NATO Needs an Island Chain Strategy for the Baltic Sea
As the upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius (11-12 July) welcomes Finland as a new member and while Sweden awaits approval to join NATO, the article looks at how NATO should re-evaluate its approach to the Baltic Sea region, especially surrounding strategic assets.
David Carr/Swedish Armed Forces
The next NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, the first in years to be held in Eastern Europe, will present NATO with an ample opportunity to reevaluate its approach to Baltic Sea security. It will also be the first summit with Finland as a member of NATO while Sweden awaits approval from two countries 鈥 T眉rkiye and Hungary 鈥 to conclude the ratification process. With Sweden and Finland in the alliance, NATO should re-evaluate its approach to the Baltic Sea region, especially surrounding strategic assets. The Baltic Sea region is home to many strategic islands near Russia, however, currently these strategic islands are insufficiently defended and underutilized. Given the region鈥檚 tense security situation and Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, it鈥檚 time for NATO to realize the vitality of the Baltic Sea鈥檚 strategic islands to the alliance. The most viable option for these strategic islands, which are located near vital trade routes, undersea cables and Russian military bases, is to create a Baltic Sea version of the island chain strategy in the Pacific Ocean. At the present moment, the key islands in the Baltic are scarcely populated, lacking infrastructure and having a low military presence; getting adequate defensive capabilities to the islands will require strong political will and substantial investments. However, in the long run, an island chain strategy would increase regional security and curb Russia鈥檚 possibilities to destabilize the region.聽
The Most Strategic Locations in the Baltic Sea
Denmark, Sweden and Finland have considerable island possessions in the Baltic Sea: Denmark has Bornholm, Sweden holds Gotland and Finland possesses 脜land. However, the extent of each country's military presence and the political situation between the islands differs substantially and is influenced by each country鈥檚 strategic doctrine, defense spending, and the history of the islands themselves.
Little attention has been paid to the Danish island of Bornholm, located between Sweden and Poland. However, last year鈥檚 and the recent revelations of Russian vessels for strategic cables and pipelines near the island has given Bornholm renewed significance. The military presence on the island is modest. Since 2000, the Danish Home Guard 鈥 a voluntary part of the Danish military 鈥 has been responsible for the island鈥檚 . Russia鈥檚 recent activity near the island, as well as Bornholm鈥檚 proximity to Russia's Baltic Sea fleet headquarters in Kaliningrad, clearly showcase the importance of Bornholm, with Danish politicians for a standing force on the island.聽
The Swedish island of Gotland, the largest island in the Baltic Sea, similarly has modest military capabilities. For most of the Cold War, Sweden hosted a large military presence on the island. However, these forces were scaled back after the Cold War, and by 2005 the island鈥檚 defensive capabilities were almost nonexistent. After Russia鈥檚 annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden re-raised the Gotland Regiment in 2018. In recent years, Sweden has a mechanized battalion and anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as put aside specific of $163 million for the defense of the island. The current military presence is however far from what it was at the height of the Cold War.
Whereas Bornholm and Gotland are integrated parts of their respective countries, 脜land has a different status. 脜land, part of Finland since 1809, has been an region of Finland since 1922. 脜land has been demilitarized by international treaties since 1856, although Finland is still responsible for its defense. This creates a gap in a strategically important region. Due to this excellent location, some experts have described 脜land as the Achilles heel of the Finnish defense. While the status of 脜land is complex and would require considerable political will to change, it doesn鈥檛 mean Finland nor NATO couldn鈥檛 use the geostrategic island in other ways, such as securing infrastructure and trade.聽
Russia鈥檚 Historical Interest 鈥 and Implications for Today
While many Great Powers have shown a considerable interest in the islands historically, none have however shown as much interest as Russia and the former Soviet Union. Russia鈥檚 historic interest can be clearly seen from its actions during the Second World War, when it Bornholm for 10 months from 1945-1946. Russia is still interested, as seen in its opposition to an defense agreement between Denmark and the US, which could see foreign troops being placed on Bornholm.
