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

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[The conflict between Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi . . . is at the heart of Central African regional instability, producing massive refugee flows, insurgencies, and cross-border violence.]

Summary

- The Tutsi-Hutu conflict, both in Rwanda and Burundi, is unique in being the only intercommunal violence among Africans that has led to genocide.
- The conventional wisdom that ethnic conflict in Africa is the product of cultural diversity and ancient tribal antagonisms is wrong on both counts.
- The Burundi conflict is best understood as a result of the manipulation of ethnic identities by the political class in the struggle for postcolonial control of the state.
- The conflict in Burundi is significant in part because of the massive refugee flows, insurgencies, violence, and regional instability it fostered, and in part because of the innovative approach to peacebuilding in postwar Burundi.
- The Burundi peace process, which lasted more or less from 1993 to 2005, is as convoluted as the conflict.
- Four phases of Burundi's peacemaking can be distinguished: the initial UN intercession, Julius Nyerere as facilitator, Nelson Mandela as facilitator, and the transitional government.
- A number of critical lessons for establishing peace in the wake of violence can be drawn from the Burundi experience.
- Process matters.
- One of the most important facilitator skills is the ability to listen.
- All parties, especially those with destabilizing potential, must be at the negotiating table.
- Timely and coordinated donor support are imperative.
- Negotiations will, without question, be affected by the military circumstances of a conflict.
- The risks of embassy clientitis and donor or facilitator fatigue should not be taken lightly.
- Regional support for the peace process is indispensable but has its downsides.
- Effective facilitation depends on coordinated diplomatic intervention.
- Building long-term collaborative capacity among the former belligerents is critical to a sustainable peace.
- Democracy has numerous viable forms, and distinguishing between core universal principles and the institutional diversity of those forms is critical.

Introduction

It is a small country, no larger than the state of Maryland, with a population numbering just over 8 million.

e dimensions of the human tragedy that has played itself out in Burundi since the country's independence in 1960, however, are anything but diminutive: an estimated 400,000 killed, some 800,000 forced to flee the country, and many tens of thousands internally displaced. e human catastrophe that is Burundi is dwarfed in Africa only by its neighbor, Rwanda, which

claimed the lives of close to 1 million persons, predominantly Tutsis but many moderate Hutus as well.

What is less known is that the first regional genocide took place in Burundi in 1972, when the Tutsi government of the day systematically massacred approximately 150,000 educated Hutus. ousands more, both in Rwanda and in Burundi, have been killed either in intercommunal violence or in indiscriminant attacks on civilians by rebel forces or national armies. As recently as October 1993, Burundi was plunged into another round of violence by the assassination of the nation's first democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye. As many as 150,000 died in the weeks immediately following that assassination—both in Hutu massacres of unarmed Tutsis and in the Tutsi-led army assault on Hutu peasants that followed.

A second recurrent theme in Burundi's immediate postindependence political history is the economic and political dominance of the minority Tutsi (an estimated 14 percent of the population), in combination with the systematic exclusion of the Hutu majority (approximately 84 percent of the population) from key social, economic, and political institutions. In the words of a leading scholar on Burundian political life, "in no other state in the continent, with the qualified exception of South Africa, has minority rule been carried to such an extreme."[2]

It is this combination of extreme inequality, on the one hand, and recurrent intercommunal violence, on the other, that has made the conflict one of the most intractable in Africa. Almost no Burundian commune or family has been una ected. It should come as no surprise, then, that fear and insecurity, as well as a reciprocal demonization of the two groups, gave rise to exceedingly low levels of intercommunal trust and confidence—and to a pattern of preemptive violence, each side fearing that restraint invited vulnerability.

is was the stage on which the Burundi peace process would unfold, presenting all who were involved in e orts to resolve the conflict—diplomats and facilitators alike—unique and di cult challenges.

Distinguishing Tutsi and Hutu

Ethnic conflict in Africa is commonly characterized as the product of cultural diversity and

the same hills and communes, and have intermarried. e two do have distinct origins and physical prototypes: the Tutsi are believed to have migrated from the East and are generally described as tall with angular facial features; whereas the Hutu are believed to be of Bantu origin, and are often characterized as short and stocky. Intermarriage, however, has made these physical characteristics an extremely imperfect predictor of ethnic identity. Today one finds as many short Tutsi as tall Hutu. Moreover, although Burundians theoretically derive their ethnic identity from their fathers, the many children of mixed marriages have further blurred the Tutsi-Hutu distinction.

What traditionally distinguished Tutsi and Hutu were their occupational di erences: Tutsis tended to be cattle herders and Hutus generally farmers. But even this distinction was not ironclad. Many Hutus grazed cattle and "it was by entrusting their cattle to the Hutu that the Tutsi were able to establish clientage ties with Hutu elements, thus bringing Hutu and Tutsi together into a complex web of reciprocal rights and obligations. Far from driving a wedge between Hutu and Tutsi, their r6r5(l)16(e)-5(r)n98(i)10(n)10(r)1o(r)20(e)110(g)]TJT*a

I turn now to examine these phases of the Burundi peace process. e scope of this paper does not permit a detailed history. My goal, rather, is to identify the most significant events, decisions, and factors that have helped shape the process and were most directly responsible for both its achievements and its shortcomings.

Phase I. The UN Steps In (1993–95)

In the wake of the October 1993 Ndadaye assassination and the large-scale intercommunal violence that erupted afterward, the UN decided to intervene in Burundi, designating a distinguished diplomat, Amadou Ould-Abdullah, as the special representative of the secretary-general to Bujumbura. For two years, Ould-Abdullah labored valiantly to calm the political turbulence and end violence. However, new power-sharing arrangements negotiated between the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA and Hutu-dominated FRODEBU parties failed to satisfy either the extremist Tutsi elements or Hutu activists. An armed Hutu rebellion took root and began to operate in the countryside with increasing e ectiveness. Within Bujumbura, extremist Tutsis launched a campaign of assassination and intimidation against all those associated with FRODEBU and even perceived UPRONA moderates. In his narrative account of his experience in Bujumbura, Ould-Abdullah captured the political mood:

> The country is plagued by a culture of fear: Burundians, like Rwandans, live in permanent fear of murder, displacement, and mass exodus. . . . This atmosphere has not been generated by violence, alone, however. Rather, it is the product of violence and impunity. . . . Violence has become a catalyst for fear, which in turn aggravates violence. In a similar vicious circle, the culture of impunity and the culture of fear justify and perpetuate each other.[9]

e 1994 Rwandan genocide sharply accelerated these negative trends, greatly deepening ethnic polarization and intercommunal fears and insecurities within Burundi. Growing anxiety within the UN that Burundi could go the way of Rwanda led UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, at the end of 1995, to call for the contingent creation of a UN peacekeeping force poised to move into Burundi as necessary to avert further mass violence or genocide. is

minister Meles Zenawi, and OAU secretary-general Salim Salim began to encourage former Tanzanian president Julius (Mwalimu) Nyerere to become involved in an e ort to defuse the deepening Burundi crisis.[10] Following two gatherings of regional leaders representing Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, and consultations with UN o cials, Nyerere agreed to help "assist the people of Burundi in finding means to achieve peace, stability, and reconciliation," including "the resolution of fundamental problems relating to the access, control, and management of power, so that either the ethnic or political minority is reassured."[11]

Initially, Nyerere was welcomed as a facilitator not only by the subregion but also by the United States and the wider international community. First, no country outside Africa wanted to assume the lead role in e orts to resolve the Burundi conflict. Second, the willingness of regional leaders to step up and identify one of their own to guide the peace process was seen as a significant and positive development. Moreover, few African leaders enjoyed the iconic stature of the former Tanzanian president. A world statesman, a charismatic leader of Africa's anti-colonial struggle, a pan-Africanist who played a key role in the liberation movements of southern Africa, the first president of an independent Tanzania—Julius Nyerere was the George Washington, the Abraham Lincoln, and the FDR of Tanzania (and much of the African continent) all rolled into one. Brilliant, articulate, passionate in his convictions and advocacy, Nyerere enjoyed a moral stature comparable to that of Nelson Mandela—the kind that would be di cult for any of the belligerent Burundian parties to challenge. In addition, probably no African leader was more knowledgeable about Burundi's volatile political dynamics.

