澳门六合彩

This is a co-publication with the听.

The Jupiter Missiles and the Endgame of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Part II

Sealing the Deal with Italy and Turkey

Reluctant Turkish Military Needed Special Incentives to Cooperate

Air Force鈥檚 Operation Pot Pie Made Jupiter Missiles 鈥淯nidentifiable鈥�

Sixty years ago, during April 1963, the US Air Force took steps to implement the final stage of the secret US-Soviet deal that helped resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis with the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles deployed in Italy and Turkey. While Air Force leaders had no knowledge of the secret agreement, they had instructions from the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to remove the Jupiters and to render them 鈥渦nidentifiable,鈥� according to the Air Force鈥檚 declassified 鈥溾�� of the Jupiter system published here today for the first time by the National Security Archive and 澳门六合彩's History and Public Policy Program. The Air Force dubbed the dismantling operations Pot Pie I (Italy) and Pot Pie II (Turkey).

Getting to the point where Pot Pie could be implemented was not easy. While negotiations with Italy had been relatively straightforward, Turkey鈥檚 Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to move forward on dismantling the Jupiters. According to a declassified State Department memorandum, US officials worried that the 鈥渃risis of confidence鈥� could lead Turkish defense officials to 鈥渟tall鈥� parliamentary approval of the operation or unnecessarily delay 鈥渢echnical level鈥� understandings on Jupiter removal. Especially concerning to the State Department was that a plan then in the works to cut levels of US military aid could upend Turkish confidence. Secret talks between US and Turkish military officials in March 1963, however, improved the atmosphere with assurances of higher levels of aid. Within weeks, the US and Ankara signed off on a dismantling agreement.

As necessary as removing the Jupiters was to fulfill the secret deal, top policymakers did not want to shine a spotlight on the matter. As preparations were underway to dismantle the missiles, on March 30, 1963, the State Department reminded the US embassies in Ankara and Rome of the need to 鈥渁void fallacious comparison between Jupiter dismantling and withdrawal [of] Soviet missiles from Cuba.鈥� To minimize that risk, neither the US, Italy, nor Turkey should provide 鈥渙fficial facilitation [to] press or photo coverage of missile dismantling.鈥� To prevent too much 鈥渕ystery鈥� over the dismantling, however, the State Department advised against any Italian or Turkish efforts to block the photography of trucks carrying missiles away from military bases.

Today鈥檚 posting by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP), a part of 澳门六合彩's History and Public Policy Program, is the second of a two-part series on the execution of the secret deal that helped settle the Cuban Missile Crisis. The arrangement made by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin stipulated that, in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, the US would reciprocate with a non-invasion pledge and the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 鈥渇our or five months.鈥� The Dobrynin-Kennedy conversation did not mention the Italian Jupiters, but the US had to remove them to make the Turkish deal less conspicuous.听 As both Part I of this posting and today鈥檚 Part II indicate, the process of removing the missiles from Italy and Turkey was not easy, automatic or effortless. Both countries had seen the missile deployments as symbols of a US security commitment, making it necessary for the Kennedy administration to persuade Italian and Turkish leaders that what they would receive in place of the Jupiters would be beneficial to their security.

Part I of the posting illuminated Italian and Turkish reactions to US proposals for removal of the Jupiters. Turkish Defense Minister 陌lhami Sancar was concerned about the adverse impact on his country鈥檚 鈥渃onfidence鈥� in the US, while Italian Defense Minister Giulio Andreotti worried that it represented a 鈥済raphic step backward鈥� for Italy鈥檚 role in nuclear deterrence. Rome and Washington, however, reached a high level understanding relatively quickly, expedited by the January 1963 meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, in which the latter agreed to the 鈥渕odernization鈥� of NATO nuclear forces by substituting Polaris patrols in the Mediterranean for the Jupiters and by replacing obsolete Corporal missiles in Italy with up-to-date Sergeant missiles. While Turkey鈥檚 Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin announced in January 1963 that his government had accepted the withdrawal of the Jupiters and their replacement with the Polaris patrols, his was not the final word on the matter, and it was still necessary to convince the Turkish military.

