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## **1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy**

**THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT  
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**CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN, Series Editor**

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**#22 Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-77”**

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China.



Communist Party in February 1956.<sup>10</sup> An important factor that has been neglected, however, is that after the de-Stalinization campaign begun at the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress and the uprisings that fall in Poland and Hungary, Chinese leaders came to realize that Moscow's earlier relations with other countries in the Socialist camp, especially with

alliances in the modern period, though it had wished to conclude alliances at several points. Consequently, the only basis the PRC leadership had for dealing with the complicated situations that arose in the Sino-Soviet alliance was their experience with inter-party relations in the international communist movement, “fellow traveler” relationships in the international united front, and inter-state relations in a general sense. In contrast, the Soviet Union had a rich experience with alliances, and knew very well that to sustain an alliance it was sometimes necessary to chastise allies. Of course, such chastisement might damage or devastate an alliance if not exercised properly.

The Sino-Soviet alliance, and more broadly the Sino-Soviet relationship, had seen the cornerstone of Chinese foreign relations in the 1950s. As later events demonstrated, once such a cornerstone was shaken, Chinese foreign relations and domestic politics became unstable. However, because the hostility between the two states after the Sino-Soviet split was so intense, scholars within China have long underestimated the importance of the alliance for Chinese foreign policy. Beijing might not have anticipated the extent to which the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance would impact China. The PRC leadership did not clearly define the guidelines for managing the Sino-Soviet relationship after the deterioration of the alliance, and neither did their Soviet counterparts. It is thus not surprising that Beijing’s goals were not accomplished. It is then worthwhile to explore more deeply how Chinese leaders dealt with the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship and how they understood the alliance relationship.



communes in Poland was an indirect attack on China's People's Commune Movement, Mao Zedong made up his mind to break publicly with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's speech, which was published in the *Neibu cankao* (*Internal References*) for CCP leaders, was in Mao's eyes equivalent to hitting a person when he was down. It also dangerously echoed Peng Dehuai's criticism of Mao's policies. Mao therefore promptly ordered the party to begin a counter-strike against the "opposition and suspicious factions" of the Soviet Union at the earliest in the autumn of 1959 and no later than the spring of 1960. He even considered publishing Khrushchev's "anti-communes" speech in the *People's Daily*.<sup>14</sup> This final step was not implemented, however, after other party leaders disagreed with the idea.

Sino-Soviet alliance.

Meanwhile, the border conflict with India intensified. Following Indian encroachments on Chinese territory, the two countries engaged in a brief military conflict at La

Committee members convened several meetings, confirming the spirit of the January Meeting, and discussing concrete forms for its implementation. Guided by this new principle, pragmatism reemerged in Chinese diplomacy.

First, in terms of Sino-Soviet relations, the leadership was determined not only to avoid a split, but also to strive to “reach unity based on new foundations,” even “to make [reach] unity with him [Khrushchev] and not split shamelessly.”<sup>22</sup> This is why even after several months of quarrels with the Soviet Union, including the poignant clash at the Romanian Workers Party Congress in Bucharest in June 1960 and the withdrawal of all Soviet experts from China, the Chinese still reached an understanding with their Soviet ally at the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist and Workers’ Parties in December 1960, where they agreed “to confer together on anything that may come up so as to avoid conflict.”<sup>23</sup> Bilateral relations further improved after Chairman Liu Shaoqi made a follow-up state visit to the Soviet Union. By 1961 Moscow had again decided to transfer to China advanced military technology, such as equipment for producing the MiG 21 fighter jets.<sup>24</sup>

One of the key adjustments in Chinese foreign policy was the effort to defuse tensions along the Sino-Indian border. With the rebellion in Tibet and the rise of border skirmishes, Sino-Indian relations had deteriorated dramatically during 1959. Indian policy, Chinese leaders believed, had severely weakened China’s security and that New Delhi was using the border conflicts to coordinate its policy with the West’s “anti-China tide.” Operating under these assumptions, Beijing decided to strike back firmly. However, after August border clash, the PRC leadership did not want its relations with India to deteriorate further, nor did it allow the Sino-Indian border conflict to become the focal point of the policy agenda. The Politburo decided on 8 September to try to resolve the conflict through negotiation.<sup>25</sup>

Two days before the 8 September Politburo meeting, Beijing briefed Moscow on

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 241.