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First Gambit

Toward the end of April 1996 and again early in June of that year, Nyerere brought FRODE-BU and UPRONA representatives together in Mwanza, Tanzania, but made little progress in defusing political tensions. In particular, UPRONA, the party that despite its initially inclusive character had come to represent Tutsi hard-line interests, rejected Nyerere's suggestion that representatives of the armed rebels be invited to join the talks.

e situation appeared increasingly desperate. Eighteen members of parliament had been assassinated. Tutsi youth militias were wreaking havoc within Bujumbura which was being ethnically cleansed of Hutus. Violence was mounting in the countryside. e capital was rife

leader Leonard Nyangoma also opposed it, fearing that it would pressure the rebellion to disarm before its political demands had been met.

e political and security situation inside Burundi rapidly deteriorated. In a gruesome act of violence, Hutu rebels slaughtered more than three hundred Tutsi civilians at Bungendana. At the funeral service that followed, President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was forced to flee for his life. en, on July 25, 1996, the Burundian army declared Pierre Buyoya—who, three years earlier, had guided Burundi into a democratic election he then lost to Melchior Ndadaye—as Burundi's new president. e request for a regional peacekeeping force was immediately withdrawn.

Condemnation and Sanctions

In the private deliberations that produced the final summit communiqué, Ugandan president Museveni had taken the hardest line. He wanted to demand that the Burundian army relinquish power immediately or face a regional military intervention. As he explained to his colleagues, the coup had taken the putchists only a few hours; it should take no longer for them to step down. Museveni's position reflected his fundamental contempt for the principal actors on both sides of the conflict. In his view, there were no patriots in Burundi—no leaders motivated by the country's national interest rather than personal interests or those of a narrowly defined group. Moreover, in Museveni's view, the principal contestants for power were all killers, and a sustainable peace would never come from a negotiation among killers.

But others pressed for a more pragmatic approach. Zairean prime minister Kengo, in particular, urged that the regional leaders not overreach, arguing that their credibility would su er if a deadline for Buyoya to step down were established and no regional response should he fail to do so.

All, however, were agreed on the need to exert maximum pressure on the putchists. It was Nyerere, who had advocated the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions against Burundi even before the Buyoya coup, who most forcefully articulated the pro-sanctions case. In Nyerere's first meeting with Buyoya after the coup, the Burundian president had claimed that he enjoyed the full support of the army and of the Tutsis, that he wanted to talk with the rebels but he needed some time. "Time for what?" Nyerere had asked. He did not want Buyoya to use this period to strengthen the Burundian army. Nyerere believed that Buyoya's professed commitment to a negotiated solution to Burundi's conflict was nothing more than lip service and that the Tutsi leadership remained committed to a military solution. Nyerere was particularly troubled by Buyoya's announcement, immediately on his return to power, of an intention to significantly expand the size and capability of the Burundi army. As the peace process was being launched, Nyerere remained deeply skeptical of Buyoya's intentions and capacity to deliver a peaceful settlement. "I don't believe that the Buyoya regime is a reformist regime," he said, "but a regime trying to establish a lasting Tutsi authority." In Nyerere's view, Buyoya needed to be told: behave or else. A Tanzanian advisor to Nyerere expressed the fundamental mistrust of Tutsi intentions even more starkly: " e region's reaction," he said, "will depend on a real response from Buyoya, not an arrogant response. e Tutsis have an absolute belief in their power, in their God-given right to rule. ey see themselves as people of intellect. To change their mentality, you need shock treatment."[12]

Nyerere saw the sanctions against Burundi much as he and a number of international actors had seen those against the apartheid South African regime. ey were a way of making it clear to the Tutsi elite that attempts to retain their monopoly of power would, in the end, be far more costly than a negotiated political settlement with the majority Hutu. He argued, in addition, that the imposition of sanctions would be an important message to the Hutu rebels—that the international community was not abandoning their cause and that means other than military force were available to bring the Tutsi-dominated regime to the negotiating table. Because Burundi was e ectively landlocked, Nyerere argued, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya had it within their power to make sanctions work. "For once," he told the special envoys, "we can do without the rest of the world." Later, in an interview with

Although Nyerere had minimal confidence in Buyoya, he was even more mistrustful of the people around the Burundian president. Nyerere reported that he had told Buyoya in his first postcoup encounter, "I'm not going to assume you are completely in control. I don't think we can help you by being nice to the others around you." In explaining his approach to Buyoya, Nyerere used the analogy of a minister of finance who knows that tough decisions have to be made even though others within the government may resist what is required and recruits the IMF to play the role of the bad cop, to make it clear that there is no alternative, no way out unless certain conditions are met. In Nyerere's view, sanctions were intended not to box Buyoya into a corner, but to provide the "necessary shock therapy" to hard-liners around Buyoya.

Giving Buyoya the benefit of the doubt as to his professed commitment to negotiations, Nyerere argued that the Burundian president would need this external pressure so that the Tutsis around him would realize that they had to do something. Again, he compared the Burundi situation to that of South Africa: the sanctions against the South African regime were directed not so much at the reputed reformer De Klerk as they were at his core Afrikaner constituency whose resistance to change had to be overcome.

Further driving Nyerere's insister

disingenuously argued subsequently that the decision was out of his hands: the regional leaders had spoken.

From a process standpoint, the problem was not the application of sanctions per se. e arguments advanced by Nyerere in their defense were sound. However, when Nyerere took on the role of sanctions enforcer he simultaneously undermined his claim to be an unbiased facilitator and put major strains on his relationship with Buyoya, his principal Tutsi interlocutor. Buyoya found it di cult to trust Nyerere's intentions, believing that the former Tanzanian president had a hidden agenda of imposing the region's notion of an appropriate political settlement on the Burundians.

In addition, with his continued forceful advocacy of sanctions, Nyerere unintentionally

to the underlying paternalism that shaped Nyerere's approach to the Burundians. On one occasion, Buyoya observed that Nyerere, who saw himself as a cofounder of UPRONA thirty years earlier, still approached UPRONA "as if it were a child in his hands." Buyoya added, "He would never have spoken the same way to FRODEBU."[16] Not surprisingly, Nyerere, idolized

e speaker, for his part, doubted that Buyoya had any intention of giving to FRODEBU leaders and the National Assembly any meaningful decision-making role. He had been par-

Tanzania's interests in a sustainable settlement of the Burundi conflict were clear: mass

of large numbers of Rwandan as well as Burundian Hutus in Zaire had become a significant political liability for him. In addition, an increasingly beleaguered Mobutu saw cooperation with the United States on the Burundi conflict as an opportunity to secure some international credit that would enable him to more e ectively deal with his domestic problems. Even before the regional initiative on Burundi, he was receptive to U.S. government d)-62(w)15(51e)15(n)15ae

embargo against Burundi, insisted that Burundi had no dog in the Congolese fight. Burundi's troops were in the DRC, he said, only to guard against rebel intrusions into Burundi from the DRC. However, it was not long before Burundi became more directly involved in coordinating its military e ort in the DRC with Rwanda and Uganda. For the Burundi process, all this meant a much less confrontational posture by Museveni toward Buyoya, and a much greater willingness by the Ugandan president to threaten regional action against intransigent Burundi Hutu rebels.

