澳门六合彩

In Southeast Asia, democracy is under acute threat from rising authoritarianism, while U.S.-China competition has brought the region into sharp focus in Washington. However, despite the Biden administration鈥檚 , it has seemingly downplayed democracy and human rights in its relations with Southeast Asian allies and partners. There are two reasons for this: one, a desire to avoid alienating less democratic allies and partners, and two, a lukewarm commitment within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue for a full-throated pro-democracy agenda. Indeed, as experts have debated in recent weeks, democracy promotion has its but also that could . However, there is a path forward within these limitations. Expanding a low-profile, ground-level approach to democracy programs could help square the circle and allow for a sustained, long-term strategy of promoting democracy in Southeast Asia that minimizes risks to other interests.

Democratic Decline and U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia

From military coups鈥攊n 2014 in Thailand and February 2021 in Myanmar鈥攖o a gradual rise in authoritarianism in places like the Philippines, democracy has suffered severe blows throughout Southeast Asia over the past decade. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains , periodically erupt in Thailand, and a on civil society, (NGOs), and threatens pro-democracy activists and institutions. According to , all mainland Southeast Asian countries now rank as 鈥渦nfree鈥� (i.e., authoritarian countries), and only Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore constitute 鈥減artly free鈥� (i.e. flawed) democracies. In this context, which countries in Southeast Asia will attend the Biden administration鈥檚 Democracy Summit in December 2021 presents a .

Additionally, the authoritarian trend is exacerbated and sharpened by U.S. China competition. To be sure, great power competition does not mean a contest solely defined by 鈥渄emocracy versus authoritarianism鈥濃�攁s close American ties to Vietnam and previously warm China-National League for Democracy relations attest. Yet, ideology in the overall rivalry. A newly confident Beijing has adopted a decidedly bent and pragmatically aligned itself closely with fellow authoritarians in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. This means that, regardless of concern that an to some interests, the United States for human rights and democracy, of U.S.-China competition.

However, U.S. efforts to promote democracy sometimes collide with the need to work with authoritarian and reluctant allies and partners in an era of great power competition. After a hiatus during the Trump administration when the United States largely sidelined , the Biden administration again placed support for democratic norms and values at the forefront of , as well as an emphasis on . On the other hand, its overall approach also hinges on revitalizing alliances and partnerships, which is where the United States runs into trouble in Southeast Asia. Many of these allies and partners are either shades of authoritarian themselves or reticent about promoting democracy.

Relations with ASEAN, Authoritarians, and Flawed Democracies

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin鈥檚 July trip to Southeast Asia brings home the fact that the United States needs ASEAN and its regional allies and partners鈥攂oth autocracies and flawed democracies鈥攁nd it has prioritized relations with them over democracy promotion. In Singapore, Secretary Austin firmly the U.S. role in Southeast Asia, its support for its allies and partners, and China鈥檚 aggressive foreign policy under President Xi Jinping. His second stopover in Vietnam featured similarly . Perhaps most importantly, his visit to the Philippines (听 at least) the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that enables U.S. troops to operate on Philippine territory and had been by President Rodrigo Duterte as part of his administration鈥檚 outreach to China.

Considering that threatened U.S. Magnitsky sanctions to the scuffle over the VFA, Secretary Austin ignored tensions over Duterte鈥檚 backsliding to make only a cursory mention of U.S.-Philippine shared democratic values to instead focus on security ties and other regional threats. Criticizing Duterte and his government for its authoritarianism or the ongoing would, of course, be poor diplomacy and unlikely to encourage the Duterte administration to align with the United States鈥攐r shore up its own democracy. It should therefore come as no surprise that Secretary Austin made of promoting democracy during the trip and instead reassuring ASEAN and making short-term gains in alliance and partnership management. From the standpoint of shoring up these relationships, Secretary Austin鈥檚 efforts and follow-on work by were successful but arguably minimized democracy promotion.

Fundamentally, there is in Southeast Asia or a new Cold War drawn along ideological battle lines. Treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines are respectively an autocracy听and a swiftly backsliding democracy鈥攁s well as both being relatively warm to China. Vietnam, a crucial security partner, operates under single-party Communist rule. Meanwhile, even Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are only 鈥減artially free鈥� under Freedom House鈥檚 rubric鈥� and at the low end of that spectrum at that. No country in ASEAN scores higher than a 59 (Indonesia), and . Too much emphasis on democracy promotion therefore risks alienating these geostrategic countries.

The Quad鈥檚 Reluctance to Promote Democracy

Beyond the ASEAN states, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States could seemingly actively promotes democracy. In an earlier iteration of the grouping, it was pitched as a , and the March 12th Leaders鈥� Summit statement prominently tied the free and open Indo-Pacific concept to 鈥�.鈥� At that same meeting, the Quad countries sharply criticized the military takeover in Myanmar and demanded . On August 12, 2021, senior officials from all four countries 鈥溾�� to promote democracy and human rights, among other discussions.

However, while the Quad is a grouping of democracies (albeit, one that includes a backsliding government in India and courts authoritarian partners like Vietnam), its embrace of democracy promotion is largely symbolic. This is best exemplified in the lack of a collective policy response to Myanmar鈥檚 coup. Australia 听, and it has thus far refrained from issuing sanctions against the junta to avoid . India, which remains on its northeastern border, 听 the U.S. sanctions regime, even going so far as sending representatives to the in March. Japan , and, like India and Australia, has extensive economic ties in Myanmar. Certainly, there has been some actions鈥斕� and made 鈥攂ut little pressure has been placed on the junta in the end. Above all, it appears that worry about growing Chinese influence if the new regime becomes too isolated is more pressing than advancing democracy.

