of the growth will be in urban

Second, age structures will begin to change, and more Africans will be in older segments of the population. Health care issues will likewise change and

demiologic transition is a shift from infectious diseases to chronic, noncommunicable diseases as the major causes of morbidity and mortality. In 1971, A. R. Omran (1971) eloquently defined three phases of the epidemiologic transition: the "age of pestilence and famine," the "age of receding pandemics," and the "age of degenerative and manmade diseases." Worldwide, chronic diseases cause about 60% of all deaths (Figure 3). The less developed and middle-income countries thus face a double burden because both infectious and chronic diseases will continue to cause significant mortality and morbidity; over the next twenty-five to fifty years this will overburden unprepared health systems. Nations in the North and South must collectively recognize this impending public health quagmire and begin new efforts to mitigate the adverse health impacts associated with the epidemiologic transition. Clearly the governments of the less developed countries cannot, and should not, bear the burden alone. A new paradigm of public-private partnership is in order. The two sectors should further define specific roles of government, nongovernmental/nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in the delivery of care and true partnerships should be nurtured and enabled.

Figure 3. Global Chronic Disease Profile

The Nutrition Transition
In October 2004, the BBC reported:

> Obesity rates are escalating everywhere. More than 300 million adults worldwide are overweight and most of them are suffering from weight-related illnesses like diabetes, heart disease and sleeping disorders. . . . The developed and developing world will not be able to cope with treating people with diseases linked to obesity. (Lichtarowicz 2004)

The demographic and epidemiologic transitions are pre- or at least co-factors in the nutrition transition (and links to the urban transition are also clear; see below). The twentieth century witnessed large shifts in dietary behavior, physical activity, food consumption, and the types of foods available. The consumption of saturated fats, sugar, and processed foods characterized the nutrition transition in wealthier countries; an increase in the body mass index of populations and consequent increases in overweight and obesity followed. Some countries, such as the United States, now have more than 30% of the adult population overweight (CDC 2007). Worldwide trends indicate that less developed countries are experiencing growing proportions of overweight and obesity as well. Higher rates of overweight are observed there in the upper socioeconomic tiers, but increasingly poorer populations are also at risk; the prevalence of overweight in children has increased in Brazil, China, and Zambia (Popkin and Gordon-Larsen 2004). The association of overweight and obesity with chronic disorders such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease is clear, and the urban environment is the nexus of these trends in developing countries, particularly among wealthier populations. Low- and middle-income countries present a direct relationship between socioeconomic status, overweight, and obesity. In some respects, rising affluence and industrialization in poor countries promotes poor nutrition. Once again, the urban environment is the springboard. Thus, planners must strive to address the nutrition transition in the twenty-first century and appropriately balance investments in under- and overnutrition in the future.

THE URBAN TRANSITION
Urban Growth
As noted above, about 50% of the world's population will live in urban and peri-urban areas by 2008 (Figure 4). By 2020, over 60% of the world will be

Figure 4. The Urban Transition

Figure 5. World Population and Urban Growth, 1950–2020

Figure 6. Top 11 Urban Populations - City Limits -

City	Population
Shanghai	14.6
Mumbai	12.7
Karachi	11.6
Buenos Aires	11.6
Delhi	10.9
Manila	10.5
Moscow	10.4
Seoul	10.4
São Paulo	10.2
Istanbul	9.8
Lagos	8.9

Figure 7. Selected Agglomerate Doubling Times From 2015

Bombay: 26.1 million; 2.4% - 2X = 29.2 yrs
Lagos: 23.2 million; 3.6% - 2X = 19.4 yrs
Dhaka: 21.1 million; 3.6% - 2X = 19.4 yrs
Karachi: 19.2 million; 3.2%- 2X = 21.9 yrs
Jakarta: 17.3 million; 3.0% - 2X = 23.3 yrs
Calcutta: 17.3 million; 1.9%- 2X = 36.8 yrs

as well as illnesses resulting from water shortages and inadequate sanitation. The urban environment will also contribute to infectious disease syndemicity. Syndemicity implies a synergistic effect of linked health problems that not only contributes to increased disease burdens, but also gives rise to a new set of challenges. These challenges may relate to drug resistance, such as extremely-drug-resistant tuberculosis resulting from the interface of HIV and TB, or more severe respiratory disease due to the combined effect of indoor air pollution and pneumococcal disease. In both these cases, as well as others, the urban crucible will contribute to the breadth of syndemic effects and compound disease burdens worldwide.

Urban social structures are also changing. The urban environment often magnifies poverty, disparity, and desperation and causes stress on families and psychosocial health in general. Mental health issues will likely expand in the future and become more evident. Out-of-school youth may give rise to a

generation of ill-educated and potentially violent adults. Gangs are beginning to replace families in larger South American cities, promoting expanded levels of gun, gender, and household violence. Behavioral norms are changing, for the worse in many respects.

Presently, noncommunicable diseases cause about 44% of the disease burden in low- and middle-income countries; by 2030, that proportion will increase to 54% (WHO 2005). There are a number of myths associated with chronic disease epidemiology and transmission: chronic diseases are not only diseases of the affluent and elderly; economic growth alone will not improve health conditions; and infectious disease models do not apply to chronic dis-

Lessons from the field

There are a number of lessons from the field that should be explored further and evaluated relative to their replication/application potential; for example, the role of multilateral drug companies in the control of neglected tropical diseases. BRAC (Building Resources Across Communities; formerly known as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) in health, the Grameen Bank in microfinancing (health), and the Public Health Foundation of India (Harvard University 2006) all promote public-private partnerships to address urban and rural health issues.

Linkage of major programs / economies of scale

Links should be forged with major health programs—such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and others dealing with maternal and child health/reproductive health/family planning, TB, and infectious diseases—to increase their impact. There are cross-cutting issues, such as communication, laboratory support, referral care, and NGO/private sector engagement, that can be maximized in the urban environment.

Mainstream urban health

The realities regarding urbanization relate to the "face of poverty." While pro-rich policies are issued from Washington to Mumbai, the poor suffer

Implement "demonstration" projects

Host governments and donors should design and implement "urban demonstration programs" in selected countries with appropriate resources and considerable support (i.e., up to ~$10M/yr/program). The programs should focus on specific vulnerabilities such as maternal and child health, the epidemiological transition, and salient policy priorities such as budget, equitable access, quality, and cost recovery. These programs should help enunciate an urban development "vision" that is anchored in better health, but transcends health to other sectors such as housing, governance, and infrastructure.

