澳门六合彩

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On May 9th, Filipinos went to the polls to cast their votes for President to succeed Rodrigo Duterte. The acerbic former Mayor of Davao oversaw a , a , the , and a foreign policy that failed in its pivot to China but distanced Manila from Washington. Continuing this populist authoritarian trend, Ferdinand 鈥淏ongbong鈥� Marcos Jr., the son of the former dictator ousted in the People Power Revolution of 1986, , along with his incoming Vice President, Rodrigo Duterte鈥檚 daughter, Sara Duterte.

The run-up to the election was and before the field solidified under a solid Marcos lead. While a 鈥攖he outgoing Vice President, a position that is elected separately from the President鈥攔aised some hopes for the opposition to mount a victorious campaign, Marcos held his early lead through election day. Many youth in the Philippines are unfamiliar with the corruption and human rights abuses of Marcos鈥� father鈥檚 dictatorship, and a altered perceptions of history and amplified his populist appeal. Marcos and Sara Duterte, , represented continuation of the current administration鈥檚 populist style of politics, which duly secured them victory alongside the influence of entrenched and online misinformation.

The implications of a six year term under Marcos-Duterte are significant for everyday Filipinos and the country鈥檚 standing in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, the new administration is likely to , including , thus heralding further declines in Philippine democracy and human rights, as well as in its relationship with the United States.

Dark Days for Philippine Democracy and Human Rights

From 2016 to 2022, the Philippine democracy declined substantially due to Duterte鈥檚 autocratic policies, from a in Freedom House鈥檚 democracy rankings. A violent wave of of thousands of suspected drug users, and , and crackdowns on the abounded under Duterte. These efforts led to the according to the government鈥檚 own data, while others extrajudicial killings. Nobel Peace Prize recipient Maria Ressa, a journalist and founder of independent news outlet Rappler, exemplifies the impact of Duterte鈥檚 authoritarian turn. , Ressa was targeted by the Duterte administration for her criticism of human rights abuses. While the case against Ressa is the highest profile, it is far from the only instance of government repression in the Philippines. The environment for civil society and the media is far more restricted in 2022 than in 2015.

With their victory, the Marcos-Duterte administration appears poised to continue many of Duterte鈥檚 autocratic policies. Although push, Marcos appears set on continuing the 鈥�, perhaps through further . When questioned regarding his father鈥檚 human rights abuses, Marcos . Early on in his campaign, that he would continue the drug war, albeit in a 鈥渄ifferent way鈥� by focusing on prevention and education, but he also reiterated that he will 鈥渂ehave as a non-signatory鈥� towards an International Criminal Court investigation of Duterte鈥檚 drug war. He that 鈥渨e have a functioning judiciary, and that鈥檚 why I don鈥檛 see the need for a foreigner to come and do the job for us.鈥� Regarding disinformation, Twitter associated with the Marcos campaign for . On issues of corruption, the Marcos family for an estimated $10 billion theft of Philippine wealth during his father鈥檚 dictatorship, and a last ditch effort to disqualify him on the basis of tax evasion . These warning signs imply that the already serious damage to democracy and human rights in the Philippines will likely worsen during the next six years of Marcos鈥� tenure.

Courting Beijing

On foreign policy, Duterte similarly upended longstanding practice. Shortly after his win in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte announced that he would be ignoring the Philippines鈥� legal victory against Beijing in a regarding disputed claims in the South China Sea. He promptly extended an olive branch to China. At the time, Duterte 鈥溾�檛here is no sense in going to war. There is no sense fighting over a body of water.鈥� Within his first year, he embarked on a visit to Beijing to with President Xi Jinping of China, which led to a for joint energy development. Much of impetus for this stemmed from Duterte鈥檚 of the U.S. alliance鈥檚 reliability against China鈥檚 growing dominance in the region.

Yet, his foreign policy resulted in few, if any, wins for Manila. The Philippine , and only a fraction of promised Chinese investment has been implemented . Indeed, Chinese harassment of Filipino fishermen and island militarization in the South China Sea continued regardless of Duterte鈥檚 supposed d茅tente with Beijing, leading to a . In spite of his best efforts, Duterte鈥檚 outreach to China .

Regardless of the Philippines ability to court China, Marcos and Sara Duterte seem poised to carry this maverick foreign policy forward. While Marcos has advocated for a military presence in the disputed maritime region to defend Philippine interests, he said that he would order them 鈥溾�� Chinese vessels. Indeed, Marcos appears to share Duterte鈥檚 view that appeasement with China is in Manila鈥檚 best interests. He has stated his intention to and for a bilateral deal with Beijing. 听 for persuading听China to accept Filipino fisherman in the South China Sea鈥攄espite Chinese vessels continuously harassing them regardless of Duterte's past efforts鈥攁nd for an ASEAN Code of Conduct on maritime disputes, which would likely be to Beijing鈥檚 benefit. Marcos will also likely seek greater Chinese investment, including in are questionable deals and gifts beneficial to the Marcos family鈥檚 personal interests. In short, Rodrigo Duterte鈥檚 recent the stalled Memorandum with China will likely be heeded.

