澳门六合彩

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, there was considerable speculation and concern, especially in Western capitals, that China would take advantage of the power vacuum created by the US departure to establish its economic dominance over Afghanistan鈥檚 untapped mineral resources, especially its valuable lithium sector. The speculation was not without basis; there had been considerable rhetoric and diplomatic signals emanating from China about investing in Afghanistan鈥檚 minerals. Less than five days after the withdrawal, Zhou Bo, a former senior official in the People鈥檚 Liberation Army (PLA) even聽聽that 鈥淲ith the U.S. withdrawal, Beijing can offer what Kabul needs most: political impartiality and economic investment. Afghanistan in turn has what China most prizes: opportunities in infrastructure and industry building 鈥� areas in which China鈥檚 capabilities are arguably unmatched 鈥� and access to $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits.鈥� Now almost three years after the withdrawal, has Beijing realized its ambitions? Let鈥檚 take a closer look. 聽

The Allure of Afghanistan鈥檚 Untapped Mineral Wealth

Afghanistan鈥檚 mineral resources have long been an enticing prospect for global investors and nations. The country is believed to possess vast reserves of critical minerals, especially its lithium deposits, believed to be worth easily more than $1 trillion, according to a聽, which examined its mineral potential and dubbed it the 鈥淪audi Arabia of Lithium.鈥� These minerals are crucial for the聽 away from fossil fuels towards more sustainable聽forms of energy. The lithium found in Afghanistan could be a crucial component of large-capacity rechargeable batteries for electric vehicles (EVs), mobile phones, computers, power tools, and battery storage of energy generated from wind and solar power.

The global EV market has especially experienced exponential growth in recent years. 聽EV sales in the US alone could reach 40%聽of total passenger car sales by 2030, with聽聽suggesting sales could surpass 50%. This surge has led to intense聽 between the West and China, both racing to dominate this burgeoning sector. 聽

The rising demand for lithium and other minerals highlights the importance of Afghanistan鈥檚 untapped mineral wealth. However, the Taliban lack the resources and expertise to commercialize Afghanistan鈥檚 mining sector without external assistance. With this in mind, China has emerged as the most viable partner. Beyond the sanctions that deter Western companies from investing,听China has steadily built and strengthened its relationship with the Taliban since their takeover.聽

Beijing鈥檚 Strategic Engagement with Kabul聽

Since the Taliban鈥檚 takeover, Beijing has made some major steps towards the Islamic Emirate. Beijing, like certain other regional powers, has foregone the international consensus to not engage with the Taliban until it fulfills its obligations towards the international community, such as allowing girls' education and adhering to counterterrorism commitments. Instead, China has prioritized its own interests, most prominently to ensure that Uyghur militant groups, particularly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (renamed the Turkestan Islamic Party), do not use Afghan soil for terrorist and separatist activities against China. Beijing believes that active engagement with the Taliban, rather than pressure, is the best strategy to safeguard these security interests along with its other strategic long-term investments.聽

In September 2023, China聽 an ambassador in Kabul. Since then,听 indicate a flurry of diplomatic activity, with Chinese diplomats meeting their Afghan counterparts almost weekly and inviting them to participate in international initiatives. As the proverbial cherry on top of all this diplomatic engagement, in late January, President Xi Jinping聽 the credentials of the Taliban鈥檚 newly appointed ambassador to China in the Great Hall of the People鈥攁 foreign policy achievement that the Taliban widely publicized. Although Chinese diplomats were quick to deny that the ceremony amounted to official recognition, many view this move as de facto recognition by Beijing. 聽

Chinese investments in Afghanistan: Rhetoric or Reality?聽

In addition to its diplomatic efforts, China and its companies have made notable investments in Afghanistan. In January 2023, the Taliban held a聽 with a Chinese company and the Chinese ambassador Wang Yi to announce their first international agreement since taking power. The 25-year contract, signed with the Chinese company CPEIC, was for the extraction of oil from the Amu Darya basin in northern Afghanistan, with an investment of over $540 million. 聽

China has continued to expand its involvement in Afghanistan's resource sectors. The Fan China Afghan Mining Processing and Trading Company has聽 plans to invest $350 million over the next few years in various sectors, including power generation, the creation of a cement factory, and public health initiatives. Furthermore, in May 2023, China and Pakistan聽 that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), would be extended to Afghanistan. Although this extension is increasingly unlikely due to deteriorating Taliban-Pakistan ties, it highlights China's strategic interest in Afghanistan.聽