<sup>23</sup> “*huigu yu siR.0014 Tw 9 0 0 115.700bid.*,”



the Sino-Indian border conflict. However, the day after the Politburo meeting, the Soviet news agency TASS issued a statement declaring that Moscow did not approve of the Beijing's policy. Chinese leaders were startled by this action and concluded that it was an effort by Moscow to "present Eisenhower a gift" and "to please American imperialism."<sup>26</sup> As a result, Mao Zedong decided to stop public discussion of the border issues with India, and directed the media to cease any related reports.<sup>27</sup>

At its meeting in January 1960, the Standing Committee of the Politburo adopted guidelines for the peaceful resolution of the dispute with India and proposed that the PRC reach a compromise through "mutual understanding and mutual concession" (*huliang hurang*). The Politburo also decided that Zhou Enlai would visit New Delhi to negotiate in person.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile, Chinese troops stationed along the Sino-Indian border were ordered to adopt policies designed to avoid armed clashes, such as not opening fire, patrolling, hunting, military exercises, and explosions or chasing rebels within twenty kilometers of the effective line of control on the Chinese side.<sup>29</sup>

In preparation for the visit to India, Zhou Enlai worked out *The Proposal Concerning the Border Issue Meeting between the Premiers of China and India (Draft)*. Zhou anticipated that the visit to India would not solve the problems completely, but that the negotiations would not break down. The most likely result would be a limited agreement of some kind. Zhou suggested that the PRC try to defuse the tensions while not being afraid of a delayed resolution. China, Zhou continued, should also set as the goal of the visit to further ease bilateral relations and prepare the conditions for continued meetings and a peaceful resolution of the border issues in the future.<sup>30</sup> Other party leaders agreed with Zhou Enlai's suggestions. His visit to India 19 to 26 April proved that Beijing's assessments were basically correct. Sino-Indian relations temporarily improved, and the tension along the border eased.

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<sup>26</sup> "sugong lindao tong women fenqi de youlai yu fazhan" (The Origins and Development of the Differences between the Soviet Leaders and Us), September 6, 1963, in *Guanyu gongchan zhuyi yundong zongluxian de lunzhan* (The Polemics Concerning the General Guidelines of the International Communist Movement), Beijing: *Renmin chubanshe*, 1965, p. 71.

<sup>27</sup> *Shinian lunzhan* (A Decade of Polemics), Vol. 1, p. 215.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 248.

<sup>29</sup> Lei Yingfu and Chen Xianyi. *Tongshuaibu canmou de zhuihuai* (The Reminiscence of a Staff Memb

Resolving the Sino-Indian border issue and improving relations with India were arguably among the government's top priorities,<sup>31</sup> but Beijing also sought to resolve border issues with other neighboring countries. At the same meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee in January 1960, the leadership thoroughly discussed the border issues with all neighboring countries. Probably influenced by the progress made in the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Indian border negotiations, the Politburo established as a guideline to resolve border issues through step-by-step negotiations, as quickly as possible. The rough order was to try to resolve the Sino-Indian border issues first, then turn to North Korea and Mongolia as quickly as possible, and subsequently accelerate the pace in resolving border issues with Burma, Nepal, and Laos. Because of Vietnam's war with America, the issues regarding its border would temporarily be set aside. China's longest border was with the Soviet Union, and the problems there were very complicated, yet, Beijing was still determined to try to resolve them.<sup>32</sup>

Although the border dispute with India was not resolved, China basically accomplished the rest of the plan outlined at the Standing Committee meeting in January 1960. The PRC signed border agreements with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Mongolia, and North Korea. One could argue that a smooth conclusion of the the Sino-Soviet border negotiations, which began only after 1964, might have been reached in 1960 had Sino-Soviet polemics not sabotaged the process.

With regard to Indochina, as tensions with Moscow escalated, Beijing faced two problems: whether to support the armed struggle in South Vietnam and how to solve the Laos crisis. By 1959-1960, Chinese leaders were more preoccupied with the Laotian crisis than with the situation in Vietnam. Yet, under the pressure of the dramatic changes in the situation in South Vietnam in 1959 and 1960, the leaders of the Vietnam Worker's Party (the VWP) began to change the strategy of strengthening communist construction in the North and striving for peaceful unification they had adopted after the 1954 Geneva Conference.<sup>33</sup> Instead, a policy of strengthening the

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<sup>31</sup> Because of Zhou's visit to India, Chinese leaders even postponed the border negotiations with Mongolia. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

armed struggle for the liberation of the South was adopted at the Third National Congress of the VWP in September 1960.<sup>34</sup>

