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**THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT  
WORKING PAPER SERIES**

**Christian F. Ostermann, Series Editor**

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- #54 Péter Vámos, "Evolution and Revolution: Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution"
- #55 Guyore3rd Revolution: 7wdtti3The QJ0 Gordtio33Eingove33OP6sA33W33H33Egyp33(ou33Q33R33e33g33)33#33Ce33R

## **Special Working Papers Series**

#1 Mark Kramer, "Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981"





**The Interkit Story:  
A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship**

James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Péter Vámos, and David Wolff

The tumultuous relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—from alliance to bitter falling out to violent border clashes to frigid standoff to wary warming—was one of the main plotlines of the Cold War narrative; and the central drama in the evolution of the communist world from mighty ideological and geopolitical monolith (at least on the surface) and rival to the American-led “free world” to nasty schism to ultimate fragmentation and collapse. Thanks to the progressive opening of both Chinese and Soviet (and Soviet-bloc) sources and archives, the years since the Cold War's conclusion have seen an outpouring of new scholarly accounts of the creation, short life, and dissolution of the alliance forged by Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong in Moscow in February 1950.<sup>1</sup> Most recently, detailed studies by Lorenz

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<sup>1</sup> For examples of important publications of new evidence on the Sino-Soviet relationship beginning in the early 1990s—not including broader studies of Chinese and Soviet foreign policy and history by such figures as Chen Jian and Vladislav Zubok that, inter alia, deal with this subject—see, e.g., Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 1998); Wu Lengxi,

M. Lüthi and Sergey Radchenko, building on Chinese, Russian, and other records, have tracked the story through the mid-1960s, bringing the tale beyond Khrushchev's ouster and up to the early stages of the Cultural Revolution's chaos and concurrent sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict and competition.<sup>2</sup>

However, comparatively little fresh scholarship or published new evidence from communist sources has emerged on Sino-Soviet relations during the second half of the post-World War II superpower confrontation—from the shrill rhetoric and frenzied rallies of the Cultural Revolution and the military buildups and bloody fighting along the remote, disputed Ussuri River frontier in the late 1960s, to the rapprochement two decades later, epitomized by the chaotic May 1989 summit in Be

because of the financial and linguistic challenges inherent in scouring relevant archives in various countries of the former communist realm, even if they have already been opened.

To stimulate and support scholarly inquiry into the largely untold story of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and relationship during the latter decades of the Cold War, we have launched a project to collect and assess archival sources from the now partially-open Russian archives and generally-open archives of the Warsaw Pact

Building on that study, we are taking a far broader approach. We aim to illuminate relations between the entire Soviet bloc and China over more than a two-decade period rather than focusing on one particular Warsaw Pact ally. Besides seeking records related to the Interkit process itself, we recognize that it is also crucial to collect and disseminate evidence on higher-level debates and exchanges such as records of summits and politburo meetings, cable traffic between Soviet-bloc foreign ministries and their embassies in Beijing, and bilateral inter-party exchanges. For at least the initial phase of this project, we are focusing on Russian and ECE archives, since post-1965 Chinese archival records remain extremely difficult to access (the Foreign Ministry Archives in Beijing has only processed and opened files until that date); for that matter, the extent of Chinese awareness of “Interkit” remains uncertain, although the outlines of its “differentiation” strategy are well known.

The project grew out of an initial exploration of Interkit by Prof. David Wolff in 2003 when (not yet aware of Gardet’s work) he assembled Russian and East German archival records (in particular a stenogram of the group’s second meeting, in Berlin in 1969, from SAPMO, a depository for the SED records) for a presentation at a conference in Budapest devoted to using Central and East European archives on the Cold War in Asia; Wolff subsequently published his early findings in *Russian History*.<sup>5</sup> Our efforts to look into this topic have benefitted, over the years, from parallel endeavors by CWIHP and the Parallel History Project, including an oral history conference on Sino-East European relations in Beijing in March 2004 and the posting of pertinent materials on the PHP website.<sup>6</sup>

This new effort to collect a wider range of sources—not only documents from various Warsaw Pact countries but also oral history evidence from participants—is overseen by Prof. Wolff at the Slavic Research Center (SRC) of Hokkaido University in Sapporo, Japan, in collaboration with the Cold War International History Project and other academic institutions. In February 2010, the SRC, along with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and CWIHP, organized

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*Quarterly on China and Europe Since 1978: A European Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), did not even substantially address Sino-E

a second Budapest workshop, hosted by Dr. Péter Vámos and focused on Interkit and Sino-Soviet relations, to gather international perspectives from archives in the region and beyond, collect oral history testimony from Hungarian participants in the Interkit process, and brainstorm future activities (See Appendix III for program). Hungarian, Polish, Czech and Mongolian documents were added to the German and Russian materials available earlier. A second workshop is now scheduled to take place in Freiburg, Germany—also hosted by Dr. Vámos—in May 2011; there are also plans in the works for further documentary and oral history workshops.

In this working paper, we present an initial sampling of translated documents to outline Interkit’s shadowy existence, together with a contextual introduction that outlines our current knowledge of the group’s existence and raises some key questions about its function and activities. Did it actually influence or even shape Kremlin policy toward China and perceptions of what was happening there? Or was it primarily a transmission belt to spread propaganda, coordinate policy, and enforce orthodoxy among Moscow’s allies? Was it an accurate barometer of the shifting Sino-Soviet relationship, or did a particular faction—most likely the hard-line Soviet China experts led by party stalwart Oleg Rakhmanin—sometimes dominate or distort Interkit’s proceedings to advocate its own policies or maneuver in bureaucratic struggles over how to deal with the PRC? To what extent, if at all, did non-Soviet China experts use the regular gatherings to develop their own approaches, if not in the plenary sessions (where disagreements tended to be smoothed over) then in more private bilateral talks? Were the effects of China’s “differentiation” strategy evident in the Interkit proceedings? Did Beijing closely track the organization, or try to influence its activities or outcomes, either directly (through contacts with participants) or indirectly?

These are among the questions we will be exploring in our Interkit project, along with others that will em

narrative also tended to dominate, or at least heavily influence, both policy toward and academic studies of China in their own countries.

Mikhail S. Kapitsa,<sup>7</sup> Oleg B. Rakhmanin,<sup>8</sup> Mikhail I. Sladkovskii,<sup>9</sup> and Sergei L. Tikhvinskii were the Big Four and maintained a firm hold on all studies of China, from the commanding heights of four interlocking institutions. In addition, the last three names were among a small group of “counselor-experts” selected to participate in various party analyses “of the Chinese problem.”<sup>10</sup> By the early 1980s, Kapitsa had become the deputy foreign minister (after a long tenure as director of the Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern Department), Rakhmanin worked as first deputy director of the Department for Relations with Fraternal Countries (known simply as THE Department), Sladkovskii oversaw several hundred specialists as director of the Institute of the Far East, while Tikhvinskii trained diplomats as the head of the Soviet Union’s Diplomatic Academy. During the final six years of the Brezhnev era, this quartet produced over 200 articles and books, providing unerring semi-official guidance to Soviet China experts, academics and journalists regarding the party line.<sup>11</sup> Two of the Sinological “gang of four,” Rakhmanin and Sladkovskii, were also Interkit leaders. As the directors of China-policy in the Central Committee and of the Institute of the Far East, these two individuals represented the two streams of policy-oriented China-watching that would be merged into Interkit, shaping elite and popular perceptions of the Middle Kingdom throughout the Warsaw pact.<sup>12</sup>

closest student of Soviet Sinology in the 1960s-1980s, has observed that: “Only after 1967 was a concerted effort made to explain what had happened and was happening in the PRC...At the end of the 1960s Soviet Chinese studies reached their maturity. From this time to 1982 they would be marked by voluminous output, stable organization, and a consistent prevailing outlook on Chinese society. This outlook was an amplification of emerging views from the mid 1960s; so there was no fundamental change in thinking for about two decades under Brezhnev’s and Suslov’s leadership...”<sup>13</sup> Such was the fate of Soviet Sinology during the later ye

Moscow's wartime Western allies, the Comintern was reinvented in 1947 in the form of the Cominform—an "information bureau" of the nascent communist bloc, employed by Stalin effectively to bring the East Europeans into line with Soviet policies and punish transgressors (i.e. Yugoslavia).

Most people who know something of Soviet history—or history of communism in general—will have heard about these two institutions. Few have heard of the third—and last—Soviet effort to institutionalize conformity through party channels. This introduction recounts the rise and fall of the little known Interkit—the China International—a series of meetings held interchangeably in the different capitals of the socialist bloc since 1967. The purpose of these meetings was to force Soviet views of the Chinese threat on Moscow's allies—the East Europeans and the Mongols at first, but later the Cubans, the Laotians and the Vietnamese—and to keep these allies in line with the confrontational Soviet policy in the face of tireless Chinese efforts to split up the ranks of Soviet followers. Through the party channels the conclusions of a small group of Soviet functionaries were brought to bear on the press and academia not only in the USSR but also across the bloc and, for a generation, defined what, when, and how something could be said about China.

Where had this initiative to coordinate China-related research and propaganda sprung from? The origins of the Interkit process go back to the Sino-Soviet split, which had divided the international communist movement. The Sino-Soviet rivalry was a defining factor in the relations between the Soviet bloc and China during the second half of the Cold War. From the late 1950s, the Chinese leadership made it increasingly clear that it was unwilling to remain a subordinated member of an alliance led by the Soviet Union. At first, China's pursuit of an independent posture was disguised in ideological garb—Mao Zedong accused the Soviet leadership of restoring capitalism and attempting to subvert the revolution through peaceful cooperation with the United States. In the 1960s, however, some of this ideological phraseology wore off, and the Sino-Soviet conflict deteriorated into a vitriolic power struggle that nearly boiled over into a full-blown war over a border dispute in 1969.



communist bloc and in the third world. Beijing of course aspired to win over Moscow's closest allies as well, courting in particular the GDR, Hungary, and Poland (Albania had already defected from the Soviet-bloc to side with China in 1960-61, and a few years later Romania began to stake out a more equidistant position, though Bucharest did not go so far as Tirana in its warmth toward Mao's regime).

Starting from the early 1960s, Beijing identified states as friendly, unfriendly, or hostile, based on their relations with the PRC and their attitudes toward its enemies—in the case of East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union. China distinguished among the socialist states based on their degree of autonomy from the USSR, a policy referred to as a “differentiated” approach toward the socialist community. In 1964, Liu Shaoqi compared Beijing's treatment of socialist countries to how peasants planted rice: “each plant has to be treated separately.”<sup>14</sup> Using this method, Beijing wanted to test the firmness of these countries' alliance with the Soviet Union and the Soviet capacity to control its satellites. The policy of differentiation played on the various nuances and changes in the domestic political and economic situation of socialist countries, and was characterized by Chinese attempts to penetrate into domestic life, to undermine and shake the unity of the Soviet bloc, and to spread China's influence in various strata of the population, including the intellectuals and the young people.

To be sure, China focused its struggle on the Soviet Union. Chinese foreign policy considered relations with individual states and with the whole socialist camp as a derivative of Sino-Soviet relations, and subordinated its bloc-policy to its policy toward the Soviet Union. The relationship between China and the Soviet satellites was probably best described by Hungarian leader János Kádár in April 1970: “as to the essence of the issue, the crucial question is what the Chinese intend to do in relation to the Soviet Union. In their eyes, we are only puppets.”<sup>15</sup> Of course, the Chinese would have felt justified in doubting ECE independence had they read a 1972 internal Polish party report [**Document 12**] flatly declaring: “The fundamental principle of our policy toward China is to fully cooperate with the Soviet Union—our main ally.”

The Soviet attitude toward the development of relations between its satellites and China was first reactive and later preemptive. During the first phase of ideological debates, Moscow

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<sup>14</sup> Hungarian MFA, 4<sup>th</sup> Territorial Department, China Desk, György Újlaki's report: Foreign Policy of the PRC and Sino-Hungarian relations during the past year. Budapest, 7 July 1964 HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína- 26-00153/1964,.