Lithium Investments聽聽

Coming to Chinese investments in lithium mineral mining in Afghanistan, there鈥檚 also been substantial movement. In late 2021, several Chinese companies聽 on-site inspections of potential lithium projects in Afghanistan following diplomatic coordination between the two countries. Many company representatives praised聽the Taliban鈥檚 welcoming attitude, believing that the friendly relations between Beijing and Kabul were conducive to their interests. Following these inspections, more than 20 Chinese state-owned companies have made inquiries about these lithium projects.聽

In April of last year, the Afghanistan Ministry of Mines & Petroleum聽 a significant deal transpiring with the Chinese company, Gochin. It offered to invest $10 billion in mining minerals, including building a lithium ore processing plant. Then, after months of no further details, the Taliban聽 in late August that they had inked seven mining contracts worth $6.5 billion (equivalent to about half the country's entire GDP) with local and foreign partners, including the Chinese. These contracts would cover the extraction and processing of gold, copper, iron, lead, and zinc in four Afghan provinces. 聽

All the aforementioned investments might seem to signal significant progress toward Beijing鈥檚 ambitions to tap into Afghanistan鈥檚 mineral resources. However, the reality is that there is a notable lack of concrete information about these investments and projects, and a glaring absence of significant progress on the ground so far. Additionally, there鈥檚 many reasons to be skeptical of these investments materializing in the near聽future. 聽

Beijing鈥檚 Security Concerns聽聽

At the end of the day, the primary reason for skepticism about the realization of these projects and investments is the glaring lack of security. Although violence has notably reduced in Afghanistan since the Taliban's takeover (mainly because the Taliban themselves were the primary source of insurgent violence), terrorist and militant groups continue to operate. Most groups, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, can be expected to heed the Taliban鈥檚 directives due to certain alignments and refrain from attacking potential Chinese projects within the country. However, the same cannot be said about Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is locked in a deadly battle with the Taliban. ISKP has demonstrated its significant capabilities by conducting terrorist acts within Afghanistan and beyond its borders in聽,听, and even聽 鈥攁ll three were brutally attacked in 2024 alone, showcasing its growing reach and increasing capability.聽

ISKP will be determined to sabotage Chinese investments to prevent the Taliban from securing legitimacy both internationally and domestically by bringing economic benefits to a struggling population. Their goals are simple: prevent the Taliban from gaining legitimacy, continue recruiting disenfranchised Taliban fighters and other Afghans unhappy with the regime, and continue using Afghanistan as a base to carry out their local and transnational terror activities. ISKP already聽 a Kabul guest house popular with Chinese businesspeople, wounding five Chinese citizens, in late 2022.聽This attack showcased ISKP's intent and capacity to strike Chinese targets in Afghanistan, and it was accompanied by a dramatic聽聽in聽anti-China rhetoric deriding the 鈥渃ommunist Chinese imperialists鈥� for seeking to exploit Afghanistan鈥檚 resources. These developments are highly concerning for Beijing, and it will remain cautious about investment deals in Afghanistan until it feels these security anxieties are being properly addressed. Tellingly, the aforementioned China-Taliban oil extraction deal was announced only after the Taliban very publicly聽 that they had arrested ISKP militants involved in the Kabul guest house attack.聽

Despite being China鈥檚 鈥淚ron Brother,鈥� Pakistan has come under increasing scrutiny from Chinese officials about security threats around its investments.

Indeed, China has been highly sensitive to security concerns when it comes to its investments in the wider region,听as evidenced by its experiences in neighboring Pakistan. Despite being China鈥檚 鈥淚ron Brother,鈥� Pakistan has come under increasing scrutiny from Chinese officials about security threats around its investments. Some experts even聽 that these security concerns and Pakistan鈥檚 inability to effectively address them have caused China to downgrade Pakistan from "the highest priority" to "a priority" in its foreign policy, leading to聽 in further CPEC projects.聽

Similar challenges, and arguably more, will confront authorities in Kabul as they work to protect potential Chinese investments. Pakistan, with considerably more state capacity and a significantly better-equipped security force, has already implemented a rigid security protocol for Chinese nationals and has even聽 a Special Security Division to secure CPEC, among various other strident measures. But despite these measures, Pakistan has still struggled to allay Beijing鈥檚 security concerns and prevent occasional attacks on Chinese nationals. This makes it unlikely that Afghanistan, with its considerably lesser capabilities, will be able to effectively address similar or worse security聽challenges.聽