SUMMARY

The messages are exceedingly clear. Urbanization is inevitable and the demographic, epidemiological, and nutritional transitions are already underway. Billions of people will be negatively affected in the twenty-first century unless action is taken now. Urban population growth routinely exceeds rural growth in most countries and the majority of urban growth will be in slum and disadvantaged populations. Growth in small and medium-sized cities will outpace megalopolises, with growth rates higher than 3% and doubling times less than twenty-five years. If not addressed, multiple disease burdens will plague the poor and fuel disparity, discontent, and instability.

In order to meet future needs, the urban imperative and the window of opportunity associated with the epidemiologic transition must be recognized. Ominously, that window is rapidly closing. The world can ill-afford complacency, indecision, or neglect regarding urbanization and urban health. Development professionals, and particularly public health professionals, must embrace the vision of improved urban health before it is too late.

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IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: NEW

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of master planning and the nature of the impact it has had on these current urban conditions. The next part of the chapter examines some of the newer planning approaches and assesses their likely usefulness. The conclusion will give an indication of the qualities that new approaches to planning must have if they are to play any role in the emerging urban landscape.

THE NEW URBAN CONTEXT FOR PLANNING: HUMAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The 2003 UN report, *The Challenge of Slums* (UN-HABITAT 2003), as well as the

Compounding all of the above, this rapid urban growth is taking place in those parts of the world least able to cope: in terms of the ability of governments to provide urban infrastructure, in terms of the ability of urban residents to pay for such services, and in terms of coping with natural disasters. It is these parts of the world where the highest levels of poverty and unemployment are to be found. The inevitable result has been the rapid growth of urban "slums," referring to physically and environmentally unacceptable living conditions in informal settlements and in usually older inner-city and residential areas. The 2003 UN-HABITAT report claimed that 32% of the world's urban population (924 million people in 2001) currently lives in slums on extremely low incomes, and are directly affected by both environmental disasters and social crises. The fact that some of the most densely settled poorer parts of the world are also in coastal zones and will thus be subject to rise in sea level with climate change adds a further dimension to this.

The issue of urbanizing poverty is particularly severe in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, given that the bulk of urbanization is taking place under different global economic conditions than those that prevailed in Latin America and even in much of Asia. Here urbanization is occurring for the most part in the absence of industrialization and under much lower rates of economic growth: in effect urbanization has been decoupled from economic development. Urban growth rates are also more rapid here than elsewhere (1990–2000: Africa, 4.1%; Asia, 3.3%; Latin America, 2.3%; Roberts, 2006). But they are due primarily to natural increase rather than rural-urban migration: 75% of urban growth is from this source, compared to 50% in Asia in the 1980s (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004). The inevitable consequences have been that urban poverty and unemployment are extreme, living conditions are particularly bad, and survival is supported predominantly by the informal sector, which tends in many parts to be survivalist rather than entrepreneurial.

Within towns and cities, sociospatial change seems to have taken place primarily in the direction of the fragmentation, separation, and specialization of functions and uses, with labor market polarization (and hence income inequality) reflected in major differences between wealthier and poorer areas. Marcuse (2006) contrasts up-market gentrified and suburban areas with tenement zones, ethnic enclaves, and ghettos; and areas built for the advanced service and production sector and luxury retail and entertainment with older areas of declining industry, sweatshops, and informal businesses. Althouq1[pasts u0.0endi1i6 contragun

speculation, it is also a response to local policies that have attempted to position cities globally and attract new investment. "Competitive city" approaches to urban policy aim to attract global investment, tourists, and a residential elite through up-market property developments, waterfronts, convention centers, and the commodification of culture and heritage (Kipfer and Keil 2002). However, such policies have also had to suppress and contain the fallout from profit-driven development: surveillance of public spaces, policing and crime-prevention efforts, immigration control, and problems of social and spatial exclusion. Work by Caldiera (2000) in Brazil shows how fear has increased urban fragmentation as middle- and upper-income households segregate themselves into "gated" and high-security residential complexes.

In many poorer cities, spatial forms are largely driven by the efforts of low-income households to secure land that is affordable and in a reasonable location. This process is leading to entirely new urban (*ruralopolitan*) forms as the countryside itself begins to urbanize, as in vast stretches of rural India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Egypt, Rwanda, and many other poorer countries (see Qadeer 2004). As well, large cities spread out and incorporate nearby towns leading to continuous belts of settlement (such as the shantytown corridor from Abidjan to Ibadan, containing seventy million people and making up the urban agglomeration of Lagos [Davis 2004]), and as the poor seek a foothold in the areas primarily on the urban edge. It is these sprawling urban peripheries, almost entirely unserviced and unregulated, that make up the bulk of what is termed slum settlement, and it is in these areas that the most urban growth is taking place. These kinds of areas are impossibly costly to plan and service in the conventional way, given the form of settlement, and even if that capacity did exist, few could afford to pay for such services. In fact the attractiveness of these kinds of locations for poor households is that they can avoid the costs associated with formal and regulated systems of urban land and service delivery. Because of this, however, it is in these areas that environmental issues are particularly critical, both in terms of the natural hazards to which these settlements are exposed and the environmental damage that they cause.

These processes of urbanization and sociospatial change have been shaped by global forces that have had an impact on urban development everywhere. However, such change can never be attributed only to wider structural forces, since these forces articulate in various ways with local histories, cultures, and environmental contexts, resulting in highly differentiated patterns of urban development and change across the globe.

New economic processes have had a major impact on urban labor markets, which show a growing polarization of occupational and income structures (and hence growing income inequality) caused by growth in producer services and decline in manufacturing. Urban labor markets are also increasingly heterogeneous and volatile, and urban residents are disproportionately affected by international economic crises (National Research Council 2003, 7). The growth of informality, discussed above, has been one important outcome of these economic and policy processes. The concept is by no means new, yet there are strong indications that its nature has changed and its scale has increased over the last few decades. Researchers point to new processes of polarization within the informal economy, with informal entrepreneurs moving into sectors abandoned by the public and formal private sectors, but many as well swelling the ranks of "survivalist" activities.