<sup>15</sup> Minutes of the HSWP Politburo Meeting on 7 April 1970 HNA, p. 12, M-KS-288f-5.a-515. .e.,.

showed great sensitivity toward each Chinese move and reacted immediately. By the second half of the sixties, however, the Soviet leadership, convinced that the radicalism of the Chinese Cultural Revolution effectively scared off most would-be adherents of Maoism on the international stage, merely felt the need to take prophylactic measures in order to avoid unexpected situations. One of the most effective preventive methods was the close coordination of China policies with allies in the socialist camp.

The Soviets intended to control all spheres of cooperation between their satellites and the PRC, from economic and cultural relations to more sensitive scientific and technological cooperation, not to mention military or party-to-party contacts. Even the annual bilateral trade agreements with the detailed list of export and import goods were subject to Soviet approval. The close coordination of China policies was implemented on different levels, including meetings of the top leaders, ministers and deputy ministers in Moscow or in other capitals, meetings of “friendly” ambassadors in Beijing, regular meetings of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Party Central Committee International Department officials, meetings of China specialists from government organizations and research institutes, and consultations of Soviet diplomats with government officials and party workers. ECE diplomats were summoned to Moscow for consultations, and one of the main tasks of the satellites’ diplomats in Beijing was to coordinate their countries’ steps with their allies, primarily with the Soviet Union. The Soviets stressed the importance of mutual exchange of information, and of the united resistance to China’s differentiation strategy.

When all hell (later to be known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) broke loose in China in the summer of 1966, the Soviets, like the rest of the world, were stupefied by the pointlessness of the violence and the overwrought adulation of Mao’s image, but they were also horrified and outraged by the vitriolic anti-Soviet (and anti-Russian) fervor that accompanied the chaos.<sup>16</sup> By that winter, the venomous insults and accusations hurled at Soviet leaders, along with frenzied round-the-clock protests around the Soviet embassy in Beijing and harassment of Soviet diplomats, generated serious concern in Moscow (where Chinese students passing through the capital even protested in Red Square in front of the Holy of Holies, Lenin’s

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<sup>16</sup> On the Cultural Revolution, see in particular Roderick MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao’s Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

Tomb). Was China's tumult simply a domestic crisis? Or did Mao's actions imply a serious military threat in addition to the now open competition for leadership of the communist (and post-colonial Third) world? Amid rising fears of war, facing a new and evidently more serious challenge from their erstwhile ally, the Kremlin leaders took a series of steps. After a period of restraint following Khrushchev's ouster two years earlier, they returned to open criticism of Mao and his policies—in December 1966 party boss Leonid Brezhnev took off the gloves and resumed polemics in a major speech to a CPSU CC plenum, and two months later, when he met in London with British leader Harold Wilson, Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin—as he was being hung and burned in effigy by protesters in Beijing—seemed “obsessed” by the Chinese (their “bacilla of hatred”) and spoke of them “the way Pakistanis talk about Indians.” Rallying communists around the world to try to isolate the CCP virus, the Soviet leaders stepped up efforts to organize a collective of like-minded fraternal parties that could collectively denounce Beijing. Amid eased relations with the West with the settlement of the Berlin and Cuban crises (despite intensified tensions over Vietnam), they quietly built up Soviet military forces along the Sino-Soviet border and, after 1967, in Mongolia.<sup>17</sup>

And, puzzled and alarmed by Beijing's enmity and its ferocity, they decided to found a closed institute (*zakrytyi institut*) to study the Far East, mainly China. Its importance was such that a number of *nomenklatura* appointments were involved, *valiuta* (hard currency) was allotted to purchase Western literature on China, and a new building was constructed, standing to this day in somewhat dilapidated state near the Profsoiuznaia Metro station. The Institute of the Far East was set up in 1966—partly to help the Soviet leadership understand what was happening in China, and partly as a place of employment for numerous China experts who had become redundant now that Sino-Soviet relations had been downsized to the long-distance barrage of hostile propaganda. Within a few months of the Institute's founding, a second China-related move was undertaken. The leading China specialist, Oleg Rakhmanin hosted a delegation of heads and deputy heads of party CC International Departments from ECE socialist countries and Mongolia in Moscow in December 1967 to coordinate China policy.

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<sup>17</sup> On these steps, see esp. Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens*, chap. 4; Kosygin's attitude was recounted by British officials to U.S. officials in U.S. embassy (London) telegram no. 6315 (Bruce), 6 February 1967, SUNFLOWER folder, box 255, National Security Files, Country Files, Vietnam, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.

The initiative for what was later institutionalized as Interkit may have actually come from Poland. Although the Polish leader Wladislaw Gomulka had earlier opposed tough Soviet policies on China (for example, he resisted Khrushchev's efforts to bring Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact in 1963, which would have been a slap in the face for the Chinese),<sup>18</sup> by 1967 he was in no mood to defend Beijing. "There are absurd things happening" in China, the Polish leader told Brezhnev as the Cultural Revolution intensified; the disturbed Soviet leader agreed that the "Chinese problem must be

The Germans and Mongolians came out strongly for this agenda for forging a common front to

leadership feared that the Soviet leadership might apply the Brezhnev doctrine to China as well, and began to consider an attack from the North as the greatest threat to its national security.<sup>21</sup>

After the invasion, East Central Europe appeared in Chinese propaganda in two contexts. On the one hand, Beijing virulently attacked those countries which participated in the action, terming them collaborators of Soviet revisionists—even though Mao had little sympathy for the goals of the Prague Spring (which in essence represented the very opposite of Mao's continuous revolution). But at the same time, the Chinese press described the Warsaw Pact and Comecon member states as victims of the exploitative and oppressive policies of Soviet imperialism. In early 1969, China launched renewed propaganda attacks against Soviet neocolonialism in Southeast Asia and Eastern Eur

delegation's desire to please, and possibly an understanding that Sinology in the Warsaw Pact was often strongest beyond the borders of the USSR. "We are of the opinion," stated Rumiantsev, "that the publication of documents and articles provided by the fraternal parties about the Chinese question was and is extremely significant. We consider this form of coordination and mutual aid in our shared affairs to be most important and promising."<sup>22</sup>

Eager to avoid the tensions regarding the appropriate approach to China that marked discussion among the Warsaw Pact allies throughout the early 1960s, the Soviets listened attentively to reports from the other countries' delegates. But numerous details make clear the Soviet initiative and continued enthusiasm for this project. For example, when the head of the East German International Department within the Central Committee, Paul Markovski, welcomed the heads of the guest delegations punctually at 10 AM on January 28, he addressed them in alphabetical order in German, starting with Bulgaria (Bulgarien in German) and ending with Hungary (Ungarn in German). Tellingly, when three days later, a protocol was adopted unanimously by all present, the list of signers, while still beginning with Bulgaria, continued with Hungary and Germany, for in Russian "Vengerskaia Narodnaia Respublika" and "Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika" come before Mongolia. Clearly a translation from the Russian, the meeting's conclusions had been drafted by the Russians for approval by their allies.

Rumiantsev suggested the removal of the word "Secret" from the first page of the joint protocol. In a show of trust, he insisted that each party should make its own decisions on the document's use, not limited by the strict rules on the circulation of classified documents.<sup>23</sup> Rumiantsev may also have assumed that Beijing would get the document anyway. It is impossible to say if the broader writ and tighter coordination of Interkit helped provoke the Chinese attack at Zhenbao Island, but it could only have contributed to the spirit of combative retaliation in the spring of 1969. The Chinese dubbed the Interkit "fanhua guoji"—"The anti-China International."

The bloody border clashes in March 1969 marked the nadir of relations between the two countries. At the 9th CCP Congress in April 1969, convened after a thirteen-year interval, the Chinese party denied the existence of the socialist camp and made anti-Sovietism part of its

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<sup>22</sup> RGANI F.4, op.19, d. 525, l. 29, 107-110,.

<sup>23</sup> G3(t)5.8 1e5(o8-3.84m)12.9aJanu.44f04f1184mm 4pp.84msu.g32.84msu3-3.84msu21( th6.84msu,.2 cl)SAPMO

official policy which remained the key elements of Chinese foreign policy throughout the seventies. But the Party Congress also set in motion processes that had positive effects on relations between China and the Soviet bloc. Mao's aim was to strengthen moderate forces within the leadership, to break out from self-imposed isolation and to implement a more rational foreign policy. During the next few months, most Chinese ambassadors returned to their posts (which they had vacated during the Cultural Revolution) and the PRC established diplomatic relations with countries such as Italy, Turkey, Austria and Canada. One of the results of the Chinese opening was the Kosygin—Zhou Enlai meeting at the Beijing Airport on 11 September 1969. The most positive aspect of the meeting between the two prime ministers was that they met at all. Relations returned from the battlefield to the conference table. Both sides set forth their own positions, but could not reach an agreement on any disputed issues.

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In the seventies, the orientation of anti-Soviet Chinese foreign policy shifted to a united front strategy – or what Mao called a “horizontal line” – which was to include any country opposing the Soviet Union, irrespective of ideological position. Even the United States, the once number-one enemy, had a role to play in the united front along with Western European capitalist countries and the Third World.

The basic Chinese attitude toward East-Central Europe was cautious openness. Beijing attempted to establish semi-official channels of informal exchange first, primarily in scientific and technological cooperation, gradually increased the amount of bilateral trade and initiated small steps in other areas. The PRC denied the existence of the socialist community; the Soviet Union and its closest allies were not considered socialist, but instead condemned as opportunist and revisionist. China excluded the possibility of re-establishing inter-Party relations, but showed willingness to improve state-to-state relations on the basis of Panch Shila, the five principles of peaceful coexistence agreed to by China and India (i.e., Zhou Enlai and Nehru) in 1954.<sup>24</sup> Only Albania was considered as truly socialist (even though in the 1970s Tirana increasingly fell out of step with China's foreign policy orientation). Socialist Vietnam, North

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<sup>24</sup> The five principles are: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual ndn).CafIJ-3n-.0003 ; no Twed







will be forced to use a not small portion of its economic and m

consideration the indications and recommendations worked out by the [Interkit] meeting.”<sup>35</sup> By 1973, when the group met again in Moscow, the Interkit mandate had been extended further with the meeting’s agenda including “coordinating work in the fields of foreign policy, economic relations, and propaganda, as well as the reconciliation of scientific research on the Chinese question [**Document 13**].”

Soviet commitment to Interkit also increased with Moscow delegates prepared to push their points in various ways. Moscow’s instructions encouraged Soviet delegates to be optimistically aggressive and report to their Interkit comrades that “the Chinese leaders are

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### III. From Mao's Death to the Death of Interkit

Mao's death in September 1976 did not result in a breakthrough for Sino-Soviet relations. Even as China embarked on the road to reforms in 1978, tensions continued to mount. A major catalyst for this enduring hostility was the Soviet Union's ever friendlier ties with Vietnam, sealed in November 1978 with a treaty of alliance aimed principally against China. Oiled by a constant flow of arms and economic aid from the USSR and emboldened by postwar triumphalism, Hanoi took on the role of regional power. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 to depose Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime effectively showed Vietnam's neighbors—especially China—who really was in charge in Southeast Asia. The Chinese did not take lightly to this challenge, resorting to a brief border war in February 1979 to “teach Vietnam a lesson.” The war having ended inconclusively, the real lesson was for China: that it had been encircled by hostile communist nations, and that deliverance lay in strengthening the anti-Soviet united front.

Soviet global strategy, Deng Xiaoping told visiting US Vice President Walter Mondale in August 1979, was like a “barbell,” with one side anchored in the Middle East, as shown in the Soviet push toward the Indian Ocean, and the other—in Southeast Asia. “If we do not try to frustrate their attack from this strategic perspective, then they would gain the strategic initiative in Asia and the Pacific.”<sup>47</sup> Frustrating these Soviet schemes required closer relations with Japan and the United States. The Japanese, who had normalized relations with Beijing after the Sino-American opening, signed a 1978 Friendship Treaty with China, prompting angry calls by the Soviet hardliners to “serve the Japanese some of their own [medicine]” (wisely vetoed by the more pragmatic Kremlin policymakers).<sup>48</sup> Sino-American normalization in December 1978 reinforced Soviet suspicion of collusion between Beijing and Washington, but seasoned observers like Kapitsa tended to downplay the prospects of an outright entente, not because

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<sup>47</sup> Memorandum of conversation between Vice President Walter Mondale and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 28 August 1979, p. 6, China/US Meetings/Trips, 5/18-9/82 (binder 3 of 7), box 92355, Douglas H. Paal files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA.