Internal Fragmentation

Another factor seriously complicating the Burundi peace process was that both the Tutsi and Hutu were deeply divided—with leaders and aspirants to power often more focused on their internal quarrels and political competition than on the broad Tutsi-Hutu cleavage. is presented several di cult challenges to whoever was attempting to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

ree sets of internal divisions were of particular consequence—those within UPRONA, those between the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA and PARENA, and those within the broad Hutu-dominated FRODEBU. UPRONA, which in recent decades had become most identified with the protection of Tutsi interests and power, was paradoxically led by a Hutu, Charles Mukasi—a testament to the complexity of the Burundian political landscape. Similarly, the chairman of the CNDD—the National Council for the Defense of Democracy—viewed as one of the most militant advocates for the redress of Hutu grievances, counted three Tutsis among his principal political advisors. Mukasi was a hard-liner among hard-liners—rigid in the rejection of both Nyerere and the Arusha process. ere could be no justification, he argued, for negotiating with genocidaires. e key to a di erent kind of Burundian future was to end the culture of impunity, and this meant bringing to justice those culpable for the murder of Ndadaye in 1993 and the massacres of Tutsis that followed Ndadaye's assassination. All the e orts made by Buyoya and his closest associates to encourage greater flexibility from Mukasi were for naught, and the UPRONA chairman was unrelenting in his criticism of the Arusha initiative and of Buyoya. When UPRONA's continuing resistance to Arusha became politically embarrassing, the group's more moderate wing organized its own internal coup, deposing Mukasi in favor of a Buyoya supporter. However, even many UPRONA moderates acknowledged that it was h 1993 A 5( )-75(h,)85( )32 A 5(p(a)15(t)15(e)1-A)15(r)2(u)15(s)15(h)15(a)]TJ-0.015
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second, that between FRODEBU, on the one hand, and the principal armed rebel groups, the CNDD and the PALIPEHUTU, on the other; third, those between the armed and political wings of the two rebel organizations. Some of these internal conflicts turned on ideological or policy issues. CNDD chairman Leonard Nyangoma, for example, had opted for armed struggle and believed that the deposed president Sylvestre Ntibantunganya and other internal FRODEBU leaders had wrongly yielded to their Tutsi adversaries. But many intra-Hutu divisions appeared to be the consequence of interpersonal conflicts and political rivalries. e divisions between the military and political arms of both the CNDD and the PALIPEHUTU were to prove the most problematic. e absence from Arusha of those who were actually doing the fighting on the ground meant that the result of negotiations would be a peace accord incapable of delivering peace.

Fluctuating Balance of Ground Forces

E orts to get all-party negotiations started were also a ected by the fluctuating balance of forces on the ground. One of the most notable such instances occurred when, as one of the by-products of Laurent Kabila's 1997 ouster of Zairean president Mobutu, the CNDD lost its rear base and safe harbor in eastern Zaire. In a reminder of the inseparability of the Burundi crisis from events elsewhere in the region, this turn of fortunes on the battlefield had several

Tensions between Facilitation and Donors

e United States and other Western countries initially reacted positively to the Arusha initiative on Burundi. Particularly given their own reluctance to mobilize an international peacekeeping force, that regional countries had come together to sponsor their own peace initiative was enthusiastically applauded. Nyerere reached out to several of these donor countries, and quickly secured commitments to fund what was to become known as the Arusha process. Later, in response to concerns that had been voiced about financial mismanagement, Nyerere acquiesced to a signed memorandum of understanding that provided for external financial oversight and auditing of what was to become a very costly process.

e appointment of several international special envoys to the peace process was intended to strengthen Nyerere's hand. Nyerere periodically drew these envoys together, ostensibly to consult on recent developments and exchange ideas on the appropriate next steps. However, the very strong-willed former president had his own ideas and his own perspective and, though always a gracious listener, often seemed minimally receptive to ideas that did not correspond to his own predispositions. At times, the special envoys had the feeling that Nyerere's outreach to them was motivated less by a genuine interest in consultation than by a desire to keep his funders happy.

Obstacles

Following discrete informal meetings that the two sides held separately with Sant' Egidio, the first informal bilateral talks between the government and the CNDD were secretly convened in the first week of September 1996. Both delegations were relatively low-level in composition and the atmospherics were decidedly frigid. Not wanting to convey the least legitimacy to the Buyoya regime, the CNDD refused to even use Buyoya's name, referring instead to "the regime of Bujumbura."

It quickly became clear that neither side was yet prepared to address matters of substance, or to enter into any kind of process that might be characterized as negotiations. Both sides remained concerned that any direct contacts remain discrete and confidential. But they also both a rmed their willingness to continue to talk8(t)15(o)15( )-68(t)5(r)25(e)15(f)nT n the efof substanc

Fourth, Zuppi had to contend with Nyerere's continuing reservations about the Rome talks. Recognizing that the secret process Sant' Egidio had launched might have a better chance of bringing the Burundian government and the CNDD to the negotiating table—a task that he had himself unsuccessfully attempted at Mwanza in 1995—Nyerere reluctantly decided to give Sant' Egidio a chance. He needed time, in any event, to prepare for all-party talks, and perhaps, the Rome process might produce a suspension of hostilities and thereby improve the environment for follow-on all-party negotiations. But Nyerere's reservations about the Rome process deepened as time went by, and led to several weeks of discussions involving members of the facilitator's team, Sant' Egidio, and several diplomats. ese informal consultations culminated in a two-day retreat that produced agreement on rules of the game devised to avoid any misunderstandings and improve the coordination between Nyerere and Sant' Egidio:

1. The Rome talks were to be understood not as a separate initiative, but as an integral part of the Nyerere-led Arusha initiative. In effect, the Sant' Egidio role was to provide a track II of a single peace process.
2. It was agreed that any decision to relax sanctions would be linked only to public events; no credit would be given for secret talks or secret undertakings.
3. The secrecy of the Rome talks would be preserved.
4. Negotiations in Rome were to be over a cease-fire, not over a political settlement of the Burundian conflict. Decisions on the latter required that all Burundian parties, not only the government and the CNDD, be at the table. The Rome negotiations between the two principal belligerents were designed to set the stage for the follow-on all-party negotiations on the fundamental political issues.
5. A representative of Nyerere would join other diplomatic observers at the Rome talks. Neither the Burundian government nor the CNDD was particularly enthralled with this decision, fearing that it increased the risks of public disclosure of the secret talks. However, Buyoya felt that the presence of a Nyerere representative might overcome the cynicism of the facilitator and other regional leaders about the sincerity of the government's commitment to negotiations. For its part, the CNDD did not want to risk offending Nyerere by rejecting the presence of his representative.
6. Nyerere would organize consultations with all the parties in preparation for the first all-party negotiating session. Buyoya had been pressing him to do so, because it was the only way he could meet the regional condition for sanctions relief. Moreover, preparatory meetings for the all-party process would provide useful cover for the secret talks, and give to the other parties—including other armed rebel groups—a sense of inclusion in the evolving peace process. Nyerere did bend to Buyoya's appeal that he not yet press for public meetings between the armed groups and the government, or between the armed groups and UPRONA. Nyerere recognized that these contacts remained extremely sensitive and needed to be handled discretely.

