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BY ANDRIAN PROKIP

On February 24, the Russian Federation launched a massive war against Ukraine. Most of the events before the war were connected with the upcoming escalation in hostilities.

1. PREWAR DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE

Russia Pressures the West with Demands Regarding Ukraine

Last year’s negotiations between U.S. and Russian top officials on security regimes at the Russia-Ukraine border and NATO expansion continued in early 2022. Among other unfulfillable requests, a written guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO. and reiterated that the decision on joining NATO could not be based on third-party pressure and that it was the sovereign right of states to shape their own security policy.

On January 12, , CIA director Bill Burns unofficially visited Kyiv and met with President Volodymyr Zelensky to discuss Russia’s military buildup. On January 19, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken to discuss the same issue.

After Russian attempts to gain concessions failed, the Kremlin resorted to blackmail: Putin a "military-technical" response if NATO did not acquiesce to Russian demands. Two days before the invasion that the situation might be normalized if Ukraine canceled its NATO aspirations and recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But by then it was very clear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but about something much bigger, the Kremlin’s desire to control the country in the same way it controls some other former Soviet Union states.

Negotiations Over the Donbas

The year 2022 started with political negotiations over peacemaking in the Donbas: a meeting of the quadrilateral group—Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France—in the Normandy Format was held in Paris and again in Berlin. The Ukrainian representatives on keeping the discussions focused on Ա’s national security interests, while the Russians blamed the Ukrainians for stalling the negotiations. Some analysts believe that Moscow’s inability to impose its will on Ukraine with respect to implementing the Minsk agreements was among the factors that finally pushed Russia to invade. (Two earlier Kennan Focus Ukraine posts addressed this issue: one described the risks of implementing the Minsk agreements as they currently stand; and the other noted that for Ukraine, the accords represent a national humiliation.)

On February 18 and 19, Russian representatives a planned meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group—Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE—to discuss peacemaking, a meeting convened at the OSCE’s initiative.

Concentration of Russian Troops on the Ukrainian Border

Since the first information about Russia’s plan to attack Ukraine came to light in October 2021, Russia has continued aggregating troops and equipment on the border with Ukraine, even as Moscow dismissed such troop movements as routine exercises and issued statements saying it was moving the forces back from the border. In mid-January Putin’s spokesperson, Vladimir Peskov, that Russia could not put up with “NATO’s invasion of Ukraine” anymore—a reference to NATO member states sending military equipment and instructors to Ukraine—and so would need to keep forces along Ա’s border. Later, Russia transferred to the border , tanks, truck-mounted Grad rocket launchers, fuel, and .

In January, Russia announced the largest joint military drills with Belarus ever, “,” to take place February 10–20. In addition, Russia conducted , an occupied part of Georgia, and , which affected Ukraine economically by virtually halting shipping and severing . The six Russian ships sent to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov were of the kind typically used to onto land.

A few days before the invasion, Russian general Stanislav Zas, the secretary general of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russia-led military alliance of a few former Soviet Union states that in early 2022 had helped , proposed . Later, when Russia started the war, Kazakhstan refused to join the operation.

At the same time, however, Russian officials on several occasions issued statements denying any plans to invade Ukraine, saying that Russia had a to engage in troop maneuvers. However, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev the West for ”imposing” war on Russia against Ukraine for its own purposes, and said the United States was responsible for the war’s escalation. Earlier, in 2021, Patrushev had that a “fire might swallow” Ukraine that would lead to millions of refugees fleeing the country.

In mid-February, the foreign parliaments, governments, and international organizations to condemn the concentration of Russian troops on the border and to demand a de-escalation.

The Belarusian Factor before the War

In mid-January 2022, Russian military troops and equipment began arriving in Belarus to take part in Allied Determination-2022 drills on Ա’s border. In late January Russia fighter aircraft to airfields in Belarus. Aleksandr Lukashenko Ukraine had been engaged in troop buildup near the border and that Belarus needed “reliable protection in the case of inadequacy of Ա’s government.”

Lukashenko described the military concentration in the Baltic states and Ukraine as a threat and to organize a huge military presence at the Belarusian border. Later, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg observed that the Russian military buildup in Belarus since the Cold War. The head of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, to direct them in January 2022.

Diplomatic Escalation on the Russian Side

One month before the invasion, Russian officials started accusing Ukraine of preparing to attack the unrecognized republics in the Donbas, the self-declared Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and Russia. This was done to justify Russia’s war intentions.

