澳门六合彩

When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) opened for signature in 1968, officials in Bonn fiercely debated whether and under what conditions the Federal Republic of Germany should accede to the agreement.

In late 1966, a 鈥済rand coalition鈥� cabinet was formed by Christian Democrats from the CDU, the Bavarian CSU, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Surprised by a breakthrough in secret Soviet-US NPT negotiations in the autumn of 1966, leaders in Bonn expected that the NPT negotiations would very likely result in a globe-spanning multilateral treaty in the near future. There was a widespread opinion in West Germany that the country had no real choice but to accede to this treaty 鈥� at least according to the preferences of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and practically all other European states irrespective of their alignment.听

Yet the government under Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) was split from the outset on whether and under what conditions Germany would sign and ratify the NPT.

It was only following the Bundestag elections of 28 September 1969, which led to a new coalition government formed by the SPD and Liberals (FDP) under Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD), that Germany signed the NPT. When the government signed the agreement on 28 November 1969, its representatives included a declaration and a note to make clear its conditions.[1] This was also a first step in West Germany鈥檚 鈥�Neue Ostpolitik鈥� that would lead to, inter alia, the Soviet-German Moscow Treaty of 1970, West Germany鈥檚 admission to the United Nations in 1973, and the ratification of the NPT in 1975.

A tranche of documents, recently added to the and introduced here, focuses on the government deliberations on whether and how the FRG should accede to the NPT.听

Most of the documents are dated from July-September 1968, after the NPT had opened for signature. This breakthrough prompted a new round of examination in Bonn of the conditions under which Germany might accede. At this point, policymakers also looked back on one-and-a-half years of specific diplomatic efforts by West Germany, at that time still a non-member of the United Nations, to influence provisions of the NPT, interpretations of those provisions, and accompanying assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.

Depending on policymakers鈥� views on how demanding or restrictive conditions for Germany鈥檚 accession to the treaty should be, policymakers gave or suggested negative or positive answers to the fundamental question of whether Germany should accede to the NPT.

Unsurprisingly, no stable consensus on policy could be worked out at senior official levels. Indeed, disagreements intensified, especially after Soviet forces crushed the Prague spring in late August 1968. West German diplomacy was tasked once again with seeking further improvements on disputed issues. In the last year of the 鈥済rand coalition鈥� government in Bonn, NPT-related disputes became increasingly acrimonious, which led to paralysis on the accession issue. A rupture of the coalition could be averted thanks to the foreseeable end of the 叠耻苍诲别蝉迟补驳鈥檚 legislative period in the autumn of 1969 and Kiesinger鈥檚 disposition to postpone a basic decision on whether to accede.

These disputes and the resulting political paralysis on NPT signature could distract at the time from three important political realities. First, no matter how many skeptics advocated signing the treaty, 鈥渁mong the 50 or 60 top politicians and officials there is not one who supports the NPT,鈥� as one US diplomat put it.[2] Second, whether the 鈥淔edRep鈥� signed and ratified the NPT or not, 鈥渢here was no issue whatsoever of any German national nuclear authority or decision over nuclear weapons, or of any national production of weapons.鈥�[3] Third, German governments supported the basic principle of nuclear non-proliferation, even if the government disapproved of the NPT approach until late 1966 and even if various policymakers continued to oppose it thereafter.[4]

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In a , the Minister of Finance Franz Josef Strau脽 explained that he would 鈥渇ight against鈥� the NPT. Strau脽 was chairman of the Bavarian CSU and had served as Minister of Defense between 1956 and 1962. His point was that a decision to accede to the treaty was unthinkable as long as he remained minister in Kiesinger鈥檚 cabinet and, hence, with the CSU participating in the 鈥済rand coalition.鈥� Strau脽鈥� letter also made clear his suspicions of Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and Brandt鈥檚 disposition towards the NPT, which Strau脽 apparently regarded as submissive.

