澳门六合彩

In his inaugural address, John F. Kennedy proclaimed, 鈥淚n the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger.鈥� We are such a generation. JFK鈥檚 words ring truer today than at the time of his inauguration in 1961 or any time since. The People鈥檚 Republic of China (PRC), under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is more a peer competitor economically, militarily, and diplomatically than the Soviet Union JFK鈥檚 America faced. And the CCP is every bit as resolved as the Soviets to shift global norms away from the defense of freedom.

Na茂ve arrogance keeps too many Americans from seeing that China has become a tech powerhouse. China has a credible path to gaining technological parity (and in some cases, superiority) in military applications.听

Yet too many believe all the US needs to do is to keep the CCP from stealing American technologies (essential 鈥� yes, sufficient 鈥� no). They have not accepted the fact that the US trails in key technologies and risks falling behind in others. They don鈥檛 fully appreciate how harmful America losing its innovative edge would be to its prosperity and security, now and in the future.

America must awaken from complacency and dedicate itself to winning the race for tech leadership.

China is Competing for Tech Leadership

Ever since JFK鈥檚 call to win the space race accelerated investment in talent and discovery, America has enjoyed the advantage of being home to much of the most innovative technologies. This has propelled its prosperity by making its products in high demand and advanced its security by giving its military an advantage over any foe. Yet the CCP鈥檚 multi-decade focus on achieving leadership in key technologies has undercut 础尘别谤颈肠补鈥檚 advantage.

A recent study found China leading in听 crucial technologies based on the proportion each nation had of the most highly cited research reports. For those frustrated that open-source publication accelerates the dissemination of dual-use technologies, the good news is China is publishing even more than America. Neither the classified insights the US gains nor the People鈥檚 Liberation Army鈥檚 (PLA) network of military science听 are included in the comparison. The picture may change if they were. Yet dominant Chinese market shares in听,听,听,听,听, and more lend credence to China鈥檚 technological advances.听

础听 by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) suggests...

...no one should have been surprised when China听 a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle. China publishes four times the most cited papers as the US on hypersonic and advanced aircraft engines. It also leads in other sciences vital to hypersonic flight.听

Achieving speeds above Mach 5 requires advances in low-friction surfaces to reduce and dissipate heat produced by air friction. It also demands the development of novel materials able to handle high temperatures and high forces on control surfaces. China publishes three times as many highly cited papers as the second-place country (often, but not always the US) on novel metamaterials, eight times as many on coatings and three times as many on high-specification machining processes. These are areas where China manufacturing producing听 as much output as the US, gives the PRC an advantage.听

The CCP鈥檚 penchant for secrecy is reflected in its research focus. Their research leadership in photonic sensors, quantum communications, advanced optical communications, and post-quantum cryptography could allow the CCP to make their communications impenetrable by the West and make the West鈥檚 classified communications vulnerable.听

The ASPI study shows the US leading in research publications in high-performance computing, integrated circuits design and fabrication, and natural language processing. But it trails China in machine learning, advanced analytics, and protective cybersecurity technologies.

It shows the US leading in terms of research in small satellites and space launches, but trailing China in drones, autonomous systems, and advanced robotics.听

Finally, it shows the US leading in quantum computing research, but trailing China in post-quantum cryptography, quantum communications, and quantum sensors.听

China Contesting Military Leadership

How does this translate into military applications? During the decades America spent fighting terrorism, the CCP听 built its military capabilities. The US military is sprinting to retool to deter great power conflict. At the time of JFK鈥檚 address, defense spending represented听 of GDP. Today it is at a post-World War II low of听.听

Since the time of JFK鈥檚 inauguration, the Department of Defense鈥檚 (DoD) research funding has听declined from 36% of global R&D to a mere 3% now. Today鈥檚 础尘别谤颈肠补鈥檚 military is more a consumer than a provider of technology. The CCP has听 its quest for technological and military leadership. It is no different in the US. The contest for technological military superiority is in great part determined by which side can more quickly adapt commercially developed technologies.听

• The CCP has the advantage of building anew while the US is handicapped by needing to replace an installed base of aging technology and bloated base structure that is aggressively defended by elected representatives in Congress听 keeping federal jobs in their districts.听
• The CCP has aggressively steered its industry to focus on technologies that give its military a technological edge, while US industry remains focused on gaining the greater payback from consumer markets.听
• Captains of American industry gave Xi Jinping a standing听 during his US visit last year, even as the US military is increasingly reliant on industry for its innovative edge.