<sup>48</sup> Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheni'ia, 1994), 276.

Deng's anti-Soviet outlook knew the bounds of reason but because "the American public correctly understands the danger of the US being pulled into China's anti-Soviet policy."<sup>49</sup>

Under these circumstances, Interkit remained central to the Soviet effort to keep a tab on what other socialist countries were doing in relations with China, lest Moscow's allies became tempted to bury the hatchet of anti-Chinese sentiment.





ahead to work out the materials and draft conclusions, thus neutralizing any Polish resistance, the SED made 43 proposals for modifications of the final texts, many of which passed. In particular, the East Germans insisted on the removal of the phrase “Eurasian opportunism,” an attempt by Moscow to link Beijing to the dangers of Eurocommunism. A fresh analysis of realities in China was also demanded [**Document 20**].<sup>53</sup>

Rakhmanin was able to fend off significant change in 1980, but by the May 1982 Sofia Interkit meeting, the SED delegation had an explicit directive to push for an “active policy toward China, corresponding to the long term interests of socialism and peace...” Interestingly, the main battleground was the interpretation of Brezhnev’s March 24 speech in Tashkent, which appeared to signal Soviet willingness to mend fences with China. The SED and Cuban representatives wanted to consider this a major initiative on which they could follow up, while Rakhmanin counseled against an erroneous interpretation. For him, Brezhnev’s speech had simply been a tactical move in line with previous policies and its importance was not to be exaggerated.<sup>54</sup>

Gromyko's First Deputy Viktor Mal'tsev put it a few days later, "the foam has gone down but the beer remains," meaning: "the essence of Maoist policy remains unchanged."<sup>55</sup>

Whatever the disagreements, the China Commission adopted a 12-page document in Rakhmanin's style, which singled out Honecker for criticism, and proposed measures to bolster domestic conformity, lest Soviet China scholars or journalists step out of line. The Politburo endorsed both the document of the Chinese Commission and Rakhmanin's report, although Brezhnev reportedly protested feebly that the Tashkent line would have to be continued. Brezhnev's foreign policy aide Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov was furious with Rakhmanin's interference, as was Ponomarev's deputy at the International Department Anatoly Chernyaev who refused to sign Rakhmanin's report despite the latter's threats to take the

become part of the Chinese ‘broad anti-Soviet united front.’” The anxious Ambassador





substance of Gorbachev's policy. The latter "objected, saying that he does not see the 'difference' and is not inclined to withdraw the

**APPENDIX I:**

**SELECTED TRANSLATED SO**



revisionists. Besides, the development of events testifies to this. The 18 [provincial party] committees have been either broken up or attacked. Apparently, a kind of situation has emerged over there, which was considered very dangerous by a particular group within the Chinese leadership.

It is clear from many statements that those who wanted to get closer to “the modern Khrushchevite revisionism” were represented in the party. This is understandable. Besides, it could not happen otherwise given the failure of their foreign policy. One has to only point to Bandung II, the events in Indonesia, etc. This was a bankruptcy of their policy. People must have given this some thought.

Given the situation of the war intensification in Vietnam, when the masses are being mobilized to fend off the U.S. aggression, there were surely those in the party who questioned

The question arises: why were the Red Guards created in the first place? It seems that they were created, most of all, in order to spread fear among the society and the party organizations. A particular situation then arises, that is, people are scared. Subsequently, they begin to adapt to the new situation. Or perhaps it was difficult to do this by using the normal administrative methods and means. Because when you get rid of [the first] secretary, then you need to create some kind of accusations. Then, a discussion will ensue. Apparently, they thought that this method wouldn't reach their goals.

We are currently in a situation where we actually don't know who is in charge of all of this. There is no doubt that these are not spontaneous phenomena, because the addresses are being given, they point out who should be attacked. There is some kind of a power center. Whether there are seven of them, or perhaps a bigger circle of people, we don't know. We know, however, that many people have been removed from the leadership itself. For example, they removed Peng Zhen, whom we know very well and who chastised "the revisionists" with foam in his mouth during our meetings. Liu Shaoqi is silent. We know that he has been removed from a series of positions he held. Also, a whole bunch of other people are being silent, for example, Deng Xiaoping, about whom we haven't heard anything recently. They have not been announcing any changes in leadership for years. This is why we don't know who is actually in charge of all of this.

There is no doubt that there's an internal struggle within the party. It is being played out

In connection with this topic, I would like to move on to the issue of the world conference of communist and workers' parties...I spoke about this issue w

**Gomu ka:** ... Now the issue of Johnson's statement...The [U.S.] administration decided to take a step in order to strengthen its propaganda position, as well as to in fact get closer to the USSR.

This rapprochement, in our opinion, serves two purposes:

- I. To show that despite the war in Vietnam, they are able to come to an understanding with the USSR...
- II. They want to all the more pit the Chinese against the USSR, that is, if one is able to do more in this area. This would be very convenient for the US since this situation could lead to a further exacerbation of relations between the USSR and China, not even excluding a military conflict. This is a classic example of a policy conducted by the imperialist nation. We should also take into consideration this second goal.

[...]

[15 October]

[...]

**Brezhnev:** The Vietnam issue. We fully agree with your opinion that we need to know the real position and aims of the policy conducted by the Vietnamese Workers' Party. However, so far we have not been able to achieve anything on this end. We see the reflection of their dependence on the Chinese. We have done a lot to persuade the Vietnamese to sensible negotiations...

We are in full agreement with your analysis regarding China. I would only like to emphasize that our position will change on this issue. The situation has changed so much that we are of the opinion that we should tell our party and the nation everything. We will provide them with the assessment of these events.

I think that some kind of a misunderstanding took place between us regarding the issue of the conference of 17 parties. We consider this conference as useful. I only wanted to say that this phase is over. When it comes to an international conference, then our positions are the same. We think that we should present the issue openly, that is, without talking about the date or place for this conference. Our propositions were of a fully preliminary nature. The main point is eliminate

the ban of talking [?] about the issue of the conference. How we will go about it, then this is another matter which demands a more thorough planning [thinking].

The Chinese problem must be investigated. We don't know what the "Cultural Revolution" will lead to. They have already held campaigns to eliminate flies, sparrows, and so on. But, currently this campaign is a political one. I think that some kind of a social opposition took place over there. Chen Yi said clearly that the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to avoid a state coup in China.

Some kind of a struggle must be going on over there. The CC CCP has 180 members, while at the latest plenum, according to the published documents, there were only 86 present. Where are the rest? Were they perhaps eliminated or removed from the CC? We know that they have removed an additional 10 members from the CC following the latest [August 1966] plenum. All of this testifies to the complicated nature of processes that are taking place over there.

The list of the members of the highest Chinese leadership was not published by mistake either. We agree with you. We will try to get to know the processes taking place in China. We also know very little of what is going on over there. Our embassy is working in exceptionally difficult conditions. And, just as in other socialist countries, we do not carry out intelligence activities.

[...]

## **Document No. 2**

### **Minutes of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee meeting, 12 April 1967**

**(excerpts)**

*[Source: Hungarian National Archives (HNA) M-KS-288. f. 4. cs. 87. .e. Obtained by Péter Vámos, and translated by Gwennyth A. Jones and Péter Vámos for CWIHP.]*

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## **MINUTES**

**of the Central Committee meeting held on 12 April 1967**

Agenda

1. Presentation on international questions



are not appropriate for the degree to which productive forces are developed, and are restricting China's economic development. These cadres represent Mao Zedong's opponents.

The present situation shows that the struggle against opponents has ended up with a split. It appears that the opposition of the Party and state apparatus is stronger than presumed. There are conflicts within the military leadership, the result of earlier dismissals. The anarchy of worrying measures has saturated the life of the country. The events have increased the international isolation of the Communist Party of China, with more Parties turning away from them. These reasons may have compelled Mao Zedong and his milieu to reduce the vehemence of the struggle and seek a compromise.

Although Mao Zedong's ideas indicate failure, it is too early to speak of defeat. It is impossible to sidestep him while he is alive because of his unquestionable popular authority. It is characteristic that his opponents have not dared take their struggles against him to a personal level, but rather sabotaged the Mao Zedong line. Regarding the future, and as we saw after the failure of the Great Leap Forward of 1958, it seems likely that the slogans will remain the same, but with new content.

Comrade Gomulka said that the great deficiency in the work of our like-minded Parties is that we were not able to resolve the analysis appropriate to the Chinese situation, or inform our Party members and public opinion. Our propaganda dealt with the extremists and sensational elements, and traced events back to one person's subversive thoughts. What is missing is the deeper connections of the events, the introduction and analysis of China's different relations. We must also see that forces opposing the Mao Zedong line cannot automatically be called adherents of friendship with the Soviet Union. However complicated the situation appears, we must still eliminate this deficiency in our communications.

We must strive in future to maintain relations and guard existing positions. The conduct of the Soviet Union is exemplary in this regard. At the time of the Peking atrocities, Comrade Brezhnev et. al. proceeded in cold blood and with great political prudence. The Western-10.1.0324 Twcif4 T



Comrade Kádár pointed out to the Soviet comrades as well as to the Polish comrades that we held similar information and reached the same conclusions. We too see that the struggle is not yet over, and a dénouement in the near future is unlikely. The unbalanced situation could last for years, and we will need to take into account further surges of internal contradictions, flare ups and restraints.

The most recent events represented a great loss of prestige for the Chinese Party not only internationally, but also internally. The people expect from the new socialist social system not only material welfare, but law and order, a secure livelihood, and respect for human dignity. If the cornerstones of social order disappear, this can affect the credence and authority of the system.

The defeat of Mao Zedong's concept could disillusion the youth and part of the Party membership not only in their leaders' theories, but also in communism.

The development of the Chinese events will in all probability be the great question of our lives and struggle in the forthcoming years. In connection with various international problems we must time and again take into account China's extremist behavior. On the day-to-day level, we must consider that positive steps to improve relations with the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China cannot be expected. The Chinese will be absent from the common front for years, they will not have a positive influence over our common struggle, but it is possible that the negative influence of their actions might diminish in the international sphere.

[Pages 20-24, Excerpts from the discussion of the China issue]

**Comrade SÁNDOR NÓGRÁDI:**

Respected Central Committee!

I request to speak mainly to break the silence which has been present at the discussion of international questions during the last meeting of the Central Committee. In the information briefing at the last meeting, Comrade Komócsin raised some very interesting questions and we were informed, perhaps incorrectly, that speeches imparting information do not require a response. This is not the case! In the communist movement

*The Interkit Story:*

he or his followers would give up the fight. Who are his followers? Those who have been sawn off in at least 10-15 provinces. Communists, communists, at least half of them. These are his followers and the masses attached to them. And this is already tens of millions of people, or even





American imperialism's aggression against the Vietnamese nation, the socialist countries are faced with an urgent need to coordinate their actions in order to provide support to the Vietnamese nation to such a degree as to force the imperialism to stop the aggression. This is why six socialist countries are turning to the CCP leadership with an ardent appeal to, in the face of this grave situation, agree to take place in the consultations regarding a joint and coordinated

fulfill the role of its ardent helper and supporter. What kind of unity are we then talking about here?

In the process of the conversation, Liu Ningyi ac

The entire conversation, except for an introductory statement of Comrade Z. Kliszko was characterized by harsh polemics. At the end of the conversation, Liu Ningyi, having briefly consulted with the Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and after a moment of hesitation, finally accepted the letter handed over to him by Comrade Kliszko.

**Document No. 4**

**Minutes of HSWP Politburo meeting, 18 July 1967**

*[Source: HNA M-KS-288. f. 5. cs. 430. .e. Obtained for CWIHP by Péter Vámos and translated for CWIHP by Gwennyth A. Jones and Péter Vámos.]*

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**MINUTES**

**of the Political Committee meeting held on 18 July 1967**

HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Prepared in 2 copies

INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT

Budapest, 14 July 1967

[...]