The VWP's change of policy and the development of the liberation war in South Vietnam confronted China with a very complex situation. In 1958 the PRC clearly declared that the VWP should regard as its prime task the consolidation and construction of the North, and adopt in the South "a guideline of long-term lying in wait, accumulation of strength, contacting the masses, and waiting for an opportunity [to strike]."<sup>35</sup> By 1960, however, China had to make a choice between the contradictory goals of maintaining peace in Indochina and preventing large-scale American military intervention on the one hand, and supporting a traditional ally on the other. The Chinese reactions to the Vietnam situation unfolded gradually.

First, the situation in South Vietnam was not a top priority of PRC foreign policy. The situation in Laos was a more direct and serious menace to China. Since North Vietnam was a buffer, the limited US intervention in South Vietnam did not constitute a direct threat to China. Second, VWP policy was developing gradually, and at least in 1960 did not cause a dramatic change in the situation in South Vietnam. Third, China had to keep its Indochina policy in line with its overall foreign policy.

The above factors explain Beijing's reserved attitude toward the question of whether North Vietnam should launch an armed struggle. On the one hand, China promptly expressed its support of the VWP's effort to strengthen armed struggle in the South. *The People's Daily* released an editorial during the Third National Congress of the VWP publicly endorsing the VWP's policy of supporting armed struggle in the South.<sup>36</sup> China immediately lent recognition and support when the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (the NLF) was established in December 1960.

On the other hand, the PRC did not want the leaders of the VWP to rule out completely the option of a political resolution. Beijing also did not want to escalate the

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(Beijing: shijiezhishi chubanshe, 1993): 66-75.

<sup>34</sup> On the changes in the VWP policy, see Shi Hongyin, *ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Guo Ming, ed., *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian shinia* (A Decade of Change in Sino-Vietnamese Policy), *Guangxi renmin chubanshe*, 1992, pp. 66-67.

<sup>36</sup> "Yuanan gemin he jianshe de xin lichengbei" (The New Milestone of the Revolution and Development of Vietnam), *The People's Daily*, 12 September 1960.

war in South Vietnam to such an extent as to invite a large-scale American military intervention. Beijing stressed Hanoi, again and again, to that it “must liberate the South,” but must also pay attention to the tactics of its struggle, noting the difference between rural and urban areas. The Vietnamese should adopt a “flexible strategy,” and “combine political struggles with military struggles.”<sup>37</sup> Until mid 1961 China continued to declare publicly that it supported Vietnam’s struggle to “strive for the peaceful unification of the motherland” according to the Geneva agreements.<sup>38</sup> Those public declarations should not be considered as part of a propaganda campaign. Indeed, they indicated that Beijing did not want the VWP completely to give up efforts to strive for peaceful unification.

China’s persisten

United States as escalating its intervention in Indochina, they still made an effort to break the stalemate in Sino-American relations. Although such an effort was a very limited probe, it could, in a sense, demonstrate Beijing's determination to adjust its foreign policy.

At the Standing Committee meeting of the CCP Politburo in January 1960, the leadership also outlined its guideline for handling Sino-American relations as "to talk but not in haste, to talk but not break off." In other words, Beijing wanted to continue to negotiate with the Americans and not to break off the talks, but also not establish a diplomatic relationship with the US too hastily.<sup>40</sup> Under such a guideline, Chinese policy toward the US showed increase

introducing issues regarding the Sino-Soviet split. Since Zhou Enlai showed an in-depth knowledge of the China policy of the Kennedy Administration, it is likely that his conversation with Snow was carefully prepared and purposeful.<sup>44</sup> Four days later, Mao Zedong again received Snow and discussed with him the Kennedy/Nixon presidential debates. Mao told Snow exp



production greatly exceed the state's plan, but also agricultural production, after successfully combating record natural disasters, achieved a harvest larger than that of



adjustments were needed

the New Year editorial that appeared in the *People's Daily* in 1961 was low-key, a rare occurrence since 1949. It included more analyses of the domestic situation and was more pragmatic. The editorial admitted “a poor harvest in agriculture in the past two years,” and that “neither the agricultural production plan, nor the production plan for light industry, whose supply of materials depend on agriculture, has been accomplished” in 1960.<sup>57</sup> One of the consequences of the serious recession in the domestic economy was that foreign policy was placed under more pressure for further adjustment.