Zuppi felt he had no choice but to accede to Nyerere's wishes, but from a process standpoint certain of these constraints were problematic. By saying that underlying political issues

preferred Sant' Egidio over Arusha as the principal negotiating venue. On several occasions, both parties quietly pleaded with the special envoys that a way be found to shift the facilitation away from Arusha and the Tanzanians. At the end of the day, however, the CNDD was no more willing than the government to risk a breach with Nyerere and the regional leaders. Nor were the donor countries that were underwriting the Arusha process any more prepared than the belligerent parties to risk incurring the wrath of Nyerere and other African leaders, and provoking a major north-south confrontation.

An Agenda

With Nyerere's assent, Zuppi returned to the task of attempting to move the Burundian government and the CNDD to be more flexible in their approach to the secret negotiations. is was no easy task, given the divergent interests and objectives of the two sides. Moreover, Zuppi had little freedom of maneuver. Although the government's highest priority was a cease-fire agreement, this was not achievable without some political concessions. A negotiation over political issues—whether army reform, or power-sharing, or judicial reform—was e ectively ruled out by Nyerere. Likewise, the CNDD's priority—securing the government's agreement to restore the constitution of 1992—could not be resolved in Rome but, under the terms of the understanding with Nyerere, would have to be taken up at all-party talks.

Zuppi attempted to finesse the constraints imposed on the Rome negotiations by suggesting that the parties in Rome could agree on certain principles by which they would be guided in the follow-on all-party negotiations on the understanding that nothing agreed to in Rome would be binding until agreement had also been reached in the all-party process. us, an agreement might be reached, in principle, that the two parties would support the restoration of the constitution of 1992, albeit with some modifications to take account of changed circumstances. Similarly, the government and the CNDD might agree on the principles that would guide their approach in the all-party negotiations to the reform and restructuring of the national army. Here, too, however, it would be the all-party process that would make the final decisions. Zuppi hoped that such agreement on principles might be enough to secure an agreement by the CNDD and the government to suspend hostilities, pending the outcome of all-party negotiations on a comprehensive political settlement. e Rome process would not be

tion of 1992. e government adamantly rejected this demand, insisting that the negotiations should be about a new constitutional system.

But, over the next few days, a dramatic transformation occurred in both the atmospherics and the substance of the exchange. Zuppi met with the delegations separately, as did Nyerere's representative and the special envoys who were present as observers. e tension began to dissipate and the two sides began to focus their attention on the search for common ground. e CNDD signaled that it would be willing to accept the government delegation as representing the "government in place." Both sides a rmed their agreement to negotiate

In addition, a shift in the military balance of forces on the ground had produced a new political dynamic within the Tutsi community and among Hutu rebels. Before the July 1996 coup that brought Buyoya back to power, the military position of the Hutu insurgency had appeared increasingly strong, and some observers predicted a Hutu victory within a year. By late February 1997, however, the military situation had been dramatically reversed in the wake of several developments: the destruction of CNDD bases in eastern Zaire by the forces of Laurent Kabila, a major expansion in the size of the Burundian army, and a new Burundian army strategy of forcibly regrouping dispersed Hutu peasants living in contested areas into larger and more easily controllable camps.

For a brief time, Tutsis in Bujumbura enjoyed a sense of triumph, hard-liners proclaiming that a military victory was in sight. Buyoya rea rmed his personal commitment to the peace process, and to securing a negotiated political settlement, but simultaneously responded to the demands of Tutsi hard-liners to both expand the army and organize Hutu "regroupment camps." As European Union special envoy Aldo Ajello observed at the time, military developments had led both sides to harden their positions in the Rome negotiations—the government because its Tutsi hard-liners felt stronger and the CNDD because it felt weaker.

e intensifying mistrust of Buyoya and increasing impatience with the pace of the Rome negotiations posed additional di culties. Nyerere was particularly concerned about Buyoya's announced plans to enlarge the Burundian army and the government's refusal to allow the speaker, who was still being investigated in connection with his alleged complicity in the killings of 1993, to travel outside Burundi. Nyerere wanted quick results in Rome. He did not want Rome to become an opportunity for the government to buy time to further strengthen its military position. He was also concerned that other Burundian parties would become increasingly restive if the all-parties negotiations were not begun soon. Finally, he wanted a quick concrete achievement in Rome, because he wanted to convene the regional leaders to update them on the peace process they had sanctioned, and did not want to report that the Rome negotiations had produced nothing. To project some sense of forward movement, Nyerere undertook informal bilateral consultations with the Burundian parties—ostensibly as preparation for launching all-party negotiations. is activity had the side benefit of distracting attention from Rome.

In addition, Buyoya was increasingly preoccupied by the refusal of Nyerere and the regional leaders to provide any sanctions relief, notwithstanding the government's initiation of talks with the CNDD. Buyoya felt betrayed, believing that the Arusha goalposts had e ectively been raised. He complained that the peace process was unfolding on the basis of the facilitator's mistrust of the Burundi president's sincerity. He noted that the initial Arusha declaration imposing regional sanctions had stipulated that th25(t)15( )( )-15(i5(i)1(e)15( )245(a)

encouraged the CNDD to take a harder line in Rome. e latter had been weakened militarily

to the sensitive issues of the constitution and the army. In the words of one member of the government delegation, “Our main concern is that [if the Rome talks become known] without a suspension of hostilities, and killings in Burundi continue, the massacres of defenseless people, then the whole process will come apart. Back home, people around the president know about the talks. e political forces suspect something, but no one is sure. People generally don't know what is happening in Rome. Even the members of the negotiating team are not known. We fear for our physical security.”[22]

e CNDD, however, had no intention of yielding its principal leverage in advance of agreement on the constitution and the army—the very issues that had led it to take up arms in the first place. Considerable e orts of persuasion by Zuppi, reinforced by pressure from the envoy and observers, finally produced an agreed formula of 0stl0( )2p6c46(an)46(agr)10(eed)46(f)-5(or)-5(ma)10(l)2

prospects of a cease-fire agreement, he told Zuppi that Sant' Egidio could continue its track II e orts to secure a suspension of hostilities. But the facilitator did not want the Rome talks to become an excuse for further delay in the all-party negotiations.

Fourth, in a closed meeting with the Burundian president, the regional leaders also pressed Buy ealth prest, prnaiainnalthsr,dmer0et,werosed mresident,mainan urg nnalth peaalthe

or, in political terms, between Buyoya and his UPRONA supporters, on the one side, and the internal FRODEBU leadership, on the other.

Two personal experiences in Bujumbura brought home to me the dramatic nature of the political transformation taking place within Bujumbura. e first was a dinner that the American deputy chief of mission hosted at my request with a mixed group of UPRONA and FRODEBU parliamentarians. In my earlier visits to Bujumbura, I had been struck by the frigid atmosphere at any event when both Tutsi and Hutu political figures were present. Everyone appeared to walk on eggshells and avoid any direct reference to their fundamental di erences. Even references to Tutsi and Hutu ethnicity were problematic, many Burundians trying to insist that Burundian problems were not ethnic, but simply traceable either to Bu-

and of little substantive importance, they would have had far less interest in an outsider's judgment. But they were clearly concerned about what the unfolding developments might mean for Burundi's future, fearing that the government (and the Tutsi army command) was embarking upon a risky and uncertain path. ey were seeking assurances that the other partner in this e ort could be trusted.

By the end of the evening, the lack of enthusiasm of these o cers both for the Arusha process and the internal partnership was unmistakable. But so was their grudging continued support of Buyoya. "At this point," one of them concluded, "we don't see any alternative." is was hardly a ringing vote of confidence, but was, nonetheless, an indication that for the moment at least, the army would follow Buyoya's lead.