Inflection Point

We are at an inflection point. Depending on its response, America will continue to provide leadership that benefits both the nation and the world or surrender leadership to an ascendant China, at great risk to its future prosperity and national security.听

How can America successfully defend its innovative edge to underwrite freedom in its hour of maximum danger?听

How can we ensure the US stays a step ahead in new technologies? The US military can only build an听 on technologies where the US leads.

Solutions

As we consider what it takes to preserve an innovative edge, I am reminded of a conversation I had as President of the University of Colorado with an institute director in Boulder who claimed national leadership in studying oceans. When I asked how it was that a university in the Rockies was good at studying oceans he replied, 鈥淚t turns out that the first thing you need to study oceans in money, the second thing you need is graduate students.鈥� I am sure the fact that the campus in Boulder leads in satellite research and development didn鈥檛 hurt either. Colorado is no closer to space than to oceans, yet success in research and development does not require proximity.

Research Funding

Let鈥檚 begin, then, by considering how the US is doing providing money for research, then consider tech talent. As it turns out, not so well on either.

Business. 础尘别谤颈肠补鈥檚 source of research funding is business, yet Congress recently allowed a tax incentive for spending on research and development to听. Renewing the R&D tax incentive is urgent.

Federal.听Concerned that China is听 the US in total research spending...

...the Chips and Science Act authorized a significant increase in research support, but indications are that Congress will fail to appropriate the level of听听funding authorized by the act.听

Fully funding the authorized research spending is essential for the US to retain its innovative edge.

Productivity. Studies have found that research is becoming听 disruptive. The concern is that using committees to allocate funds and professors fixated on gaining tenure both听 to the pursuit of incremental advances rather than breakthrough work. Governments should treat the听 for the best ways to fund science as though it were itself a scientific problem, experimenting with how and who it funds. The US should also aggressively pursue how AI can be transformational in听 scientific discoveries in all fields.听

Collaboration. Innovation productivity is fueled by iterative collaboration among those who specialize in a specific field. New rules and chilly politics in both countries has resulted in US-Chinese academic collaborations听 in 2019 and falling since. As research collaboration with China abates, the US must increase its collaboration with allies. US scientists currently collaborate听 as much with Chinese partners as they do with those from Europe. Yet Europe has much to offer. For example, the EU is a strong听 to China in all quantum technologies, including post-quantum cryptography, where the US lags China. It is vital that the US and its European and Asian allies tighten research collaboration to build an aggregate lead in critical technologies.听

Bolster geopolitical benefits.听Many universities encourage faculty to bypass open source publication and instead steer them toward filing a patent, perhaps a听, to facilitate greater commercialization. This financially benefits the inventor and the university and could have geopolitical benefits. The National Science Foundation听 promoting greater commercialization and the Department of Defense鈥檚 (DoD) academic partnerships should include an emphasis on bolstering geopolitical benefits.

Some small steps could further facilitate research:

New NSF Directorate. The Chips and Science Act created a new Technology, Innovation and Partnerships听 in the National Science Foundation to help ensure a greater focus on critical technologies. It emerged from concerns that China concentrates its research on technologies that give it a security edge, while US government funding is widely disbursed and US commercial research is focused on consumer markets.

OSC. The DoD鈥檚 Office of Strategic Capital seeks to help advance 鈥渃ritical technologies vital to national security鈥� that might not otherwise get funded.

Talent

The state of tech talent is a substantial factor in tech leadership.

Declining STEM enrollment.听While a wide range of talent is essential to an innovative ecosystem, college graduates play an important role. Ongoing declines, driven in large measure by simple demographics, paint a worrisome picture. US college enrollment in 2021 was 15%听 2010 and is expected to drop听 still, due to declining births following the 2008 financial crisis. The resulting drop in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) graduates will exacerbate the of tech talent.听

Targeted funding should be provided to reverse the disincentive to pursue STEM degrees caused by their often costing up to听 as much to deliver or earn as liberal arts degrees.听

Considering that the PRC is now graduating听 the number of STEM PhDs as the US, significantly听more funding should be provided for STEM scholarships and doctoral fellowships.

Declining International STEM Students. With the US听 near the bottom in the percentage of graduates pursuing STEM fields, it has long relied on attracting the world鈥檚 best and brightest. The overwhelming share of these students have historically听 from two countries鈥揅hina and India. Visas for Chinese students and academics have听 by two-thirds since peaking in 2015. A recent听 in students from India provides hope that they can take up the slack. The US must continue to attract international STEM students to contribute to the preservation of its innovative edge. 听It is essential that all students feel welcomed in the country.