After 1 July 1968, when the NPT opened for signature, Brandt brought up the accession question in a , arguing that the 鈥渃redibility of our d茅tente policy鈥� depended on Germany acceding to the NPT. In his review, the German government should sign the treaty by 鈥渆arly autumn.鈥� Brandt鈥檚 letter mirrored arguments made previously by Georg-F. Duckwitz, who was State Secretary in the Foreign Office.[5]

Later that month, Brandt answered a letter in which Strau脽 had asked the Foreign Minister to comment on a translated 鈥溾�� of the NPT, which he claimed to have received from 鈥淔rench friends.鈥� The note argued that the ambiguous wording of NPT articles I and II concerning indirect transfer of control of nuclear weapons would pose problems. The Soviet Union might politically exploit it over time to 鈥減ut Germany on a path towards neutrality.鈥� The document also alluded to a concern that the Soviet Union might later argue that non-nuclear weapon states鈥� (NNWS) participation in 鈥渘uclear NATO鈥� 鈥� such as allowing nuclear weapons deployments in their territories听 鈥� violated their NPT commitments.听

Brandt answered Strau脽 by from the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenk枚tter, who clarified that the ambiguity in wording reflected 鈥渁 quite conscious dissent鈥� between the United States and the Soviet Union. Concerns about this point of legal ambiguity remained central to the lines of argument taken by NPT opponents and many NPT skeptics in Bonn through late 1969 and, to a lesser extent, though 1973 and 1974 when NPT ratification was debated.[6]

NPT opponents continued to hold competing views on how to thwart Germany鈥檚 accession to the treaty. Strau脽鈥� approach was to oppose the NPT as categorically and directly as possible. In the late summer 1968, Strau脽 even told his fellow CSU friends that he was determined to terminate the cooperation between the CSU and CDU in their joint Bundestag faction if the government was prepared to sign the NPT. It had been a 鈥渂ig mistake,鈥� he argued, to 鈥渁llow鈥� Brandt and the Foreign Office engage in 鈥渄etailed negotiations鈥� and obscure what he felt like were core problems with the treaty.[7]听

Strau脽 positioned himself to end the government coalition and the party-political cooperation with the CDU, if CDU leaders and particularly Kiesinger acted contrary to his expectations.[8]听

Other opponents, called 鈥渇undamentalists鈥� by critics who dubbed themselves 鈥減ragmatists and realists,鈥� agreed with the objective of blocking Germany鈥檚 accession to the NPT but pursued a different method. Instead of posing the 鈥測es or no鈥� question, they preferred to ask what a 鈥済ood NPT鈥� 鈥� to which the FRG might at some point be able to accede 鈥� might look like.[9] The implied suggestion was that a 鈥済ood NPT鈥� could not actually be achieved.听

Two of the most knowledgeable proponents of this approach were the diplomats (and jurists) Schnippenk枚tter and Wilhelm G. Grewe, Germany鈥檚 Permanent Representative to NATO. Both Ambassadors did not shy away from arguing their case in public. This behavior was widely seen as publicly contradicting Foreign Minister Brandt鈥檚 position. On the first of those occasions, Helmut Schmidt, at the time chairman of the SPD faction in the Bundestag, publicly indicated that he would have dismissed Grewe, had he been Foreign Minister.[10]

All of this was part of the domestic and bureaucratic context when Chancellor Kiesinger asked the Foreign Office after the 鈥淐zech crisis鈥� of late August 1968 to examine the 鈥溾�� of a 鈥渉ypothetical case of a German non-signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.鈥澨�

The request was forwarded by Director-General Hans Ruete to Grewe, Helmut Allardt, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Schnippenk枚tter, who attended the UN Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in Geneva.[11] In Grewe鈥檚 judgment, it would be a 鈥渂enefit鈥� for the NATO alliance, 鈥渓ikely even a condition of her future viability,鈥� if the NPT were to fail. He conceded that 鈥渋f it was the missing German signature which brought the NPT down,鈥� then that would lead to 鈥渁 severe stress test,鈥� but as a NATO member state, Germany could get through the crisis.听