In late January the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ukraine and the United States of planning military and information provocations against Russia. On February 19 Russian officials said a shell had hit a building in , close to the border with Ukraine, and on February 21, a also in Rostov and 150 meters from the border was shelled. Russia laid responsibility for these isolated attacks at Ա’s feet; Kyiv denied the accusations.

Russia also fabricated the story that Ukraine planned to produce nuclear weapons. On February 21, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu that Ukraine had everything necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons. That same day, Vladimir Putin in his hourlong address that it was impossible for Russia not to respond to this threat.

Russia’s Military Support for and Recognition of the DPR and LPR



Arm supplies. In late January, Russian representatives they intended to protect Russian citizens living in the DPR and LPR if Ukraine and the West attacked them. The Russian ruling party on Putin to send arms and military equipment to the Donbas separatists. Commenting on this, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov did not such support, arguing that the West had failed to pressure Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements.

Separatists playing along with the Kremlin’s speculations. Following provocative statements from Russia implying that the Ukrainian army was preparing to launch an operation against the self-declared republics in eastern Ukraine, on February 18 the separatist leaders of civilians to Russia. Later in February these leaders a general mobilization.

Recognizing the separatists. On February 15 the Russia State Duma Vladimir Putin to recognize the independence of the LPR and DPR. On February 21 the separatists addressed the Kremlin with the same demand. Later that same day, President Putin recognizing the independence of the self-declared republics, and the next day the State Duma and the Federation Council ratified the recognition. After this step, Putin that the Minsk agreements were no longer in force.

Exposing the Kremlin’s Plans



Moscow’s desire to establish a pro-Russian government in Kyiv. In late January 2022, the UK foreign office it had evidences that Russia intended to change the authorities in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet regime. According to , the U.S. State Department had acquired similar information about Russia’s plans. Naturally, Russian representatives denied that the Kremlin harbored such plans.

Later, Ukrainian intelligence said that Moscow considered former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who had fled Ukraine for Russia during the 2013–2014 Maidan uprising, to be Ա’s legitimate president, and that Moscow had the Euromaidan and the following elections as a coup. In January 2022, Yanukovych addressed the court in Kyiv demanding he be returned to the presidency, which he lost in 2015 after parliament passed a corresponding law. In early March 2022 Yanukovych visited Minsk, but since then he has kept a low profile.

Planned repressions. A few days before the beginning of the war, the US ambassador to the UN sent a letter to the UN high commissioner for human rights saying existed that Russian authorities planned repressions on the territory of Ukraine in case of war, to include forced detention and killings. Later, Ukrainian forces, following successful attacks on Russian military convoys, found that the Russian forces had riot-police gear, typically used to disperse demonstrations.

Military Escalation in the Donbas before the Start of Full-Fledged War

Since the beginning of 2022 and up to the start of the war, the number of ceasefire violations in the Donbas grew exponentially. In the four-day period of February 20–23 alone, the number of ceasefire violations exceeded the typical number for a month in relatively quiet periods.

On February 19, a delegation that included members of Ա’s parliament, Interior Affairs minister Denys Monastyrskiy, and foreign journalists from CNN, FoxNews, the Washington Post, the New York Times, and Voice of America from the Russia-backed separatists in the Donbas. The Ukrainian officials had joined the visiting journalists to demonstrate provocations on the part of the separatists. Massive fires set by the separatists to destroy civilian infrastructure and take out Ukrainian army positions were arguably an attempt to provoke the Ukrainian army into creating a casus belli for the Russian invasion.

In response to the military escalation, and facing a clear risk of further lethal provocations, on February 23 the Ukrainian parliament approved President Zelensky’s decision to a state of emergency across the country, stipulating close security control.

The Final Stage of Escalation before the War

Putin’s February 21 decree recognizing the self-proclaimed republics in Luhansk and Donetsk region as independent also sending Russian army troops to the Donbas to “support peace.” The decree was followed by the movement of troops and to the line between the government-controlled and the occupied territories of the Donbas. After , Putin said he recognized all parts of the Donbas, including the territory controlled by Ukraine, as independent republics. This announcement made clear that Russia would try to get more territory under the control of its proxies in eastern Ukraine.

On February 23, Russia its diplomatic staff from Kyiv and the airspace on Ա’s eastern border, where the Russian troops were located, to civilian aviation. That same day, the separatist leaders of the non-government-controlled LHR and DPR asked Putin to introduce military forces to protect them from “the Ukrainian threat.”

