澳门六合彩

In the days since President Trump came down hard on Pakistan in his聽outlining America鈥檚 new Afghanistan strategy, the reaction in Islamabad鈥攁nd elsewhere across the country鈥攈as been predictably angry and defiant.

Pakistan鈥檚 National Security Committee, a group of top government and military officials, rejected Trump鈥檚 allegations鈥攐nes also made by many American leaders before him鈥攖hat Pakistan provides sanctuaries to terrorists that destabilize Afghanistan and attack American troops. 鈥淭o scapegoat Pakistan will not help in stabilizing Afghanistan,鈥� the committee聽in a sharply worded statement. In a fiery interview with CNN, political opposition leader Imran Khan聽Trump for blaming Pakistan for U.S. struggles in Afghanistan and proclaimed that Trump鈥檚 criticism was 鈥渉urtful鈥� and 鈥渉umiliating鈥� to all Pakistanis. Most recently, on August 30, Pakistan鈥檚 National Assembly passed a resolution聽聽Trump鈥檚 accusations as 鈥渉ostile鈥� and 鈥渢hreatening.鈥�

"Speaking to Parliament on August 30, Pakistani foreign minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif called on the government to suspend all high-level bilateral visits with Washington."

Pakistan鈥檚 anger is now affecting high-level diplomacy. Islamabad asked Alice Wells, a top South Asia official at the State Department, to indefinitely postpone a planned visit to Pakistan. Pakistan鈥檚 foreign minister, who had been scheduled to visit Washington, will now be going to China, Russia and Turkey instead鈥攖hree countries with close or newly growing ties with Pakistan. Speaking to Parliament on August 30, Pakistani foreign minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif called on the government to suspend all high-level bilateral visits with Washington.

Meanwhile, anti-American protests, all peaceful, have. From demonstrations in the remote tribal areas to a sit-in outside the U.S. consulate in the city of Lahore, people are expressing their anger toward Trump鈥檚 criticism and America鈥檚 policies more broadly.

On one level, Pakistan鈥檚 apoplectic reaction to Trump鈥檚 speech isn鈥檛 anything new. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is fraught with mistrust and ill will. Most recently, in 2011 and 2012, the relationship was plunged into deep crisis thanks to a rapid-fire succession of events鈥攊ncluding a CIA operative killing two Pakistani men on a busy city street in Lahore, U.S. Special Forces entering Pakistan to take out Osama bin Laden, and NATO aircraft accidentally killing two dozen Pakistani border troops. Back then, the rhetoric in both capitals was much angrier than it is now.

Additionally, in a nation as anti-American as Pakistan (in the pre-Trump era, as many as聽of Pakistanis disapproved of U.S. leadership), top leaders are obliged to issue strong, public rebukes to sharp rhetoric like Trump鈥檚. If you simply laugh or shrug off tough talk from the U.S. president, you risk becoming a political liability. So there鈥檚 a playing-to-the-gallery dimension inherent in the Pakistani response.

All this said, by no means is the Pakistani political class displaying manufactured sentiment. Far from it. There is genuine anger and apprehension, and for three major reasons that go beyond the simple fact that a U.S. president has put their country down in a big and threatening way鈥攃ause for anyone on the receiving end of such rhetoric, in any context, to be incensed.

First, Pakistani officialdom is well aware of Trump鈥檚 uncompromising, black-and-white position on terrorism: In effect, any terror group anywhere must be destroyed at all costs. Trump, more than his predecessors, is likely to order new and draconian measures meant to compel Pakistan to sever its ties to groups like the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network, which help Pakistan in a big way by keeping India鈥擯akistan鈥檚 bitter foe鈥攁t bay in Afghanistan. These possible measures could include聽into areas of the country, like Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Provinces, where militant leaders are harbored but have rarely been hit by drones;聽and travel bans on Pakistani officials with known ties to terror; launching broader air strikes on terrorist facilities; and even designating Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror if it fails to undertake a series of counterterrorism measures within a certain space of time. Trump administration officials have specifically singled out the first two measures as real possibilities.

Second, Pakistani leaders understand the increasingly anti-Pakistan mood in Washington. Such sentiment is apparent in the White House, at the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill and even within the community of think-tank analysts. The mood toward Pakistan may be friendlier at the State Department and USAID, but the influence of these agencies in shaping foreign policy, not to mention Pakistan policy, has taken a major hit. For all the unpopularity of Trump鈥檚 policies in Washington, the White House鈥檚 tougher line on Pakistan is likely to garner glowing bipartisan approval.

"For an American president, for the first time, to formally call on India to deepen its footprint on territory that Pakistan claims New Delhi already uses for anti-Pakistan activities鈥攖his is nothing short of a nightmare scenario for Pakistan."