Part II of the posting on the Jupiters covers the last phases of US action to remove the Jupiters through official agreements with Italy and Turkey, notifications to the North Atlantic Council, tricky negotiations with the Turkish military, and the d茅nouement: the US Air Force鈥檚 implementation of Operations Pot Pie I and II. Like Part I, this posting includes declassified documents that have not been published before, including material from the files of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell Taylor and the records of the US Embassy in Italy.听The editors intended to include several Italian archival documents but permission to do so has either been refused or not yet granted.

Among the new documents are the , notifications to NATO on the Jupiter/Polaris 鈥渕odernization鈥� arrangements, strategic retargeting requirements dictated by the removal of the Jupiters, and a memorandum from quoting General Lauris Norstad鈥檚 opposition to the Jupiter withdrawal as 鈥渨eakening our nuclear capability.鈥澨� Other documents detail the plans for , including a submarine visit to Turkey鈥檚 port of Izmir. The latter was seen as a demonstration of the US commitment to Turkish security, especially to address concerns that the Polaris system had a 鈥渞emoteness which lessens its appeal.鈥�

An especially striking item is a translation of excerpts from a prepared by retired non-commissioned officer Antonio Mariani and published by the Historical Office of the Italian Air Force. 听The excerpts detail the role of the Air Force in the missile dismantling process, including the emotional reactions of personnel who had been closely involved in the Jupiter deployment: 鈥淎 frenetic destructive activity pervaded the military community which, almost with anger and a certain sadism, destroyed and reduced to useless remains everything on which it had studied, worked and operated.鈥�

Getting to an agreement with the government of Turkey was a crucial development that is documented in Part II. It was the Jupiters in Turkey that had most aggravated Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev when they were first deployed, and their removal was essential to realize the secret deal.[i] Just as was the case with Italy, the US had to find a way to carry out its end of the trade 鈥渨ithout appearing to do so鈥� and without antagonizing the Turkish government.[ii] As noted in Part I, the US tried to ease suspicions by characterizing the arrangements as the 鈥渕odernization鈥� of nuclear forces. While the details were different in the Italian and Turkish cases, the crucial point for both was the US proposal to substitute up-to-date and relatively invulnerable Polaris submarine launched ballistic missiles for obsolete and vulnerable Jupiter missiles. Securing Italian, Turkish, and NATO support for the modernization plan was the Kennedy administration鈥檚 key objective.

In dealing with the more demanding Turkish government, played a central role, and his job was difficult. Unlike the Italian case, there had been no direct interaction between heads of state that could expedite the process. While Hare could reach agreement in principle with , the latter acknowledged that the military had the 鈥渇inal word." That problem made a US military role in the talks essential. To encourage Turkey鈥檚 General Staff to accept the dismantling of the missiles, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tasked General , the director of Defense Department military assistance programs, to negotiate with them, which he did during March 10-13, 1963.

The full story of Gen. Wood鈥檚 negotiations with the Turkish military cannot be told from the available archival records. For example, the memoranda of conversations of the talks with the Turkish General Staff are classified top secret at the US National Archives, although a declassification request by the National Security Archive may eventually lead to their release.

Gen. Wood and Turkish military officials may have discussed delays in the availability of nuclear weapons to Turkey since President Kennedy had required the installation of Permissive Action Links (PALs) to . The declassified record also indicates that Washington disabused Ankara of the notion that Turkish officers or sailors would have a role in the operations of the Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean. As previously noted, Washington would not accept this arrangement, but it did agree that a Polaris submarine would visit a Turkish harbor and that Turkish and Italian officers at SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) headquarters would play a role in selecting targets for Polaris missiles.

Another element of the agreement with Turkey was the early delivery of F-104 nuclear capable fighter-bombers to Turkey, which, from the beginning of the negotiations, Washington saw as a 鈥渃arrot鈥� to expedite Turkish cooperation. But Turkey wanted a third squadron, and what the US promised remains unknown. One major element of the overall understanding is clear, however: As a confidence building measure, the White House decided to reverse scheduled cuts in the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and provide the Turkish armed forces with higher levels of aid.