2. ROLLOUT OF THE WAR

The First Stage of the War



Putin announces war. In the early morning of February 24, Vladimir Putin appeared on TV announcing his decision to conduct a “special military operation”—to this day he has not called it a war—against Ukraine. This speech three days earlier, on February 21. During the address he the separatists’ request for military aid and rehearsed the by now customary Russia propaganda messaging, blaming the West, and in particular the United States, for NATO in expansion to the east, the “Maidan coup” in Ukraine, and the like. He characterized the “special operation” against Ukraine as aimed at the “demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine” and at “protecting” Ukrainians from “those who had taken them as hostages.”

First strikes. The speech was followed by air strikes on Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa, and against military and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine. Then Russian troops crossed the border of Ukraine from Russian and oblasts and from Crimea.

Shortly after the start of the invasion, the Verkhovna Rada to introduce martial law in the country and announced a general mobilization.

The Kremlin’s plan to kill Zelensky. According to Western media reports, the Russian leadership ordered mercenaries to President Zelensky and members of the Ukrainian government to help shift power in Kyiv. Later, representative of Ա’s presidential administration confirmed the facts of attempts to assassinate Zelensky.Despite several threats to his life, Zelensky refused offers from the and the to help him leave the country.

Failed Russian plan for a blitzkrieg. On the second day of the war, Russian army units to enter Kyiv. Since then all attempts to capture Ա’s capital have failed.

Civilians Join the Fight

When the war started, many volunteers, not just those with military experience, sought to join Ա’s armed forces: Ukrainian officials there were about 100,000 volunteers during the first two days of the war. Besides the regular army, reserve Territorial Defense units in each region are accepting local residents ready to fight. In some regions and cities, such as Kyiv, the government has provided guns and arms to Territorial Defense volunteers to protect their cities. About 150,000 Ukrainian men who lived or stayed abroad to Ukraine to help defend their country.

In addition, with military experience from more than fifty countries have joined the Ukrainian forces to fight the Russian occupants in Ukraine.

Civilian Infrastructure and Civilians under Attack

When Russia’s plan for a quick regime change failed, Russian forces adopted a different strategy, . Cities close to the Russian border, including , , , are among those that have borne the brunt of the shelling. In some cases, Moscow has not even bothered to deny the deliberate shelling of civilian infrastructure, in the critical Black Sea port of Mariupol. Residents of this city access to humanitarian aid or for weeks, and evacuation routes have been repeatedly shelled.

As of late March, over Ukrainians had left the country as refugees, and another had become internally displaced persons. More than a quarter of the country’s population has had to leave home.

Kidnappings. On the temporarily occupied territories, Russian forces have kidnapped local officials— of cities and of city and regional councils—as well as and , forcing them to cooperate or leave.

Use of prohibited weapons by the Russian army. Ա’s and international organizations, including , say that Russia has used cluster and and munitions, which use is condemned by international agreements. Western governments and intelligence also point to the high risk that Russia will use and biological weapons in Ukraine.

Engagement of Belarus

On February 27, Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko confirmed that some missiles used to attack Ukraine had been launched from Belarus, but denied that Belarus was engaged in the war against Ukraine. Nonetheless, Lukashenko cited a possible attack from Ukraine as a reason for going to war, and a Belarusian “special operation” against Ukraine.

President Zelensky then a phone conversation with Lukashenko to try to persuade him not to join the Russian war against Ukraine. After that conversation, and up to the time of publication of this text, Belarusian troops have not entered Ukraine. However, Russian troops have on several occasions used Belarus as a base for missiles into Ukraine.

Nuclear Terrorism

During the war, the Russian army has exhibited highly with respect to nuclear facilities and hydroelectric power plants, behavior that poses a great danger to Ukraine and neighboring states and to the Russian troops themselves. The risky Russian maneuvers have included of the decommissioned Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP), with a in levels of radiation in that area, and , the largest NPP in Europe. Russian forces also hostage, the NPP grounds, and so forth, as elaborated in a recent Kennan Focus Ukraine analysis.

Negotiations with Russia

On February 25, Volodymyr Zelensky called on his Russian counterpart to start negotiations in earnest to stop the war and the killings. The first round of negotiations was held on February 28 in Belarus. Among other key issues, the parties opening humanitarian corridors to allow noncombatants to leave areas of heavy fighting. Regardless of what agreements were reached, Russian troops often violated them by routes or .

