澳门六合彩

The deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles only 90 miles from Key West in 1962 brought the world as close as ever to a superpower nuclear conflict. Unsurprisingly, the Cuban Missile Crisis attracted immense interest by contemporary students of international affairs and subsequently by Cold War historians.听

After the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, new evidence from Soviet archives as well as from Eastern Europe highlighted Khrushchev鈥檚 original explanation for sending medium-range missiles to Cuba. Accordingly, in 1961,听 painted a very dire situation on the island with US-backed counter-revolutionary forces gaining momentum.[1]

The interruption of diplomatic relations with the US in January 1961 brought the immediate danger of military aggression against Cuba, the听.[2]听At the same time that Cuba鈥檚 security prospects waned, Havana鈥檚 economy also worsened. To signpost the urgent need for tangible support for the new Cuban regime,听 of the听Soviet envoy鈥檚 admission that the threat of US-sponsored counter-revolution left Castro with no other choice but to turn to Marx and Lenin and to rely on the help of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.[3]

Amid the rapidly changing situation in Cuba, with the new regime鈥檚 turn to the left and the perceptible US threat, Khrushchev decided to launch the transatlantic transfer of the missiles in utmost secrecy, keeping even the East European socialist leaders in the dark. The Soviet Party chief鈥檚 brash initiative confused the other socialist states.听, Moscow鈥檚 goal to install missile launchers in Cuba was not completely clear. The explanation given by the Soviet Deputy Premier Sergei Mikoyan that Moscow wanted to use the missiles to obtain a guarantee for Cuba had obvious holes,听Jele艅 argued. To him, the Soviet move seemed more like a political ploy than military strategy.听Warsaw鈥檚 emissary in Havana concluded his critical observations by stating that the Soviet Union did not make a mistake in withdrawing the missiles as the Cubans suggested but rather by installing them in the first place.[4]

While East European leaders felt sidelined by Khrushchev, Eastern European diplomats felt ignored by the Cuban authorities during the crisis. The Soviet ambassador, Aleksandr Alekseev, however, enjoyed close relationships with the Cuban leadership, allowing him not only to take the central stage in the events but also to provide valuable insights as to the origins of Castro鈥檚 disagreement with the Kremlin鈥檚 management of the crisis. As听, this could not be said for Alekseev鈥檚 predecessor, Sergei Kudryavtsev, who failed to听develop a sufficiently close relationship with Castro personally.[5]听, Kudryavtsev鈥檚 dismissal was made at Fidel Castro鈥檚 explicit request, showing the Cuban leader鈥檚 hands-on approach in his dealings with the Revolution鈥檚 new friends. [6]

The way the crisis was resolved between Kennedy and Khrushchev without Fidel Castro being closely involved incensed the sensitive Cuban leader, highlighting his fear of Cuba鈥檚 subjugation. An听 testified to the worsening Soviet-Cuban relations in the wake of the missiles鈥� withdrawal, zeroing in on the 鈥渆nraged鈥� Fidel, who believed the Soviet leader treated Cuba not as a socialist country but as a satellite state.[7]

A decade later, Fidel鈥檚 brother, Ra煤l, shared in a very frank听 that at a Politburo meeting of the Cuban Communist Party, without specifying when Fidel admitted that Khruschev鈥檚 approach was correct as Moscow鈥檚 objective for Cuba 鈥渢o exist and continue to exist鈥� was fulfilled. According to Fidel, the Soviets were right then because 鈥淐uba still exists now.鈥� Arguably, with this admission, Fidel Castro had forgiven Moscow for a difficult chapter in Cuba鈥檚 relations with the Soviet bloc.[8]

Connected Sources

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[1] [undated document from Soviet Embassy in Cuba requesting Soviet support against 鈥渃ounter-revolutionary gangs鈥漖 c. April 1961,听NA膶R, 脷V KS膶, Anton铆n Novotn媒 鈥� Zahrani膷铆, Karton 121, Komunistick谩 strana Kuby

[2] J. Miller, 鈥淣ebezpe膷铆 vojensk茅 agrese proti Kube a n谩vrh na dal拧铆 opat艡en铆 膷s. rozv臎dky na podporu revolu膷n铆 Kuby鈥� [The danger of military aggression against Cuba and a proposal for further measures of Czechoslovak intelligence in support of revolutionary Cuba], 6 January 1961, Archiv Bezpe膷nostn铆ch Slo啪ek [Security Services Archive] (ABS), RN 80618 I.S SNB, p. 3 [39].

[3] "Informatsiya sovetskogo posla iz Kub瘸 ot 18 aprelya" [Information of the Soviet ambassador in Cuba on 18 April], n.d. (c. 1961),听NA膶R, 脷V KS膶, Anton铆n Novotn媒 鈥� Zahrani膷铆, Karton 121, Komunistick谩 strana Kuby, p. 1.听See also Minutes of Conversation:听Gust谩v Hus谩k and Fidel Castro, 22 June 1972, NA膶R, KS膶-脷V 1945-1989, Praha - Gust谩v Hus谩k, k. 376, p. 11/1 啪.

[4] Boles艂aw Jele艅, "Notatka informacya" [Information note], 13 December 1962, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (AMSZ), D. VI, 1962, Blokada Kuby, 52/65, W-5, pp. 2-3 [3-4].

[5] Boles艂aw Jele艅 [Memo to Department VI [Latin America]], 14 August 1962, AMSZ, D. VI 鈥� 1962, Kuba, 52/65, W-4, p. 3

[6] A. Krajewski, "Ocena pozycji Polski na Kubie w okresie wizyty min.听Rapackiego, dokonana na podstawie rozm贸w, kt贸re przeprowadzi艂em w Hawanie po Jego wyje藕dzie鈥� [Assessment of Polish position in Cuba during the visit of Minister听Rapacki, based on the conversations I had in Havana after his departure] draft, 2 July 1962, AMSZ, D. VI 鈥� 1962 Kuba, 52/62, W-4, p. 1.

[7] 鈥淭毛 dh毛na mbi gjedjen n毛 organizatat e bashkuara revolucionare t毛 Kub毛s鈥� [Information on the situation in the United Revolutionary Organizations of Cuba], n.d. [c. 1962],听Drejtoria e P毛rgjithshme e Arkivave [General Directorate of Archives] (DPA), f. 14, l. 3/1, d. 7, p. 3.

[8] Memcon, Todor Zhivkov - Ra煤l Castro, 11 March 1974, Tsentralen Dyrzhaven Archiv [Central State Archive] (TsDA), f. 1B, op. 60, a.e. 142, p. 5.