Strain with the United States

In a corollary to his outreach to China, the Duterte administration听oversaw significant strain to its ties with the United States. Almost immediately upon taking over, President Duterte damaged relations with the United States on President Barack Obama and the during the drug war. This, and the commensurate courting of Beijing, came out of a larger drive from Duterte to practice an 鈥�,鈥� where Manila would strive to be 鈥�.鈥�

Although ties during the Trump administration as Washington over Manila鈥檚 human rights abuses and democratic decline, the downward trend reached a new low in 2020. its Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States in a serious blow to the alliance. The VFA enables the United States military to maintain legal jurisdiction over its forces operating in the Philippines, including those in the fight against Islamist militants in Mindanao and those attached to the 2014 that provides for U.S. access and pre-positioning at five bases. The Duterte administration kept the United States in limbo with before a by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin ultimately resulted in its . Despite its eventual resurrection, the VFA鈥檚 loss could have been catastrophic for the U.S.-Philippine alliance and reflected Duterte鈥檚 unpredictability.

While U.S.-Philippine ties now appear more stable鈥擶ashington and Manila the largest ever Balikatan military exercises鈥攖he risk of a resurgence in tensions under Marcos is likely. Beyond his outreach to China, Marcos has troubled history with the United States, having fled to Hawaii following the 1986 democratic uprising against his father. A U.S. court issued contempt of court proceedings against Marcos in 1995 over a class action lawsuit against his family, a judgement which reportedly in 2011 and could theoretically lead to arrest upon his entry into the United States. Furthermore, while in the Philippine Senate in 2014, he as unfair. During his electoral campaign, Marcos claimed that his negative history in the United States his foreign policy, but his message largely emphasizes a between Beijing and Washington. Even if he abides by the , as he has he will, the relationship will likely be rocky.

From a U.S. perspective, the Philippine alliance and EDCA are hugely important for competition with China, because U.S. force posture remains over weighted towards Northeast Asia, and the Philippines is the only Southeast Asian candidate for a sizable U.S. military presence. Under Marcos, the potential that the Philippines moves away from EDCA and the VFA, or further, could threaten the wider U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. At the very least, Washington and Manila are likely to butt heads again after reaching a modicum of understanding in 2021, which would complicate the wider effort to face China.

The Domestic and Foreign Policy Risks of a Marcos Presidency are Real

Overall, the likely domestic trajectory under a President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is the continued tumult and authoritarianism of his predecessor. While Philippine democracy was never perfect, the decline under Duterte is notable and mirrors broader regional trends in the consolidation of strongman rule. The new administration may build off of Duterte鈥檚 popularity and represent a democratic electoral result, but it is fair to say that the outcome is a threat to Philippine democracy. The likelihood that the new president maintains Duterte鈥檚 anti-democratic policies oppressing civil society, the media, and the most vulnerable Filipinos is high.

On foreign policy, the erratic zig-zag in Philippine policy between the United States and China is liable to continue. To be sure, President Marcos is not likely to completely reject the U.S. alliance, nor entirely embrace China. Rather, he will likely follow a balancing effort. This is not unlike other countries in Southeast Asia, who prioritize non-alignment in great power competition, but it is a challenge considering that the Philippines is one of the United States鈥� most crucial allies in the Indo-Pacific.

For the Philippines鈥� interests itself, a balanced approach to the United States and China may not be all that Marcos hopes it can be. Beijing has shown little compunction about deploying coercive gray zone tactics to push Filipino fishermen out of the South China Sea regardless of Duterte鈥檚 best efforts to accommodate China, and few of the promised economic projects have come to fruition. From a regional perspective, a potentially more pro-China Philippines will further undermine an already struggling ASEAN and hamper its ability to stand up to Beijing. If it acquiesces too much to Beijing and alienates the United States or undermines ASEAN鈥檚 collective response, then Manila may find itself dictated to by a much more powerful China, the exact situation Duterte and now Marcos hope to avoid through accommodation.

The United States will need to prepare itself for unpredictability in one of its oldest allies, and it will have to decide if it can continue to look the other way at Philippine democratic decline in favor of narrower security interests"

But, Washington has little ability to change Marco鈥檚 mind on these issues. The United States will need to prepare itself for unpredictability in one of its oldest allies, and it will have to decide if it can continue to look the other way听at Philippine democratic decline in favor of narrower security interests, such as EDCA and the VFA. To be sure, an overemphasis on 鈥�democracy versus authoritarianism鈥� in foreign policy can be problematic for Washington鈥檚 relationships in the Indo-Pacific, but there are legitimate human rights concerns that will be difficult to ignore as well, especially considering the Marcos family's record. Going forward, there are storms ahead in U.S. relations with the Philippines.

In the end, the biggest potential losses under another autocratic Marcos presidency will be borne by the most vulnerable Filipinos. The rise of misinformation has clouded popular understanding of the Marcos鈥� crimes and corruption, and many in the Philippines now听 for the earlier Marcos era. But, the realities of the dictatorship were harsh, with widespread 听(an estimated $10 billion stolen)听and human rights violations. , President Marcos himself reported in 1975 that 50,000 were arrested during martial law while听, which Marcos Jr. publicly denies.

If past is precedent and the many warning signs come to fruition, further damage to already fragile institutions in the Philippines is likely under the new administration.

In , incoming President Marcos asked to be judged not by his father's record but by his own actions, all while promising to be a president for all Filipinos. Yet, if past is precedent and the many warning signs come to fruition, further damage to already fragile institutions in the Philippines is likely under the new administration. If he is to continue the crackdown on civil society and the media or mirror his father鈥檚 corruption, Ferdinand 鈥淏ongbong鈥� Marcos Jr. and Sara Duterte pose a substantial risk to Philippine democracy over the next six years.

Follow Lucas Myers, Program Coordinator and Associate for Southeast Asia, on Twitter @lucasdeanemyers

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or 澳门六合彩. Copyright 2022, Asia Program. All rights reserved.