To be sure, it鈥檚 worth noting that in 2023, the Taliban's聽 against ISKP proved somewhat effective, significantly reducing attacks compared to previous years. This reduction can be attributed to intelligence-led Taliban raids on ISKP hideouts, which resulted in operational and financial strains for the group. However, while the Taliban's measures have been聽relatively聽effective, they face limitations such as inadequate resources and advanced equipment (including the absence of air power,听which the Taliban do not know how to operate). There are also concerns that the Taliban鈥檚 scorched-earth tactics against IKSP could anger local communities and even provide possible new ISKP recruits. Consequently, the potential for ISKP鈥檚 resurgence in Afghanistan remains strong, which bodes poorly for China and and the security of its potential investments in Afghanistan. 聽

The previously mentioned Chinese investors who were hoping to invest in Afghanistan鈥檚 minerals already聽 ensuring safety as the 鈥渇irst and foremost鈥� priority because 鈥渋f safety is not guaranteed, the gain will not be worth the loss鈥� we need to further observe the situation in the country before deciding whether the company will go in." 聽

There is already a glaring precedent for Chinese hesitancy in mining Afghanistan鈥檚 valuable minerals due to security concerns. In 2007, the China Metallurgical Group was聽 the rights to develop the Mes Aynak copper mine in Logar province, with a $3 billion investment commitment. Despite the promise of substantial premium and royalty payments to the then-Afghan government, along with the construction of a railway and power plant, the project has been聽 due to security concerns and other contractual issues. While the Taliban have been anxiously聽 China to restart the project, calling it 鈥渙ne of the top priorities鈥� for their regime and having taken聽 to remove current obstacles, the timeline for production still remains unclear. 聽

Additional Challenges聽

There are several other significant issues to consider. Firstly, the cost and time required for China to develop mines and associated infrastructure are substantial. Developing mines and associated infrastructure is notoriously expensive and time-consuming. A聽 by S&P Global found that it takes an average of 15.7 years from discovery to production. As a result, China is unlikely to proceed with such projects unless it is fully confident that the investment will be worthwhile. Moreover, China is not in an immediate rush to invest in Afghanistan鈥檚 minerals; it already has significant investments in minerals in Latin American and聽Africa. From 2019 to 2022, Chinese companies聽 about聽$4.5 billion in lithium projects in Mexico and South America. 聽

Short-Term Uncertainty, Long-Term Potential聽

In the near future, China鈥檚 goals are mostly security-focused. China wants to leverage the promise of investments, such as lithium mining, as a strategic tool to positively engage with the Taliban, so that it can ensure its fundamental security interests. Chief among these is preventing Uyghur militants, such as聽the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, from launching attacks on Beijing. Additionally, China seeks to promote a base line of stability in Afghanistan, as any fallout could impact China directly through the Wakhan Corridor or indirectly affect its economic interests in neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Central Asian nations. 聽

This is not to say China lacks long-term ambitions to exploit Afghanistan鈥檚 mineral wealth; on the contrary, it seems to be laying the groundwork for that now. It is bidding for mining concessions and building relationships with the Taliban in a context where few others are willing. In so doing, China is preemptively trying to block other nations from entering Afghanistan鈥檚 mineral sector, in order to ensure its market dominance when the security situation improves sufficiently and investments become worthwhile to pursue. 聽

颁辞苍肠濒耻蝉颈辞苍听

China鈥檚 evolving role in Afghanistan, particularly in its mineral sector, highlights a complex interplay of strategic interests, security concerns, and long-term ambitions.聽Despite significant rhetoric and initial diplomatic engagements, the reality on the ground reveals substantial hurdles. Security challenges, economic feasibility, and infrastructural demands have stalled many of China's investment ambitions. But while Beijing鈥檚 short-term ambitions may be constrained, its long-term plans for Afghanistan鈥檚 mineral resources remain robust and potentially transformative, with implications for China, the Taliban, and global power dynamics. The coming years will reveal whether these investments can overcome the myriad challenges and translate rhetoric into reality.

Makhdum Shah is a former South Asia Institute and Indo-Pacific Program staff intern at 澳门六合彩.

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or 澳门六合彩. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.

Follow the Indo-Pacific Program on Twitter or .