澳门六合彩

This essay is one in a series about the Helmut Kohl Transcripts, a new Wilson Center Digital Archive resource featuring hundreds of Helmut Kohl鈥檚 foreign policy meetings with world lead

After Saddam Hussein attacked Israel with Scud missiles in 1991, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl felt it was important that newly unified Germany stand firm at Israel鈥檚 side. Yet tensions between Israel and Germany only increased when the latter failed to take a military role in the ensuing Gulf War.听

After Iraq鈥檚 defeat, Kohl aspired to help build a lasting and comprehensive security system for the entire Middle East. He argued that 鈥渨ithout a聽, there would be no permanent economic upturn and the region鈥檚 social unrest would explode鈥� 鈥� a point he聽 with other regional leaders.听

But, again, relations with Israel proved a complicating factor for Kohl鈥檚 plans. The Israeli government refused to negotiate with PLO leader Yaser Arafat, curtailing any hopes for a lasting solution to the Palestine issue. Despite these roadblocks, Kohl remained determined to help resolve some of the Middle East鈥檚 most existential conflicts.

Given the stalemate in the Palestinian question, Kohl instead focused his energy on rapprochement with Iran. Tehran鈥檚 policymakers saw Saddam Hussein鈥檚 defeat during the Gulf War as a unique chance for Iran to re-enter the world stage, particularly after its own devastating war with Iraq ended in 1988. Kohl sensed the Iran might be susceptible to Western influence given its desire to see Western embargos lifted and to expand trade relations with the European Community. In February 1991, Kohl had a聽 in which they discussed opportunities for the establishment of a new regional security system. (Kohl subsequently聽 补苍诲听 on his talk with Velayati.)

Velayati reiterated that 鈥淚ran wanted a regional peace order which would not repeat the mistakes of the past.鈥� He criticized members of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for failing to come to Kuwait鈥檚 defense聽 after the Iraqi invasion, and stated that the countries of the Gulf must come together 鈥渢o establish the cornerstone for the future security architecture in the region.鈥� Velayati invited European Commission member states as well as the Soviet Union to 鈥減articipate in such as security system,鈥� to which Kohl responded that the United States also had to play a vital part in a new security system.

In March 1991, Kohl had an important聽. Kohl underlined the necessity for a comprehensive solution of the Middle East鈥檚 problems. Although Rafsanjani had asked for Germany鈥檚 views about the future of Iraq, Kohl argued that the 鈥淚srael and the Palestinian question鈥� These problems must not disappear from the agenda. There would be no peace without its resolution.鈥澛�

With regards to the emergence of a new security system in the Persian Gulf, Kohl stressed that he 鈥渢hought it was important to have ideas for a solution coming from the region itself. One had to avoid the impression of tutelage from others. We Germans were ready to contribute our experience.鈥�

Meanwhile, Kohl was determined to work with moderate Arab leaders in the search for a Middle East peace arrangement. A prime example was Kohl鈥檚 close contacts with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, with whom he reviewed the whole story of the Persian Gulf War in a聽.听

Kohl and Mubarak discussed the chances for an Arab-Israeli rapprochement over the Palestinian question. Mubarak鈥檚 view was that Israel鈥檚 Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, was not willing to enter into a serious dialogue with the Palestinian side. Israeli intransigence saddened Kohl, but he saw a narrow window of opportunity for a peace settlement as long as President Bush was in office. 鈥淧resident Bush was the first American President who acted decisively against Israel,鈥� to which Mubarak responded, 鈥渙ne would not find a better American government for the resolution of these problems.鈥�

Meanwhile, Kohl worked with the Iranian leadership to gain the release of two German relief workers who were kidnapped in Lebanon in May 1989 while working in Palestinian refugee camps. In June 1992, Kohl鈥檚 envoy, Bernd Schmidbauer,聽 with the Iranian representatives. Schmidbauer expressed gratitude for Iran鈥檚 support on Germany鈥檚 behalf during the negotiations.