At its core, the emerging internal partnership reflected a pragmatic realization that any

international peace and security exists, there seems to be no justification for the establishment of a tribunal."[23]

e secretary-general's letter became public and was extremely embarrassing to Buyoya, who felt more exposed and vulnerable to Tutsi criticism than ever. At the end of July, under pressure to demonstrate his toughness, Buyoya ordered six executions (three Hutu, two Tutsi, one Twa) allegedly involved in the 1993 violence. In so doing, he defied the regional leaders who, at the April regional summit, had demanded that all adjudication of politically sensitive crimes be suspended. He also ignored warnings by the United States and others that such an action would never be seen as legitimate in the eyes of either the majority of Burundians or the international community, and would constitute a serious provocation to the facilitator and regional sponsors of the Arusha peace process.

Predictably, the entire international community condemned the executions. Nyerere, who two days earlier had announced that the first all-parties meeting would be convened in three weeks, was outraged and hung up on Buyoya when Buyoya attempted to speak with him.

Tanzania Accused of Complicity

is period was also characterized by a deterioration in the Burundian-Tanzanian relationship. Several issues had raised tensions and led to strident rhetoric. Each side accused the other of planning an invasion. e Burundians accused Tanzanians of being complicit in rebel activity from the Burundian refugee camps within Tanzania. Buyoya repeatedly spoke of his conviction that Nyerere and the Tanzanians had a hidden agenda and were helping train and supply Hutu rebels. e Burundians also criticized the Tanzanians for doing nothing to halt the takeover of the Burundian Embassy in Dar es Salaam by Hutu elements hostile to the Buyoya government. In addition, there was the continued Burundian frustration with the sanctions, as well as with Nyerere serving not only as facilitator but also, e ectively, as sanctions enforcer. For its part, the Tanzanian government flatly denied the Burundian charges, insisting that the Burundian government was simply attempting to divert attention away from its own internal failures.

Government Rejects Invitation

Nyerere had established the all-party negotiations launch date as August 25, 1997. At the last minute, however, the Burundian government asked for a short postponement. Nyerere, angered both by the executions and by the request, refused. e Burundian government was a no-show at the negotiations and a series of events was set in motion that led to a one-year hiatus in the peace process. So, at a summit of regional leaders held in Dar es Salaam on September 3 and 4, 1997, regional leaders decided to maintain the sanctions regime and to increase the demands on the Burundian government. Even FRODEBU leaders inside Bujumbura were frustrated

munity. Indeed, he had gone so far as to arrange for the speaker, former president Bagaza, and FRODEBU secretary-general Augustin Nzogibwani to travel to Arusha—thereby meeting one of the principal long-standing demands of the regional leaders that the speaker and others be free to travel. However, at the last moment, Tutsi hard-liners—never comfortable with the Arusha process, and still convinced that the speaker was complicit in the 1993 killings—threatened to lie down on the airport runway to block the speaker's travel. Buyoya had a major political problem on his hands and felt he had no alternative but to ask for a short postponement.

Buyoya, Taking Risks

As mentioned, Buyoya's reaction to the unanticipated public disclosure that he and his government had, for some time, been involved in secret talks with the CNDD also contributed to the new internal political dynamic. When these talks were leaked to the press, many observers feared that Buyoya's life was on the line. Coup rumors were afoot, and the entire diplomatic community focused on the prospect of another round of intercommunal bloodletting. Buyoya, however, rather than retreating, instead publicly defended the necessity of a negotiated settlement to the Burundian conflict, and personally lobbied both the army rank-and-file and hard-line Tutsi constituencies to understand and accept the need for negotiations. A military solution was simply out of reach, he argued, and a negotiated political settlement was required.[24]

In mounting this vigorous campaign in support of negotiations, Buyoya assumed considerable personal risk. is was both recognized and appreciated by FRODEBU leaders. It may

months and eventually produced a consensus that, given the blockages in the external Arusha process and the collapse of the Rome talks, the parliamentarians needed to seize the bull by the horns and build an internal partnership that would establish the conditions to make negotiations feasible. By joint action on their part, they believed, they could help build the confidence required for a real political partnership.

Paradoxically, the emergence of the internal partnership between UPRONA and FRODEBU, and between the Buyoya government and the National Assembly, was a direct consequence of the initial failure of the Arusha process. Burundian leaders felt that they simply had no alternative.

An intensive e ort by the special envoys to narrow the di erences between the facilitator and the Burundian government, and to persuade Nyerere to make another attempt to launch all-party negotiations, went nowhere eic 1.4 -1.4 Tdu89(a)15eo toB, noB, il -1.4 -1.4 Td[(a)13y the secial ciey mply thisae-18(t-0.0of)67ac

process. He insisted that it was only in Arusha with third-party facilitation, that Burundi's Hutus and Tutsis would have equal standing at the negotiating table; otherwise, the Hutus would always be at a significant disadvantage.

During this period, the special envoys—and the Bujumbura-based diplomatic community—welcomed the emergence of the internal partnership. ey saw it as a significant confidence-builder that, by demonstrating the existence of a critical mass of Hutu and Tutsi moderates capable of working together, would pave the way for all-party negotiations. We spent considerable time and e ort attempting (with little success) to persuade both Nyerere and Museveni that something more fundamental and hopeful was occurring within Bujumbura. At the same time, we pressed Buyoya to continuously and explicitly acknowledge the primacy of the Arusha all-parties process. Not only would it be foolish to alienate the facilitator and regional leaders, but peace would simply not be achievable without the full engagement of all parties.

of having sold out to the Buyoya regime. e armed rebels had been even more dismissive. In
e ect, the Hutus saw the Arusha process as a protective umbrella. In Arusha they would havpmI18(A)1 501 TT¶TDpar-6(er(-)1nment—and

In the months following the Kampala summit, the government acted to finally resolve the judicial cases involving the speaker and former president Bagaza, and to ensure that the two of them and former president Ntibantunganya would be free to travel. In addition, the government committed itself to closing its regroupment camps within six months and, though Buyoya would not agree that all political trials be suspended, a moratorium was imposed on executions.

Meanwhile, the government and the National Assembly continued to flesh out the nature of the new internal partnership. ey focused on three objectives: the search for peace, the development of a model of society that would represent a shared vision of the Burundian future, and a transitional government. Agreement was reached on a constitutional act and a political platform.

In the first, the National Assembly was expanded to include many of the smaller parties and civil society organizations that were part of the Tutsi power structure, FRODEBU thereby accommodating Tutsi feelings of being submerged in an 80 to 90 percent Hutu body. At the same time, the executive branch was restructured to give a prominent role to FRODEBU.

e second document, the political platform, defined in general terms the mission of the transitional institutions: to bring about peace and stabilize the country. It also identified the agenda of issues to be tackled if these goals were to be achieved: security, genocide, justice, social and economic development, exclusion, reconstruction, and the external peace process.[28]

e two sides undertook other confidence-building measures as well: the government decided to rebuild a Bujumbura neighborhood that two years earlier had been "ethnically cleansed" of Hutus; the Tutsi minister of interior agreed to assign special security to the visiting members of the CNDD, who had come to Bujumbura to test both the security and the political space available to Hutus; and the new Hutu first vice president undertook to visit army barracks immediately after his appointment to provide assurances of his collaborative relationship with the (Tutsi) minister of defense (who reported to him). Another significant FRODEBU gesture to its Tutsi partners was to signal its acquiescence to the suspension of sanctions. In addition, FRODEBU committed itself to work for an early cease-fire by reaching

the principal players were given the opportunity to interact discretely, without the presence of the smaller parties, that the most progress was made.

