澳门六合彩

Despite several notable differences, President 鈥檚 policy in the region鈥攕o far鈥攈as largely been strikingly similar to that of President Barack Obama鈥檚.

When assessing President 鈥檚 efforts abroad over his first year in office, there are copious examples of major foreign policy breaks with his predecessor, Barack Obama. has taken a hard line on Iran, backed out of the Transpacific Partnership agreement, cracked down hard on immigration, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and rejected the idea of climate change.

And that鈥檚 just the tip of the iceberg.

However, by contrast, when it comes to South Asia, there鈥檚 been a notable level of continuity in policy. Despite several notable differences, 鈥檚 policy in the region鈥攕o far鈥攈as largely been strikingly similar to Obama鈥檚. This can be seen through 鈥檚 approach to the three countries in South Asia that his administration has focused on the most鈥攖he same three South Asian countries, in fact, that attracted the most attention from the Obama and George W. Bush administration. They are India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

India offers the most clear-cut case of policy continuity. has picked up where Obama left off and called for deepening an already rapidly growing partnership. and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had a warm meeting in Washington last year that resulted in a laying out a series of new areas of cooperation in security and beyond. Major policy documents released by the administration, including its , , and strategies, as well as some of its , all call for deeper U.S.-India cooperation. And it鈥檚 easy to understand why. The U.S.-India relationship pivots around two shared strategic concerns, both of which resonate deeply with the administration: terrorism and China鈥檚 rise.

Afghanistan is another area of continuity. To be sure, last summer a new strategy for the country that diverges from Obama鈥檚 in several respects: It increases the U.S. troop presence by several thousand, it pledges to use conditions on the ground鈥攏ot artificial timelines鈥攁s the basis for future policy decisions, and it calls for India to take on a greater role. Aside from these differences, however, 鈥檚 Afghanistan strategy is remarkable similar to Obama鈥檚. Its core goal is to step up the fight against the Taliban, put it on the defensive, and in so doing compel the insurgents to step off the battlefield and launch negotiations with Kabul to end the war. This is exactly what the Obama administration tried鈥攁nd failed鈥攖o do during the height of the U.S. troop surge in 2010 and 2011. 鈥檚 emphasis on eliminating terrorist strongholds in Afghanistan and preventing the Taliban from retaking power are also objectives previously pursued by the Obama White House.

鈥檚 Pakistan policy, at first glance, may appear to diverge sharply from Obama鈥檚. Over the course of the last year, the administration that it might take coercive steps to try to compel Pakistan to crack down on terrorists, particularly the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network, that stage attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Many of the possible measures leaked to the media鈥攊ncluding with ties to terror and 鈥攚ould be unprecedented. And yet the only punitive action taken by the administration so far has been a suspension of security assistance to Pakistan. This is nothing new; Obama froze aid to Pakistan after Osama Bin Laden was discovered in the country in 2011. To this point, U.S. policy toward Pakistan has not entered uncharted territory. On the contrary, it remains ensconced in quite familiar territory. The Obama and George W. Bush administrations, like , repeatedly demanded鈥攁lbeit with less hard-edged rhetoric鈥攖hat Pakistan crack down on terrorist safe havens.

This year, in the context of Pakistan, 鈥檚 South Asia policy may start contrasting more sharply with that of Obama. In the coming weeks, should the White House conclude that Pakistan is still not targeting terrorist sanctuaries on its soil, it鈥檚 likely to take several punitive measures that go beyond aid freezes. The administration is now to mitigate the effects of possible Pakistani retaliations鈥攑articularly the closure of supply lines used by U.S. forces to access Afghanistan. Pakistan has not retaliated to a mere aid freeze, but it would probably retaliate against something harsher. If the administration implements punitive measures beyond the aid freeze, it would set a new precedent for U.S. policy.

More broadly, however, 鈥檚 South Asia policy this year is likely to continue hewing closely to Obama鈥檚. will authorize the increased U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan to go on the offensive against the Taliban鈥攋ust as Obama did during the height of the surge. will continue to focus on deepening Washington鈥檚 relations with India. And even as applies more pressure on Pakistan than did his predecessor, look for him to otherwise stick with the same strategy as Obama: Getting the U.S.-Pakistan relationship to work, warts at all, by focusing on narrowly defined areas of security cooperation鈥攕uch as, for example, counterterrorism cooperation against ISIS.

Finally, expect , like his immediate predecessors, to accord little strategic focus to South Asia鈥檚 smaller countries, and to watch as China continues to expand its influence across a region where the United States is significantly less present.

Given that the administration鈥檚 recently released defense strategy that strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the 鈥減rime concern鈥� for national security, the deep inroads made by Washington鈥檚 top strategic competitor across South Asia should be cause for concern. How the United States responds to China鈥檚 deepening footprint in South Asia鈥攁n even greater concern for New Delhi, Washington鈥檚 most powerful friend in the region鈥攔emains to be seen.

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or 澳门六合彩.聽 Copyright 2018, Asia Program.聽 All rights reserved.