At the same time, Kohl and his advisors turned down Iranian requests for the transfer of sensitive technology for the completion of the nuclear reactor in Bushehr that Iran had started to build with West German assistance back in the 1970s. When Iranian Security Minister Ali Fallahian portrayed the Bushehr project as 鈥渁 burden for bilateral relations,鈥� Schmidbauer drew a red line. Pragmatic solutions could be found on a lot of issues, but 鈥渢his did not apply to the Bushehr nuclear power plant and similar cases,鈥� Schmidbauer said.

In a聽, Schmidbauer was more forthcoming. When Rafsanjani reviewed the state of the Bushehr reactor project and lamented that 鈥渁 failed investment of $4 billion was not acceptable for Iran,鈥� Schmidbauer noted that both sides had to discuss the issue at the highest level. He stated that 鈥渋t was important to also review those issue areas where both sides had been speechless so far,鈥� and that President Rafsanjani and Chancellor Kohl should be willing to raise 鈥渃ontroversial points, in the President鈥檚 conversations with the Chancellor. President Rafsanjani had already begun this process, as Germany did not want unresolved problems with Iran, possibly involving the IAEA over the long term to handle some nuclear aspects. A lot of things could be solved "when the fog clears.鈥�

In terms of the Middle East peace process, things changed with the election of Yitzhak Rabin as Israel鈥檚 Prime Minister in June 1992. In September of that year,聽. Rabin wanted to foster the peace process but was not very hopeful. First and foremost, he emphasized the need to focus on economic and educational reform in Israel and on the integration of more than half a million Jews from the former Soviet Union. At the time, Rabin was skeptical about Arafat鈥檚 readiness for serious dialogue. 鈥淗e did not think that Arafat was willing to contribute to the continuation of the peace process. Rather, he was continuously creating obstacles as he was concerned that the local Palestinian leaders would become stronger,鈥� Rabin said. From Rabin鈥檚 vantage point, conflicts within the Palestinian leadership were one of the main challenges on the path toward a peace settlement.听

Meanwhile, Israelis and Palestinians representatives initiated secret peace talks in Oslo in December 1992.In March 1993, Israel鈥檚 Foreign Minister聽 that 鈥渨ith regards to the Palestinian problem, one needed a new strategy. Israel wanted the Palestinians to live their lives. One did not want another Yugoslavia. The problem was that the Palestinians did not have a unified leadership. Arafat envisaged himself as the leader of the Palestinian diaspora.鈥�

Though unable to permanently resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict or to fully bring Iran back in the Western fold, this period shows Kohl鈥檚 commitment to bringing peaceful resolutions to the endlessly complex Middle East diplomatic landscape. His willingness to personally engage with all sides showed his ability to act as a trusted interlocutor, even when his fellow world leaders refused to speak to one another.

Associated Documents

Kohl and Faisal discuss the situation in the Gulf, Germany's foreign policy and its financial assistance to the Saudis, as well as Saddam Hussein's position in the Arab world.

Kohl and Mitterrand debate the situation in the Gulf, the state of reforms in the Soviet Union, and the prospects for progress in terms of European integration.

Brandt agrees to Kohl's request to serve as a mediator and interlocutor for the Iraqi side in an effort to achieve the release of hostages in Iraq.

Kohl and Gorbachev review the state of bilateral relations, the Gulf crisis, and the situation in the Soviet Union, especially with regards to Gorbachev's聽perestroika 补苍诲听glasnost and the Soviet Union's economic reforms. They discuss Western economic assistance and food supplies for the Soviet Union.

Kohl and Mitterrand assess the relevance of the Paris CSCE Summit and the situation in the Gulf, especially UN resolutions on Iraq and the potential use of force under a UN mandate.

Kohl and 脰zal debate the Gulf crisis and Turkey's request for the deployment of the air component of NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. In addition, they discuss the resignation of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Kohl and Mitterrand talk about the start of allied military operations in the Gulf War and France's contribution in particular.听

On behalf of Gorbachev, Ambassador Terechov complains that the Soviet government was only informed about the start of U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf an hour in advance.

Kohl and Bush review the situation in the Gulf and discuss Germany's financial contribution to the costs of the war. In terms of numbers, Bush has in mind one billion dollars as a contribution to the previous costs for the "desert shield" campaign and another five billion dollars to help cover the first three months of the war.