In the realm of government, formal urban planning systems are typically located within the public sector with local government usually the most responsible tier. Within the last three or so decades, and closely linked to processes of globalization, there have been significant transformations in local government in many parts of the world, making them very different settings from those within which planning was originally conceived.

Since the late 1990s "good governance" has become the mantra for development in the South. These shifts have had profound implications for urban planning, which has often been cast as a relic of the old welfare-state model (in fact the emergence of planning can be closely linked to a Keynesian approach to development, which was state-led and strongly reinforced in Europe by the requirements of postwar reconstruction), and as an obstacle to economic development and market freedom. In a context in which the power of governments to direct urban development has diminished with the retreat of Keynesian economics, and in which the new central actors in urban development are real estate investors and developers, whose activities are often linked to economic boosterism, planning has found itself to be unpopular and marginalized. It has also found itself at the heart of contradictory pressures on local government to promote urban economic competitiveness on the one hand, while on the other dealing with the fallout from globalization in the form of growing social exclusion, poverty, unemployment, and rapid population growth, often in a context of unfunded mandates and severe local government capacity constraints (Beall 2002).

Generally urban planning is highly reliant on the existence of stable, effective, and accountable local government, as well as a strong civil society, in order to play a positive role. Significant parts of the global South simply do not have this (Devas 2001). Certainly the notion of a stable and homogeneous civil society with a common worldview, able to debate planning alternatives and reach sustained consensus, has been challenged more generally (Watson

tive state and Keynesian economics. Urban "visions" put forward by particular individuals (the "founding fathers" of planning) in the UK, Europe, and the United States in this early period were to shape the objectives and forms of planning, which in turn showed remarkable resilience throughout the twentieth century. Although there have been some shifts in approaches to planning in its regions of origin, in many other parts of the world imported planning approaches and systems have remained static or have changed very slowly. So while it has always been possible to question the appropriateness of "developed world" planning in countries of the global South, there is now often an extreme disjuncture between persisting traditional planning approaches and the very different and rapidly changing nature of cities and towns in these parts of the world.

Taylor (1998) identifies a number of essential components of planning in the early years. The first was that it was seen as an exercise in the physical layout and design of human settlements and hence, although it responded to social, economic, or political matters, it was not seen as the task of planning

A central argument here will be that in many parts of the world planning systems are in place that have been imposed or borrowed from elsewhere and in some cases these "foreign" ideas have not changed significantly since the time they were imported. Planning systems and urban forms are inevitably based on particular assumptions about the time and place for which they were designed, but these assumptions often do not hold in other parts of the world and thus

management, but also a source of state revenue and often a political tool to reward supporters. Frequently postcolonial political elites who promoted these tenure reforms were strongly supported in this by former colonial governments, foreign experts, and international policy agencies: in 1950 the UN passed a resolution on land reform contending that informal and customary land tenures inhibited economic growth. In Cameroon, for example, 1974 legislation required people to apply for a land certificate for private land ownership. The procedures were complex and expensive and seldom took less than seven years to complete. Few people applied, yet in 1989 the certificate became the only recognized proof of land ownership and all other customary or informal rights to land were nullified (Njoh 2003).

Notably, the most common criticism of master plans is that they bear so little relation to the reality of rapidly growing and poor cities, or are grounded in legislation that is so outdated that they are not implemented or are ignored (see Arimah and Adeagbo 2000). However, as long as the provisions are in

In brief, urban modernism involves all or some of the following:

• The prioritization of the aesthetic appearance of cities: modern cities are spacious, uncluttered, efficient, ordered, green, offer grand views (particularly of state and civic buildings), clean, and do not contain poor people or informal activities.

• High-rise buildings with low plot coverage and large setbacks, releasing large amounts of open "green" space between them, following the "superblock" concept.

• The dominance of free-flowing vehicular movement routes (rather than rail), the organization of traffic into a hierarchy of routes, and the separation of pedestrian routes from vehicle routes. High rates of car ownership are assumed.

• Routes, particularly higher order ones, are wide with large road reserves and setbacks (for future expansion), have limited intersections with lower order routes and limited or no access to functions located along them.

• The separation of land use functions (using zoning) into areas for residence, community facility, commerce, retail, and industry. Shopping occurs in malls surrounded by parking. It is assumed that people travel from home to work, shops, and so on, by car.

• The spatial organization of these different functional areas into separate "cells," taking access off higher-order movement routes, and often surrounded by "buffers" of open green space.

• Different residential densities for different income groups, often organized into "neighborhood units"; for wealthier families, low densities, usually organized as one house per plot, provided with full infrastructural services.

The most obvious problem with urban modernism is that it completely fails to accommodate the way of life of the majority of inhabitants in rapidly growing and largely poor and informal cities, and thus directly contributes to social and spatial marginalization. One kind of response, as in Brasília and

Chandigarh, has been that an informal city has been excluded from the formal city, and has simply grown up beside and beyond it. In other cities the informal has occupied the formal city: informal vendors operate from the sidewalks and medians of grand boulevards, and informal shelters occupy the green open spaces between tower blocks; in Dar es Salaam the main road reserves have been turned into huge linear markets, and in Lagos the freeways carry informal retailers, pedestrians, buses, and so on.

Both these kinds of "occupation" are problematic. In many cities, modernization projects involved the demolition of mixed-use, older, historic areas that were well suited to the accommodation of a largely poor and relatively immobile population. These projects displaced small shopkeepers and working-class households, usually to unfavorable peripheral locations, but as importantly, they represented a permanent reallocation of highly accessible and desirable urban land to large-scale, formal manufacturers and government. Where attempts to reoccupy these desirable areas by informal traders and settlers has occurred, their presence is sometimes tolerated, sometimes dependent on complex systems of bribes and corrupt deals, and sometimes met with official force and eviction. This hardly provides a good business environment for small entrepreneurs.