The third reason for Pakistan鈥檚 unhappiness boils down to the India factor. Trump generated banner headlines for putting Pakistan on notice, but his comments about India are more consequential鈥攁nd problematic鈥攆or U.S.-Pakistan relations. Trump called on India to step up its game in Afghanistan鈥攁 country where New Delhi already plays a major role. India and Afghanistan signed a聽in 2011, and this accord has translated to generous levels of Indian development assistance to Afghanistan鈥攊ncluding funds allocated to dam construction and to Afghanistan鈥檚 new Parliament building.

But other than training that India offers to Afghan troops, the provision of military transport vehicles and other nonlethal hardware, and a聽of several Russia-made fighter helicopters to Afghanistan, New Delhi鈥檚 military aid to Afghanistan is modest鈥攔eflecting a high level of discretion on the part of India to avoid antagonizing Pakistan. When it comes to New Delhi鈥檚 warm relationship with Kabul, it鈥檚 the specter of deeper security relations that really spooks Pakistan.

Significantly, Trump did not ask India to scale up its military assistance to Afghanistan. Instead, his speech explicitly called on India to intensify its development and economic support there.

And yet, the simple fact that Trump asked India to do more in Afghanistan likely sent shock waves coursing through Islamabad and especially through Rawalpindi, home to the Pakistani military leadership. Pakistan often聽that India uses Afghanistan as a base from which to orchestrate acts of meddling and sabotage in Pakistan鈥攆rom supporting separatist rebels in Baluchistan to providing aid to terrorists like the Pakistani Taliban. For an American president, for the first time, to formally call on India to deepen its footprint on territory that Pakistan claims New Delhi already uses for anti-Pakistan activities鈥攖his is nothing short of a nightmare scenario for Pakistan.

"If Pakistan were to walk away from its partnership with the United States, it wouldn鈥檛 be wandering into the wilderness; it would be marching into the wide-open embrace of Beijing, which is cementing its already-deep partnership with Pakistan as it builds out the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor."

From Pakistan鈥檚 perspective, now may seem to be an opportune time to lower the curtains on its relationship with America. Pakistan is stuck with an American president dead set on threatening, with likely support from key players in Washington, some of Pakistan鈥檚 most important national interests. Trump is poised to apply draconian new tactics to drive Pakistan away from nonstate assets that make Pakistan鈥檚 Indian enemy vulnerable, and he has already encouraged India to deepen its presence on Pakistan鈥檚 western flank. If Pakistan were to walk away from its partnership with the United States, it wouldn鈥檛 be wandering into the wilderness; it would be marching into the wide-open embrace of Beijing, which is cementing its already-deep partnership with Pakistan as it builds out the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

One might also conclude that America is prepared to walk away. The tough-on-terror Trump can鈥檛 be expected to have any patience for a country that takes billions of dollars from Washington while sheltering terrorists that kill Americans. The White House, by telegraphing its willingness to take escalatory policy steps that could ratchet up U.S.-Pakistan tensions to unprecedented levels, appears ready to risk the possibility of a rupture in relations in order to pursue its new Afghanistan strategy.

In truth, however, while both sides will be keen to take several big steps back, neither will want to walk away entirely. In fact, Trump, in his speech, extended an olive branch: 鈥淧akistan has much to gain from partnering with our effort in Afghanistan.鈥�

"Even at such an uncertain moment for U.S.-Pakistan relations, this much is true: The relationship may not shrivel up and die, but it鈥檚 dangerously low on oxygen. Dark days lie ahead."

Both countries derive benefits from partnership, and the loss of these benefits could damage their interests. Now that Trump has formally endorsed an open-ended military commitment in Afghanistan, the strategic significance of NATO supply routes that snake through Pakistan has never been stronger. Islamabad would close these down in a heartbeat, as it did for a seven-month period in 2011 and 2012, if relations further deteriorate. Meanwhile, Pakistan, despite all it gets from Beijing, continues to value American military assistance and the prestige value of a relationship with the world鈥檚 sole superpower. Additionally, the supportive treatment that Pakistan receives from the International Monetary Fund鈥攁n institution where Washington holds great sway, and which has often helped Pakistan ease its economic woes鈥攃ould be jeopardized in the event of a collapse in bilateral ties.

Ultimately, the trajectory of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will depend on the types of pressure tactics implemented by the White House, and on the nature of Pakistan鈥檚 responses and retaliations. Another determinant of the relationship鈥檚 future is how much risk Washington and Islamabad will be willing to take on. The harsher the measures adapted by the United States, the greater chance that Pakistan could retaliate in dangerous ways. Additionally, the more that Pakistan resists changing its policies, the harsher the American tactics are likely to be.

Even at such an uncertain moment for U.S.-Pakistan relations, this much is true: The relationship may not shrivel up and die, but it鈥檚 dangerously low on oxygen. Dark days lie ahead.

Michael Kugelman is the Asia program deputy director and senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

This article was originally published on the聽.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.