In Ambassador Hare鈥檚 words, the , thereby playing a 鈥渓arge role in obtaining [their] cooperation鈥� in the details of the 鈥渕issile substitution.鈥� Wood also accepted a Turkish proposal of a Polaris submarine visit the port of Izmir. The US Navy objected to Izmir for technical reasons, but the State Department and General Wood believed that it was suitable enough and successfully pressed Defense Department higher-ups to accept it.

In the weeks after General Wood鈥檚 talks, the Jupiter dismantling operation began to fall into place. In late March, the US and Italy exchanged notes on the Jupiter-Polaris arrangement, while John McNaughton reported to McGeorge Bundy that the dismantling in Italy would begin on April 1 and in Turkey on April 15. Early that month, the US and Turkey exchanged notes, although the agreement remains classified. During early April, the dismantling of Jupiter missiles in Italy began.听 On April 15, dismantling began in Turkey. The day before, as part of the arrangements, the for a multi-day visit that provided positive media coverage. On April 25, 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara sent a brief note to President Kennedy that the

For the US Defense Department, General Counsel John McNaughton played a directing role in the implementation of the Jupiter removals. According to McNaughton鈥檚 with the Kennedy Library, in early 1963, he was given overall responsibility for removal of the Jupiters and their replacement with Polaris patrols. In the interview, he asserted that the Jupiter/Polaris operation had nothing to do with the missile crisis settlement. Robert McNamara, who gave McNaughton his assignment, did nothing to enlighten him on that point. He later recalled that he instructed McNaughton not to ask why he was getting the assignment because 鈥淚鈥檓 not going to tell you.鈥� Unfortunately, McNaughton鈥檚 records as general counsel are not available, and his name appears in few of the declassified records, although notably in document 25.[iii]

The importance of the secret deal makes it worthwhile to understand how it was implemented, but it also had a broader significance that is worth noting. As historian Philip Nash has argued, by removing Soviet missiles from Cuba and Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey, the Cuban missile swap deserves recognition as a trailblazing arms control agreement, the 鈥渇irst arms reduction agreement鈥� of the Cold War. Nash contends that even though it was 鈥渧erbal, informal, secret, spontaneous,鈥� and part of a larger tacit arrangement, the secret deal was the 鈥渇irst agreement in the history of the arms race under which both sides dismantled a portion of their operational nuclear delivery systems.鈥�[iv] It would take nearly ten more years before Washington and Moscow would agree to the new dismantling decisions that were incorporated in the SALT I agreement in 1972.

By then, the secrecy surrounding the deal over the Jupiters was beginning to erode. In 1970, former Turkish president and prime minister 陌smet 陌n枚n眉 made an extraordinary statement to the Grand National Assembly, saying that, during 1963 鈥渨e 鈥� learned that [the US] had made a deal with the USSR.鈥� Exactly how Turkish officials learned this remains obscure. Robert F. Kennedy鈥檚 memoir of the crisis, Thirteen Days, did not acknowledge an explicit agreement but recounted how he had told Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin that the president wanted to remove the Jupiters, and that, 鈥渨ithin a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone.鈥� Even though Kennedy had denied to Dobrynin that there was a quid pro quo, Harvard University government professor Graham Allison surmised, in 1971, that 鈥渋t could not have been plainer鈥� that there had been one.[v]

During the 1970s, enough material had been declassified at the Kennedy Library, including detailed summaries of the ExCom discussions and State Department documents, for Stanford University historian Barton J. Bernstein to conclude that Robert F. Kennedy 鈥減rivately offered a hedged promise 鈥� to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey at a future time.鈥� More information became available during the 1980s, but it was not until 1989 that John F. Kennedy鈥檚 speechwriter/counsel, Theodore Sorensen, made his 鈥溾�� that he had altered Robert Kennedy鈥檚 memoir to conceal the fact that removing the Jupiters had been part of the agreement with the Soviets. The release from Russian archives of Ambassador Dobrynin鈥檚 telegraphic report of his meeting with Robert F. Kennedy provided essential confirmation of the secret quid pro quo.[vi]

Background Documents

听

JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was aware of Kennedy鈥檚 Jupiter decision, but it is not clear when the other Chiefs learned of the 鈥渃losely held decisions.鈥� This paper, approved by General Paul S. Emrick, director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, gave an overall look at the 鈥減lanning requirements鈥� necessitated by the Jupiter decision and the recent Nassau conference between President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Among the issues presented by the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were retargeting requirements, Sergeant missiles for Italy, the number of Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean and their basing, and the speeding up of F-104G deliveries to Turkey.

