澳门六合彩

The Nixon Forum on U.S.-China Relations听brings together leading experts, many of whom contributed to President Richard Nixon鈥檚 China policy in the 1970s and to the development of U.S.-China relations over the following 40 years.

The conference featured panel discussions on the most pressing contemporary issues that will shape this vital bilateral relationship now and in the decades ahead: geostrategic tensions, the trade war, and human rights and religious freedom. Keynote addresses by David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Democratic Senator Chris Coons of Delaware, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, anchored the day, which ended with a moderated conversation between three distinguished American diplomats-- Winston Lord, Stapleton Roy, and Chas Freeman-- who worked under President Nixon.

Selected Quotes
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Keynote

David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

鈥淭he three myths that have come to light that we need to discuss. First, that is engagement with the PRC will lead to some sort of liberalization or an accommodation. The second, that the Chinese Communist Party鈥檚 goal is simply to remain in power just to survive. The third is that ideology no longer matters 鈥� Yeah, you can throw these at the strawman, but I do think we need to address these, you know, as we adapt our relationship.鈥�

鈥淎s happens with a lot of people who go to the embassy and come back, I came back disappointed in the complete inability to make changes and to affect that system鈥擨n large part due to the restricted nature of our interaction where, you know, we were limited with who we could engage in the Chinese government and in society, in general. And that has only continued, that limitation on engagement, and I think that is probably, if you take anything away from this conversation, that to me is something that has to be addressed. if this relationship is going to continue to grow in a productive way, we鈥檙e going to have to have an open conversation, and you don鈥檛 have that by limiting access.鈥�

鈥淪o, in summary, our goal here is a region that is strong, sovereign, and prosperous. And our goal is also a relationship with China that is fair and reciprocal with Beijing living up to its many commitments; commitments like the Convention on the Law of the Sea, World Trade Organization, its joint Declaration with Hong Kong鈥攆ifty years of autonomy鈥攁nd others 鈥� We asked them to live up to these commitments because, in my mind, there鈥檚 an equation here. You鈥檝e got words, that鈥檚 the commitments you signed up to, and then you have actions, what you actually do, and words times actions equals trust. Trust is a result of stating what you鈥檙e going to do, following through with what you鈥檙e going to do, and you can鈥檛 have trust without that. Words alone, talk is cheap.鈥�

Conversation on U.S.-China Geostrategic Tensions

Dan Blumenthal, American Enterprise Institute

鈥淲e know what the Chinese Communist Party wants, but the Chinese are 1.2 billion people. We have no idea what the Chinese want or how much they support it. I mean, we know in Hong Kong they want freedom and probably throughout China they want more freedom, as well 鈥� It鈥檚 very important to distinguish; the Chinese Communist Party says very clearly that鈥擨鈥檓 interpreting鈥攁 different world order with China at the center.鈥�

鈥淭here鈥檚 a lot of talk about One Belt One Road and so forth. Fundamentally, it鈥檚 a means to an end 鈥� If people are looking for massive amounts of money spent then, you know, they鈥檙e not going to see it; it鈥檚 very unprofitable for China, it鈥檚 a waste of money and so forth, but what they have succeeded in doing is creating an international organization with China at the center and the ability to bring sixty nations to China every year to at least talk about the infrastructure projects even if they鈥檙e not going forward.鈥�

"So China wants a different world order. They鈥檙e very clear about a community of common destiny for all of mankind; they鈥檙e not just talking about the Indo-Pacific. They鈥檙e clear about wanting you propagate what they call a socialist culture 鈥� but they鈥檙e certainly training other countries elites and what they call a socialist culture. Which basically means this Beijing model of elite authoritarian governance with some experimentation with markets. They鈥檙e very clear on becoming a world-class military 鈥� They鈥檝e changed the balance of power in the Pacific with their military modernization program鈥攑robably one of the vastest and fastest military modernization programs in human history.鈥�

鈥淭here鈥檚 one area, and I think this is part of the competition, that I don鈥檛 agree with the administration鈥檚 assessment and that is to give up on engagement because it doesn鈥檛 change China. I think that, again, making the distinction between the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party is extremely important.鈥�

Jonathan Hillman, Center for Strategic and International Studies

鈥淚 think the Belt and Road brand has been tarnished in many ways, and yet even in the places it鈥檚 really struggled--Malaysia is an example, Pakistan is an example鈥攖he leaders of those countries go to Beijing at the last forum and they publicly praised this initiative 鈥� The power of inducements, this is really an effective tool for China; it鈥檚 something that speaks to the needs of developing economies, so that鈥檚 why they get a hundred and thirty-plus countries to sign up 鈥� I think it should cause the U.S. to think about, 鈥榃hat are we offering to the rest of the world,鈥� as we think about how to compete with China.鈥�

鈥淐hina鈥檚 not limiting itself to the Indo-Pacific, right? They鈥檙e in Eastern and Central Europe, they鈥檙e in Latin America, so even as we zone in on Indo-Pacific, China鈥檚 thinking and acting globally, and so I do think that we need sort of a broad, attractive economic vision, and it shouldn鈥檛 be defined in opposition to the Belt and Road. I think it should be defined as something that鈥檚 worth, you know, it鈥檚 worthwhile on its own鈥攊t reflects our interests, not necessarily something that鈥檚 against China鈥檚 interests.鈥�

Jean Lee, Wilson Center

鈥淲e don鈥檛 have to go that far back in history, but remember that in Korea we still refer to China as Chungu, Middle Kingdom or Middle Country, and so there鈥檚 a long history that goes back centuries of China seeking to play that essential role, the central role within the Asia region, and perhaps what we鈥檙e seeing is a strong bid to reassert itself as the Middle Kingdom, as the country that can perhaps treat neighboring countries as vassal states.鈥�

鈥淜orea has been dealing with the concept behind Indo-Pacific strategy for not only decades but for centuries and North Korea, perhaps, can be seen as a cautionary tale. What happens when a small country feels the only way that it can remain relevant within this larger US-China competition is to arm itself with nuclear weapons, and I would go one step further and say that if the diplomacy around this issue doesn鈥檛 right itself soon, we may start to see some of the other small countries in that region鈥擲outh Korea and Japan鈥攕eeking to arm themselves as well to remain relevant, protect themselves within this broader US-China competition.鈥�

鈥淪outh Korea鈥檚 a great example of a very recently developing country that is now a developed country 鈥� Eleventh-largest economy and can really serve as a role model to countries in Southeast Asia and in the broader region as a country, an Asian country, that can serve as a role model, rebuild its economy, and I think what we need to do as Americans is to encourage them to take the next step and think about the values that we share鈥攖he United States shares鈥攚ith countries in that region and encourage them to pick the path with values that they would like to embrace.鈥�

Edward Wong, NYT and Wilson Center

鈥淭here鈥檚 a fundamental difference in ideologies that these two countries, because of the status they occupy now in the world and because of the economic status that exerts, is hard to reconcile with each other. And I think that the U.S. can work with authoritarian regimes; the question is can the U.S. coexist in a world where authoritarian regime is as powerful as the U.S. is economically, and I don鈥檛 think that we鈥檝e had that before鈥攍ike the Soviet Union never occupied the same economic space in the world that the U.S. does.鈥�

鈥淚 don鈥檛 think that it鈥檚 clear cut, but I do think that there are concerns about whether [China will] push certain constraints on free societies such as what we鈥檝e seen with what happened with the NBA this week鈥攖hat because of their power economically, that we want access to their markets 鈥� They have so much leverage over us in the capitalist system that we embrace that they鈥檙e able to force constraints on us that the U.S. doesn鈥檛 want. And I think that鈥檚 whats is the fundamental tension at the heart of this relationship.鈥�

鈥淭here is this idea that capitalism should be unfettered to a certain degree, and so like for example, institutions like the NBA should be able to do business on whatever grounds that they want and accept these constraints. But at the same time, that acceptance of that undermines the sort of liberal democratic values that America is based on. So, how do you reconcile? 鈥� In the eyes of a lot of American strategic thinkers, that鈥檚 the most fundamental threat that I think China poses.鈥�

鈥淚 think anyone who reads President Trump鈥檚 transcripts and looks at speeches, whether it鈥檚 Chinese officials or us, like he rarely talks about human rights or about sort of the liberal values that the United States traditionally projects. I think that when other nations look at that then they wonder whether, you know, then it鈥檚 fine to deal with China on its terms because the U.S., what used to be the beacon of these values 鈥� might not stand for those anymore depending on the leadership.鈥�

Agenda

9:00 am听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听 听听听听Welcome by Congresswoman Jane Harman and Hugh Hewitt

9:15- 9:45 am 听 听 听 听 听 听听听听听听U.S.-China Geostrategic Tensions

听 听 听 听 听 听 Keynote Address by听David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

9:45 鈥� 10:45 am 听 听 听 听 听 听听Conversation on U.S.-China Geostrategic Tensions

听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听Dan Blumenthal, American Enterprise Institute
听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听Jonathan Hillman, Center for Strategic and International Studies

听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听 Jean Lee, Wilson Center
听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听Edward Wong, NYT and Wilson Center

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10:45 鈥� 11:00 am听听听听听听听 听听听Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:00 pm听 听 听 听 听 听The Trade War: Any End in Sight?

听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听 Meg Lundsager, Former executive director, IMF, Wilson Center

听 听听听听听听听听听听听听听 Bob Davis, Wall Street Journal and Wilson Center

听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听 John Frisbie, Hills & Co
听 听 听 听 听 听 听听听 Moderated by Shihoko Goto, Wilson Center

12:00-1:30pm听听听听听听听听听听听 听听听听Luncheon with Address by Senator Chris Coons of Delaware in Conversation with The Honorable Jane Harman and Hugh Hewitt

1:45- 3:00 pm听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听Human Rights and Religious Freedom in U.S.-China Relations

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听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听听 Christopher Walker, National Endowment for Democracy 听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听听

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听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听Moderated by Katie Stallard-Blanchette, Wilson Center

3:00 鈥� 3:15 pm听 听 听 听 听 听 听听Coffee Break

3:15- 4:30 pm听听听听听听听听听听听听 听听The Nixon Legacy and U.S.-China Relations

听听听听听听听听听听听听听听 Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr, The Watson Institute
听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听Ambassador Winston Lord
听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, Wilson Center

听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听 听听 Moderated by Robert Litwak and Hugh Hewitt听听听

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