With both the ASEAN member states and the Quad reluctant to adopt an overtly democracy promotion strategy, the Biden administration鈥檚 democracy agenda in Southeast Asia is caught between a rock and a hard place. On its face, it would seem that, if the United States wishes to counteract expanding Chinese influence and power in Southeast Asia, it should disregard democracy promotion in the region. However, such a stance neglects the clear U.S. interest in advancing democracy and runs the risk of the United States . Furthermore, it overlooks the , as demonstrated in the (increasingly transnational) movement and the indomitable resistance displayed by Myanmar鈥檚 people against the coup.

A Low-Profile, Ground-Level Approach to Democracy Promotion

As an alternative to sidelining democracy promotion, the United States could instead expand its deployment of low-profile, ground-level democracy programs for civil society. Supporting democratization abroad is not only about , vocal statements, naming and shaming, targeted sanctions, or publicly calling for elections but for . To be sure, what exactly constitutes civil society is complex and dependent on context, but, as , civil society is the 鈥渆ntire range of organized groups and institutions that are independent of the state, voluntary, and at least to some extent self-generating and self-reliant.鈥� 鈥攑articularly if the definition is expanded beyond professional NGOs to grassroots groups and other actors, like unions鈥攊s vital in supporting democratic transition and once it is achieved. in backsliding societies can therefore ensure the long-term establishment and expansion of democracy and is thus for a United States concerned about alienating allies and partners.

Crucially, this expanded effort would maintain a low-profile and ground-level approach. In order to continue making the near-term gains that the United States has achieved with Secretary Austin鈥檚 visit to Southeast Asia, the United States will need to keep its democracy programming low-profile while expanding their scope. The National Endowment for Democracy is particularly adept at working in closed environments, and it operates separately from the U.S. government, that accompany USAID or State Department projects. The key elements are a low-profile to minimize the risk for diplomatic incidents with authoritarian and reluctant allies and partners and a ground-level approach that reaches a wide swathe of civil society actors.

Expanded low-profile and ground-level U.S. democracy programs would focus on a variety of initiatives鈥攎any of them non-political and thus lower risk鈥攄epending on context, security situation, and diplomatic concerns. These could include providing capacity building and training for local activists and groups focused on a range of political and social issues, developing cooperative networks within countries and regionally, enhancing security measures in high-risk environments, and鈥攃rucially鈥攅xpanding funding for a range of groups, from those at the local level to nation-wide, high capacity NGOs, among other activities. U.S.-supported programs should also be inclusive and diverse. This is particularly important, as that elite capture of an otherwise vibrant civil society space in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand contributed to recent authoritarian backsliding. Moreover, as many civil society groups are low-capacity in Southeast Asia, sustained and effective training in financial management practices and organizational capacity would better enable them to compete for U.S. government and other sources of international funding, which is vital for sustainability long-term.

To be sure, low-profile democracy programs are not a panacea. Authoritarian governments view independent civil society as deeply threatening, doubly so when it is funded or supported by outside governments. For example, China commonly that the National Endowment for Democracy is part of an American plot against the Communist Party, and it has issued . Furthermore, the growing proliferation of and substantially elevates the physical, mental, and legal risks to personnel and partners. Additionally, the United States runs the risk of alienating target countries if its programs draw too much attention or focus on high-sensitivity issues.

Mitigating risks to both partners and wider U.S. objectives will necessitate several measures. To alleviate concerns that U.S. democracy programs are perceived as 鈥渋nterference,鈥� U.S.-supported programs should focus on supporting the establishment of non-partisan institutions, norms, and other non-political mechanisms developed in close consultation with local actors and in accordance with locally-identified needs. As USAID Administrator Samantha Power recently , supporting local leadership and decision-making is necessary for success going forward. Unilaterally dictating how things should be from afar with a paternalistic attitude is for generating support for democracy. Finally, ensuring the safety and security of project partners in authoritarian environments will need to remain a priority throughout. 听

A Long-Term Policy Option for Democracy Promotion

There are several recent examples of U.S. policy moving in this direction. During the Trump administration, Congress consistently kept funding for democracy programs at around despite Executive Branch . In 2018, the appropriated $210 million each year for five years to support democracy promotion in the Indo-Pacific. In response to the rising challenge from China, the Senate passed the , which calls for $10,000,000 for democracy promotion in Hong Kong; emphasizes countering malign influence by supporting civil society and independent media; expands efforts to work with ASEAN on civil society, democracy, and human rights; and enhances engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean. As democracy promotion remains at the forefront of administration policy, we can expect to see similar initiatives in Congress in the future.

Ultimately, an expanded low-profile, ground-level approach to democracy programming in Southeast Asia provides a policy option for the United States to promote democracy in the region. This approach would aim to address the limited enthusiasm for the concept amongst U.S. allies and partners, while also advancing the cause of democracy and U.S. interest in opposing authoritarianism. Supporting civil society is a long-term effort that will take years, if not decades, to see results, and it will still require the occasional high-profile diplomatic pressure, naming and shaming, and economic sanctions on certain issues, such as the egregious human rights violations in Myanmar. Overall, democracy programs be the most sustainable path forward in a region beset by authoritarianism and an ambivalence towards U.S. government embrace of democracy promotion.

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The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or 澳门六合彩. Copyright 2020, Asia Program. All rights reserved.