**PROPOSAL**

~~to the HSWP CC Secretariat~~

to the Political Committee

At the meeting of Central Committee secretaries of the 6 Eur







within the CCP and the PRC, the assessment of the so-called Maoism and the political course of Mao Zedong's group.

The participants of the meeting agreed that this material would be used by the Central Committees of their parties as they see fit.

The participants of the meeting exchanged their views on coordinating studies and research, as well as the propaganda and informational activity regarding the China issue, which will be conducted in individual socialist countries. The list of proposals regarding these issues is attached here.

Some of the delegations preliminarily made their remarks regarding the tactics on how to battle Mao Zedong's factional course.

The delegations expressed their wish to agree—after the consultations in the Central Committees of their parties—to hold no later than February 1968, a meeting of the representatives of the CC International Departments (at the level of heads or deputy heads of the departments) during which it would be necessary to exchange information regarding the attitude of the CCs of individual parties toward the concrete proposals that were put forth at the abovementioned meeting.

The delegations of the CC International Departments of fraternal parties emphasized the fruitful nature of the meeting, as well as a friendly and concrete atmosphere in which the meeting took place.

December 21, 1967

[Note: What follows are excerpts from a jointly worked out material entitled “About the Events in China”—trans.]

**“About the Events in China:” (An excerpt from the material worked out at the meeting of the International Departments of 7 parties in Moscow in 1967)**

It should be stated in the beD-.0002e mate



countries about the situation in the PR China and in the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). In preparation of the meeting the CPSU had forwarded to all participants a draft of an assessment about the Mao Zedong Group's policy and the situation in the PR China. SEC, CPC, HSWP and PUWP also provided the other participants with according material. Following a CPSU proposal, participants agreed to define the meeting as internal.

According to decision # 35/67 from 5 December 1967 made by the Politburo of the SED Central Committee (CC) the following comrades participated in the meeting as representatives of the SED:

- Paul Markowski, Candidate of the SED Central Committee, Head of International Relations Department of SED CC
- Heinz Bauer, Staff Member of SED CC
- Bruno Mahlow, Staff Member of SED CC

Among others, members of the CPSU delegation were: Comrade [Aleksiej] Rumiantsev, Member of CPSU CC and Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Comrade [Oleg] Rakhmanin, Deputy Head of the Department for Relations with Fraternal Parties of Socialist Countries; Professor [Mikhail] Sladkovskii, Director of the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The other fraternal parties were represented by the heads and deputy heads of International Relations Departments.

According to a proposal made by the Soviet comrades the following agenda was agreed:

1. Compilation of a joint assessment in form of working material about the situation in the PR China and the policy of the Mao Zedong Group.
2. Oral exchange of information about these issues.
3. Exchange of opinions about the future course of the confrontation with the Mao Zedong Group's Policy, also about how to coordinate research activities and the exchange of information in this field.

A protocol was drafted concerning the convocation of the meeting (Appendix # 1 [not included—trans.]). As another result of the meeting, the attached assessment was passed (Appendix # 2 [not included—trans.]). In addition, proposals made by individual participants on how to proceed in the future were compiled for the CC with the recommendation to comment on them (Appendix # 3 [not included—trans.]).

Already before the meeting began, it was apparent how the Soviet comrades were attributing extraordinary high importance to the undertaking. As evident in later statements by Comrades [Mikhail] Suslov and [Boris] Ponomarev, as well as by Comrade Rumiantsev, the Soviet comrades currently view the determined struggle for a complete and comprehensive unmasking of Mao Zedong Ideology as extremely important. They base these perspectives on the assumption that the planned IX CCP Congress will create, under the label of a Chinese Communist Party, a party completely alien to

During the drafting of the joint assessment proposals made by our delegation were met with full support. Our suggestions for amendments were incorporated in the document.

## II.

During the meeting we had an interesting exchange of information on the current situation in the PR China, on the history of the CCP and the emergence of Mao Zedong Ideology, on the state of bilateral relations with the PR China, and on the international splitting activities by the Mao Zedong Group.

The CPSU comrades provided extensive information on Soviet-Chinese relations and emphasized the dangerous aggravation of the situation at the Chinese-Soviet border. They informed about major efforts by the Chinese leaders to spread disinformation within the Soviet public through massive radio propaganda, and also noted other attempts to infiltrate the Soviet Union with Mao Zedong Ideology. The Director of the Far Eastern Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences [Sladkovskii] gave a historical overview of the CCP's development. He proved how Mao Zedong placed himself at the helm of the CCP with schemes and violent methods, and how he always had fought a fierce struggle against internationalist forces and Marxist-Leninist members of the CCP leadership. Sladkovskii outlined the traditionally strident anti-Soviet positions of Mao Zedong. The Soviet comrades characterized the destruction of friendship between the Soviet and Chinese people as one of Mao Zedong's gravest crimes.

Comrade Sladkovskii informed that the Soviet Union is working on a five-volume history of the CCP. Comrade Rumiantsev provided an assessment of Mao Zedong Ideology as it becomes apparent from a six-volume edition of Mao Zedong's works. He informed that the Russian edition of these works was edited by Comrade [Pavel] Iudin so that many anti-Marxist, non-scientific, and anti-Leninist positions of Mao Zedong were corrected. Notwithstanding this, an overall analysis of Mao Zedong's existing work shows how he had never completely adopted a Marxist-Leninist basis. His nationalistic, anti-Marxist, and petit-bourgeois-anarchist positions permeate his entire oeuvre. Such gets confirmed when one compares these theoretical positions with Mao Zedong's practical policy.

The Soviet comrades provided the participants of the meeting with many written materials, such as a compilation of biographies from all the important people in the CCP and the PR China (Who is Who); a manuscript version of statements by Comrades Sladkovskii and







Between us there are certain differences of opinions, but we remain good friends; this is why we can openly say what we think. You defend Dubcek. But we must say that Dubcek followed in Khrushchev's footsteps and trusted the Soviets, which is why he failed.

During many discussions we had with Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, with Cde. Emil Bondaras, with other Romanian leaders, we showed that one cannot trust the Soviet Union, that they are not friends in need.

You already know that you cannot always go down the same road with the Soviet leadership, which sets you apart from the Czechoslovak leaders, from Dubcek."

Referring to the General Secretary Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu's speech of 21 August, Chen Yi stated that: "I was very happy to hear that you took steps to protect your independence and national sovereignty. I am convinced that if you remain resolute, your cause will succeed. We are behind you."

Considering the desire on the Chinese part that Premier Zhou Enlai give a speech at the cocktail [party] we are organizing on the occasion of 23 August, a speech in which he would express the position of the PRC regarding the USSR actions in Czechoslovakia, and considering

1. Premier Zhou Enlai, two deputy premiers, the Chief of the General Staff, his deputy, several Chinese individuals with high positions, as well

this crime of aggression” and are behind the Czechoslovak people. Comparing what was happening in Czechoslovakia with what Hitler did in that country, and what the US did in Vietnam, Premier Zhou Enlai stressed that “Soviet revisionism degenerated into Social[ist]-Imperialism and Social[ist]-Fascism,” and that the US and the Soviet Union are trying to divide the world [among themselves].

Saying that “Romania is facing the danger of foreign intervention and aggression,” Zhou Enlai stressed that the Chinese people are behind the Romanian people.

Zhou Enlai made no reference to the relations between our two [communist] parties, but stated that the RCP led the people in armed insurrection, and that “the Romanian people, and their leadership, have enjoyed significant successes.”

At the end, he gave a toast in Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu’s honor, mentioning the position of President of the Council of State,<sup>64</sup> and sent his congratulations to the government and people of Romania on behalf of the government and people of the PRC.

(ss) A. Duma

**Telegram no. 74325, 24 August 1968**

24 August 1968. Nr. 74 325

Top Secret. Flash.

On 23 August [1968], at 1800 hours (before the reception) I was received by Premier Zhou Enlai. Also present were Vice-Premiers Chen Yi and Li Xiannian. I passed along the information in your telegram Nr. 23/002617 (the declaration of the Grand National Assembly did not arrive yet, so I did not pass that along).

Premier Zhou Enlai reacted as follows to what I said:

“We consider that the events in Czechoslovakia are the inevitable result of the politics followed by the revisionist, Khrushchevite clique. Whatever Dubcek might be personally, one thing is clear—his clique is revisionist.

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<sup>64</sup> Translator’s note: Ceausescu was not the President of





II.

The participants of the meeting propose to hold in a socialist country during May or June 1969 a meeting of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of participating countries. Its objectives ought to be the exchange of information and assessments on the Mao Zedong Group's foreign policy and the further arrangement of state relations between the participating countries and the PR China.

III.

In light of the Mao Zedong Group's tactics toward the communist world movement under current new conditions, it was agreed to exchange material and information about the splittist activities of the Mao Zedong Group within the communist world movement and about its attempts to create special Maoist organizations in individual countries. It was agreed to coordinate activities for a further push-back of the Mao Zedong Group's policy, and for a defeat of their intentions to split the socialist community.

It was recommended to analyze jointly the activities by the Mao Zedong Group in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to agree upon concrete measures in various areas.

IV.

About the Coordination of Propagandistic Activities and Scientific Research by Fraternal Parties on the China Question

The delegations rated positively efforts of participating parties to implement recommendations from the previous meeting. They noted a certain progress in the expansion of cooperation among the organs of foreign propaganda and the scientific institutes of our countries regarding the China question.

They hold the opinion that activities planned in the fraternal countries pertaining to W.I. Lenin's 100

*The Interkit Story:*



- Regular exchange of material and information on the China question;
- Organizing cooperation between foreign correspondents of our countries regarding the collection and exchange of information about China.

d) In the Research Field

- Organizing a symposium in late 1969 on “Basic Problems of Socio-Economic Development in Today’s China” and publishing the material of this symposium;
- Exchange of researchers, research assistants, aspirants<sup>65</sup> and students who work on problems concerning China;
- Organizing a meeting of directors of research institutions from our countries in summer 1969 to exchange information and coordinate plans for publications and scientific works.

V.

The delegations from International Departments of the CC from fraternal parties listed above unanimously stressed the fruitful character of this meeting and its objective and companionable atmosphere. They emphasized that the organization of such meetings will develop into a good tradition and a useful form of cooperation between the fraternal countries represented at this meeting.

Delegations agreed to hold, after consultation with the CC of their parties, the next meeting in late 1969 in one of the socialist countries.

Besides the exchange of info



can do so. As stated in the first point of the agreement, the Central Committees themselves decide at their own discretion how they wish to proceed with this question.

We shall not enter into details, because our obligation—and this has been emphasized both by ourselves and representatives of other Parties—extends only to issuing a statement to the Central Committee. The Poles in particular have emphasized that these ideas be regarded as recommendations, and that the Central Committees will then decide what they intend to take part in.

**Comrade REZS**

To these questions, the material gives a fairly unambiguous yes, and suggests determined political consequences.

But questions also arise at the international level. If it is not clear at the international level that we wish to approach them, and that our approach is rejected by them, then I am not sure we would be helping the international workers' movement. I think it better if the "Wall of China" is erected by them, and not us.

Another problem: it is my opinion that we would do well to think a little in advance. We should analyze power relations realistically, and must also consider whether if a split still took place, what sort of impact there would be on the positive forces there, on the situation of the socialist countries and Parties, the parties of the capitalist countries, and what concerns me in particular, the situation of the third world. The impact of this unsubtle propaganda suggested by the material is not certain. This chauvinist hatred against white people on the part of the Chinese is not certain to produce the same result in the third world as in Europe, or the same in Latin America as in the developed countries.

In summary, my opinion is that a proposal is necessary, based on—even if there is one-thousandth of a chance of this—initiating state, cultural and economic relations, and that we should take the lead. As many [Chinese] as possible should know what sort of initiatives we have. At the same time we should continue the struggle of principles, but discretely, and should take care not to confuse our own wishes and desires with the existing situation there. I think that we could produce more, and more discrete results, than this material.

I would like to add that however correct the material is in part, the struggle is unavoidable. But we must also think what will be more helpful to the positive forces there, striving for a split or seeking connections. I think the response to this is beyond doubt.

