



& • • • •



.

Steve, D, ..., A, ... P, ..., W., ... Ce e

* Uganda and South Africa; and as Desk O cer for Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome & Principe



STR., Stephen ..., Stephen ..., Stephen ..., S. ..., AGOA, CBI² ..., GSP³ ..., SFTA ..., H. Pa. H. N. e Sc ..., Ad a cedI e a, a S, de, J. H. ..., f

1. General Agreement on Tari s and Trade 2. Caribbean Basin Initiative 3. Generalized System of Preferences 4. Israel, Mexico and Canada, in Central America and with the Dominican Republic



* Dennis headed Ugand& ed by Naturecampaign and was one of three founding members of the Uganda Media Center

Preamble

I a e, McD. a d, La de & Ma a da a re a e ed c. d. e e e e e C. A. ca a de e e e, e e e e e c. c. d be b e a fe e ff 2015.

An Introduction

T. O. S. T. S. A. Heritage Foundation, Brookings Institution, Corporate Council on Africa, and the Wilson Center, ... S. A. S. A. S. S.

 J. 2015.

K. B. (D-CA),

H. S. AGOA

A A ..., ...,S., ...

Executive Summary

A ... To their credit, the big Ameri can boys Coca Cola, Microsoft, Walmart, GE, Procter & Gamble, amongst others continue to fly the American flag in the region. But Witney Schneidman in a recetrookingspublication argues that these represent only 1% of U.S. FDI, and U.S. exports to Africa are just over \$ 22 billion - about only 2% of worldwide exports. Besides, the big boys do not necessarily need AGOA!

Time is of the essence: AGOA expires in 2015. Be cause we mustn't wait for the 114th Congress to sit in January 2015, collaboration between Obama and the 113th Congress on a well coordinated ap proach to stave off China's influence and EU-pref erences in Africa must start soon. We recommend that the next 18 months not only be used to renew and enhance AGOA but ensure that the renewal is part of an overall US approach towards the region.

Potential Ingredients to Effective Policy

1. American stakeholders must agree that collec tivity is better than ud enos influence ad e.016 Tw 1Ah18n <</M-8(b)-9(o)12(ra)19(t015. BT /T1_1 1f 0.025

With Obama freed from having to prove heritage, a more open and aggressive commercial policy towards the region can now be implemented. Besides, Republicans who still control the House realize that century, renewing or tweaking aspects of it does their best hope to increase votes may lie in championing as many pronot do justice to recent latent synergy between the minority programs. A pro-Africa program could mean addition to the more than 100,000 AGOA created American jobs.

4. The U.S. must not be blinded by a desire to ne gotiate closer relations with Europe under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The EU policies that force African coun tries to provide preferential access for European exports in sub Saharan markets pose a clear and present danger to U.S. commercial interests and also, the survival of AGOA in its present form.


Illustrative Initiatives

A solid body of ideas and proposals for an en hanced U.S. - Africa economic partnership exists. Like already mentioned, various parties, includ ing Corporate Council on Africas well as con tinuous work by Brookings Heritageand this collaboration between Wilson Centeand Manchester Tradeare in the process of putting suggestions up for discussion.

Secondly, the current Washington trade agenda is not crowded. With the exception of possibly considering renewal of Trade Promotion Author ity (TPA) - something that could take months of consultations before a bill is presented - these are ideal conditions for crafting of successful U.S.-Africa legislation.

The WTO's DOHA Round is, at best, moribund; the Transatlantic Trade + Investment Partnership yet to be launched, and even the optimistic don't expect TPP negotiation to conclude before the end of 2013 at the earliest, meaning that any agree ment resulting from these negotiations will not be presented to congressional committees until mid 2014. This should allow time for the respective committees to complete work on a transatlantic initiative on Africa.

Whatever the case, a new U.S. - Africa program must be put through Congress' rigorous legisla tive process. Also, considering that the basic ar



other: For instance, MCC and USAID investments, address the important issue of sanctions and conin Africa should be linked, wherever possible, to ditionality. No matter how laudable, there's little loans from ExIm Bank, OPIC and USTDA.

iv. Because Congress does not treat failure kindly of AGOA benefits or a cessation of MCC or-US federal agencies may be justified in their precau AID development programs. tion. However, being much too process and-pro onerous conditionality must be dealt with im mediately or continue the risk of being further would be awhole-of-governmentoproach that al lows for the inevitability of venture failure.

v. Given the fact that Africa is still divided into 48 separate countries, the continent must work out its own trade policy in the context of integra priorities, at least, in the short term. To this, the U.S. Trade Representative must modify or delay a 'henchmen' and their families. natural proclivity to gain reciprocity from African countries in the tariff area, ensuring that AGOA is renewed or enhanced with the program's nonreciprocal status.

Nonetheless, the US should continue efforts to support American investors through such mea sures as liberalizing non-tariff measures, improv ing protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and entering into Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).

Striving to strengthen its relationship with the East African Community, the US is working on a regional Trade and Investment Framework Agree ment (TIFA). This sort of relationship intensifi cation and effort to improve regional integration conditions should be extended to other African RECs. The expectation should be that the African main reliant on fossil fuels for many years. Thus, Union and RECs will use this extended AGOA pe riod to progress towards a continental FTA + CET by the end of the decade.

We address this in Proposal 2.

iii. Relatively, all programs must re-enforce each vi. These changes to current programs should also impact on strengthening democratic practices in an African country through unilateral withdrawal

cedure driven goes against the grain of economic Instead, whenever a country is suspended or se activity, and the meme that U.S. programs have questered, US firms lose business to countries like China which simply supplant American firms, further undermining the AGOA's positive intent shunned by the private sector. The premise here even weakening the very groups that may oppose heavy handed regimes.

The deleterious effect of suspending programs with long run development outcomes beyond the restoration of democracy can be avoided by tar geted sanctions. Interpretively, ICJ proceedings, tion efforts. Thus, the U.S. must temper her trade arms embargoes, travel restrictions and freezing of assets would be imposed on 'dictators', their

> Following a military coup in Madagascar, the U.S. took unilateral action in removing that country's AGOA eligibility. However, this very action not only affected the economy, but especially the Malagasy women producing under AGOA.

In a parallel illustration. American businesses in the Democratic Republic of Congo lost vantage points to Chinese investment when the country was removed from those benefitting from AGOA. While this sanction was meant to end barbarous practices used by both sides in that country's civil war, America's reaction had no discernible impact - except to cause a direct hit to U.S. investors.

We recommend that automatic + unilateral sus pension of benefits be replaced with a collective approach. For example, peer pressure by one or more African countries on dictatorial neighbors has been effective in 'helping' West African lead ers be more democratically conscious.

vii. Given present technology, Africa should re while we support special incentives to promote the use of clean energy, the US must lift prohibi tions on supporting fossil fuel development when cleaner forms of energy are not feasible or com petitive.

