澳门六合彩

Shortly before his passing in February 2021, A. Ross Johnson shared with the History and Public Policy Program a set of about 70 documents created by the American Committee for Liberation (AMCOMLIB, renamed Radio Liberty or the RL Committee in 1964) that were released to him by the Central Intelligence Agency in response to his many Mandatory Declassification Review requests.

The History and Public Policy Program is now pleased to make these documents available through the , as Ross wanted, and to publish an introduction to the collection written by Ross.

- Christian Ostermann and Charles Kraus

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Copies of unclassified Radio Liberty (RL) corporate records were routinely provided to the CIA during its years of sponsorship (1951-1971). While RL (now RFE/RL) copies were lost, CIA retained its copies. I located the present documents in the course of my historical research in CIA archives. Many are, as noted in the accompanying annotation, cited in my book, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond (Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2010).

The newly available RL documents supplement RFE/RL and related documents previously deposited in the , including , a collection of declassified CIA and State Department documents about Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and e-dossier 59, a collection of documents from formerly closed Soviet and East European archives about Cold War Broadcasting. (See also available in my book with R. Eugene Parta, Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.)

This article provides an overview of the content and significance of the newly available documents. A first set consists of internal AMCOMLIB/RL correspondence and memoranda. A second set consists of AMCOMLIB/ RL 鈥淧olicy Position Statements (PPS)鈥� on topical issues intended to provide editorial guidelines for RL broadcasts. These PPSs were generally drafted by RL and then submitted to CIA (International Organization Division, later Covert Action Staff) and, through it, to the State Department for approval or revision. The 鈥渂uy-in鈥� of broadcasters was facilitated by inclusion of the RL Council of Editors鈥攖he 茅migr茅 chiefs of all broadcast services鈥攊n the process.

Most PPSs contained situational analyses that (the title notwithstanding) only implied an editorial policy and were routinely endorsed by CIA and the State Department. A second category of PPSs conveyed 鈥渆nlightened 茅migr茅鈥� editorial perspectives on international affairs that sometimes departed from U.S. government policies and鈥擱L鈥檚 U.S. government-approved charter notwithstanding鈥� invariably led to State Department criticism and occasional revision of the document in question. This second category also includes material from RL policy manuals 鈥� general editorial guidelines for broadcasts. A third set of the newly available documents consists of correspondence between AMCOMLIB/RL and CIA officers, usually identified with pseudonyms.

Engaging Emigres

The documents illustrate the challenges faced by RL in drawing on the talents of Soviet emigres in the U.S. national interest, in setting editorial policies for broadcasts that could attract Soviet listeners, and in measuring the broadcast audience. A by AMCOMLIB Chair Leslie Stevens outlined RL鈥檚 efforts to facilitate a more united Soviet emigration, which Stevens saw as a necessary sponsor of RL broadcasting. An provided draft program guidelines agreed between RL and the 茅migr茅 Coordinating Center for the anti-Bolshevik Struggle, which was intended to manage RL programming but soon disintegrated because of differences among its member 茅migr茅 groups, leaving Americans in charge of broadcast policy. Howland Sargent, who succeeded Stevens as head of AMCOMLIB, provided guidance to RL staff on . A summarize RL broadcast content during and following the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A reported on audience research and influence measurement as discussed at the Munich Radio Conference of RL, RFE, VOA, USIA, and State Department officials on U.S. international broadcasting.

Charges of Appeasement

A document Sargent鈥檚 efforts to counter the accusations of AMCOMLIB founders Eugene Lyons and Isaac Don Levine that RL broadcasts had become 鈥渁ppeasement of Red imperialism,鈥� 鈥渓eftish, Marxist, anti-Western and even pro-Soviet,鈥� the result of 鈥渋nfiltration by elements set upon subverting from within the purposes and policies of Radio Liberation鈥� (as Radio Liberty was called until 1959). Sargeant of his efforts.

Host Country Concerns

Operating from Munich, and transmitting on shortwave from Germany and Spain, RL was necessarily attentive to the interests of its host countries. A reported the view of a German foreign office official that RL broadcasts corresponded to German policy and were in the interest of the Federal Republic. Changes in the led Sargeant to highlight new Spanish efforts to monitor RL broadcasts and pressure to share use of RL transmitters. that broadcasting on its Spanish transmitters anything about Spain that might be viewed adversely by Spanish officials and only broadcast any such content on its German transmitters. RL sensitivities about its situation in Spain were heightened by its concern about the content of Radio Madrid broadcasts. An the content of Radio Madrid broadcasts to the USSR and Eastern Europe, concluding they reflect 鈥渂ad policy, bad journalism. . . the tone is on the whole inflammatory; the content represents reaction at its most extreme鈥� the spirit which informs the broadcasts is a violation of the spirit and intent of U.S. policy.