Second, the two armed groups responsible for the continuing fighting on the ground were not at the negotiating table. By the time the first all-party talks had convened, the CNDD-FDD had divided—with its military arm, the FDD, rejecting the leadership of CNDD chairman Nyangoma, who led his movement's delegation in Arusha. In addition, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL had also fragmented, and the PALIPEHUTU representatives in Arusha had no control of its fighters in Burundi. us, the joint commitment entered into by the government and the three rebel groups present in Arusha to suspend hostilities by July 20, 1998, was devoid of meaning and did little to dilute the violence on the ground.

Over the next several months, all e orts to bring the absent armed groups into the Arusha process failed. Nyerere decided to put the best face on a bad situation, arguing that progress in the Arusha talks with the delegations that were present would ultimately be a powerful incentive for at least the largest of the armed groups, the CNDD-FDD, to come into the process. In the end, however, this did not happen. Some in the Burundian government questioned whether the facilitator and the Tanzanians had, in fact, done everything they could to bring the CNDD-FDD into the table. e suspicions of a Tanzanian hidden agenda were such that some Burundians believed that the Tanzanians wanted to maintain the CNDD-FDD military pressure on the government as a further incentive for the Tutsi regime to make concessions in the all-party negotiations. In any event, the absence of the CNDD-FDD and the FNL from the Arusha process was to ultimately prove disastrous. e August 2000 Arusha accord laid

political allies, on the other, the parties and rebel groups advocating restoration of a democratic political system. However, this proposal was bitterly resisted by the government and its internal FRODEBU partneroa œ poups rœ ic 157psc 157c 157c

the United States and Europe had begun to wonder whether the agenda of Tanzanian and Ugandan leaders was, in fact, to topple the Buyoya regime. However, when this was reported to Nyerere, he reacted indignantly. To the contrary, he said, he believed that Hutus saw Buyoya as their preferred interlocutor, and he expected Buyoya to ultimately emerge as Burundi's tran-

unwilling to break his ties with Laurent Kabila, and had little incentive to join the Arusha negotiations.

When the various approaches to bringing Jean Bosco's FDD into the Arusha process failed, Nyerere decided that as much as he wanted to have everyone on board, he was not about to give to the FDD a veto over the peace process. It was important, he believed, to move forward with the negotiations. e FDD would still have the option of joining the process at a later stage.

However, the deepening involvement of the FDD with the Congolese war presented another extremely worrisome threat: diplomats and regional analysts became increasingly concerned about the ethnicization of the Great Lakes conflict—with allied Hutu elements from Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo taking on the Tutsis of Burundi and Rwanda. e region had already seen two genocides and several other episodes of intercommunal violence between Tutsi and Hutu, and no one relished another round. is placed a special responsibility on the Burundian negotiators. As EU special envoy Ajello put it to a Burundian delegation, "We have a historic responsibility—you and the international community—to kill the monster in the cradle—and in Burundi it is where you two have agreed to talk."[32]

Aside from these external distractions, the Arusha process itself was the target of persistent complaints, by virtually all of the principal Burundian parties. e facilitation appeared to be defined not as an ongoing process, but rather as a series of formal all-party meetings in Arusha. Virtually no shuttle diplomacy was undertaken, and meetings were seldom well prepared. e facilitation team made little e ort between sessions to follow up on the progress made in the Arusha talks, such as meet with the belligerent parties, identify their bottom lines, or narrow di erences. E orts to establish a more flexible negotiating framework—for example, permitting working committee chairs to organize meetings of their groups in other venues or undertake some shuttle diplomacy with key parties—were resisted. Consequently, every Arusha negotiating session e ectively began from scratch, and it was often di cult to pick up the threads of talks held many weeks earlier. In addition, one of the most commonly voiced complaints was that the presence of so many parties and delegates meant that the Arusha meetings were more conducive to public posturing than to serious negotiations.

Another factor increasing internal tensions among the Arusha negotiators was a move on Nyerere's part. At the suggestion of some of the Hutu parties, Nyerere agreed to convene and meet in Moshi, Tanzania, with representatives of all the Hutu groups present in Arusha. Although his intention was reportedly wholly benign—to simplify and expedite negotiations by reducing the fragmentation among the Hutu and establishing a more orderly two-sided

ernment. e Moshi initiative led, over time, to the eventual creation of a coalition of Hutu-dominated parties known as the G-8, in reaction to which the Tutsi-dominated G-10 grouping emerged. Neither coalition was particularly cohesive—and one or the other party would frequently break with the group orthodoxy of the moment—but this development moved the negotiating process in the direction of the two-sided negotiation that Nyerere and some of the Hutu parties had advocated for some time.

In an e ort to address some of the broader process concerns, Nyerere, the special envoys, and representatives of donor countries, came together in New York a few weeks before the regional summit of January 25, 1999. e donors welcomed the announced intention of Nyerere at the upcoming summit to recommend suspending sanctions, an indication that the Burundian government and Nyerere had agreed to seek signing a peace agreement within six months to one year, and Nyerere's report on steps taken to strengthen his facilitation team. In addition, they discussed ways of coordinating more e ectively the e orts of the donor community in support of Nyerere's facilitation. In particular, the donors agreed that economic assistance should be provided on a phased basis and integrated with developments in the peace process. On this the envoys and the facilitator were in agreement. Given the suspension of regional sanctions, the only remaining international leverage on the Burundian government and the intransigent Tutsis was the government's desire for a cash bailout and the normalization of its relationship with the donor community. ere was also concern that the premature legitimization of the Burundian government (in advance of a signed peace accord) would lead to a sense of abandonment by the Hutu majority and could invite greater violence. However, in a meeting that involved representatives of the Burundian government, the World Bank was more forward leaning in laying out its planned role in Burundi. It had not been part of the previous evening's donors-only strategy meeting, and that it was not in sync with the other donors did not escape the Burundian government's attention. With the sanctions issue resolved, the government shifted its focus to a full-court press in support of expanded economic cooperation with the international community.

With the sanctions issue resolved, the government shifted its focus to a full-court press in support of expanded economic cooperation with the international community.

Finally, further complicating the Arusha process, the premature contemplation of the negotiating end-game led to elevated personal rivalries and a preoccupation with who would occupy which roles in a transitional government. Tensions inevitably increased long before any agreement on the principles around which the transitional institutions would be organized. Particularly troublesome were new divisions within FRODEBU centering on Buyoya's role in a transitional government, and the continued value of the internal partnership. Some argued that with the Arusha process taking o , the internal partnership was no longer required. Others insisted that the collapse of the partnership would undermine the Arusha negotiations. What appeared to be really at issue, however, was the jockeying for power within FRODEBU, party leaders anticipating their roles in a post-Arusha transitional Burundian government. In any event, the internal conflicts within the Hutu political family made forging a common partnership position in the Arusha talks more complicated and independently further slowed the process. e working committees continued to meet and resolve the less contentious issues—but the more sensitive questions of power-sharing, judicial reform, and genocide were postponed. Moreover, the government increasingly began to warn of the dangers of a forced agreement. e process would take time, government o cials insisted. Noting the earlier failed Rwanda negotiations at Arusha, Buyoya and his allies emphasized that signatures on a paper document would mean nothing absent real political will. e ground had to be prepared for popular acceptance of whatever would be agreed at Arusha.

By August 1999, the all-parties talks were e ectively stalemated. At the same time, a number of factors contributed to a sharp escalation in political tensions inside Burundi: the weakening of the internal partnership, an army massacre of Hutus, and rebel attacks that claimed

Moreover, Mandela had made it very clear that he would be taking on the job of facilitator only reluctantly, and would be able to give the Burundi negotiations only intermittent attention. But the Tanzanians, like others who had reservations, did not want to give o ense to the South Africans or to the iconic figure of Mandela.