On March 10, Ukrainian and Russian foreign affairs ministers in Turkey, but reached no agreement on a ceasefire. On March 29 the parties another round of talks in Istanbul mediated by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A representative of the Russian delegation that Russia would reduce military activity in two sectors near Kyiv, but the situation after the meeting proved his words false.

Ukraine presented its initial terms on March 29. It is expected that Russian authorities will provide their answer in the next two weeks, which would then be followed by another meeting of Russian and Ukrainian foreign affairs ministers. Direct meetings of the presidents are not yet countenanced.

3. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Investigation of Russian War Crimes in Ukraine

After the Russian army invaded Ukraine, on February 28 the International Criminal Court prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan he was prepared to open an investigation into the acts of violence committed against civilians and the destruction of civil infrastructure. Even though Ukraine is not a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and so cannot itself refer the situation to the court, the investigation was on the referral of thirty-nine states on March 2, 2022. The Ukrainian government has collected evidence of Russian army crimes since then.

On March 16, the UN’s International Court of Justice Russia to halt its invasion of Ukraine, but the Kremlin the order. In late March the UN to investigate violations and abuses of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

Alliance with UK and Poland

One week before the war, Ukraine—together with Poland and the UK— establishing a new strategic cooperative alliance designed to contribute to security and develop trade among the three states. The idea of the alliance was proposed by Kyiv in October 2021. As of now, the UK and Poland are among the key partners supporting Ukraine in the war with Russia.

EU Integration

On February 26, Polish president Andrzej Duda that the EU offer Ukraine an accelerated path to EU membership. This idea was later by Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Ա’s EU aspirations by the president of the European Commission. Representatives of , including France and the Netherlands, however, did not endorse a fast track to EU membership.

On February 28, President Zelensky a request to join the EU. On March 10, participants in a expressed support for Ա’s application and a decision on Ա’s future EU membership: the council acknowledged the European aspirations of Ukraine and invited the European Commission to submit its opinion regarding this application. Later, Slovenia’s prime minister Janez Jansa that the EU should have specifically promised Ukraine EU membership. According to polls, most people in Germany, France, and Italy the idea of Ukraine becoming a member of the EU.

Relations with NATO

Since the start of the war, President Zelensky has persistently on NATO to establish a no-flight zone over Ukraine. However, NATO itself and member states have , or the unleashing of a world war.

At an extraordinary session on March 24, NATO issued a urging Russia to allow rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access and safe passage for civilians, and to allow humanitarian aid to be delivered to the besieged cities. NATO member states committed to continue supporting Ukraine politically and offered to provide assistance in cybersecurity and protection against threats of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear nature. They also called on China to cease amplifying the Kremlin’s false narratives and to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Canada

In March, Canada’s parliament to introduce a visa-free regime for Ukrainians. Earlier Canada had expressed support for Ukraine and committed to helping with energy exports for Russian oil, gas, and uranium.

4. INTERNAL AFFAIRS



Energy Crises Avoided and Energy Developments during the War


In the winter of 2021–2022, many politicians and experts expected an energy crisis in Ukraine because of a rally in energy prices and restrictions on importing coal supplies from Russia. With a warm winter, however, the energy sector survived the season without much problem. Despite the Russian invasion, Ա’s energy sector has exhibited an unexpected resilience, as detailed in an earlier Kennan Focus Ukraine analysis.

Once the war started, Ukraine lost supplies from Russia and Belarus. Now fuel is being delivered only from the EU.

Confiscation of Russian Property in Ukraine

On March 10, President Zelensky stipulating the confiscation of Russian property in Ukraine. The law set out the rules for seizing without compensation property owned by Russian residents, the Russian state, or Russian companies.

Ban on Pro-Russian Political Forces for the Duration of the War

In March 2022, Ա’s Security Council suspended operations of the Opposition Platform—For Life political party, co-led by the pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk, and of ten more political parties suspected of harboring pro-Russian sympathies. Medvedchuk had been , suspected of high treason, but he when the war started.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

About the Author

Andrian Prokip

Andrian Prokip

Senior Associate, Ukraine;
Director, Energy Program, Ukrainian Institute for the Future
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Kennan Institute

The Kennan Institute is the premier US center for advanced research on Eurasia and the oldest and largest regional program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Kennan Institute is committed to improving American understanding of Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the surrounding region though research and exchange.  Read more