But other aspects of urban modernist planning similarly reinforce spatial and social exclusion and inequality. Thus cities planned on the assumption that the majority of residents will travel by car become highly unequal. Those who have a car have high levels of mobility and accessibility, while those who do not—the majority in cities of the South—often find themselves trapped in peripheral settlements, unable to access public facilities and work opportunities. The modernist city is usually spread out due to low-built density developments and green buffers or

The strategic spatial planning system contains a "forward," long range, spatial plan that consists of frameworks and principles and broad and conceptual spatial ideas, rather than detailed spatial design (although it may set the framework for detailed local plans and projects). The plan does not address every part of a city—being strategic means focussing on only those aspects or areas that are important to overall plan objectives. Albrechts (2001) frames these general planning goals, in Western Europe, as sustainable development and spatial quality. The spatial plan is linked to a planning scheme or ordinance specifying land uses and development norms to indicate restrictions that apply to development rights. Decisions on changes in land use must be guided by the plan. The spatial plan also provides guidance for urban projects (state or partnership led), which in the context of Europe are often "brownfield" urban regeneration projects and/or infrastructural (particularly transport or communications) projects. Significantly, though, strategic spatial planning is a process: it does not carry with it a predetermined urban form or set of values. It could just as easily deliver gated communities, suburbia, or new urbanism, depend-

planning in Europe may be seen as an ideal but it is not easy to put into practice, and there have been criticisms that in many cities economic positioning is taking precedence over addressing issues of sociospatial exclusion. There have been criticisms, as well, of planning through shared governance arrangements: Bulkleley and Kern (2006) argue that it weakens government's ability to implement local climate protection policies and Swyngedouw (2005) that it allows business interests to have undue influence on urban development.

Western European strategic spatial planning has emerged in a particular context characterized by strong, well-resourced and capacitated governments (together with the EU and its policy and funding directives) with a strong tax base, in stable social democracies, where control through land use management systems (of all urban and rural land) is still a central element in the planning system, made possible through state control over how development rights are used. Cities are growing slowly, and while poverty and inequality are increasing, the majority are well-off and can meet their own basic urban needs. It would be problematic, therefore, to imagine that the planning problems of the cities of the South could be solved simply by importing European strategic spatial planning.

Nonetheless, a number of Latin American countries have adopted strategic spatial planning, with many attempts seemingly "borrowed" from the European experience through the involvement of the city of Barcelona, the Institute for Housing and Urban Development in Rotterdam, and other think tanks. Steinberg (2005) notes the danger that a strategic planning process adopted by a city administration is often dropped when a new political party or mayor comes into power, because to continue it might be seen as giving credibility to a political opposition. The fact that a plan can be dropped, however, also suggests that neither business nor civil society sees it as sufficiently valuable to demand its continuation. The Bolivian approach, of introducing a national law (Law of the Municipalities 1999) requiring all municipalities to draw up an urban plan based on the strategic participatory method, is one way of dealing with this, but does not prevent the content of the plan from changing with administrations.

Steinberg (2005) concludes that success depends on political will, participation, technical capacity, and the institutionalization of plan management. The social and political processes of debating and agreeing on a plan are as important as the plan itself. The very different approach required by strategic planning inevitably encounters opposition: from politicians and officials who use closed processes of decision making and budgeting to insert their own projects and further their own political interests, and from planners who may

be reluctant to abandon their comfortable role as "grand classical planners" and become more communicators and facilitators.

European strategic spatial planning: the Barcelona model

This particular approach to strategic spatial planning has claimed significant success in the context of Barcelona (Spain), but Borja and Castells (1997) argue that it could be a more general remedy for urban restructuring, particularly in Latin America. In Barcelona (Marshall 2000) it is seen as an architect-led urban design approach, coordinated by politicians and delivering compact urbanism

2006 UN-HABITAT disengaged from the program and transferred the work to local anchor institutions (UN-HABITAT 2005).

In common with other recent and innovative ideas in planning, and particularly with the "urban management" approach, the UMP attempted to shift the concept of planning and development to the whole of local government rather than having it belong to one department. It attempted to promote participatory processes in local government decision making (the city consultation), to encourage strategic thinking in planning, and to tie local government plans to implementation through action plans and budgets. The more recent concept of the City Development Strategy (CDS), promoted particularly by Cities Alliance, encourages local governments to produce intersectoral and long-range visions and plans for cities. One of the longest and deepest involvements of the UMP has been with Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, but the final plan emerging from this process has still not been approved.

Comments on the success rate of this program have been mixed. Although some argue that it has made a major difference in terms of how local governments see their role, and the role of planning, others have been more critical. One of the originators of the program (Michael Cohen, former chief of the Urban Development Division of the World Bank) concluded that it had not had a major impact on the process of urbanization in developing countries (UN-HABITAT 2005, 5). Coordinator of the program, Dinesh Mehta, noted that the city consultations had aimed to change the way local government did business, but this did not always happen. Ambitious plans often had no investment follow-up to make sure that they happened (ibid., 6) and the weakness of municipal finance systems, a prerequisite for implementation, has been a major stumbling block.

Werna (1995) notes that persistent urban problems should not be seen as due to the failure of the UMP, but rather due to the ongoing globalization of the economy, which has weakened nation-states and increased income inequalities

Allen (2003) argues that it is not possible to extrapolate the planning approaches and tools applied in either urban or rural areas to the peri-urban interface: they require different planning approaches specific to these conditions. Drawing on research by the Development Planning Unit of University College London, she advocates a combination of methods usually associated with urban, rural, and regional planning. Allen calls for a strategic environmental planning and management approach, working incrementally from subregional to community levels to manage their articulation at different stages of the process. At the community level, other work (Kyessi 2005) has shown the value of an incremental approach to service provision using community-based and informal service providers, managed by local committees, with technical advice from city administrations. Research focussing on alternative land delivery systems is also of particular importance in interface areas.

A second specific concern has to do with planning for environmental risks and hazards. Pelling's (2005) report to UN-HABITAT shows that urban growth is accompanied by an increased incidence of natural disasters and risks, with the poor urban populations most vulnerable. Too often, disasters are managed as exceptional events, seen as happening outside of the mainstream concerns of urban planning. This has led to a responsive mode of disaster management relying on humanitarian aid, with the consequence that disaster risk continues to rise in cities around the world.

Pelling argues that the urban planning system is a central tool for dealing with hazards and risks, but this is not yet widely recognized. He suggests that there are three interrelated areas where urban planning policy and practice can contribute to the reduction of losses to disaster: identifying risk, risk reduction, and disaster response and recovery. Identification of risk involves hazard, vulnerability, and risk mapping as a component of everyday urban planning, and is already taking place in many cities. It is immediately useful for land-use planning, construction, insurance, and housing and land mar-

tion the cadastral system needs to be put in place usually in advance of national land and planning policy and urban plans (which take much longer to develop), although these systems should provide the broader goals that inform the cadastral system.