In a , Schnippenk枚tter estimated that 鈥渘egative consequences鈥� would be 鈥渙bjectively low, but stronger in the atmospheric.鈥� For the Soviets, the NPT was no 鈥渃onditio sine qua non鈥� for commencing negotiations on strategic nuclear arms. And in the United States, there would be 鈥渁 certain annoyance鈥� among Democrats but that would be all. Allardt counselled to sign the NPT in London and Washington under certain conditions, while making the signing in Moscow dependent on accommodating Soviet behavior to 鈥渃reate the conditions鈥� for it.[12]听

To prepare the Foreign Minister for a conversation with the Chancellor, Ruete forwarded Schnippenk枚tter鈥檚 analysis and an additional assessment to Brandt. At Ruete鈥檚 request, the 听was prepared by a specialist from the Commissioner鈥檚 subdivision in the Foreign Office, Otto Hauber, who coordinated it with other officials in the ministry. As Hauber told Ruete, his 鈥減olitical evaluation鈥� differed from those of the three Ambassadors and it was impossible to find a 鈥渃ommon denominator.鈥�[13] Within the Foreign Office, yet another strand of assessment was pushed aggressively by the Policy Planning Staff, headed by Egon Bahr, who was of course not a diplomat but Brandt鈥檚 confidant since the latter鈥檚 tenure as major of West Berlin.[14]

These documents show that when senior officials in Bonn assessed the NPT and Germany鈥檚 potential accession, tensions, dissents, and contradictions came to the fore. This made it difficult to manage related processes even within the otherwise responsible Directorate-General of the Foreign Office, not to speak of the political challenge of maintaining an elementary degree of cohesion of the government coalition concerning the subject matter.听

As the documents indicate, the competition about influencing and shaping government policy on the accession question was fierce. Deliberations often tended to become obstinate and were mostly shrouded in a highly specialized but also passionate phraseology. Until the 鈥渟ocial-liberal coalition鈥� took over in 1969, largely repetitive rounds of argumentative battle followed, mostly between unrelenting NPT opponents and a slowly growing number of skeptics who grudgingly advocated or at least began to accept Germany鈥檚 eventual accession to the NPT.

Associated Documents

Document No. 1

Archiv f眉r Christlich-Demokratische Politik, St. Augustin (ACDP), Nachlass Kiesinger, I-226-285. Contributed by Andreas Lutsch and translated by Bernd Shaefer.

听

Document No. 2

Politisches Archiv des Ausw盲rtigen Amtes, Berlin (PAAA), B 43, IIB1, Bd. 787.听Contributed by Andreas Lutsch and translated by Bernd Shaefer.

This document also appears in Akten zur Ausw盲rtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968, doc. 221: , and Willy Brandt. Berliner Ausgabe. Herausgegeben von Helga Grebing, Gregor Sch枚llgen und Heinrich August Winkler. Im Auftrag der Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung. Bd. 6: Ein Volk der guten Nachbarn. Au脽en- und Deutschlandpolitik 1966-1974. Bearbeitet von Frank Fischer (Bonn: Dietz, 2005), 155-158.

Document No. 3

PA AA, B 1, Bd. 378. Contributed by Andreas Lutsch and translated by Bernd Shaefer.

听

Document No. 4

PA AA, B 1, Bd. 378. Contributed by Andreas Lutsch and translated by Bernd Shaefer.

Document No. 5

PA AA, B 130, Bd. 4338. Contributed by Andreas Lutsch and translated by Bernd Shaefer.6 pages

This document also appears in听Akten zur Ausw盲rtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968, doc. 283:

See also Wilhelm G. Grewe, R眉ckblenden. Aufzeichnungen eines Augenzeugen deutscher Au脽enpolitik von Adenauer bis Schmidt (Frankfurt et al.: Propyl盲en, 1979), 694f.