Improving Broadcasts

Evaluation and improvement of RL broadcast content was a constant challenge. Professor of RL broadcasts for February 1959, concluding that they were of 鈥渉igh quality鈥攕olid, informative and interesting. They meet the standards set by the RL Policy Manual, with certain exceptions.鈥� A by RL policy advisor Robert Tuck reviewed strengths and weaknesses of RL programming, concluding that 鈥渃overage of major breaking developments in the world news has been first class鈥� and 鈥渇eature and commentaries continue to be filled with interesting and provocative scripts,鈥� but 鈥渢he only weakness, although a fundamental one, remains the basically negative approach of our commentaries on internal Soviet affairs.鈥�

In that RL鈥檚 task was to 鈥渙ffer [Soviet listeners] constructive encouragement and relevant, meaningful alternatives which they can use in their own way to weaken the regime and better their condition.鈥� to exert additional editorial control of , expressing disappointment with a draft Policy Position Statement, 鈥淩adio Liberty鈥檚 Task and Tone,鈥� calling for 鈥渕uch greater emphasis on positive versus negative programming; . . . our task is to stimulate and exploit evolutionary changes within the USSR which will make the regime less onerous to its subjects and less of a threat to world peace.鈥�

CIA and State Department Role

Periodic editorial advice notwithstanding, CIA did not approve broadcasts in advance. A rare exception was an April 1962 RL program 鈥溾�� (and in fact improved) by CIA.) CIA did advise RL to delay broadcasting the full text of Boris Pasternak鈥檚 novel . RL policy guidelines were regularly criticized by the State Department. Documents in this category included PPS鈥檚 on , criticized by the State Department for understating the Soviet threat; , criticized by the State Department for downplaying reforms under Gomulka; and , criticized by the State Department for guidelines on coverage of developments contrary to as well as supportive of U.S. interests.

Russians and Others

RL faced a constant challenge in balancing the content of its broadcasts for the USSR in Russian for Russians and its broadcasts for non-Russians in their own languages. It espoused a policy that it termed 鈥渘onpredeterminism.鈥� A 1960 PPS 鈥溾�� directed that 鈥淩adio liberty does not espouse nor seek to promote the independence of constituent parts of the USSR specified in any such [U.S. Congress] resolutions, because Radio Liberty 鈥� will not attempt to predetermine the choice which the peoples concerned will have to make for themselves on the basis of free self-determination.鈥�

In in a new RL Policy Manual in response to concerns of RL nationality service editors: 鈥淣or does RL depart from the principle that it is the right of the peoples of the Soviet Union themselves to determine their future state structure when they are free to do so.鈥� The defined the role of the RL Ukrainian Service role as to 鈥減reserve and stimulate the growth of Ukrainian cultural values and national identity 鈥� to 鈥渟timulate Ukrainians to think about their national problems and provide them with information which may assist them in finding their own solutions.鈥�

Although the State Department did not object to this annex, and similar annexes to the Policy Manual for the other RL nationality services (see a comparable document for the ), Department of State officers remained critical of what they viewed as excessive attention to non-Russian nationalism in RL broadcasts based on these editorial documents. They were on , writing that:

鈥漮ur long-standing policy has not included encouragement of national separatism to the extent of independence for the many and varied groupings within the USSR. In order to be entirely clear on this matter the proposed Annex should include a specific disclaimer along the following lines: In its output, Radio Liberty takes care not to be identified with a program of separatism and dismemberment of the USSR, which can only alienate and unite all Great Russians, who still constitute the dominant and ruling element in the USSR and the primary target of RL broadcasts.鈥�

RL officials viewed such language as accusatory and excessively Russo-centric, and it was evidently never incorporated into a revised PPS.

Baltic Broadcasts

Radio Free Europe had originally planned broadcasts to the Baltic States but abandoned the idea in the face of opposition from the State Department, citing just-launched VOA broadcasts. and was urged to initiate Baltic broadcasts by . (Broadcasts to the Baltic states began in 1976 as part of RL and were transferred to RFE in 1983).

Beyond Covert Funding

Anticipating an end to covert CIA funding in the wake of publicity in 1967 to various CIA covert projects (even though RL was never mentioned), Sargeant -- Radio Liberty, the Institute for the Study of the USSR, and the Soviet 鈥渂ook program.鈥� He outlined alternative organizational and funding possibilities for RL, including a publicly-funded National Council for Freedom of Information: 鈥淭he American Government should now provide the authorization and the means to continue such broadcasting to areas where the effectiveness of the concept of peoples speaking to peoples has been so clearly demonstrated鈥︹�� He with a .