**Comrade ISTVÁN SZIRMAI:**

I too have a few remarks on this question. My first is whether it is correct for us to form the orientation of the group of seven Parties in this way, even if it is on the basis of a collective decision. I think it would be better if discussions took place not in such a closed way between representatives of the seven socialist countries, but that we should bring in, for example, the Western European Parties to discussions. My opinion is that we would be able to give a more





tasks brought the Communist Party of China to a halt, and why the thesis appears different there that socialist revolution, the socialist economy, cultural revolution and the development of socialist society must proceed together with the improvement of the people's welfare. Why was the Communist Party of China frightened by these tasks, and why were the leaders of the Chinese state frightened? Because they encountered difficulties not even we encountered starting from our semi-feudal base.

If we fundamentally and truly analytically address these questions we will encounter things we cannot avoid. We do not have to say how guilty

enter into unnamed, direct or indirect dispute with fake, anti-Marxist Chinese arguments, to propagate our own positions.

This applies to policy too. We have a resolution there too, and we implement it. This should be continued.

I can agree that we report the arguments in the International Department Bulletin, but it would be good if the Agitprop Committee prepared a heading for it. Something like that the Agitprop Committee has examined this material and finds that its main points reflect the current situation. We must continue to address the questions, exchange experiences with fraternal Parties, examine the great ideological questions too, and at the same time continue what we have been doing so far.

[...]

The matter of China and America has arisen. Of course all sorts of things will happen here, opportunities to exploit this and that. But we must see that the fundamental social contradictions are the same as those that Marxism-Leninism taught us, and China and America throwing themselves at one another is not such a simple matter. We should take into account that



entirely different situation, and from our side the struggle becomes easier. But who knows who those healthy forces are. It is certain that there are proper communist and revolutionaries in China, but I fear that if we cite Liu Shaoqi too often, that won't please us either. For even he used to begin with that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are pursuing a revisionist policy, etc. The situation there now is that everyone carries a flag with Mao's face on it, yet declares different policies. Both his and different ones.

Finally, I think that this material does not complicate our work, indeed, if we use it sensibly, it will help.

[...]

There is a recommendation among the organizational matters, that the press, radio, television, news agencies and representatives of book publishers hold meetings. This is a rather more complicated matter, and there is a concern that they might get over-excited, and all understand something different. The most sensible thing would not be for 34 Hungarians to travel to this meeting, but for one or two sensible people to observe the news agency organizations. One can be from the Party Centre, the other let's say the president of the radio.

[...]

On the proposed resolution, only to add that the Political Committee should approve only our work, not that of all delegations. And we should not decide what ot

## **The China Problem following the Ninth CCP Congress**

The following information constitutes a joint study designated for internal use only, as a result of consultations of the international departments of central committees of the socialist parties of fraternal countries. The draft was prepared by the CC CPSU International Department, presented for consultation, after which some editorial corrections were carried out.

The CC PUWP International Department, March 1970

### **Introduction:**

[...]

Last year revealed new elements in China's domestic and foreign policies. The Ninth CCP Congress held in April 1969 ostensibly legalized the military-bureaucratic regime which was founded during the cultural revolution in the PRC. Without formally breaking with Marxism-Leninism, in reality, Maoism had transformed into a political trend which is hostile to the principles of scientific communism...The Maoists organized armed provocations on the Sino-Soviet border, they came out with a program of full preparations for war and further militarization of China's society. Given the above, we need to conduct deeper analysis of the Chinese events, their causes, sources, and possible prospects.

[...]

The situation is all the more complex since the current stance of the Chinese leadership, which is pitting the PRC against the socialist commonwealth in military and political terms, forces us in many cases to exclude China's material and human potential from the world power of the socialist system. The following [factors] confirm this thesis:

a) Maoist China is blocking the resources of the socialist world (both in terms of numbers and military aspect), especially when one takes into account armed provocations and war





The events in China are the result of a temporary victory of reactionary tendencies of petty bourgeoisie and one can call them, with full justification, a zigzag in the development of the Chinese society in the history of world socialism.

[...]

While spreading war scare and using social demagoguery, Mao Zedong succeeded in cheating the working class to a great degree...and in temporarily uniting the most backward strata of society on the basis of nationalism. The opponents [to Mao's group] are split and devoid of any most basic conditions for a political struggle...

[...]

Marxist-Leninists have no doubt that the Chinese communists and the working class will ultimately put an end to the Maoist order and bring life in China back to one based on the theory of scientific communism and on cooperation with the communist movement and socialist countries.

[...]

While decisively fending off the anti-Leninist political line carried out by Mao Zedong, by undertaking all possible means to thwart his provocations, the socialist countries favor normalizing state relations with the PRC... Precisely, such a policy will lead to the isolation of the Maoist group inside China and will contribute to the consolidation of real Marxist-Leninist forces within the CCP in the struggle for socialist China.

[...]

We need to carry out the task of thwarting the attempts [by apologists] who romanticize Maoism and justify the falsely understood definition of "the Chinese model of socialism."

[...]

## **Document No. 11**

### **East German report on Interkit meeting in Sofia, February 1971**

*[Source: SAPMO-BA Berlin, DY 30, IV A 2/20/1152. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]*

Berlin, 24 February 1971

#### Report

About an Internal Meeting of Delegations from the International Departments of Central Committees of CPSU, BCP, MPRP, PUWP, SED and HSWP in Sofia.

Following an invitation by the BCP Central Committee, between 15 and 18 February 1971 the fourth internal meeting of delegations from the International Departments of Central Committees of fraternal parties was held on current issues concerning the policy of the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong and the situation in the PR China.

I.

#### About Tasks and Results of the Meeting

1. The meeting was scheduled to analyze the policy of the Chinese leadership and developments in the PR China at the current stage. It was based on the presumption that a couple of new elements have surfaced in the Chinese leadership's policy during the past year. Especially the Soviet comrades put great emphasis on working out a joint assessment at the eve of a couple of upcoming party t

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New elements in Chinese leaders' national and international policy are exclusively tactical changes, modifications of political slogans, new means and methods to realize the old great-power chauvinist hegemonic and anti-socialist goals.

It cannot be excluded that contradictory tendencies in Chinese policy reflect also certain conflicts within the Chinese leadership.

The main tactical changes in international policy are as follows:

- In 1970 Chinese leaders backed off from unpopular war slogans and shifted the tactical focus to "revolution." Using the Maoist thesis "Maturing of the Revolution", the Chinese leaders place, even more so than in the past, the following patterns in the center of their policy: Support for any forces working toward the overthrow of the existing order in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; undiminished instigation of tensions at the hot spots of international class struggle; and the -

VWP, SCP<sup>66</sup>). Their efforts are primarily oriented toward those parties that continue to propose a different position from the joint line espoused at the International Conference [of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow] in 1969.

It can be expected that Chinese leaders will resume, with these intentions in mind, their activity in international democratic organizations.

3. During the meeting the following main causes for the Chinese leaders' changed tactics were identified:

a) Apparently the Chinese leadership is guided by an assessment according to which its rule in the country's interior was solidified through the "Cultural Revolution" and the IX Party Congress, to an extent allowing major activities in the field of international politics to unfold again. In spite of ongoing domestic problems and contradictions, a certain consolidation of the current power structure and the military-bureaucratic regime has occurred. This relative stabilization also allows the Mao Group more leverage for its international policy and more flexible tactics. In order to realize its great-power chauvinistic plans, the Mao Group now wants to break out from the international isolation it had moved itself into through its rudeness and any norms and customs violating methods of the "Cultural Revolution".

b) The consequent repudiation and unmasking of the Chinese leadership's policy by the Soviet Union, by us socialist countries, by the communist world movement, and by large parts of the anti-imperialist movement, have induced the Chinese leaders to adopt new tactical means.

The decisive, and for the Chinese leaders painful, repudiation of their border provocations by Soviet forces had made them think twice.

c)





As a special contribution, the Soviet delegation informed about developments in Soviet-Chinese relations.

There was also a discussion of the situation in the PR Albania and the policy of the Albanian leadership.

II.

On Presentations by Delegations



Given the above, our party and government conduct a concurrent China policy with that of the CPSU and the Soviet government. Together with the CPSU we are decisively countering the factional course of the Chinese leadership both in the area of international politics and within the international communist and workers' movement.

Our China policy should continue to be consulted with the CPSU, it should cooperate with the Soviet policy on every single stage.

Just like the USSR, we are in favor of a gradual normalization of state relations between Poland and China. At the same time, we are decisively rejecting all efforts of such normalization which would be based on the anti-Soviet aspects...We must limit ourselves to maintaining our diplomatic relations and gradually developing economic exchange. However, we should continue to conduct a thorough observation of China's capabilities and intentions with regard to a possible activation of bilateral state relations. The conclusions which will be reached regarding this matter will be presented to the party leadership.

Given the above, the International Department proposes the following:

1) At the current stage, we should limit our contacts to a working level regarding economic matters, as well as those in science and technology, and to continue the diplomatic activity of our embassies and consulates as we have been so far; any contacts of some other type could play a role only under the conditions of significantly positive changes in China's current policy; and they should be consulted with Soviet comrades;

2) While being in favor of activating economic relations and taking on concrete necessary means in this direction, we should at the same time maintain economic contacts at relatively low and working levels...;

3) In connection with China's presence at this year's Poznan Trade Fair and Poland's consent to this fact, we should point to the nature of the Chinese exhibits which should be purely economic so they cannot be exploited for political and propaganda purposes;

4) While expressing consent in principle to the Chinese propositions to renew contacts in the area of science and technology, we should limit them at the moment and absolutely not include the areas of the economy connected with defense and the most modern areas of science (e.g. electronics);

5) We should begin to systematically examine the issues of contemporary China, as well as to create a suitable academic base. This is why we propose for this pur

9) We should continue to publish in the press, and especially in political and academic journals, well-researched publications which criticize “Maoism” as an ideology which runs contrary to Marxism-Leninism, as well as we should criticize the factional aspects of the PRC’s policy.

Our policy toward China should, at all its stages, be closely coordinated with the position of the leadership of the party. In connection with this, all departments and institutions are obligated to consult all their moves regarding China with the International Department of the CC PUWP. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in constant consultation of coordinating all moves toward the PRC.

The CC PUWP International Department

### **Document No. 13**

#### **East German report on Interkit meeting in Moscow, May 1973**

*[Source: SAPMO-BA Berlin, DY 30, IV B 2/20/583. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]*

#### Report

About the 6<sup>th</sup> Internal Meeting of Delegations from Departments for International Relations of Central Committees of CPSU, BCP, MPRP, SED, PUWP, CPC and HSWP.

Following an invitation by the CPSU Central Committee between 16 and 18 May 1973 the sixth internal China meeting of delegations from the International Departments of Central Committees of above-mentioned fraternal parties was held in Moscow.

The SED participated with a delegation chaired by Comrade Gerd König, Deputy Head of the SED CC International Relations Department.

The meeting had the following agenda:

1. Exchange of opinions and information on



It was agreed to hold the next internal China meeting in 1974 in Budapest.

I.

In their assessment of the situation in China, and the current domestic and foreign policy of Beijing's leaders, participants of the meeting arrived at the following conclusions:

1. The situation in China is dominated by elements that push the country further in an anti-socialist direction. The policy of the Chinese leaders is characterized by a serious rightist turn.

2. In China all the main elements of the Mao Group's military-bureaucratic dictatorship stay in place. The army continues to remain its main pillar of support. Changes currently occurring in the PR China (like the construction of a Maoist party and Maoist mass organizations, the reference of forms and methods of economic steering borrowed from socialism, the reemergence of former leading functionaries) aim at solidification of the Maoist regime that is hostile to the people.

The entire development of society is characterized by coercive militarization.

3. Even after the purge of Lin Biao and many of his supporters, conflicts in the center and in the provinces are continuing. A fierce power struggle is raging between the two most important groupings in the leadership, the supporters of the group around Mao Zedong's wife and the supporters of the group around Zhou Enlai.

4. The long-term negative impact of the Maoist course on the country's development pertains to all areas of China's domestic and foreign policy. The deformation of the socialist economic base and of the superstructure going on for 15 years is continuing. Specifics of deformation do not consist in a liquidation of state and collective property but in the latter's subordination under Maoism's anti-socialist objectives. This deformation is connected to a change in the social function of the Chinese state. As a consequence of these impacts, production relations are losing step by step their socialist content. The moment is coming near where the quantitative, and in part qualitative, changes can lead to a basic turnaround of the country's entire development.