It is therefore important, argue Augustinus and Barry (2004), that the process of defining the cadastre is designed to cope with a highly fluid and changing situation as well as one where claims to land are largely informal. This means that the first step is to adjudicate local land claims through community-based processes. Then, instead of moving directly to a (Torrens) title system, a deeds system is retained, as the deed is an affirmation of land rights but does not constitute them, as does a title. This approach could have wider relevance.

CONCLUSION

The context within which urban planning operates today is very different from what it was when planning emerged as a profession and function of government during the last century. Yet in a surprising number of countries planning systems have changed little from these early models. This is cause for serious concern, given the unprecedented nature and scale of the problems that are facing human settlements across the globe. There is now widespread recognition of the intractable problems of poverty, inequality, and environmental damage that are facing cities (particularly, but not only, southern cities) on a scale not experienced before, and in a context where the capacity to deal with these issues, either by government or civil society, is weak.

But while "old style" master planning was subject to a growing critique in parts of the global North, with arguments that it should be replaced with more flexible and inclusive structure, strategic, and growth-management planning, master planning has persisted to a remarkable degree in many parts of the world. And even where the nature of these forward plans has changed, the basic principles of the regulatory planning system tend to remain. What needs to be recognized is that planning systems can be a "two-edged sword" that can potentially be used to achieve good, but can just as easily be used in ways that are regressive and oppressive: to promote vested interests and political, class, racial, or ethnic domination. In less democratic and less politically stable countries, in particular, master planning has proved to be useful tool for political and economic elites to gain power and profit, and if necessary to deal with opponents through the intermittent enforcement of restrictive planning laws.

It is perhaps for these reasons that a review of innovative planning systems across the globe shows positive experiments with forward planning systems

approaches to land regularization and tenure. Although there is consensus that urban tenure security is vital, research is beginning to show the value of working with informal arrangements (see Rakodi 2002) that are actually operating, even if not perfectly, and have wider social support.[7] Research in

an acknowledgement of the importance of rights to access urban opportunities—that is, spatial justice. It is important that an agreed set of norms that should inform all planning is recognized and enshrined in law. It also needs to be recognized that doing this is only a starting point, and that these norms will have to be backed up in local regulatory and governmental practices.

Finally, it is important to recognize that there are no universal models or "rule books" to define a good planning system. In fact many past problems in planning systems can be attributed to the imposition of foreign models, usually from the global North, on other contexts with very different sociocultural and spatial traditions (see Mabogunge 2004). It is essential for the practice of planning to become institutionally embedded for it to be taken seriously, and imposed systems are unlikely to be able to do this. This holds as well for the nature of urban reform that is produced through the planning system. There also needs to be recognition that many of the crises that are currently facing urban settlements are of a nature and scale that have not been experienced before. The peri-urban interface, densifying rural areas, cities that are largely informal, and issues of environmental hazard and climate change, along with unprecedented poverty and inequality and weak governments, are only now being properly understood. Ways to address these issues are being dealt with experimentally in some parts of the world, but there are no ready-made solutions that can be applied.

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International Assistance for Cities in Developing Countries: Do We Still Need It?

Richard Stren

In the fall of 2006, I had a rare opportunity. I attended a closed meeting of the major partners making up the Cities Alliance, and was able to listen to their discussion—among themselves—of the question: What can we do to enhance agency support for urban assistance in our countries and programs? At this meeting were most of the bilateral partners of the Cities Alliance (such as USAID, SIDA, CIDA, GTZ, DFID), as well as the World Bank,

before looking more positively at the factors that ought to support, or even enhance, urban lending in the immediate future.

What about the proportions of urban populations that are poor? Again, solid statistics are few and far between. But the UN-HABITAT table cited

between the national government and the people in the capital city (a disconnect that was mirrored in the voting patterns in the second largest city, Bulawayo) seems to have been the decision of the Zimbabwe government to move massively against informal sector housing and trading in a military-style "Operation Restore Order" that eventually resulted in the displacement of at least 700,000 people in 2005 (UN-HABITAT 2005).

This pattern of greater support for opposition parties in the major cities was reflective of similar tendencies elsewhere in Africa. Urban areas have often been seen as sources of disloyal opposition to regimes that are used to the traditional vote control systems they have been able to operate in more socially and economically homogeneous rural areas. That this system has roots going back to the colonial period has been very effectively demonstrated by Mahmood Mamdani (1996). Mamdani's brilliant account shows how, during the colonial period, rural populations were governed through decentralized,

in the form of large projects will enhance the integrity of their group and their professional point of view. One of the key reflections of where support is available is the theme of each year's World Development Report (WDR). The 2008 WDR, which was released in October 2007, has as its title, *Agriculture for Development.* The launching of this document undoubtedly strengthened the position of the rural development group in the Bank when a press release from the office of the Bank's president noted that "growth originating in agriculture is four times more effective at raising the incomes of the extreme poor than growth in other sectors" (World Bank 2007b, 5). In this particular WDR, all eleven chapters deal in one way or another with agricultural development (World Bank 2007a). By contrast, in the last WDR in which urban development was a prominent feature – the 1999/2000 report entitled *Entering the 21st Century*—only two of eight chapters ("Dynamic Cities as Engines of Growth" and "Making Cities Livable") dealt specifically with urban issues (World Bank 2000). These symbolic markers are important because of the considerable effort the Bank puts into producing the yearly WDRs, and because of the current leadership role of the Bank among all other multilateral and bilateral agencies in the West. By far the largest of the development assistance agencies with approximately 12,500 full-time staff, the World Bank's professional ranks include between 200 and 225 individuals who consider themselves part of what is called the "urban family" (personal communication to author, 2006). Over the last decade or so, the Bank has been lending over $2 billion per year in combined urban development, urban water, and urban transport projects (World Bank 2000, 122–23; personal communications). Fortunately for the "urban family" (which some insiders see as "on the decline"), the WDR for 2009 has been designated as "Spatial Disparities and Development Policy." Three major chapters (out of ten) have been set aside for urban issues, but this is unlikely to dispel the impression that "urban" is declining on the Bank's agenda.