This urgent message 鈥渙f the highest sensitivity鈥� from the Joint Chiefs to top commanders began with a misrepresentation of President Kennedy鈥檚 decision: 鈥渟erious consideration [is] being given to withdrawal of JUPITERS from Italy and Turkey.鈥� The recipients鈥擥eneral Lyman Lemnitzer [CINCEUR], Admiral Robert Dennison [CINCLANT], and General Thomas Power [DSTP]鈥攚ere to assume that Italy and Turkey had agreed to the decision, that withdrawal of the Jupiters would occur by April 1, 1963, and that Polaris submarines would be in the Mediterranean by that date. Both USCINCEUR and DSTP, who directed work on the SIOP, were to consider retargeting requirements once the Jupiters went offline. CINCLANT was to consider the feasibility of deploying one, two, or three submarines.

听

Taylor forwarded to McNamara the views of USCINCEUR, CINCLANT, and the DSTP on targeting and submarine deployment issues. According to CINCLANT Admiral Dennison, it was feasible to deploy up to three Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. They could regain the same 鈥渙perating efficiency鈥� that they had achieved in their previous Norwegian Sea deployment. In Lemnitzer鈥檚 absence, General Lauris Norstad, who was departing as CINCEUR, opposed the withdrawal of the Jupiters as 鈥渨eakening our nuclear capability鈥� by reducing target coverage and by 鈥渄estroying鈥� the Jupiter鈥檚 鈥減sychological鈥� impact. DSTP General Power was also concerned about target coverage but did not foresee 鈥渂asic problems as long as Free World missiles are targeted as an integrated package.鈥�

听

This message conveyed several decisions that McNamara had detailed in a memorandum on 鈥淭he Replacement of Jupiter and Related Matters.鈥� One Sergeant missile battalion would be deployed in Italy to replace Corporal missiles. The U.S. would not transfer to Italy 鈥渙perational responsibilities鈥� for nuclear weapons currently deployed to the Southern European Task Force [SETAF]. The U.S. would not deploy Pershing missiles to Italy. Planning would begin for the assignment of three Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean beginning April 1, 1963. Finally, plans would be made to deliver 14 104-G鈥檚 to Turkey during April 1963.

The Joint Chiefs met with Admiral Roy L. Johnson, the deputy director of the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff [JSTPS], to discuss how to cover the target gap left by the dismantling of 45 Jupiter missiles and also the gap that would be caused by the temporary absence of one Polaris submarine during its transit from Holy Loch (Scotland) to the Mediterranean. Johnson saw the missile shortage as one that would be of 鈥渄ecreasing significance after July 1963鈥� when more ICBMs would be entering the nuclear arsenal. To complete retargeting of the previous Jupiter targets听 would take 90 days while retargeting of the Polaris submarines, which involved 鈥渃utting new cards for the computers,鈥� would take several months. Johnson reviewed in detail the problems involved in providing coverage of the previously targeted bomber bases, military control centers, and other targets.听听



JCS Chairman Taylor emphasized the importance of assuring General Lemnitzer that retargeting would not injure NATO鈥檚 position and that the U.S. would retain the 鈥減resent level of missile attacks鈥� against Soviet missile and bomber bases that threatened NATO. Johnson made suggestions for 鈥渁lternative criteria鈥� to provide coverage of Soviet threat targets, while the Chiefs conveyed their criteria for retargeting, such as the same level of damage expectancy for the Jupiter targets.



Written on top of this document is the word 鈥淪IOP [Single Integrated Operational Plan]鈥� because the targeting problems that the Chiefs were discussing with Admiral Johnson were integral to the U.S. nuclear war plan.