Kohl and Hurd discuss Germany's financial aid in support of Britain's military operations in the Gulf in the amount of DM 800 million. Moreover, Kohl reviews his efforts for constitutional changes in order to enable Germany's participation in future of out-of-are missions.

Kohl and Major review Germany's financial contributions in the support of the Gulf coalition and Kohl's plans for changes in the German constitution in order to enable the Federal Republic's participation in future out-of-area missions. In addition, they talk about the domestic situation in the Soviet Union.

Kohl and Mitterrand examine the Soviet position in the Gulf War and the situation in the Baltics.听

Kohl and Velayati debate the future of security and defense issues in the Middle East after the end of the Gulf War. They exchange thoughts on the emergence of a new security order and the participation of the EC, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Kohl and Bush discuss the Gulf War. Kohl reports on his meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati and his recent telephone conversation with Gorbachev.

Kohl reports on his meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati and the latter's meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister Aziz. Kohl and Mitterrand discuss Iran's plans for the country's return on the world stage after the end of the Gulf War.

Kohl and Mitterrand review the state of the allied military operations in Iraq.

Kohl and Major examine the situation in Iraq. Both reject the idea to send troops to Baghdad and to catch Saddam Hussein.

Kohl and Rafsanjani talk about plans for the emergence of a new security system in the Middle East after the end of the Gulf War. They emphasize the importance of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity.听

Kohl and Levy discuss the situation in Iraq, the Palestine question and Israel's request for financial assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany.

Kohl and the American Jewish Committee review the international position of unified Germany in Europe and in NATO in particular. Kohl rejects the term "leadership role" for Germany.

Kohl and Mitterrand comment on the situation in the Middle East, the Palestinian question and the idea of convening an international conference on the region.

Kohl and Gonzalez discuss the state of European integration and the situation in the Gulf. They review the preparations for the forthcoming European Council in Luxemburg arguing in favor of a step-by-step approach as the best way to achieve lasting results.

Kohl and Perez de Cuellar discuss Germany's international role, European integration, the Yugoslavia War, the Middle East and the end of Perez de Cuellar's tenure as UN Secretary General.

Kohl and Mubarak discuss the overall situation in the Middle East after the Gulf War. Mubarak shares his insights examining the positions and competing interests of Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

Kohl and the American Jewish Committee discuss the challenge of potential nuclear proliferation after the Soviet Union's disintegration. They scrutinize the problem of increasing xenophobia in Germany after unification.

Kohl and Rafsanjani discuss Germany's role in the stabilization of the CIS countries and the Balkans. Rafsanjani expresses Iran's desire for the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in a "good atmosphere" without pressure pledging that Iran was not planning any military use.

Schmidbauer and Vaezi search for new overtures in bilateral cooperation. They discuss the problem of German hostages in Lebanon and attacks on Iran鈥檚 embassy in Bonn.

Schmidbauer and Fallahian review possibilities for increasing bilateral cooperation in the intelligence field. Schmidtbauer does not see any chances to assist Iran in the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He requests Iran's assistance in the release of German hostages in Lebanon.

Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in the Near and Middle East and the changed in Syria's position toward Israel after the demise of the Soviet Union. Rabin expresses concern about the continued arms race in the region and Syria's purchases of Scud missiles from Russia and Slovakia. He also reiterates Iraq's continued capability to go nuclear within 5 to 6 years despite international arms control inspections. Last but not least, Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in Iran and Kohl's contacts with President Rafsanjani.

Schmidbauer and Erbakan discuss the situation of Muslims in Western countries and in Germany in particular against the background of rising xenophobia in unified Germany. Erbakan sees Germany as a good Western partner for Muslim countries.

Kohl and Peres examine the state of the Middle East peace process and chances for closer cooperation between Israel and the European Community.

Kohl and Mubarak discuss the recent bomb attack in Cairo and the question of the assassins. Upon Kohl's question, Mubarak rejects the idea that Libya and Gaddafi could be behind it. Rather, Mubarak suggests the changes in Gaddafi鈥檚 position and the latter's concern about fundamentalist terror in Libya. Mubarak thinks Iran was behind the terror attack in Cairo.