First, the economic recession had at a deeper level changed the dynamics of the adjustment in Chinese foreign policy. The adjustment in foreign policy in the early 1960s, as shown above, was based on the leadership's confidence in achieving the goals of the Great Leap Forward, and was aimed at creating a favorable international condition for this domestic policy. The economic recession after 1960, however, proved that the initial impetus for the adjustment in foreign policy was unfounded. Consequently, the adjustment was altered to create conditions for solving economic difficulties and helping overcome the catastrophic consequences of the Great Leap Forward.

Second, the difficulties brought by the economic recession created more pressure to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy. China's foreign trade was harmed by the shortcomings in the production plans for agriculture and light industry. The PRC had to ask the Soviet Union and some East European countries to postpone loan payments due in 1960. It also had to reduce the scale of imports and exports with those countries, and receive economic aid from the Soviet Union.<sup>58</sup> Under such conditions, China had to try to stabilize rather than exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations, and therefore had to make compromises.

In addition, two years of poor harvests forced the Chinese government to import foodstuffs from non-Soviet bloc countries. In August 1960 Beijing proposed “Three

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<sup>57</sup> Editorial, “*Tuanjie zhiyi, yikao qunzhong, zhengqu shijie heping he guonei shehuizhuyi jianshe de xin shengli*” (To Unite Together, Rely on the Masses, and Strive for a New Victory of World Peace and Domestic Socialist Development), *the People's Daily*, 1 January 1961.

<sup>58</sup> Liu Xiao, *Chushi sulian banian* (Eight Years of Diplomatic Mission in the Soviet Union) (Beijing: *zhonggong dangshi chubanshe*, 1986: 105; *Zhou Enlai nianpu*, Vol. 2. p. 394.

Principles for Trade” gradually to resume Sino-Japanese trade, which had been interrupted in 1958. A civil trade agreement was signed in November and trade between China and Japan was gradually resumed in 1961.<sup>59</sup> Chinese leaders were even considering signing an agreement to import foodstuffs from the United States.<sup>60</sup> These developments inescapably impacted PRC foreign policy. For instance, when the economy sank into recession, and Beijing’s ability to pay off foreign debts was impaired, the PRC had to reduce its foreign aid, which was mostly aimed at supporting world revolution. This curtailment of support for revolution then had an indirect impact on policy toward the West.

The economic situation became grim at the end of 1961. Output from heavy foreign (59)TjETEMC

affairs and brief each other regularly. Some

Marxist-Leninist theory. To achieve such a victory, Mao argued that the CCP leaders should also understand what was Marxism, and what was revisionism.<sup>65</sup> China's restraint in its ideological disputes with the Soviet Union was manifested only either in not specifically mentioning the Soviet Communist Party (e.g. in the three articles commemorating the 100th anniversary of the birth of Lenin in the spring of 1960) or through indirect criticism (e.g., the assessment of the 20<sup>th</sup> Soviet Communist Party Congress in the *Moscow Declaration* in 1960). Given these constraints, China could not possibly end the ideological dispute with the Soviet Union.

Beijing and Moscow also disagreed over the Soviet dispute with Albania in the spring of 1961. Some suggested that China be cautious in the Soviet-Albanian dispute so as to avoid severely damaging the Sino-Soviet relationship.<sup>66</sup> The issue nevertheless sparked a further deterioration of relations with Moscow. Chinese leaders sharply criticized the way the Soviet Union treated Albania, asserting that it did not display "a sober attitude of Marxism and Leninism."<sup>67</sup> The Sino-Soviet controversy over Albania quickly intensified during the 22<sup>nd</sup> Soviet Communist Party Congress in mid-October 1960, when Chinese leaders disagreed with Khrushchev's policies over issues such as Stalin and peaceful co-existence, and believed that the attacks on Albania by the Soviet leaders were actually aimed at a denunciation of China.<sup>68</sup>

More seriously, about sixty thousand Chinese residents in the Yili region of Xinjiang Province crossed the border and fled into Soviet territory in the spring and summer of 1962. No evidence has emerged that Soviet leaders directly orchestrated this incident. It is possible that the incident was related to the deterioration of Sino/Soviet relations after the 22<sup>nd</sup> Soviet Communist Party Congress.<sup>69</sup> Regardless of the origins of the incident, one of its consequences was increased tension across the

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<sup>65</sup> *Shinian lunzhan*, Vol.1, pp. 241-43.

