澳门六合彩

A month after Argentina鈥檚 currency devalued by over 20 percent in less than two weeks and interest rates doubled to 40 percent, the International Monetary Fund agreed to lend Argentina $50 billion. The loan 鈥� including an additional $5.6 billion from multilateral development banks 鈥� was far larger than analysts expected. This massive stand-by agreement 鈥� basically a line of credit 鈥� offers Argentina secure financing until the end of 2019. The deal should help ward off another speculative attack on the peso. But Argentina鈥檚 appeal to the IMF was a worrisome sign for its economic recovery, and a black eye for President Mauricio Macri. After all, though Mr. Macri inherited economic disarray from Cristina Fern谩ndez de Kirchner in December 2015, he and his finance minister had consistently denied any plans to request an IMF program.

The peso selloff clearly changed the government鈥檚 calculations. On May 9, Mr. Macri went on national television to announce discussions with the IMF, which he characterized as necessary to 鈥�.鈥� Soon after, Finance Minister Nicol谩s Dujovne聽traveled to IMF headquarters to negotiate an emergency loan. The negotiations advanced rapidly, with the United States and other major economies immediately backing Mr. Macri鈥檚 government. The show of international support stemmed the pressure on the peso.

However, the optics of an IMF program harmed the government鈥檚 already , and energized the opposition. On May 25, a national holiday that commemorates the start of Argentina鈥檚 independence movement, Ms. Fern谩ndez de Kirchner鈥檚 supporters staged a protest warning that the IMF agreement put 鈥�.鈥� The former president criticized the IMF deal in an : 鈥淭here has never been a single country in the world that applied this organization鈥檚 programs and has seen an improvement in its economic or social situation,鈥� she said. Argentina鈥檚 powerful unions were also displeased. Normally divided between doves and hawks, the fractious labor movement was united by memories of IMF-imposed austerity in 2001. So far, by raising salaries and rolling back several planned labor reforms, the government has a general strike. But the most combative factions in the labor movement appear emboldened by the government鈥檚 weakness. Labor leader Hugo Moyano is a truckers strike like the one that crippled Brazil in recent weeks, and demanding a 27 percent wage increase, far above the government鈥檚 20 percent offer.

The IMF has been careful to describe the program as reflecting Argentine priorities, and shown sensitivity to concerns that its programs have historically worsened poverty and inequality. For the first year, the IMF accepted Argentina鈥檚 pre-existing deficit target. The program, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said, is 鈥渙wned and designed鈥� by Argentina, and will 鈥減rotect the most vulnerable in the population.鈥� But those reassurances have not calmed anxiety in Argentina, where the IMF has a long and checkered history. For Juan Per贸n, the was the 鈥渟pawn of imperialism,鈥� and Argentina did not join the fund until after Mr. Per贸n was deposed in 1955.

Subsequently, it became a repeat customer. Its chronically high inflation, large fiscal deficits and financial instability prompted a series of IMF programs. The most notable IMF intervention in Argentina began after 1991. President Carlos Menem, a heterodox Peronist, had won over Washington by implementing a neoliberal reform program that included privatizations and trade liberalization. To combat inflation, he had pegged the peso to the dollar. The IMF championed Mr. Menem鈥檚 agenda, and helped him advance controversial reforms, including to Argentina鈥檚 code. In 1998, he addressed the IMF board, ing, 鈥淲e have worked side by side with the IMF鈥� to achieve macroeconomic stability, deepen structural reforms and adopt policies aimed at improving the economic fortunes of the poorest members of society.鈥� Three years later, Argentina was in the midst of its worst economic crisis in history. In 2001, it defaulted on its $132 billion debt, the largest sovereign default in history at the time. Several presidents resigned during the following, chaotic weeks.

For many Argentines, much of the blame fell to the IMF. Indeed, the IMF acknowledged its role in the crisis, that it had 鈥渞emained engaged in a program relationship with Argentina too long, when the policies being supported were inadequate.鈥� Specifically, the IMF said it had continued to back the peg, known as convertibility, even as Argentina鈥檚 dollar-denominated debts piled up and its overvalued peso crippled its export sector. In 2001 alone, the IMF had $23 billion in loans to Argentina.

Despite the country鈥檚 falling out with the IMF, Argentina signed up for another program in 2003. But soon, a devaluation and the commodities boom propelled Argentina to Chinese rates of growth, and it no longer needed an IMF crutch. In 2006, President N茅stor Kirchner all debts to the IMF; the $9.8 billion payment drained foreign reserves, but Argentines welcomed the decision. The , Mr. Kirchner had argued, promoted 鈥減olicies that provoked poverty and pain for the Argentine people,鈥� and most Argentines seemed to agree. Cutting ties to the IMF became a seminal achievement for the Kirchner movement.

The nasty divorce didn鈥檛 end there. Starting in 2007, Argentina began manipulating its economic data, and ultimately earned a from the IMF for failing to provide credible GDP and inflation figures, the to receive that punishment. In 2012, the IMF in Buenos Aires.

Under Mr. Macri, relations quickly improved. After years of refusing to participate in the Article IV process 鈥� one of only a handful of countries, such as Syria, Libya and Eritrea, that boycotted the reviews 鈥� Argentina opened its books to IMF economists. The since 2005 gave Mr. Macri strong support: 鈥淭he new government began an ambitious and much needed transition toward a better economic policy framework,鈥� the IMF concluded, and 鈥渋mportant progress has been made.鈥� In March of this year, Ms. Lagarde visited Buenos Aires, where she praised the government鈥檚 economic gradualismo, and insisted that Argentina an IMF program.

However, shortly after she left, the vulnerabilities of gradualismo became apparent. As emerging markets suffered a speculative attack, prompted by expectations of interest rate in the United States, Argentina鈥檚 peso rapidly . Though the strengthening dollar was stressing emerging markets generally, Argentina was particularly exposed; its high level of , budget deficit and current account deficit spooked investors.

Suddenly, it was time to test Ms. Legarde鈥檚 enthusiasm for Mr. Macri鈥檚 reformist government. As analysts studied the Article IV reports for clues to the IMF鈥檚 thoughts on Argentina, the government raced to secure a loan. Indeed, the IMF agreed to help. Appreciative of Mr. Macri鈥檚 pro-market agenda, and his willingness to accelerate deficit reduction, it offered a monumental, $50 billion bailout, $20 billion higher than market expectations.

But Mr. Macri鈥檚 charm was not the only factor. The IMF is atoning for the 2001 crisis. For years, it has emphasized its newfound commitment to balance macroeconomic stability with political realities. For the IMF, the Argentina bailout offers a chance to demonstrate this new approach to the fund鈥檚 most skeptical audience.