Regulations 鈥� Standards

Comparative regulatory regimes, defining global standards, and establishing secure supply chains are also important to the tech race.听

AI governance. A debate on AI governance is raging between two factions: on one side are those fixated on the consequences of far-off Artificial General Intelligence, together with market leaders seeking to insulate themselves from future competition. On the other side are pragmatists who fear excessive regulation would limit opportunities and favor China. This is playing out in the military in the context of when to keep a听, making decisions for otherwise autonomous weapons.听

The big geopolitical question is whether AI will be more beneficial for open or closed systems, democracy or authoritarianism, free market or a centrally planned economy. While centrally planned economies are less efficient than free-market economies and eventually break down, especially at scale, might the opposite be true of AI-empowered centrally planned economies? Will AI orient free-market economies toward oligopolies with concentrated control of platforms?听

In last November鈥檚 OpenAI听, 鈥淭hose who think we should slow down and be careful听 a coup against those who think we should speed up and be careful.鈥澨齌he outcome means AI will now move faster. Expect to see more companies going beyond experimentation and discovering real use cases. How听 and AI-generated misinformation impacts the upcoming election will likely influence public attitudes toward AI.听

The EU views itself as a regulatory superpower and has taken the听 in regulating AI, while a divided Congress in the US will give the courts and states outsized importance.听

While keeping a close eye on the risks of AI, it is important to ensure that governance efforts don鈥檛 disadvantage the US.

听Tech standards. China would like standards to embrace its digital approach directed toward controlling users while US seeks to advance tech that empowers users. The Biden administration听 took a positive step recently by听 the first-ever 鈥淣ational Standards Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technology.鈥澨�

While agreements excluding the US that define terms of digital trade are听, the US听 longstanding opposition to taxes on cross-border data flows, requirements to store data in an export markets such as China, and demands to share source code of software with importing countries including China. The administration took a听 to reconsider its positions.

Progressives argue the rules could hinder efforts to rein in 鈥淏ig Tech鈥� companies via antitrust moves and regulation. Others argue the US abandoning its leadership role on tech standards harms businesses of all sizes and in the words of Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon), is a 鈥渨in for China, plain and simple.鈥�

It is vital for the US to step forward soon to reassert its leadership in achieving consensus on the terms of the fast-growing digital economy.

Export and outbound investment restrictions. Seeking to prevent contributing to the CCP鈥檚 military capabilities, the US implemented export controls for advanced semiconductors and chip-manufacturing equipment in听, tightening them in听.听 Last听August, it added outbound investment restrictions on technologies with important security implications鈥搒emiconductors, AI, and quantum computing.

While the US may add further restrictions, their negative consequences must also be noted. They restrict sales of domestic companies that could be invested in further innovation and听r development of capabilities within China that could become formidable competition. Additionally, they have prompted reprisals by China, which limited exports of critical minerals听 and more recently,听.听

Export and investment restrictions contribute to the US preserving its innovative edge but are no substitute for steps that would accelerate American innovation.

Supply Lines.听Supply sources for high-tech products that are not overly reliant on China is essential. The chip plants being built in the West help, but Taiwan will听 the dominant supplier. Even considering chips alone, resilience requires more than just fabrication, but also testing and听.听While there has been a far greater emphasis of supply chain resilience in recent years, establishing robust alternatives to China has been hampered by the current bipartisan resistance to negotiating trade agreements.

Huawei having a听 in Africa and a strong presence across the Global South impedes US tech leadership. While听 may provide a solution, a greater resolve to support international infrastructure is necessary.听

Conclusion

Preserving tech leadership involves a sometimes-dizzying array of variables. There is no silver bullet that will keep 础尘别谤颈肠补鈥檚 edge in innovation. Keeping a national advantage in technology is essential to the US prevailing in its strategic competition with authoritarian powers.听

The tech race remains 础尘别谤颈肠补鈥檚 to lose. 础尘别谤颈肠补鈥檚 innovative听e is more willing to听. America still holds the most important high ground鈥揷hip design, AI, and quantum computing. Despite these advantages, it must shake off today鈥檚 complacency and take this race seriously. Threats posed by complacency rival threats posed by the PRC. Together, they amount to a giant red flag waving.

As we assume 鈥渢he role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger,鈥� let JFK鈥檚 charge on innovation be our watchwords鈥搕o 鈥渄ream of things that never were and ask 鈥榃hy not?鈥欌�澨