5. The fact that China is considered a socialist country does not change anything in principle for the assessment of the Mao Group's policy. Maoism is an unforgiving enemy and antipode of socialism.





situation and be determined by many permanent and temporary, objective and subjective, factors of both domestic and foreign policy character. In this context, some of the following prognostic thoughts were expressed:

1. Maoism has a certain base among the ideologically backwards segments of the population, but at the same time discontent with Maoist policy is growing. The lack of a constructive program to develop society, and the unresolved socio-economic core issues confronting the Beijing leadership, are objectively causing the social base of resistance against Maoism to expand. New clashes and upheavals cannot be excluded.

2.





could come to power and present socialist slogans, which could unite the Marxist-Leninists in the PRC, and they would ask for support from the socialist countries. Then, a totally different situation will evolve which we cannot possibly analyze in details at the moment.

[...]

While being guided by the line of our parties in coordinating our efforts and developing our cooperation on the China issue, the members of the meeting agreed as to the instructions regarding a further and effective countering of the acrimonious policy of the Chinese leadership:

### **The Area of Foreign Policy**

[...]

#### **In Europe**

to decisively counter Beijing's hostile activities directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to unmask the efforts of Maoists who are counting on weakening the unity of fraternal nations and sowing factionalism in its collective organs such as the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Treaty;

to cut short the efforts of the Chinese leadership in hampering the process of détente in Europe...;

...in practical [economic] dealings with China to follow the "Joint Market" [directions] agreed upon at the 62-nd session of the Executive Committee of the CMEA.

#### **In Asia**

[...]

in Southeast Asia and in Indochina, to strengthen and raise the prestige of the DRV and counter Beijing's hegemonic ambitions;

...to expand ties with India and Bangladesh and to improve relations with Pakistan;

to expand concrete cooperation with Japan based on mutual benefits as a counterweight

to carry out a tighter cooperation among the representatives of fraternal countries in the UN and other international organizations;

...to consult with other suitable institutions of socialist countries to work out a joint position on the forum of international economic organizations...;

### **In the Area of the Socialist Countries' Inter-State Relations with the PRC**

The Chinese leadership continues to implement its policy of differentiation, which counts on separating the socialist countries from one another and isolating the Soviet Union. This is why Beijing proposes, in a very selective manner, to renew economic, science and technology, and cultural cooperation with some of these countries in order to spark some kind of a competition among these nations as far as their contacts with the PRC. Some Chinese high-level officials cunningly suggest that expanding the relations with the PRC with this or another socialist nation would favor a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.

### **We need to do the following to counter this policy:**

in developing state relations by each of the socialist countries with the PRC (political ties, trade and economic, science and technology, cultural and all other types of cooperation) we need to adhere to a jointly agreed level, not allowing for any other approaches that could be used by the Chinese leadership to undermine the unity of socialist countries and pit them against one another;

to build mutual relations with the PRC so as it does not lead to strengthening Beijing's positions in their struggle against the socialist commonwealth, and in increasing their military and economic potential of Maoist China;

in order to coordinate the policy of fraternal socialist countries toward China, we need to exploit such forms and methods, such as a systematic exchange of information and regular meetings at the level of interested ministries and institutions, to expand and strengthen the cooperation between our diplomatic representatives in accredited nations;

to continue the practice of yearly meetings of the representatives of foreign trade ministries of fraternal socialist countries on issues of coordinating trade and economic policy toward the PRC;

while taking into account the special meaning which Beijing attaches to trade and economic ties in implementing their differentiation policy toward socialist countries, we should instruct the ministries of foreign trade of the countries which participated in today's meeting to continue the implementation of concrete steps worked out at the conference of deputy foreign trade ministers of fraternal countries in February this year;

to implement the coordination between the proper institutions of fraternal countries on the question of inviting the PRC to international exhibits and trade fairs organized on the territory of fraternal nations as well as to consult on issue of organizing in the PRC specialized trade exhibits of the socialist countries...;

[...]

### **In the Area of the International Communist Movement**

[...]

to activate the work of fraternal parties in capitalist and developing countries in unmasking the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist essence of the theory and practice of Maoism and to mobilize these parties to successfully counter this chauvinistic ideology and the policy of the Chinese leadership...;

to systematically inform fraternal communist parties and some of the friendly social democratic and national democratic parties about the situation in China, about the negative aspects of the activities of Beijing leaders on the international arena, about their hostile activities against the socialist commonwealth, about their factional line of Maoists in the world communist and national liberation movements...;

to adopt a custom of carrying out theoretical studies of the Chinese issue together with other Marxist-Leninist parties, to encourage them to take part in international and national symposia and conferences devoted to this issue;

examine, generalize, and widely propagate the positive experiences of the struggle of communist and workers' parties against Maoism...;



to cooperate with appropriate communist parties and representatives of other progressive forces in creating anti-Maoist propaganda centers in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America...;

[...]

### **In the Area of Ideological and Propaganda Struggle**

be aware that a decisive and multilateral unmasking of the anti-Marxist theory and practice of Maoism...is one of the most fundamental tasks in the defense of the Marxist-Leninist theory, an important element in the unity of the socialist commonwealth and the workers' movement, for a return of China to the family of socialist countries, and for strengthening the international anti-imperialist front;

...to unmask the activities of Maoists which aim to weaken the unity of the socialist countries and undermine the collective organs—CMEA and the Warsaw Pact

...to unmask all of Beijing's efforts to drive a wedge between the socialist commonwealth and the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America;

[...]

to adhere to a custom of maintaining regular bilateral and multilateral contacts between ideological and propaganda institutions of fraternal countries to intensify coordination of their activities and providing mutual assistance in the struggle against Maoism...;



[...]

4. The situation in the PRC is getting increasingly complicated. Mao lost two loyal people—Keng Sheng and Zhou Enlai, who skillfully implemented his policy line. We should expect that the power struggle in the PRC will intensify. The group of the so-called leftists and others—is making efforts to increase their influence, but it is also encountering the opposition.

However, Rakhmanin personally thinks that there will be those with professional training in the Chinese leadership, and especially in the national economy. There are no changes in the CPSU stance toward China. Mao continues to remain the main executor of the PRC's anti-Soviet course. They continue to conduct a hostile campaign toward the USSR. The USSR will not give up on the battle front either...

[...]



Also unchanged is the material situation of the workers. There are no announcements whatsoever about lowering prices, increasing wages, or expanding social benefits.

The economy continues to be run accordin

*The Interkit Story:  
A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship*

Havana

vvs 282/78—Lightening

Comrade Honecker

Comrade Axen

The final meeting for delegations to the China Consultation was with Comrade F. Castro for two and a half hours together with Comrades Blas Roca and Machado Ventura, as well as Secretaries Valdes Vivo and Antonio Perez Herrero. Comrade Castro's speech was very warm. Comrade Castro showed that he was familiar with the contents and course of the consultation. The draft stenograms and theses had been reported to the [Cuban] P[olit]b[uro]. Comrade Castro emphasized the importance of the China consultations among the fraternal parties that always brings in new materials for the re-evaluation of the situation. He greeted the inclusion of the Vietnamese at the next meeting and considered developments in Vietnam as a big defeat for the Chinese leaders.

Comrade Castro pointed out:....

The real danger that the Imperialist powers [will] do the same with China as the Western powers did at Munich with Hitler....

Comrade Castro asked after developments in Kampuchea and noted his fears that if the revolutionary front worked with the Chinese intervention then the regime might be saved.

The extensive comments of Comrade Castro about the Cuban exiles lead one to suspect that Castro and the entire leadership are very concerned with this issue, especially with the strong institutional bond of this group to Cuba.

We must make better use for the revolution of the exiles' feelings for Cuba, he said.

He said it is better to have a "Trojan horse" over there in America than in Cuba and that







therefore, PRC cannot be bound to the USSR by the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual help.

But they have not officially raised the question of the treaty's cancellation. We should not hurry. We'll see what reasons the Chinese leaders put forward, we'll see how they'll cancel it, and then we'll take our step. Under Khrushchev, we hurried too much in cancelling the Anglo-Soviet treaty, which served us no good, but became an obstacle. The preservation of the Soviet-Franco treaty throughout the Cold War is helping our relationship a great deal now. Therefore, we will wait and see what steps the Chinese leaders take regarding the cancellation of the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty. As for you, comrades, it would be correct on your part to maintain the treaty concluded with China. Your treaty is not about alliance after all.

Recently Deng Xiaoping went to the USA. The purpose of the trip was to bring China under the US nuclear umbrella, to clear up the question with the island of Taiwan, to stop the SALT-2 agreement, and to use the USA for their own policy. This aim was not accomplished. Sino-US relations directly depend on the extent of Soviet-American relations.

Deng Xiaoping made a big mistake. The US media and the public understood him correctly, depicting him as a "smiling barracuda" (they are saying a man-eating carnivorous fish is 'laughing' [note-taker's explanation of 'barracuda']). This shows that the American public correctly understands the danger of being pulled over to the side of the Chinese anti-Soviet policy.

Deng Xiaoping was looking for financial aid in the USA, but the USA will not give anything to China for free. There is no internal capital for carrying out the "Four Modernizations" planned by the Chinese leaders. They will get 60 percent of the capital internally and 40 percent externally. They cannot pay back the foreign capital. Just to account by oil extraction, China will reach the 1977 Soviet level by year 2000.

In the USA they think that Deng Xiaoping is more intelligent compared to the former Chinese leaders. But Deng does not have much time to carry out his ideas. It is difficult to say what the Chinese leaders think of Carter.

What is happening on the Vietnamese border worries the USSR a great deal. China has





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[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/620. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

Secret

**Note**

On February 26, 1980, a meeting took place in Moscow of the representatives of fraternal parties of six socialist countries...including the heads of International Departments of these parties...The meeting was devoted to the international situation and conclusions emanating from it...

[...]

...All delegations took a uniform position on Beijing's policy.

[...]

**[Excerpts from the statement of the Polish representative, Andrzej Werblan]**

[...]

7. Imperialist policies have intensified in the area of armament and tensions and have found a clear and loyal ally in China. Currently, the PRC leadership is conducting an open course of aggression. The most vivid reflection of this is [the PRC's] attack on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Currently, China cooperates with organizing a military diversion against the progressive government of Afghanistan. We fully agree with Soviet comrades' assessment of Beijing's politics. We see the need to actively unmask, and especially to reveal to the public, the damaging aspects of the alliance between Beijing and the cold war forces of the United States and the FRG. Recently, we have developed a pretty good [study] center to investigate these issues which will provide materials for the ideological and propaganda work.

[...]



**Document No. 20**

**East German report on Interkit meeting in Poland in June 1980**

*[Source: SAPMO-BA Berlin, DY 30, IV B 2/20/593. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]*

Report

About the 11<sup>th</sup> Internal China Meeting of Delegations from Central Committees of BCP, SED,  
PCC, MPRP, PUWP, CPSU

most important country in Chinese foreign policy considerations. Not only is Japan China's largest trading partner; Chinese leadership also makes efforts to use Japan in order to achieve its own dominant position in the Asian region. Among the Western European imperialist countries the Chinese leaders are viewing primarily the FRG as a promising partner in the struggle against the Soviet Union and th





The CPSU CC delegation leader, Comrade O. B. Rakhmanin, defined in his presentation the current stage of development of Maoism and the Chinese leaders' policy, as well as its

The HSWP delegation leader assessed further activation of China's role in the communist world movement and international democratic organizations to be expected, and it would create another front of conflict. He demanded closer coordination on these matters.

The MPRP delegate dealt extensively with national problems confronting Mongolia by the policy of the Beijing leadership concerning Inner Mongolia.

The head of the BCP delegation underlined the need to unmask through respective propaganda the unity in action between imperialism and Maoism. On the other hand he also proposed to devote major attention to scientific work to research contradictions between imperialism and Maoism.