<sup>66</sup> *Chushi sulian banian*, pp. 115-16.

<sup>67</sup> "Zhou Enlai tongzhi zai sugong ershierda daibiao dahui shang de jianghua" (Comrade Zhou Enlai's Talk at the 22<sup>nd</sup> Soviet Union Communist Party Congress), *the People's Daily*

Sino-Soviet border. China thus again faced pressure to adjust its policy toward the Soviet Union.

Another important factor was the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. China's primary strategic goal was to prevent large-scale military intervention by the Americans and to maintain regional stability. Support for revolutionary movements in the region would be constrained by this goal.

The intensification of the US military intervention made the Chinese leaders feel severely threatened on their southern border. The PRC publicly stated in early 1962 that the American military operations in South Vietnam constituted a threat to Chinese security, and that the American intervention was “directly targeted against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and indirectly targeted against China.”<sup>72</sup> Chinese leaders believed that only through increasing assistance to North Vietnam could the American military intervention be defeated.<sup>73</sup> In May 1962, the Kennedy Administration announced that ground troops and air forces would be stationed in Thailand. Upon seeing U.S. troops enter a neighboring country, the Chinese government immediately responded with a tough statement publicly calling on other countries to “evict the American aggressors out of Southeast Asia.”<sup>74</sup> Shortly afterwards, China decided to offer North Vietnam, at no charge, military equipment for 230 infantry battalions.

It stands to reason that American intervention in the region made China’s strengthening of its aid to Vietnam an irreversible tendency, and the deeper the U.S. intervened, the more China would aid North Vietnam. Chinese foreign aid at the time was following the principle of “to do according to one’s abilities.” However, it became more and more difficult to apply this principle to Vietnam.<sup>75</sup>

PRC strategy was to cooperate with the Soviet Union in order to solve the Laos issue by political means, prevent direct American military intervention in the regions bordering on China, increase support of the military struggles in South Vietnam, and to defeat the Americans’ “special war.” While these efforts were gradually strengthened, the leadership had to face two questions. First, would the military struggle in South Vietnam elicit larger scale American military intervention, and even lead to a situation

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<sup>72</sup> “Waijiabu guanyu meiguo dui yuenan nanfang jiajin wuzhuangganshe de shengmin,” (The Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concerning the Intensifying American Military Intervention in South Vietnam) 24 February 1962, in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji (1962)* (The Collection of Documents of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China), Vol. 9, p,

similar to the Korean War? In other words, would American troops cross the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel and force China to enter the war directly? Second, at a time when China's economy was experiencing a severe recession, could or should it bear such a heavy burden of foreign aid, which was growing heavier every day?

Another factor was the ongoing crisis on the Sino-Indian border. The border had been quiet after Zhou Enlai's visit to India in April 1960. Since April 1961, however, the Indian government had launched a so-called forward policy, initiating large-scale military encroachments on Chinese border territories at the end of the year. In response, the PRC sharpened its denunciation of India. Chinese media charged that the purpose of India's provoking the border disputes was to act in concert with the "anti-China tide" raised by the U.S. *The People's Daily* even publicly criticiz



soldiers. Mao Zedong suggested in September 1959 that Indian and Chinese troops should each retreat 20 kilometers so as to disengage the troops of the other side. The unilateral retreat of Chinese troops took place to some extent because Chinese leaders believed that military conflicts would be difficult to avoid if the troops of both sides were not quarantined.<sup>79</sup> So long as India would not give up its demand for Chinese territory and tried to resort to force, the Chinese military, especially the border troops, would certainly request a military counterstrike. Chinese decision-makers had to face pressure from within to launch military operations, and had to decide whether or not to resort to force.

Besides the tension along the borders with the Soviet Union, Indochina, and India, problems were also mounting on China's southeast coast. The CCP leadership believed that the Jiang Jieshi regime in Taiwan will attempt to take advantage of the economic recession on the mainland to launch military

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certain “foreign policy route,” which was probably the main reason why Mao Zedong later sharply criticized his views. To Mao, a concrete policy may be discussed, but the fundamental theoretical concept should never be questioned. The second part included issues at two levels. At the first were the fundamental principles of foreign policy strategy, and at the second were the principles dealing with some concrete issues. In hindsight, it is evident that the policies the Chinese leaders adopted before the summer of 1962 were in accordance with the strategic principles laid out by Wang Jiaxiang. Some of his suggestions for dealing with certain concrete issues, however, became impractical as the situation changed. For example, Wang Jiaxiang suggested that new methods be employed to break through the impasse over the Sino-Indian border conflict. However, Chinese leaders were forced to dispel the Indian troops by force. Other suggestions were never discarded, such as Wang’s argument that a “Korean style war” should be avoided in the Indochina region. Indeed Chinese leaders tried their best in that respect.<sup>85</sup>