鈥淐arrots鈥� for Turkey While Avoiding 鈥淯ndue Pressure鈥�

By late January, the negotiations with Turkey were bogged down, with Defense Minister Sancar asking for a Turkish military presence on the Polaris submarines as well as delivery of nuclear weapons for the F-100 Super Sabres before the Jupiters were replaced. Without a formal agreement on the Jupiters, the U.S. government held back from a decision on another matter: the delivery of F-104G fighter-bombers. Nevertheless, Defense Department officials approved a decision to 鈥減rovide first available aircraft鈥� in April 1963, which was necessary to authorize the Air Force鈥檚 鈥減reliminary preparatory actions.鈥� The U.S. would preserve its 鈥渂argaining position鈥� by informing Turkey in writing that an 鈥渁ccelerated delivery date will become firm upon satisfactory conclusion of current US/Turkey negotiations.鈥�

The State Department remained concerned about reaching an agreement with Turkey in 鈥減rinciple without unfulfillable conditions of replacement Jupiter.鈥� To move the negotiations along, this communication authorized Ambassador Hare to use as a 鈥渃arrot鈥� the Defense Department鈥檚 conditional approval of F-104 deliveries. It also advised him to avoid any 鈥渦ndue pressure鈥� that could harm the negotiations.

In this overview of the state of the Jupiter/Polaris negotiations and the next steps, the State Department instructs Ambassador Hare to lead the negotiations with Turkey and to inform U.S missions that McNamara鈥檚 letter to Andreotti on the Polaris and Sergeant deployments was in the works; that Turkish 鈥渃onditions鈥� were not clear; that the U.S. and the two countries had to formally notify NATO of the 鈥渕odernization鈥� program; that bilateral agreements with Ankara and Rome on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would need to be negotiated; that steps had to be taken to prepare Polaris submarines for missions in the Mediterranean by April 1; and that the U.S. needed 鈥渃onsiderable lead time鈥� to prepare for the removal of the Jupiters. The negotiation of Turkey鈥檚 conditions for the Jupiter removal should not hold up notifying NATO or cause delay of the U.S.-Italy arrangements. On the use of the naval base at Rota, Spain, for stationing Polaris submarines, several NATO governments had objected (because of the Franco dictatorship), and so far Madrid had rejected U.S. proposals.

In this telegram, Hare asks Foreign Minister Erkin where things stand and informs him that the U.S. would be ready to 鈥渢ake speedy implementation action鈥� on the Jupiters once Turkey had decided. Alluding to the military鈥檚 pivotal role in important government decisions, Erkin says that the military has the 鈥渇inal word,鈥� and he would let Hare know once he has heard from them.

The Joint Chiefs sent General Lemnitzer this outline of the current plans to remove the Jupiter missiles. The main points are that the Jupiters should be inactivated by April 1 (although that was more likely for Italy than for Turkey), that one Polaris submarine should be in the Mediterranean by March 28 and a second one by April 10, that the JCS are taking steps to retarget weapons for when the Jupiters are offline, and that guidance on the Italian and Turkish role in the targeting of Polaris missiles has been prepared.

The Joint Staff prepared a detailed and lengthy report in response to a request from the Defense Department鈥檚 Office of International Security Affairs for an 鈥渙utline plan for withdrawal and complete disposition鈥� of the Jupiter missiles. A number of options were considered and rejected, including other military uses, offering the Jupiters to other agencies as a space booster, storing the missiles, and destroying them 鈥渨ithout reclamation.鈥� As there was 鈥渘o identifiable requirement for the missiles,鈥� the most appropriate option was 鈥減romptly dismantling and removing [them] from operational launch site.鈥� While the warheads should be speedily returned to the United States, other useful components could be reclaimed, and the rest could be salvaged. The process would prevent the loss of high value components that were still usable, such as rocket motors, fueling trailers, and electronic devices. Such an outcome required decisions on the final disposition of Jupiter assets.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric visited Rome in February 1963 for meetings with Prime Minister Fanfani and Defense Minister Andreotti. The Jupiter missiles were on the agenda and this lengthy briefing book conveys the tacit linkage between the Jupiter dismantling and the range of nuclear and conventional forces issues that were then under discussion. They included, among others: the possible deployment of Polaris aboard the cruiser Garibaldi, 鈥渨ith the US retaining custody of the warheads鈥�; the long-standing Italian quest for help in the development of a nuclear-powered submarine; and the conclusion of an arrangement for a co-production of M-113 armored personnel carriers in Italy.