Many New Claims for Development Assistance. A fourth important factor that must be considered in this litany of possible explanations for a

on the alleviation of climate change, the worldwide scourge of HIV/AIDS, famines, child labor, or violence against women somehow advance propositions that reflect a high moral imperative because they are issues virtually involving life or death for millions of extremely vulnerable people. And most of the potential targets of this assistance live in the very poorest countries. Promoting a traditional urban development approach (which may involve, for example, the very important objectives of slum upgrading, capacity building for newly democratized municipal governments, support for participatory planning initiatives, and assisting the establishment of improved local financial tools) lacks a powerful moral edge. International NGOs, many of them

Emphasizing the goal of improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020 appears tangible, but at the same time, very distant and even imprecise. What and how much is required for "improvement," for example? And, given the massive size of the world's slum population—estimated quite carefully by UN-HABITAT to be 924 million in 2001 (UN-HABITAT 2003, 14)—how substantial is the overall effect of simply "improving" the lives of 100 million slum dwellers, if not even removing that number of slums in absolute numbers? We may express even more skepticism over the goal established in 2000 when it was pointed out, again by UN-HABITAT, that by 2005 there were 998 million slum dwellers

have difficulty competing in a conceptual universe that is underpinned by notions of absolute rights, personal liberties, and environmental crisis. This is not a comment on the validity or importance of the goal of improving cities in the developing world; this objective is still valid after many years. But ideas change; old projects and programmatic approaches (no matter how successful) are regularly avoided by career assistance officers because they need to identify with new, more current initiatives in order to establish their bona fides, so that competing approaches and perspectives eventually emerge.

Why one idea supplants another is a mysterious process, but "an idea whose time has come" under the right conditions, can replace old ideas at the top of the political agenda (Kingdon 1995). Just as easily, however, ideas can be negatively "framed" in such a way that they lose favor among voting publics (or competing ideas gain favor), even though the problems they represent have not been solved or even in any way reduced. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, for example, the challenge of the cities held a privileged position on the American political agenda. After that, while the plight of the cities did not change, the issue was pushed off the agenda amidst partisan rancor and the defining of urban issues as essentially "local" problems (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, ch. 7). In the policy literature in the social sciences, arriving on the political agenda is an important key to achieving the major objectives of any policy. But political competition requires new ideas. Issues, just like equities in the stock market, do not hold their position indefinitely.

A BRIEF RETROSPECTIVE

In spite of its current stagnation and even decline, international development assistance for urban problems has enjoyed some real successes in the past. These historical successes should not be forgotten, even as we focus on the future. The following discussion will list some of the highlights of the overseas assistance experience, but it is by no means comprehensive.

Perhaps the first, and most important insight about urban development in the global South came through a Western architect, John Turner, although his observations were based on experiences and discussions with Peruvian colleagues. Turner's insight was that poor people living in so-called "slums" were in fact building for their own needs much more effectively than the government and public agencies that were clearing the slums and constructing large, centrally controlled public housing estates (Turner 1976). Turner's perspective, which had first been expressed in the late 1960s, along with the

analysis of the value of the "informal sector" developed by Keith Hart (1973) and by the ILO (1972), resulted in an approach to housing for the poor that stressed self-help building and the value of the small-scale local economy. This was epitomized by the "sites and services" model of housing development, whereby—at least in principle—local governments would lay out plots, community services, and infrastructure for low-income people, and they in turn would construct their own houses and develop their own local economies. Instead of being "marginal" to urban society, the poor were central to its proper functioning (Perlman 1976).

A second insight, which was promoted and pursued in the 1980s and 1990s, was that assistance should focus on the development of national policies which, in turn, would be applied appropriately at local levels according to the context (Buckley and Kalarickal 2006). This period represents the re-emergence of the local in urban development. These national policies—sometimes brought together in the "urban management" approach to the improvement of local services (Davey 1996)—included improving urban public finance, and improving the delivery of local services. Both were absolutely central requirements for local governments that were struggling with problems of limited local funding sources and weak human resource capacities. The 1980s and 1990s also saw the emergence of movements of democratization and decentralization, which in turn focused more attention on the institutionalization of city governments and on their ability to plan for their citizens. Support by the major assistance agencies (such as DFID,

A more extensive table, which uses a different data set that includes twenty-one cities and national urban systems in developing and transitional countries, was prepared by Freire and Polèse. The results are based on somewhat older data than that in Table 2 above, but the indicators are similar. Ratios of the GNP of the cities to the percnsiToe of the national population they represent are all considerably higher than 1:1. As the authors conclude, "there is something in the very nature of urban agglomerations that contributes positively to higher incomes" (Freire and Polèse 2003, 6). It follows that any support (through overseas investment, technical assistance, or training) that helps these cities will also lead eventually to collective benefits for the recipient nation. And the poorest countries, whose planning and technical capacities are the lowest, generally need outside support the most. The poorest countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are almost always the countries with the lowest levels of urbanization and the fastest rates of urban growth (Cohen 2004).

Networked Development. The well-known sociologist Manuel Castells has argued that we are living in a globalizing, information Toe, for which "dominant functions and processes . . . are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture" (Castells 1996, 469). Whether we are talking about "global cities" at the very apex of the international financial and political system (Sassen 2001); "world cities" as leading nodes in the economic hierarchy, spread throughout the world's major regions (Friedmann 1995); or just "ordinary cities" (Robinson 2006), all can benefit from better information Tbout what other cities are doing to solve similar problems and meet similar challenges. Cities—whether rich or poor—are connected by membership in both national networks of local authorities and international networks and organizations.