The statement by the PUWP

- In close correlation with this question, we

- Portraying the dangers for peace stemming from Beijing's parallel actions with U.S. aggressive circles and the imperialist countries, as well as their extension of mutual military relations;
- Decisive support of positions held by Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, and Mongolia—all of which are subject to threats and attempts of blackmail by the Beijing leadership;
- Unmasking of Beijing's dangerous subversive actions, as well as of the American-Chinese conspiracy toward the countries in Southeast, South, and West Asia, in particular concerning Afghanistan and Kampuchea;
- Unmasking of Beijing's hegemonism and its practical effects toward developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement;
- Criticism of Maoism's latest modification that is still based on great-power chauvinism, anti-Sovietism, and hostility toward global socialism.

Concerning future scientific research, the necessity was emphasized for perfecting the coordination on the most important problems of China's current situation, and for continuing Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class content of Chinese events, and of the causes for the current course of the CCP leadership. This pertains to the following main areas:

- Character, main phases, and perspectives of social evolution in the PR China, in particular since Mao's death;
- China and its role in the world.

## **Document No. 21**

### **Hungarian report on "economic Interkit" meeting in Bulgaria, October 1980**

*[Source: HNA XIX-J-1-j-Kína-78-50-6423/1980. Obtained by Péter Vámos, translated by Gwenth A. Jones and Péter Vámos for CWIHP.]*

No. 1 0046/3/1980

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prepared in 12 copies

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REPORT

On the deputy ministers' coordination meeting held on 27-28 October 1980 in Lovech, Bulgaria, regarding questions of trade and economic policy and scientific-technical cooperation to be applied in contacts with the People's Republic of China.

Delegations from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Cuba, Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia took part in the meeting. The substantial part of the talks is summarized as follows:

In comparison with 1979, trade estimates for the participating countries for 1980 are lower. There have been more contractual problems this year than previously (the Chinese have withdrawn from purchasing many items due to lack of demand, and rigid behavior was witnessed at price talks). By the end of the year, it is expected that the Chinese will have achieved a positive balance of trade in all relations. Forecasts for 1981 are no better. The Chinese have indicated to us and other countries that as a result of the rectification policy, they do not wish to buy several machines or equipment that they used to buy in previous years. This would produce, within two years, a reduction in volume of 40-50%. In the Hungarian context for example, from our earlier traditional exports, [the Chinese] have not required the transport this year of 500 lorries, 200 buses, 4 thousand tons of steel pipes and machine tools, with a total value of 56.7 million clearing Swiss Francs. (The total value of our exports is 130 million clearing Swiss Francs.) They have further withdrawn from purchasing 6 thousand tons of steel-aluminum cables and 10 thousand pieces of oxygen bottles, with a total value of 18.4 million clearing Swiss Francs. In a departure from the practice of earlier years, "pre-agreements" between companies for expected quota will exist only in very small number, if at all. Many countries have

argument developed between representatives of both views in the editorial group. The only passage to eventually appear in the memorandum says that parties should avoid the exchange of goods which directly helps the Chinese military potential.

The Soviet representative generally urged great caution in all forms of new cooperation proposed by the Chinese. According to [the Soviet] judgment however, this is all part of the evolving Chinese policy of detachment. At the same time Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia have shown great interest in new forms of cooperation, because only this way can they hinder the reduction in important import items. This position was also represented by the Hungarian delegation. It became clear that the Chinese only made a new cooperation proposal to Poland (to participate in the reconstruction of an ore mine, a flax processing plant and a house-building factory. Polish machines, equipment, planning and technology would be exchanged for raw materials. Talks are still at a preliminary stage.)

The Soviet delegation proposed, in the interest of avoiding harmful leaks of technical-scientific findings—that a coordination meeting be convened on questions of technical-scientific cooperation at the level of member countries' National Council for Technical Development deputy leader. We regard this as an overstatement. Accordingly, despite the earlier request, we did not bring a representative from this field to the meeting. The Soviet proposal however was finally endorsed by a majority.

The leader of the Soviet delegation, Comrade [Ivan] Grishin, expressed his dissatisfaction at the price negotiations. (He mentioned, by way of example, that the Chinese, as the greatest Wolfram exporter, first set the 200-300 ton transport prices for small countries and then want to apply this to Soviet purchases of a few thousand tons.)

During the meeting, it was clear that the Soviets have a clear picture of the situation, and its proposals were motivated by keeping relations at the same level, and a tendency to block Chinese attempts at development.

The next meeting of autumn 1981 will take place

**Document No. 22**

**Cable from Hungarian ambassador to Moscow regarding talk with Soviet China expert**

**Oleg Rakhmanin, 7 July 1982**

*[Source: HNA XIX-J-1-j-Kína-103-004774-1982. Obtained by Péter Vámos, translated by Gwenth A. Jones and Péter Vámos for CWIHP.]*

Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow Mátyás Szörös

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CIPHER TELEGRAM

Moscow, 7 July 1982

On 7 July 1982 I paid a farewell visit to O.B. Rakhmanin, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department.

Comrade Rakhmanin evaluated the development of Hungarian-Soviet relations positively, and emphasized that relations between parties continued to develop both quantitatively and qualitatively. There are no problems in our relations.

With the future in mind he regards it important that the socialist countries should mutually inform each other of their own internal matters and anticipated international courses of action, and not create unforeseen situations. Second, it is important to act in unity against attempts to split the socialist countries.

According to Comrade Rakhmanin, China is attempting to play the so-called “GDR card”, citing the development of GDR-Chinese relations putting pressure on Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The GDR press deals with China too positively, and has taken up Comrade Zagladin’s statement on China from Italian sources. The excerpted—and distorted by the Italians—interview gave an incorrect impression of Soviet policy. Ambassador Abrasimov objected twice to the behavior of the GDR press



Any form of rivalry would be damaging. We need to agree on our position, but do not regard it as realistic or necessary to convene a separate meeting at the highest level on this question, as proposed by Comrades in the GDR.

It is very important that our ambassadors in Peking are of the appropriate orientation. An impression has arisen that the ambassadors of some socialist countries evaluated the processes in China with excessive optimism, from which unjustified conclusions have been drawn.

It would be correct for the press in the socialist countries to occasionally expose the anti-Soviet policy of China and criticize their position on Cambodia and other questions.

Comrade Rakhmanin responded to my question that there are no negative observations of Hungary. The position of the HSWP leadership on Interkit in Sofia is highly regarded. [...]

No. 248. Sz rösz

### **Document No. 23**

#### **Entries from diary of CPSU International Department official Anatoly Chernyaev regarding Soviet policy toward China, summer and fall 1982**

[Source: Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi Iskhod. Dnevnik dvukh epokh. 1972-1991 gody.* (Moskva: Rosspen, 2010), pp. 488-9, 494-9, 503, 507. Translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

c. 21 May 1982<sup>69</sup>

The Chinese problem. My clash with [Oleg Borisovich] Rakhmanin. Back in the beginning of May, I, as a member of the editorial board of *Kommunist*, received a review article written by [Mikhail] Kapitsa (MFA) about a book by [Oleg] Borisov (?). I did not take the trouble to think who that Borisov was [Borisov was one of Rakhmanin's pen-names], but I called [the editor of *Kommunist* Richard] Kosolapov and told him that I am categorically against such an article. This was nothing but apologetics for the book and curses of China, as if there never was a speech by Brezhnev in Tashkent.

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<sup>69</sup> 29 May is given in the original but this is definitely a mistake, for the entry refers to events that happened between 15 and 20 May (approximately), and is followed by an entry dated 24 May.

On May 11 another “Interkit” took place in Sophia—a secret meeting of the deputy heads [of relevant Central Committee departments] of the six socialist countries on the Chinese question. We were of course represented by Rakhmanin who first imposed “directives” for his trip to Sofia on the CC, and there [imposed] the protocol (as the basis of propaganda and scientific work in the participating countries and for publicity). However, for the first time the plan misfired. The Germans (Bruno Mahlow) first introduced 100 amendments to the draft of this protocol, and then refused to sign it.

Probably, the same Mahlow reported to Rakhmanin that Honecker “is generally pulling his hair” [*rvet i mechet*] about this Interkit. He, allegedly, has been preparing for fifteen years [sic], writing down various loud phrases about China (dictatorship, military-bureaucratic regime, alliance with imperialism, degeneration, surrender of position of capitalism etc.), but life goes on. The CPSU, allegedly, made all sorts of mistakes with China, it may be a good time to “apologize.” In any case, we have “our own” interests and must have “our own” policy in relation to China. That’s how it is!

Having returned to Moscow, Rakhmanin sent a “report” to the CC, signed by the four departments [responsible for foreign affairs]. He called me—and, true to his manner of “quickly-quickly”—[said]: sign it, everything has been agreed upon. I read it and decided that I will not sign it, that much I told the assistant who brought the paper.

Instead of this I send it to Ulianovskii. He read it and on the following day sent me his “thoughts”—also against Rakhmanin.

In the evening, Oleg Borisovich “personally” stormed into my office:

Where is the paper?

Ulianovskii has it.

What for? Everything has been agreed upon. The Politburo commission (on China) met today, they basically approved my memorandum, and even

By the way, about I. Aleksandrov's article<sup>70</sup>... It was circulated in the Politburo just before. I made amendments for B.N. [Ponomarev], taking out any mention of the names of the Chinese leaders and some virulent remarks—the atavisms of the “Cold War” with China. The article was not prepared by Rakhmanin's team but, probably, at Lubyanka [KGB]; it was written in the spirit of Tashkent and was fundamentally different from both Rakhmanin's memorandum and from the protocol. It was in this form that it was published in May 20... In spite of...

Indeed, the same day as Rakhmanin stormed [into my office], there was the Chinese commission. In the morning B.N. told me that, allegedly, they discussed: he (B.N.) and Andropov spoke in favor of improving relations with China (“but of course giving them a rebuff when needed!”), but Gromyko, allegedly, surprised [them] by demanding to push the Chinese, not to let them off lightly. And he was brusque in general, although it seems that as a diplomat he should have been more flexible.

A “worrying” message came from Pyshkov (from the blabbering of the assistants, and more probably from Rakhmanin who is a member of the PB Commission): that the commission took even more rigid positions than that of Rakhmanin's memorandum and of the protocol. However, I returned this memorandum to Rakhmanin, without signing it, although he threatened over the phone that he will report to Chernenko that the International Department is refusing to sign.

However, I thought it necessary (and I had to do it as a matter of work duty) to shortly explain on a note for Ponomarev why I did this.

To be precise: the memorandum departs from the Tashkent line, its main task (that it proposes to accomplish) is to expose Chinese hegemonism, it rules out reasonable prospects, using propaganda to create an atmosphere, which will undercut the opportunity to establish normal relations. And also because it characterizes the situation in China as a “move toward the right”. “Toward the right,” I wrote to B.N.—“everyone knows what that means in our party terminology. This means, ‘things are getting worse.’ But in comparison with what? With how things were under Mao, how things were under Hua Guofeng, a year or two ago?”

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<sup>70</sup> The reference here is to the article by Igor Aleksandrov [pseudonym], published by *Pravda* on May 20, 1982. Translation in “Pravda: Soviet-Chinese Differences ‘Will Have to Be Removed,’” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, May 21, 1982. SECTION: Part 1 The USSR; A. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; 3. THE FAR EAST ; SU/7032/A3/1.

And, in the end, it is not admissible that Rakhmanin's line blocks the Tashkent line, but this is happening because the implementation of policy has been practically surrendered into the hands of Oleg Borisovich, to whom I always was well-disposed, in personal terms."

I sent this to Balmashnov to pass it on to B.N. when he r5(.)e itT5k164.7(s)1f3CtnevT5k164.

departs from the Tashkent line; in essence there is no policy in it—no direction nor goal to pursue, [no sense of] what we want in our relations with China... And moreover, one should not allow Rakhmanin to make a pol

*The Interkit Story:  
A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship*

But you are a member of the Chinese commission, you can tell Andropov. I am certain that when the decision on the publication was made, none of the CC Secretaries and members of the PB read Rakhmanin's composition. This is a question of big politics. And God forbid if Brezhnev was informed that a mine was being put under his Tashkent line...

- And do you know what the Chinese are writing about us every day? And what a bad speech the Chinese made in the UN?