Gotland hasn鈥檛 seen military action during the last two centuries. However, during the Finnish War of 1808-1809, fought between Russia and Sweden, Russia briefly occupied the whole island due to its strategic location. Gotland, which has been called an unsinkable aircraft carrier due to its excellent location in the middle of the Baltic Sea, remains of interest for聽 Russia today. Sweden has been wary about Russia鈥檚 increasing number of vessels in the Baltic Sea, including landing ships; the increase may be a power play by Moscow to its ability to take over Gotland.聽
脜land was part of the Russian Empire from 1809-1917. While 脜land was demilitarized in the 1850鈥檚 to hamper Russia from using a geostrategically important region, the current state of affairs benefits Russia. There is increasing in Finland to end 脜land鈥檚 demilitarization, a move the island鈥檚 own Head of Government however . With Finland鈥檚 recent membership of NATO, discussions surrounding the future of 脜land will certainly pick up. While ending the demilitarization of 脜land could give Finland another strategically important asset for its defense, it could also risk alienating the island鈥檚 local population, who strongly see their autonomy as linked to the demilitarization. If Finland and NATO want to make 脜land an asset for the alliance, they need to engage 脜land鈥檚 local government in major decisions, or otherwise risk alienating the island鈥檚 population.
NATO
Creating an Island Chain Strategy in the Baltic Sea
Given the importance of the Baltic Sea islands, both for their respective countries in the region and for NATO, it鈥檚 time for NATO to create a new strategy that takes advantage of these vital assets. Given the enlargement of NATO, which brings all three major islands under the same defensive alliance, it could be time for NATO to propose a Baltic Sea version of the longstanding American defense strategy in the Pacific Ocean, the island chain strategy. The island chain strategy is a plan where the United States and its allies in the region have built multiple lines of defense capabilities in the Pacific Ocean, stretching across the region, in order to secure their maritime security.聽聽
A similar island chain strategy should be in place in the Baltic Sea, with the region鈥檚 larger islands Bornholm, Gotland and 脜land at the core. Not only would a stronger military presence on these islands bolster NATO鈥檚 defensive capabilities in the region, especially its maritime and aerial presence, but it would also help the alliance to secure its vital infrastructure in the region. Many countries in the region are dependent on maritime trade, and the Baltic Sea is filled with important undersea cables and pipelines. This new strategy could play a vital role to the region's economic stability and energy supply 鈥 including for the three Baltic countries, Poland, and Germany. Although NATO arranges large-scale military exercises in the Baltic Sea, such as 听补苍诲 , it isn鈥檛 a replacement for permanent military presence on the islands.聽
Russia is also aware of this new security reality and has started to increase capabilities on its own island possessions in the Baltic Sea, such as on the strategic island of . As Russia鈥檚 exports are in large part dependent on Baltic Sea trade, even after the , Moscow wants to make sure it can eventually control the Baltic Sea during a conflict. This can be clearly seen from Moscow鈥檚 on maritime capabilities in Europe, even during Russia鈥檚 ongoing invasion of Ukraine.聽
NATO鈥檚 New Frontier
Bornholm, Gotland and 脜land represent simultaneously NATO鈥檚 greatest strength and vulnerability in the Baltic Sea region. If the islands were properly utilized, they could provide NATO with the much needed strategic depth and geopolitical advantage in the Baltic, and bolster NATO鈥檚 defensive capabilities in the region. But if the islands are left without proper attention, they can also be NATO鈥檚 biggest vulnerability against Russia鈥檚 potential ambitions in the region. Given the region鈥檚 tense security situation and Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, it鈥檚 time for NATO to realize the vitality of the region鈥檚 strategic islands to the alliance. NATO needs to seriously discuss the future of the islands during the NATO summit in Vilnius and consider concrete proposals surrounding the future of the islands. A Baltic Sea version of the island chain strategy would be the most viable option. In the long run, an island chain strategy would increase regional security and deter Russia from potentially destabilizing the region.聽聽
About the Author
Global Europe Program
The Global Europe Program is focused on Europe鈥檚 capabilities, and how it engages on critical global issues.聽 We investigate European approaches to critical global issues. We examine Europe鈥檚 relations with Russia and Eurasia, China and the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. Our initiatives include 鈥淯kraine in Europe鈥 鈥 an examination of what it will take to make Ukraine鈥檚 European future a reality.聽 But we also examine the role of NATO, the European Union and the OSCE, Europe鈥檚 energy security, transatlantic trade disputes, and challenges to democracy. The Global Europe Program鈥檚 staff, scholars-in-residence, and Global Fellows participate in seminars, policy study groups, and international conferences to provide analytical recommendations to policy makers and the media. Read more