Both the talks by Liu Shaoqi and the suggestions of Wang Jiaxiang stemmed from common domestic and international backgrounds. They shared the same principle, which is to argue for a more pragmatic and stable foreign policy, creating a favorable international environment for solving China’s economic difficulties. The deteriorating international situation hindered the ability of Chinese leaders to implement some of those policies and even forced them to adopt decisive methods, including the use of force.

The situation along China’s periphery was deteriorating at the time, creating unfavorable conditions for an adjustment in the direction of pragmatism and stability. In addition, although some of Wang’s suggestions were reasonable, they proved impractical in the dramatically changed domestic and international environments. The deterioration of the situation along the borders was not severe enough to compel the Chinese leadership to fundamentally change the foreign policy that they had first implemented in early 1960, and that Wang Jiaxiang had further advocated and

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<sup>85</sup> On Wang Jiaxiang’s suggestions on the concrete issues, see *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu* (The Real Record of the History of the People’s Republic of China), Vol. 2 (Beijing: *shijie zhishi chubanshe*, 1998): 247-48.

developed in early 1962. Those border incidents were not the main causes that forced Mao Zedong to shift foreign policy.

In June 1962, the Kennedy Administration, through the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, indicated to the Chinese side that the U.S. did not intend to support the Taiwan government in attempting to invade the mainland.<sup>86</sup> Without support from the U.S., Taipei's military actions could only be very limited. The Yili Incident in Xinjiang was mainly resolved through diplomatic channels, and at least before November of that year, did not lead to a dramatic deterioration of the situation along the border with the Soviet Union, nor was it a major factor for the later deterioration in relations between the two countries.<sup>87</sup>

Chinese leaders came to acknowledge that besides the provocations from the Soviet side, certain policies of China should be reviewed and improved.<sup>88</sup> Generally speaking, the American military intervention in Indochina was seen as an indirect threat to Chinese security, though it became much more severe later. In July 1962 China and the U.S. even reached an agreement.

argument for a change in the relatively pragmatic foreign policy since 1960 more easily supportable. Of course, the deteriorating international environment might have also influenced Mao Zedong's psychological state. In the poems he published in 1961, we can still see a self-confidence, as manifested in well-known verses such as "There are infinite sceneries on the perilous peak" (*wuxian fengguang zai xianfeng*), and "As the time comes when the azaleas are blossoming on the mountain, she smiles in the flowering shrubs" (*daidao shanhua lanlan shi, ta zai congzhong xiao*).<sup>90</sup> The poems from the end of 1962, on the other hand, perhaps reflected his rage at the pressures caused by the deteriorating international environment, as shown in famous works such as "Seven-Tone—The Winter Cloud" (*qily—dongyun*)<sup>2657</sup> and "The Coldness All over the River—A Reply to Comrade Guo Moruo" (*manjianghong—he Guo Moruo to*<sup>3858309637.04012 0M7.03</sup>

that the policy adjustments after the Seven-Thousand-Man Meeting were intended to solve the problem of economic recession. However, their scope was not limited to the economic arena, but extended into some sensitive political arenas such as the democratic system within the party, the policy with regard to cadres, the policy with regard to intellectuals, and the policy of culture and education. The implementation of new policies in those arenas clearly improved the political atmosphere in the whole society. In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that recognition and criticism of previous mistakes would become much deeper and sharper. Wang Jiaxiang's suggestions on foreign policy were part of this criticism. Some officials, especially high-ranking ones such as Marshall Peng Dehuai, who had suffered blows in party struggles because they voiced different opinions, surely wished to make an appeal on their own behalf.

The Great Leap Forward originated with economic issues and then impacted a variety of arenas. As the Great Leap Forward

line for criticism of the Great Leap Forward. Mao made clear that no criticism was allowed to cross that bottom line; in this context, the political counterstrikes Mao launched after August 1962 are better explained. It is evident that Mao believed that criticism of the Great Leap Forward within the party had already crossed the line and must therefore be thoroughly corrected.