- I know. But I also know that a lot of what they used to write half a year earlier they no longer write. The whole world sees that. It's enough to glance through TASS. But Rakhmanin is

It looks like the main thing that happened during the days missing in the diary is once again China. A



South that day to help



I don't know if this is what he told the CC Secretary (on the other hand, he could well do, he is a direct, confident, beaten and honest man), but he received a response: “Well, beware, beware. [*smotri, smotri*].”

After this conversation with Bugaev I decided to call Sharapov after all. He: I reported to Iu. V. (Andropov) but sort of on my own behalf...

- Why is this? Why didn't you think it possible to refer to me. After all, I am not hiding, I just did not feel it appropriate to call myself...

- Well, that's how it is. I decided this would be better.

- Ok, and what?

- He said that... and repeated the same thing—that one needs to cut down the internal part and let it go out. (Only later did I understand what the problem was—but more on that in the finale.) However, your comments to the actual text are useful in my view.

- But I don't have the right to send them even to *Kommunist!*

o h - m J 1

And Golikov's memo, about 15 pages in length, contains the following: one gets a sense that the significance of normalization with China is being underestimated. Our propaganda weakly supports the Tashkent line, and sometimes it comes out with materials, which in fact undermine it (there is a reference, among other things, to the article in *Pravda* dated 20 July). No one wants to see the changes in China but they are taking place. Our main enemy is US imperialism, therefore the main strike should be directed there. Otherwise, it looks like in terms of negotiations, contacts, exchanges we allow many things with the US (even at a sharp time like now) which we do not allow with regard to China. One needs a strategic, Tashkent-like approach to the problem of China. One needs to do everything possible every day in order to remove tension, develop cooperation, achieve mutual understanding, not to push China in the direction of the USA. And so on.

The memo does not say a word about the article for the *Kommunist*, or about Rakhmanin's line, but it is of completely anti-Rakhmaninite essence.

About Ponomarev's reaction to this—he is completely transparent. He tells me: I sent this text to Kovalenko. You know some time ago we prepared a letter for the fraternal parties about the China question, now it needs to be amended in the spirit of this note by Leonid Il'ich. Andropov almost agreed to our draft but now he is asking to “have a look at it” again (the letter, of course, although it is not completely in Rakhmanin's spirit but almost... And the basis was written by Rakhmanin's team, and our [team] only edited—“weakened” Rakhmaninism).

I called Kovalenko right away. We sat down, the three of us, and B.N. even left his desk and sat next to us, at a small add-on table. I became completely insolent, saying: B.N., perhaps we should not send it at all? What's the point, if we are for normalization, how can we talk the others out of it?...

- No, no, don't get carried away!

And he went into the editing.

While Kovalenko was on his way, B.N. managed to tell me the “details”... Andropov called him... telling him in this connection—in some context, of course: “Rakhmanin is not behaving himself correctly. I warned him. If nothing changes, we will have to look for another place for him. And I told his Sharapov—they are friends with Rakhmanin, at one stage they were in China together, or even studied together: either you carry out your responsibilities as an aide

as you should, or you should leave the *apparat*.”... So that’s how it is! And I knocked at Sharapov’s, hoping for understanding and support. It turned out that each word and paper of mine were immediately made known to Rakhmanin!

But who inspired Golikov? Or, perhaps, he is the source of the Tashkent line. And “came up” with this note “independently,” perhaps even without the knowledge of the article for *Kommunist*. But he could not *not* know about the “Interkit”... The main thing is that his intervention came in at the right time!

And look at my Ponomarev! “I will not deal with it anymore!” A political figure equal to a minor apparatchik, who pulled tricks all his life just to stay in the cabriolet! [...]

11 September 1982

[...]

An episode with the paragraph cursing China in Ustinov’s speech at the award of an order to the city of Kuibyshev. Aleksandrov immediately grasped it: this is even despite Brezhnev’s note and the decision of the Chinese commission! If this is of Rakhmanin’s doing, his head will roll! Checked it: indeed, the circular did not have this paragraph. This means it appeared after “comments.” Turned out that yes, exactly Oleg recommended to restore it!

But this is already just an episode. At the first PB meeting chaired by Brezhnev after his vacation, he made a statement on all “questions under discussion”. About China (along the lines of his note) and to the effect that one should be calmer and more skillful in the appraisal of the international situation: “there is no negative without positive.”... [...]

2 October 1982

[...] B.N. made a report [on] “Lenin’s strategy of peace” in the Column Hall at the readings [held by the] M[oscow] P[arty] C[ommittee]. He is happy.

In the circular, Rakhmanin (as in the case with Ustinov) tried to put some of his Chinaphobia into his report, but B.N. this time rejected it resolutely, surprised by the stubbornness and insolence of Rakhmanin. He and others cannot wait for the Chinese to pull something to cause Leonid Il’ich’s “wrath”, in order that the whole Tashkent line and, especially,

*The Interkit Story:  
A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship*

Soviet Union, support other nations (Japan), and reject the proposition of signing treaties which could introduce the feel of security and stability in their relations with the USSR (a non-aggression agreement, borders, etc.).

The PRC also cooperates with the imperialist powers on a global scale. China, just as the U.S., is in favor of revising borders and agreements which regulate the post-war political reality; the Chinese are supporting the idea of the so-called German unification by criticizing the Yalta agreements...China's activities opposing the peaceful policy conducted by the USSR and other socialist countries on key issues, such as peaceful defense and stopping the arms race, are well-known.

The PRC is using all platforms and opportunities to conduct this policy: bilateral contacts, the UN, multilateral meetings and parties, and social and youth organizations (for example, during the Youth Festival in Moscow). One of the most important elements of Beijing's policy is to use China's economic, political, and other relations with the USSR and socialist nations in order to break the unity of the socialist commonwealth and to bring about the ideological diversion.

Beijing attempted to exploit Deputy Foreign Minister [Ivan] Arkhipov's visit for its own propaganda aims. On the one hand, the anti-Soviet campaign intensified in the Chinese press; on the other hand, the published information exaggerated the results of [Sino-Soviet] economic talks. In reality, the USSR has not changed its position, agreed upon during consultations with fraternal nations, on the issue of economic policy toward the PRC. In particular, the Soviets refused, for example, assistance regarding China's construction of two nuclear power plants.

The CC CPSU concludes that the present anti-socialist line in the PRC's foreign policy is long-term and [includes] strategic cooperation with American imperialism. Beijing thinks that by weakening the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth it will be able to carry out its own great power and hegemonic ambitions. Objectively speaking, there is a dangerous resemblance between China's strategy and that of U.S. imperialism: Reagan wants to open the Eastern front against the USSR; Beijing aspires to strengthen its military potential for hegemonic purposes and also seeks a military cooperation with the U.S. in this respect. Together, this is a joint aspiration of Beijing and U.S. imperialism in order to change a global system to the disadvantage of the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth.

As far as the assessment of the PRC's internal situation, Soviet comrades focused on criticizing the economic reforms. They pointed out that China's hitherto course points to the restoration of some elements of capitalism. The capitalist penetration accompanies this opening, as does the training of economic personnel with the aid of the American specialists...It was proposed that the next meeting (in October in Moscow) will be devoted to a deeper analysis of the internal situation in the PRC.

Given the above analysis, the Soviet comrades presented the following conclusions:

We need to continue to tightly coordinate the policy of socialist countries toward the PRC. In particular, we must counter Beijing's policy of differentiation toward the countries of the socialist commonwealth;

We need to counter Beijing's efforts to separate economic, cultural, science, social and other issues from those in the area of politics and ideology



representatives of our parties and to sow the seeds of mistrust as to the correctness of the party line;

[...]

We need to strengthen our research institutions which study China. According to the Soviets, the Chinese have extensively developed their research on history and culture of socialist countries, as well as China's relations with them. They [Chinese] are also

We need to deepen Sinology research in Poland and have our Sinological institutions

Department...It paid a visit to the Central Party School of the CC CCP and got to know its functioning. It also visited the Canton Province and the Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen...

[...]

### **Conclusions:**

[...]

2. The talks prove that the PRC will maintain its full autonomy in the area of foreign policy... The PRC can count on some political and economic benefits resulting from the rivalry between the USSR and the US... China will strive to affirm its interests in the [Asian] region, even more than before, especially in Southeast Asia and the entire Pacific region—the areas of Asia which it considers to be its priorities. Based on our conversations, the Chinese do not seem to be renewing their contacts with the CPSU in the near future. They reiterate the thesis of the existence of “three obstacles,” especially the USSR’s responsibility for introducing and maintaining Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. Therefore, while positively assessing M. Gorbachev’s domestic policy, the Chinese add that “this course has not yet encompassed the USSR foreign policy to the sufficient degree.”...

3. There is no doubt that the CCP treats the issue of acceleration and economic development of China as its biggest priority...The concentration of power in the hands of the party apparatus (including administrative power) serves as a trailblazer for the [economic] reform.

4. One should expect that the XIII CC CCP Congress will also be devoted to defining the direction of China’s economic and social development ...

5. The results of [China’s] economic reform have been undoubtedly successful so far...These processes have also brought an increase in the standard of living...

6. The Chinese realize that the politics of reform, the opening, and the economic revival require changes in the f

party and state, especially at middle and lower levels. The issue of democratization of political and social life looks similar. The main difference is that the Chinese are approaching this problem with great care and carefully study the processes taking place in other socialist countries. Generally speaking, according to our Chinese interlocutors, political reforms will be much harder than the economic ones. They are stressing that the politics of the economic reform and “the opening” will cause negative social and political phenomena, which would have to be overcome with the aid of ideological work.

7. The CCP confirmed its existing position of not participating in multilateral meetings organized within the framework of the communist and workers’ movement. However, one can notice the CCP’s growing interest in such meetings. One can expect that the Chinese will gradually join this multilateral cooperation, especially at the academic level... We reiterated that we would inform the CCP about notice teEo\*14



**APPENDIX III:**

**PROGRAM OF FEBRUARY 2010 BUDAPEST WORKSHOP**

China and the Communist World in the Second Half of the Cold War:

New East-Central European Evidence on "Interkit" and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1967-1986

A Documentation Workshop

Budapest (February 26-28, 2010)

**February 26, 2010**

1300 Strategy meeting of participants to prepare questions for veterans' session

1500 Interkit, Sinology and Foreign Policy: A Critical Oral History Seminar

**Participants:**

Józsa, Sándor (1928) sinologist, diplomat

1950-55: studied Chinese language and history in Beijing as graduate st

1970-73: MFA head of department

1973-82: deputy director, Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs, head of China Research Group

1982- head of department, National Planning Bureau, Institute of Planned Economy

1800 Dinner with Participants in Seminar

### **February 27, 2010**

900 Welcome from the Sponsors

Péter Vámos (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Mircea Munteanu (CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center)

David Wolff (Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido U.)

Opening Remarks and Agenda

James G. Hershberg (George Washington University)

David Wolff (Hokkaido University)

930—1300 Focusing on Interkit (Chair: David Wolff)

Bernd Schaefer, East German Documentation on Interkit

Malgorzata K. Gnoinska, Polish Documentation on Interkit

Péter Vámos, Hungarian Documentation on Interkit

Sergey Radchenko, Mongolian Documentation on Interkit

David Wolff, Russian Documentation on Interkit and China

1300—1400 Lunch Talk: Jordan Baev (Bulgarian Intelligence and China)

1400—1730 Interkit and its Context (Chair, James Hershberg)

Oldrich Tuma, Czechoslovakian Documentation on Interkit and China

Mircea Munteanu, Romanian Documentation on Interkit and China

Sergey Radchenko, “The End of Interkit and the End of the Cold War”

1730—1830 Open Discussion: Next Steps

Sponsors: Hungarian Academy of Sciences  
Cold War International History Project, WWCIS  
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

**James Hershberg** is associate professor of history and international affairs at The George Washington University; former director of the Cold War International History Project; and author of *James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age* (Knopf, 1993) and *MARIGOLD: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam* (forthcoming; Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 2011).

**Sergey Radchenko** is lecturer at the University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China. Radchenko is the author of *Two Suns in the Heavens: the Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (2009); co-author (with Campbell Craig) of *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War* (2008); *The Soviets' Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 42; and *The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 47.

**Péter Vámos** is senior research fellow at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Toronto in 1996. His research interests include the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet relationship, and the history of the Soviet Union.