A recnsi reflection on the importance that networks have assumed in international urban assistance is by Akin Mabogunje, writing about the Urban ManToement Programme (UMP). Mabogunje, one of Africa's premier geographers, and a member of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States, was a key adviser to the UMP during the 1990s when it opened regional offices in Abidjan, Cairo, Bangkok, and Quito. His observations about the success of this initiative are worth quoting at some length:

I believe there can be no better testimony to the legacy of the Programme than first, the existence in each region today of a very active constituency of stakeholders in the urban management field comprising the regional networks of institu-

example is France, where the organization Cités Unies France was created, in 1975, out of the World Federation of Twin Cities, which itself was started in 1957. With a well-organized structure, a very informative web page (http://www.cites-unies-france.org/html/home/index.html), and a wide range of planned activities, Cités Unies France has a membership of five hundred local authorities at all levels of the French decentralized structure, and a network of some two thousand cities in France and in developing countries that are regularly connected with each other. Both France and the European Union provide overseas funding for city-to-city collaboration. In the case of France, funding comes both from the local authorities themselves—some of which are very wealthy—as well as from the overseas agencies of the government. An important policy statement by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled "Governance Strategy for French Development Assistance" indicates the importance of working with local authorities on overseas projects. The document points to "decentralized cooperation" as an example of working with "new partners," and to the "dynamic created by the Decentralized Cooperation Programme . . . to develop exchanges with local governments . . . through the various representative bodies in existence" (France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, 19).

In France, Cités Unies is very proactive. When local authorities show interest in working with overseas local partners, Cités Unies France helps them with information pertaining to the country in which they are proposing to work, case studies of other partnerships, and information on training and capacity-building "tools" they have developed. It also maintains regular contacts with major French government agencies and overseas NGOs that would be germane to the overseas projects they are contemplating. On the recipient side, there is often a well-oiled NGO, supported by French and European Union funding, or funding from the active local governments from the North working in a particular country. In Niger, for example, ANIYA is the local NGO that helps coordinate decentralized cooperation programs with France. In May 2007, ANIYA claimed there were twenty French local governments (including both communes and regional governments) connecting through functioning programs with thirty-four Nigerien communes. ANIYA's work—financially supported by the Nigerien government, the French communal assembly of Faucigny-Glières, the participating communes in Niger, and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs—began in earnest in 2001, just as Niger was developing its new program of decentralization. There are regular meet-

ings in Niger and France. A brochure on their web site, which shows a group

important vehicle for valuing the city and supporting public commitment to the urban reality. A country such as Brazil, where local research and writ-

another, and they can support regular meetings (such as Africities, which is held every two years in some African city) where initial contacts are made and potential exchange of information can be initiated. A good example of a well-functioning southern network is the Shack/Slum Dwellers' International (SDI), which was formed by six national federations of slum dwellers in 1996 as a network through which they could learn from each other and collaborate to make their work more effective. As the process developed, "city governments and some national governments have become interested in supporting these community-driven approaches, recognizing their potential contribution to poverty reduction and urban development" (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2007, 489–90). By 2006 the network of federations had grown from six to fifteen, with a small staff in South Africa for coordination, and regular (mainly bilateral) meetings between federations (ibid., 492). Support has come from a number of northern donor agencies.

Supporting these South-South networks not only steers local officials and policy makers away from the more traditional circuits of visiting, say, London, Paris, or Barcelona—where the model of urban development may be questionable in terms of the real potential in a poor third world city or town—but also encourages and implicitly underpins the idea that what works locally is often the most appropriate approach.

Continue to focus on pro-poor policies. Much of what overseas assistance agencies are doing is both admirable and important. Among the most important policy thrusts in recent years has been the promotion of so-called "pro-poor" policies in southern countries. A key message from a comparative study of ten cities in the South is that "the well-being of the urban poor can be improved by access to economic opportunities, supporting social networks, and greater access to assets (notably land), infrastructure and services" (Devas et al. 2002, 3). It is important for outside agencies to continue to promote policies that can help the poor, since—as we already know from many studies of urban politics in the North—local regimes, even when they are democratically elected on a regular basis, can easily get shunted onto a development path that privileges wealth, large-scale development, and big business. In the process, their policies and programs can marginalize the very large segment of the population that is poor and often getting even poorer. But support from the outside for policies and projects that can help the poor must be nuanced, based on very solid information about local societies, collaborative with local stakeholders, consistent and reliable.

Act as responsible local stakeholders. If, as many overseas agencies argue, local development needs to be transparent, accountable, and free of any suggestion of corruption (see Tannerfeldt and Ljung 2006), external assistance must also be transparent, accountable in some reasonable fashion to local stakeholders, sustainable over time, and open to reasonable discussion. External agencies have become, themselves, very powerful local stakeholders in an important process of political and economic change. They should consider this role seriously, particularly in countries (such as Bangladesh, Niger, Kenya, Uganda, Philippines, Guatemala, among others) where the actions—combined or otherwise—of the external assistance community can have a major impact on local development. Among other things, this responsible role means that donors should stick with local programs until there is general agreement that they should be discontinued; and they should work closely as a group so that, as much as possible, their messages and the reporting requirements for their projects are "harmonized" on the ground, following the recommendations of the OECD declaration.

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VICTOR BARBIERO joined the George Washington University (GWU) School of Public Health and Health Services (SPHHS) in December 2005 as a Visiting Associate Professor of Global Health in the Department of Global Health. In addition to his full-time Associate Professor duties, he also serves as Director of Student Programs. He was awarded the SPHHS's Excellence in Teaching Award for Undergraduates in 2006 and 2007. In April 2006 Dr. Barbiero was invited by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) to serve as a Senior Advisor in Global Health. Prior to joining GWU and the WWICS, Dr. Barbiero was a Foreign Service Officer with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for 21 years and had the honor to serve with USAID in Washington, East Africa and India. Dr. Barbiero served as the Chief of the Implementation Support Division in the Office of HIV/AIDS, Global Bureau for Health, USAID/Washington from 2003–2005. He was the Director of the Population, Health and Nutrition Office at USAID/India from August 1999 through July 2003. From July 1996 through July 1999, he was Chief of the Child Survival Division in the Office of Health, Global Bureau for Health, USAID/W. He served in Ethiopia as the Director of the Population, Health and Nutrition (PHN) Office from 1992–1996 and as the Deputy Chief of PHN in the

ANNE LINE DALSGAARD is Associate Professor of Anthropology at University of Aarhus, Denmark. She holds a PhD in anthropology from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark (2000). In her present position she is the responsible organizer of a masters program for medical anthropology.

Dalsgaard´s research focuses on gender, body and political economy. She has done field research in Denmark and Brazil on maternity, birth and sterilization. Her book *Matters of Life and Longing: Female Sterilisation in Northeast Brazil* (2004) is based on eleven months ethnographic fieldwork in a low-income neighborhood on the outskirts of the city Recife, Northeast Brazil. Having lived in the neighborhood as a wife and a mother of two children, Dalsgaard describes women's motives for accepting and often actively seeking sterilization. The book received an Honourable Mention from the Society of Medical Anthropology, AAA, in 2004. It will be published in Brazil this year by the Editora UNESP, São Paulo.