A New Political Dynamic

Although Mandela attempted to assuage Tanzanian concerns—a rming his intention not to redo the negotiations, but begin from where Nyerere had left o , and use the Tanzanian-led team as his own—Mandela as facilitator gave to the Arusha peace process a very di erent political dynamic. Two elements of his approach were particularly notable.

More Interventionist Facilitation

For all of its flaws, the Arusha process had produced some noteworthy progress by the time Mandela arrived on the scene. A certain comfort level had emerged among the delegations and, although the most contentious issues were far from resolution, consensus had been achieved on a number of points.

All were agreed, for example, that mechanisms needed to be established to end the culture of impunity and hold accountable those responsible for the violent episodes that had marked Burundian postindependence history regardless of whether those who had been victimized were Tutsi or Hutu. ere was also broad agreement on the need to restore democratic political institutions in which leaders would be elected and the rule of law would prevail. Also accepted

he decided on a radical change of method. Following a series of face-to-face meetings with the various Burundian delegations, Mandela decreed that the Arusha working committees would quickly conclude their work, and that the Tanzanian facilitation team would develop a document that synthesized the concluded agreements; where no agreements had yet been achieved, the facilitation team would devise a compromise between conflicting positions. e parties would then have a few weeks to review the draft accord and share their proposed amendments. It would then be up to the facilitation team to decide which of these amendments would be incorporated into the final document.

Although Mandela engendered greater confidence that a resolution was indeed achievable, his e orts to accelerate the negotiating process greatly intensified political anxieties on all sides. In e ect, under his leadership, Arusha was transformed from a facilitated peace process into, first, a mediation and, over time, into a de facto arbitration. In so doing, the Burundian participants became increasingly focused not on the achievement of their negotiating agreements, but on their attempts to influence Mandela and the members of the facilitation team. us, paradoxically, though Mandela succeeded in accelerating the pace of negotiations and increasing the sense of urgency with which the Burundian negotiators approached their task, the new approach tended—at least in the short term—to harden positions and deepen polarization rather than move the Burundians closer to agreement. Instead of being encouraged to continue their search for common ground and for compromises that would satisfy all, the parties now sought to persuade Mandela of the correctness of their respective points of view.

At the same time, Mandela's directness had several salutary e ects. He succeeded in bringing to the negotiating table the more sensitive issues that, up to the time of his intervention, the parties had tended to avoid. He put pressure on the Burundian government to dismantle the Hutu regroupment camps in the hills surrounding Bujumbura, and permit more open political expression.[35] He explicitly and repeatedly spoke of the need to end Tutsi domination, repeatedly warning that continued minority rule was a formula for continued war and insecurity. But he also spoke of the need of the majority Hutu to reassure the Tutsi minority that it need not be anxious about its future in a democratic Burundi. In that connection, he proposed that the army be composed equally of Tutsis and Hutus. By dealing so openly and directly with the issue of ethnicity, Mandela made it possible for the Burundians to begin to tackle the most sensitive and di cult issues with greater candor—even the taboo subject of amnesty for past crimes. Mandela also succeeded in persuading the Burundian parties that negotiations could not continue indefinitely, and that the time for decisions was at hand.

When Mandela did meet with the Burundian parties, he often lectured them on their responsibilities. Although his tone was often exceedingly harsh and patronizing, no one dared take public exception with this iconic figure. Mandela's intimidating aura meant that Burundi-

Increasing International Pressure

Mandela also was determined to significantly increase the pressure on the Burundians to reach agreement. He decided to further internationalize the peace process by inviting world leaders to be present when the Burundian delegations came together. Mandela was not shy—calling on all of the regional leaders, together with President Clinton and European leaders, to play a role and accept some responsibility. At one time or another, Bill Clinton from the United States, Charles Josselin from France, Peter Hain from the United Kingdom, and Louis Michel from Belgium all found their way to Arusha. On one occasion, when President Clinton was unable to travel on the assigned date, a teleconference was arranged so that he could address the assembled Burundians.

Mandela called on his American and European allies in this e ort also to commit to pro-

and he announced that a signing ceremony would be held in Arusha in a month's time, on August 28, 2000.

e South African facilitator did acknowledge that two issues were still unresolved: a cease-fire remained elusive and there was as yet no agreement on who would lead the transition. Concerning the cease-fire, Mandela welcomed the first appearance at Arusha of the FDD leader Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye. However, he did not spell out how a cease-fire agreement might be negotiated—and, Jean Bosco, for his part, made clear that he would not associate himself with the Arusha accord. As for the selection of the transitional president, Mandela asserted that it would be for the nineteen parties to meet and come up with a consensus choice.

In fact, however, the negotiating parties were far apart not only on the issue of the transitional leadership, but also on virtually all elements of the draft agreement that concerned power sharing. In particular, the draft Arusha accord was silent on what most Burundians regarded as the fundamental issue: the reform and integration of the Burundian army. From a FRODEBU perspective, the most urgent prerequisite of a stable political future for Burundi was an army that would fully represent the national population, and no longer be simply a tool to maintain Tutsi hegemony. By the same token, because the army had come to be seen by Tutsis as their last defense against the possibility of annihilation by the more numerous Hutus, no subject aroused more intense anxieties among Tutsis. e Arusha negotiators, sensitive to the complexity of this subject and re Tsun nbu efo Hu re e the the 3st C15(i)15(l)15(a)15(i)15(l)15(a)15(t)15(i)15(h)1
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a kind of facilitation fatigue had set in. Mandela and many members of the facilitation team simply wanted to be done with the Arusha process and get on with their own lives and other responsibilities. Some members of the team argued that the special envoys were undercutting their e orts by arguing that more time might be required to reach a sustainable agreement.

e results from Mandela's pressure tactics were mixed. On the positive side, his insistence

not say no to Mandela. He agreed to turn up at Arusha, and I was sent to observe the end-game negotiations, and to prepare for Clinton's arrival in Tanzania.

As I feared, by the time Clinton and the other invited heads of state had arrived in Arusha, a number of the Tutsi parties were still balking at signing the proposed accord. Mandela shared his frustration with Clinton, and asked the American president to use his speech before the Burundian delegates to press for their signatures on the agreement. As it turned out, that speech was pivotal in persuading some of the most resistant Tutsi delegations to sign the accord.

Finally, late in the evening of August 28, following speeches by Mandela and Clinton, and in the presence of a number of African heads of state and other foreign dignitaries, the Burundian parties were invited to sign the accord. All but a few of the smaller Tutsi parties did so—though a number of delegations, both Hutu and Tutsi, entered formal reservations with respect to one or another provision. Even more worrisome, however, was that the parties had been unable to reach agreement on who would lead the thirty-six-month transitional government. Likewise, neither of the armed rebel groups had agreed either to suspend military operations or to sign the Arusha agreement. Consequently, the sensitive issues of army reform and integration of the armed forces were put on hold, in recognition that these subjects required that the rebels be at the negotiating table.

