澳门六合彩

Since the conclusion of the 2024 NATO Summit this past summer, there has been renewed focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization鈥檚 partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. As NATO鈥檚 activity in the region surges, China and other adversaries of NATO have alleged that Washington seeks to fabricate an 鈥淎sia Pacific version of NATO.鈥�

These criticisms are inherently political and should be treated skeptically. Yet there is a deeper history to the idea of an 鈥淎sian NATO,鈥� one that is mostly divorced from the activities of the United States.

During the early Cold War, particularly surrounding the Chinese Communist Party鈥檚 ascension to power, various leaders in Asia toyed with the idea of a unifying body for the region鈥檚 anti-communist and non-communist nations. The President of the Philippines, Elpidio Quirino, was one such visionary. Chiang Kai-shek and Jawaharlal Nehru were others.

This was despite the fact that the United States was generally not supportive of the idea. The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, even said in a May 18, 1949, statement that Washington was 鈥渘ot considering participation in any further special collective defence arrangements other than the North Atlantic Treaty.鈥�[i]

Left to their own devices, leaders in Asia sought pathways for regional cooperation. But an 鈥淎sian NATO鈥� never took off, largely because no one could reach an agreement on what a possible union should look like. Proposals ranged from military alliances, to economic and cultural bodies, to simple conferences of states.听

In July 1949, President Quirino hosted Chiang Kai-shek in the summer capital of the Philippines, Baguio, for some of the first in-depth conversations about what was then being called the 鈥淧acific Pact.鈥澨�

Understandably, the two did not see eye-to-eye. While Chiang was desperate for military support, Quirino did not want to get bogged down in the Chinese Civil War. He would only commit to a non-military union involving the Philippines, the Republic of China, South Korea, and possibly Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and Thailand.听

Because of its non-military nature, and because the Philippines was taking the initiative, Quirino expected that the US would eventually come around to the idea.听 Yet Quirino鈥檚 plans to forge a 鈥淧acific Union鈥� were still met with disapproval by the American administration, forcing the Philippines to change tact and instead propose a conference of leaders instead of a formal organization.

There were also disagreements between Quirino and Nehru of India.听

From early January 1949, speculations had been abuzz that India would become a signatory to the Pacific Pact. at the Asian Conference on Indonesia about creating a "permanent arrangement鈥� for 鈥渆ffective mutual consultation and concerted effort in the pursuit of common aims鈥� fueled such speculation.

But Nehru was also seeking to carefully navigate the changed regional situation following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party.听

Even when Quirino proposed only to host a leaders summit, Nehru reacted cautiously. He wrote in a secret telegram to India鈥檚 ambassador to the US and his sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit that, under normal circumstances, India 鈥渟hould have been happy to send representatives to Asian Conference in Manila to discuss political and economic trends affecting Asia.鈥� Yet he hesitated to do so, because it was 鈥渋mpossible to divorce [the] proposed Conference from the one which recently resulted in a joint manifesto by the Philippines President, Chiang Kai Shek and the South Korean republic, which announced the formation of united front against Communism.鈥�[ii]

Convincing India to join the conference was a tedious task for Manila. In a telegram to Pandit Nehru, Ambassador Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit cited General Romulo鈥檚 assurance to her that the proposed conference was nothing more than the continuation of the Delhi Conference on Indonesia for 鈥渢he maintenance of peace and freedom in the region.鈥�[iii] A telegram from G.S. Bajpai also pointed out that the Philippines was trying to distance itself from Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee of South Korea.[iv]

India finally agreed to take part in what became known as the Baguio Conference of May 1950 on the condition of limiting matters strictly to economic and cultural affairs. New Delhi鈥檚 demand not to invite Chiang Kai Shek and the South Korean Government to the conference was also accepted.[v] For fear of appearing as a participant in an anti-communist conference that might indicate alignment with a bloc, Nehru also did not want any ministers to be sent as delegates, something the Philippines was not delighted about.[vi]

Ramaswami Mudaliar, a diplomat, was chosen to lead India鈥檚 delegate. He was advised not to play 鈥渢oo prominent a part in the conference, and, to discourage, so far as possible, grandiose or aggressive ideas.鈥�[vii] India鈥檚 main concern was to keep political matters at bay and focus only on economic and cultural interests.听

On the contrary, the Philippines was keen to push forward a political resolution that would foster the creation of a 鈥渃loser political association for common purpose鈥� [viii] in the region and set up a permanent committee of representatives of nations attending the conference, headquartered at Manila. To the shock of the Indian delegates, the printed headings of the conference papers spoke of a 鈥淪outh East Asiatic Union.鈥� It was an implicit, fervent last attempt to forge a more diluted version of the Philippines' ambitious Pacific Union. Fearing that this would only escalate tension in the region, India and others worked to quash the Filipino proposal.[ix]

Much has changed in the 75 years since these first proposals of a Pacific Pact or a Pacific Union. While leaders in the Indo-Pacific fiercely debated the extent and form of regional cooperation in 1949 and 1950, such ideas for mini-laterals and deeper strategic ties among the region鈥檚 democracies seem essential today. Indeed, New Delhi need not feel as nervous about openly aligning itself with the Philippines and other Indo Pacific nations.
听

[i]听National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, 鈥淐orrespondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950.鈥�

[ii] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950. 鈥淛awaharlal Nehru telegram to Vijaya Lakhsmi Pandit鈥� DTO, July 19, 1949

[iii] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950. 鈥淭elegram from Vijaya Lakhsmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, August 9, 1949鈥�

[iv]National Archives of India. Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950, 鈥淕.S Bajpai鈥檚 correspondence to John Mathai, Nov 2, 1949鈥澨�

[v] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950, 鈥淭elegram to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit from Jawaharlal Nehru dated 11th March 1950鈥�

[vi]National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950, 鈥淭elegram from G.S.Bajpai to Vijayalaksmi Pandit dated April 29, 1950鈥�

[vii] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950, 鈥淭elegram from G.S. Bajpai to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, May 04, 1950鈥�

[viii] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2)/C.J.K./50, Part II, Baguio Conference, 1950, 鈥淩eport on the Baguio Conference, by Ramaswami Mudaliar, 1950鈥�

[ix] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2)/C.J.K./50, Part II, Baguio Conference, 1950, 鈥淩eport on the Baguio Conference, by Ramaswami Mudaliar,1950.鈥