The CCP Central Committee convened a working meeting in Beidaihe on 6 August 1962 in preparation for further discussion of economic issues. However, Mao overthrew the scheduled agenda, suggested that the class struggle issue during the socialist period be discussed, and vehemently attacked those opinions that denounced the Great Leap Forward. At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Mao further developed his argument, describing renunciation of the Great Leap Forward as *san feng* (Three Winds): “*hei’an feng*” (the dark wind), “*dan gan feng*

reports of Wang Jiaxiang. We must ask, therefore, what were the concrete factors that led Mao to criticise the views of Wang Jiaxiang.<sup>98</sup> The historical documents that have been disclosed thus far show that what caused Mao to link the suggestions by Wang Jiaxiang with the so-called “three winds” was the remark by Foreign Minister Chen Yi at the Southeast China Group meeting on September 14. Chen Yi commented that now there was a puff of wind that could be called “*sanmian he yimian shao*” (three-side kindness and one-side fewness). This comment was probably the earliest version of the later phrase “three kindnesses and one fewness.” Chen Yi argued that it was inevitable to have struggles with the U.S., the Soviet Union, and India; “political cost/benefit calculation” must be done, and more support must be given to the national liberation movement. It was evident that Mao Zedong liked Chen Yi’s remarks; he commented that the briefing was “worth reading, very good.”<sup>99</sup> Afterwards the “three kindnesses and one fewness,” like the “three winds,” began to be listed as an object for criticism. It was quite probable, however, that Chen Yi, like many other Chinese leaders, might not have understood the ultimate purpose of Mao’s criticizing the “three winds” and the possible consequences it might bring. In his remarks, Chen Yi still approved the foreign policy followed since 1960 in general, arguing, “It was very necessary” to have struggles, on the one hand, and that “the struggles be well-managed and restrained,” on the other.<sup>100</sup> The key, however, was the phrase “a puff of wind.” The phrase might have been dropped by the speaker unintentionally, but picked up by the listener carefully. Mao Zedong’s praise of the opposition to the so-called “three kindnesses and one fewness” was linked to the opposition to the “three winds,” which to Mao was not an issue concerning merely a concrete policy, but rather of fundamental thought, that is, what purpose foreign policy should serve. In that lay the crucial point and the severity of the problem.

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<sup>98</sup> On the descriptions and remarks on this incident, see Zhu Zhongli, “*suwei de ‘san he yi shao,’ ‘san xiang yi xmie’ wenti de zhenxiang*” (The Truth of the So-called “Three Kindnesses and One Fewness” and “Three Capitulations and One Extinction”), in *Dang de wenxian* (The Documents of the Party), No. 5, 1993; *Mao Zedong yu Mosike de enenyuanyuan*, p. 474; “*Nanneng de tansuo, kegui de nuli*,” p. 181; “*Biandong zhong de zuoji guanxi yu zhongguo duimwi zhengce*,” p. 191; “*60 niandai zhongguo guonei jushi de bianhua yu zhongmei guanxi*,” pp. 274-76.

<sup>99</sup> *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol. 10, pp. 188-89.

<sup>100</sup> *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, Vol.10, p. 188.



Mao Zedong's criticism of the "three kindnesses and one fewness" was linked to his criticism of the "three winds," both of which were logical products of these two views. It therefore can be argued that the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in fact changed the principle that had guided foreign policy since 1960. Of course, it took some time for the changes in the guiding principle to be implemented, as it did for the final implementation of Mao's class struggle theory. Indeed, implementation of the changes in the guiding principle of foreign policy went in tandem with that of the class struggle theory. This point is worth noting because the Sino-Indian border conflict soon after the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee and other decisions on foreign affairs could not be attributed simply to the changes in the guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy.

changes in domestic politics and began as a change in the guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy.

For this reason, several issues are worth noting for their impact on Beijing's subsequent foreign policy. First, it was probable that the changes in the guiding principle were implemented gradually, which, logically closely linked them with changes in the domestic political situation. It was thus quite probable that the domestic situation played a major role in the final outcome of the changes. Second, the change in the guiding principle might manifest itself differently in different aspects of foreign relations, and in some aspects it might even be constrained by previous policies. Third, in certain policy issue areas, the change in the guiding principle might not be carried out at all. Therefore, it can be argued in this sense that 1962 was the eve of the "left" turn in PRC foreign policy, though further careful examinations of the evolution of Chinese foreign policy after 1962 are needed.

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