Her present research is part of the project Youth and the City: Skills, Knowledge and Social Reproduction, which is a collaborative, interdisciplinary and comparative project led by Professor Karen Tranberg Hansen, Northwestern University. Dalsgaard has been responsible for the Brazilian case study and has worked in close contact with anthropologists from the Federal University of Pernambuco in Recife. With her collaborators she has written conference papers and a few articles from this work. The chapter "Dominant Categories, Uncertain Lives: The Meaning of Youth in Recife" for the book *Urban Lives/Global Exposures* edited by Professor Hansen is also a result of this collaboration. Dalsgaard continues to write on youth in Recife.

DIANE DAVIS holds a PhD in Political Sociology. At MIT she is professor of Urban Studies and Planning; associate dean, School of Architecture and Planning, and head, International Development Group (IDG) group. Her research and teaching interests include the politics of urban policy, cities in comparative and historical perspective, and the relationship between cities and national development. Dr. Davis' current research, initially supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, examines the relationship between police impunity, deteriorating rule of law, and changing patterns and priorities of urban governance in countries undergoing transition. This year Davis is working with a group of IDRP students and SPURS fellows who are interested in cities in conflict, defined as locales where war, ongoing violence, and other political upheavals fundamentally alter the conditions and structures of

urban governance. Davis is also coordinating "A Vision for a Place of Peace: Jerusalem, 2050," a project jointly sponsored by DUSP and MIT's Center for International Studies.

Book publications include:

Illegal Cities - Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries (1998), *The Challenge of Environmental Management in Urban Areas* (1999), and *Geoforum Urban Brazil Special Issue* (2001); and editor of *Environmental Strategies for Sustainable Development in Urban Areas: Lessons from Africa and Latin America* (1998).

ALLISON GARLAND is Project Associate for the Comparative Urban Studies Project. She received her M.A. in international affairs from Johns Hopkins University, School for Advanced International Studies, and a B.A. in political science from Wellesley College. She is co-editor of *Preparing for the Urban Future* (1996), *Argentina: The Challenges of Modernization* (1998), and *Social Development in Latin America* (2000). She has conducted research and prepared publications for the U.S. Department of State Office of Research, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Her research interests focus on social policy, urban development and citizen security in Latin America.

KAREN TRANBERG HANSEN is Professor of Anthropology at Northwestern University. Of Danish background, she completed her *Magisterkonferens* in ethnography at Aarhus University (1973) and a PhD in cultural anthropology from the University of Washington in Seattle (1979). She taught in the Department of Afro-American and African Studies at the University of Minnesota from 1979 to 1982 when she moved to Northwestern University's anthropology department.

Professor Hansen is an urban and economic anthropologist. Her research focuses on the material, social, and cultural dimensions of urban livelihoods in the context of historical, regional, and global dynamics. These interests were shaped in her early work in Lusaka and are demonstrated in publications on gender and household dynamics, sexuality, the informal economy of work and housing, and the cultural dynamics of the secondhand clothing trade. Her books include: *Distant Companions: Servants and Employers in Zambia 1900-1985* (Cornell 1989), *Keeping House in Lusaka* (Columbia 1997), the edited book *African Encounters with Domesticity* (Rutgers 1992) and co-edited book (with Mariken Vaa), *Reconsidering Informality: Perspectives from Urban Africa* (Nordic Africa Institute (2004). Her most recent book *Salaula: The World of Secondhand Clothing and Zambia* (Chicago, 2000) received the Anthony Leeds Prize in Urban Anthropology in 2001 and the Society of Economic Anthropology book prize in 2003. Her growing interest in ques-

tions about the dressed body culminated in an article in the 2004 issue of the *Annual Reviews of Anthropology*, entitled "The World in Dress: Anthropological Perspectives on Clothing, Fashion, and Culture."

Her ongoing research comprises a collaborative, interdisciplinary, multi-site,

the effects of migration and aid on Western Tanzania and refugee assistance strategies in western C

Marcotullio on *Scaling Urban Environmental Challenges: From the Local to the Global and Back* (2007) and a chapter co-authored with David Satterthwaite on "Providing Clean Water and Sanitation" in *State of the World 2007* (2007).

DIANA MITLIN is an economist and social development specialist and works both at the International Institute for Environment and Development and the Institute for Development Policy and Management (University of Manchester). Her major focus is on issues of urban poverty reduction, in particular in the area of secure tenure, basic services and housing. She has written extensively on shelter financing strategies for low-income households and the interface between poverty reduction and shelter provision. For the last ten years, she has worked closely with Shack/Slum Dwellers International, a transnational network of homeless and landless people's federations and support NGOs. Recent publications include *Empowering Squatter Citizen* (with D. Satterthwaite, 2004) and *Confronting the Crisis in Urban Poverty* (with L. Stevens and S. Coupe, 2006).

BLAIR A. **RUBLE** is currently Director of the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow

Toronto. Since the 1960s he has carried out research in a number of cities in East, West and South Africa. During the 1980s he was the coordinator of a major comparative project to study the crisis in urban infrastructure in Africa, and during the 1990s he coordinated a world-wide network of researchers looking at policy questions and urban governance. He has been a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (in 2000–2001), and he was the co-chair of the Panel on Urban Population Dynamics of the National Academy of Sciences (1999–2003). He is currently the Chair of HS-Net, the

VANESSA WATSON is professor in the School of Architecture, Planning and Geomatics at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. She holds degrees from the Universities of Natal, Cape Town and the Architectural Association of London, and a PhD from the University of Witwatersrand.

She is the author/co-author of seven books, forty journal articles and numerous chapters and published conference papers in the field of planning. Her particular areas of focus are planning theory, the institutional context of planning and large-city planning. She has a particular interest in developing perspectives on planning from the global South. She is an editor of the journal *Planning Theory* (UK) and on the editorial board of *Planning Practice and Research* (UK). She is co-ordinator of the Association of African Planning Schools and represents them on the Global Planning Education Association Network, which she chairs.