Document No. 6

PA AA, B 130, Bd. 10080. Contributed by Andreas Lutsch and translated by Bernd Shaefer.

Document No. 7

PAAA, B 130, Bd. 10080. Contributed by Andreas Lutsch and translated by Bernd Shaefer.

听

[1]听Federal Republic of Germany, Note and Statement accompanying Signature of Treaty on the Non-Proliferaton of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), November 28, 1969,听.

[2]听Memorandum Fried, 3 Nov. 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, XV, Germany and Berlin, doc. 235,听.听

[3] Remarks by Minister of Defense Gerhard Schr枚der: MemCon Schr枚der-Laird et al., 1 Feb. 1969, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI, Box C13, NATO docs 4-6, Laird papers.

[4] See, e.g., Vertrag 眉ber die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen. Dokumentation zur deutschen Haltung und 眉ber den deutschen Beitrag. Ver枚ffentlicht durch das Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bonn: H. K枚llen, 1969).

[5] Memorandum Duckwitz, 6 July 1968, Politisches Archiv des Ausw盲rtigen Amtes, Berlin (PA AA), B 150, Bd. 130.

[6] The unclassified Schnippenk枚tter memorandum was also used as an argumentative device in public. The CSU鈥檚 weekly newspaper, of which Strau脽 was editor-in-chief, later printed the full memorandum: Material zum Fall Schnippenk枚tter, Bayern-Kurier, 15 Feb. 1969.听Strau脽, in particular, continued to reference it: Franz Josef Strau脽, Es geht um die Zukunft Deutschlands, Bayern-Kurier, 15 Nov. 1969.听On concerns about the implications of the ambiguity of articles I and II of the NPT, see the Bundestag plenary debates on 8 Nov. 1969 on the government鈥檚 intention to sign the NPT and on 20 Feb. 1974 when the Bundestag voted on ratification. See also the protocol of the confidential joint session of the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Policy and of the Bundestag Committee on Defense Policy on 27 Nov. 1969: Karl-D.听Bracher et al. eds., Der Ausw盲rtige Ausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages. Sitzungsprotokolle 1969-1972 (鈥�). Erster Halbband November 1969 鈥� Juni 1971 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 2007), 9-43, and the protocol of a special meeting of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction on 12 Feb. 1974, Archiv f眉r Christlich-Demokratische Politik, St. Augustin (ACDP), VIII-001-1035/1.

[7] Handwritten note zu Guttenberg 鈥濺eichenhall 16/9鈥�, 16 Sep. 1968, Staatsarchiv Bamberg, NL Guttenberg, Bd. 94.听

[8]听The situation was a potential precedent for event in late 1976, when Strau脽 persuaded the CSU group within the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag to cease the cooperation with the CDU. This went hand in hand with an ambition for the CSU to compete with the CDU in all West Germany. But when CDU indicated that it could compete with the CSU in Bavaria, the CSU revised its position.

[9] Letter Mertes to Groepper, 4 April 1967, ACDP, I-403-090/1. Within the Foreign Office subdivision headed by Schnippenk枚tter, the diplomat and 鈥渇undamentalist鈥� Alois Mertes served in the department II B 2.

[10] Schlag der Trommeln, Der Spiegel, 27 Feb. 1967, 28.

[11] Telex Ruete (director of division II), 30 Auf. 1968, PA AA, B 130, Bd. 4338.

[12] Telex Allardt to Ruete, 7 Sep. 1968, Akten zur Ausw盲rtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968, doc. 288: .

[13] Memorandum Hauber for Ruete, 16 Sep. 1968, PA AA, B 130, Bd. 4338.

[14] See, e.g., memorandum Bahr, 24 Feb. 1969, PAAA, B 1, Bd. 379.