After the Accord (2002–present)

After the Arusha accord was signed, the unresolved issue of the transitional leadership became the focus of continued Mandela-led consultations and negotiations. After considerable pressure from Mandela, and direct talks between the two principal political parties, FRODEBU and UPRONA, the Arusha signatories eventually agreed that the transition would be divided into two equal parts, the first part to be led by a Tutsi president and the second by a Hutu president. However, when the parties still could not settle on who the Tutsi president would be, the regional leaders accepted Mandela's recommendation that Buyoya serve the first eighteen months of the transition; Domitien Ndazizeye, a Hutu who would occupy the vice presidency during this period, would ascend to the presidency in the second half of the transitional period. With the reluctant acquiescence of the principal UPRONA and FRODEBU leaders to this

government and the CNDD-FDD. Trust levels between FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD leaders were minimal, and both FRODEBU and the rebel organization were attempting to position themselves for the long-awaited national elections. In addition, divisions within the facilitation team—both among Tanzanians and between Tanzanians and South Africans—often produced mixed messages and encouraged the belligerent parties to play o the members

single exception of the French government, insisted that the Arusha agreement and the May 1

and organizational leaders with whom we met initially, up to one hundred key Burundian leaders from all sectors—half from the political class (inclusive of the Burundian army and rebel organizations) and half from civil society. e original program was conceived as an eighteen-month venture, in which the participants (in groups of thirty to thirty-five) would be convened for an initial six-day retreat, followed every two or three months with two- and three-day follow-on training events designed to reinforce skills and strengthen relationships.

e challenge in postconflict situations is to help the parties begin to identify win-win possibilities, in which enlightened self-interest is understood as inextricably linked with the welfare of the wider community. Only in this way will former belligerents be able to move from blame-throwing to problem-solving, from adversarial confrontation to a search for common ground. Our goal was, in e ect, to build a national, cohesive leadership network that would cut across all the lines of political and ethnic division.

We secured the services of two globally renowned trainers, expert in the techniques of conflict transformation and the building of cohesion and collaborative capacity, and the first workshop of what became known as the Ngozi process (named for the initial training venue), was held in March 2003 and involved a mixed group of thirty-five key leaders.

e actual results of the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) are reported elsewhere.[36] e impact of the training initiative exceeded all expectations. Six months into the initiative, such remarkable cohesion had been established among the former belligerents that the Tutsi leaders of the Burundi army and the six Hutu rebel groups represented in the workshops asked that a workshop be organized on an urgent basis to bring together both army and rebel commanders to prepare for the implementation of the then pending cease-fire agreement. So, in November 2003, thirty-seven army and rebel commanders were brought from the battlefield into a six-day training retreat in Nairobi. At the end of the retreat, the former belligerents spoke with one voice in asking that their training experience, which had yielded

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Lessons Learned

We turn now to some of the principal lessons and policy implications that emerge from this review and analysis of the ongoing Burundi experience.

Process is fundamental to resolving conflict.

e Burundi peace process is an eloquent testament to the fundamental importance of process to successful conflict resolution. Even if one is faced with a conflict between parties whose fundamental interests are not terribly divergent, a failure to get process right can greatly impede the conflict's resolution. At least ten process lessons emerge from the Burundi experience.

1. Mutual trust and confidence are critical.

If facilitation is to succeed, a modicum of mutual trust and confidence must be established not only between the belligerent parties, but also between the parties and the facilitator. e Arusha process was inherently di cult given the deep-seated fears and suspicions the principal protagonists brought to the table. But it was made infinitely more di cult by the mutual mistrust and lack of confidence between the original facilitator, on the one hand, and some of his principal Burundian interlocutors.

2. Belligerent parties must "own" the agreements being negotiated.

One of the unfortunate aspects of the Burundi peace process was the extent to which many decisions made in the course of negotiations—particularly on matters of process, and sometimes on matters of substance—were determined by the facilitation team, rather than by the Burundian parties.

defy the facilitator, or to appear less interested than the others in supporting negotiations. But, predictably, the war continued unabated and the signed agreement lost what force it had had. Its failure to end the violence also raised questions about the prospective value of whatever agreements would subsequently be reached.

Facilitator neutrality does not mean that the facilitator cannot make or express value judgments about the social equities that may be at issue in the conflict. At the outset, all Burundians understood that Nyerere felt passionately that Tutsi hegemony and Hutu political and economic exclusion were at the center of Burundi's political conflict. Nyerere did not disguise his determination to see an end to what he had characterized as black apartheid. Even knowing that, on the basis of his open condemnation of the killing of Rl Burun-

ther delaying the start-up of serious negotiations. e rules therefore remained silent on this issue—and the smaller parties were to emerge as a constant source of irritation, frustration, and delay for both Nyerere and the delegations.

When Nelson Mandela became facilitator, the rules of the negotiating game changed dramatically—both by Mandela's decision to have the facilitation team o er a compromise draft

sages are conveyed, careful not to filter the words of an interlocutor through a lens distorted by emotional involvement. When one is angry or agitated, it is often di cult to hear accurately. Such distortions are likely to frame the negotiating process.

Listening, for a facilitator, involves more than accurate and attentive hearing. e facilita-

ligerent parties to a negotiated political settlement. e Burundi conflict was unusual in the number of special envoys appointed to work on a continuous basis with the facilitators and regional leaders. We jokingly referred to our Special Envoy Club, made up of diplomats from the United States, the European Union, Belgium, the UK, Canada, South Africa, the OAU, and the UN. In addition, France, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway, though they did not appoint special envoys, were nonetheless very engaged diplomatically in supporting the peace process.

Nyerere periodically called the envoys together to share political intelligence and consult on appropriate next steps. Zuppi did likewise. Mandela had less frequent contact with the special envoys, but invited President Clinton, President Chirac, and other heads of state to be present at key moments in the peace process to encourage or intimidate the belligerent parties to reach a negotiated settlement.

EU special envoy Aldo Ajello and I did a good deal of shuttle diplomacy among regional states, and spent considerable time in Bujumbura, listening to the parties, carrying messages to and from the facilitator, working through misunderstandings that developed, pressing the belligerent parties to be flexible and to keep their focus on their common interest.

e envoys also sought to coordinate the formal diplomacy and economic assistance provided either bilaterally or through such institutions as the United Nations and the World Bank. For the most part, we succeeded in speaking with one voice, thereby lessening the temptation of the belligerent parties to play us o against each other. We also successfully resisted the frequent attempts by the Burundian government to garner international support to move

Whatever the explanation, the harsh reality is that the international community's non-responsiveness made an intrinsically di cult process all the more challenging, for both the facilitators and the a ected Burundian parties.

A simplistic characterization of democracy as one person, one vote may interfere with sustainable resolutions to intercommunal conflicts.

One person, one vote—the shorthand definition of democracy often heard in the United States—has unsurprisingly become the rallying mantra for ethnic communities struggling against

institutional checks and balances to guard against authoritarian rule—and the institutional diversity of democratic states.

e key to the sustainability of peace agreements is long-term collaborative capacity.

31. The issue of observers was politically difficult to resolve. The government, recognizing that much of the Tutsi hard-line resistance to the Arusha process came from within Tutsi-dominated trade unions and among Tutsi businessmen, very much wanted these elements in Arusha—not as delegates but as observers. Such groups would have no role in ultimate power-sharing, but their support would be critical in addressing the difficult issues of justice, genocide, impunity, and security reform. However, Hutus, recognizing that Burundian civil society was, in large measure, simply an extension of the Tutsi power structure, feared that the government was simply attempting to stack the cards in its favor at Arusha.

32. Another consequence of the war in the neighboring DRC was that it at times posed a major distraction for both the Burundi facilitator and others—for example, Sant' Egidio's Don Matteo Zuppi, and the special envoys—who were often drawn into DRC war-related travel and consultations. Nyerere himself undertook a major trip to the DRC and was also called into Libya on a couple of different occasions to discuss DRC issues.

33. An excellent review of the state of the Arusha negotiations at the time Mandela took over as facilitator is presented in the ICG report "The Mandela Effect: Prospects for Peace in Burundi," April 18, 2000.

34. At one point, greatly underestimating the work that remained, Mandela said that he wanted President Clinton and President Chirac to join with him in Arusha to "close the deal" in February 2000, one month

About the Institute

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