Perhaps the most striking part of this compilation is the paper reviewing the Italian experiment to use the cruiser Garibaldi as a delivery vehicle for Polaris missiles.听 According to the briefing paper, the main U.S. objection to the Garibaldi proposal had less to do with its technical aspects than with the broader NATO context. The problem with a bilateral deal was political, namely the Garibaldi鈥檚 potentially negative impact for the creation of a multilateral NATO force, including the potentially adverse repercussions for Turkey and West Germany.鈥� The former could see it as an 鈥渦nfair advantage to Italy ... in the听 matter of [the] adequacy of a replacement for Jupiter missiles,鈥� while the latter could see it giving Italy 鈥渟ome of preferred status.鈥�



Not included in the copy that went to the State Department are the probably more sensitive papers on Polaris forces and the 鈥淎ssignment of Forces鈥� to NATO.

Detailed records of the conversations between Gilpatric and top Italian officials have yet to surface. The sole source is a telegram from the Rome Embassy summing up the talks with Fanfani. On February 11, Gilpatric and Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt met with Prime Minister Fanfani. Gilpatric reviewed U.S. plans for three Polaris submarines assigned to SACEUR to patrol the Mediterranean and the projected visit to Rome by Ambassador Livingston Merchant to discuss the multilateral force proposal. In that connection, Fanfani said that Italy had given up the proposal to equip the Garibaldi with Polaris missiles. Gilpatric discussed some of the negative implications of French President Charles De Gaulle鈥檚 14 January 1963 press conference, which included statements critical of NATO. This raised concerns in Washington that听 if the American people felt 鈥渦nwanted鈥� in Europe, there might be pressure to take a 鈥渕ore restrictive鈥� position on the U.S. military presence in Europe. Fanfani agreed that it was 鈥渕ore important than ever for 鈥� the alliance to strive for greater unity.鈥�

To bring NATO officially on board, the State Department sent this draft paper to U.S. ambassadors in Italy, NATO, and Turkey for use with the North Atlantic Council and with SACEUR. Just as the three governments had informed the Council of the Jupiter deployment plans in the late 1950s, they would brief the NAC on the purposes of the Jupiter-Polaris arrangement and its military implications, including retargeting requirements for the 鈥渢imely damage鈥� of Allied Command Europe targets.

Responding to the State Department proposal for a memorandum to NATO on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangements, Ambassador Thomas Finletter writes that Italian officials suggested that government approval would be expedited if the draft were 鈥渁ltered to become a United States memorandum鈥� in which the Italian and Turkish representatives 鈥渟imply concur.鈥� When Finletter suggested that the proposal was not workable, the Italians responded that their government would 鈥渁ccept present text.鈥� NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker did not see any serious problem, even if the substitution of Polaris for Jupiters caused 鈥渟ome reduction in target coverage.鈥� Stikker asked that the U.S. 鈥渟quash [the] rumor鈥� that Polaris would be based at Rota, Spain (which was in fact the U.S. objective).



It is not clear exactly when the North Atlantic Council received this memorandum, but it may have been on February 22, 1963, the preferred date, from the State Department鈥檚 perspective, for avoiding delays in the removal of the Jupiters.

A number of issues raised by Defense Minister Sancar about the Jupiter agreement were unresolved. While some in the Turkish government wanted to withdraw Sancar鈥檚 letter to McNamara, President 陌n枚n眉 was reluctant to do that, wanting it understood that what Sancar had written 鈥渨ere not conditions but rather expression of Turkish needs and desires.鈥� During a meeting, Foreign Minister Erkin told Hare that he was trying to clear the proposed memorandum to the NAC in time for its meeting on February 20. On the sentence about Polaris submarines operating in the Mediterranean, Erkin suggested this wording: Polaris was being 鈥渆specially assigned鈥� to Italy and Turkey. That would speak to the 鈥淭urkish feeling鈥� that 鈥淧olaris has remoteness which lessens its appeal.鈥�



Later that day, Hare wrote that the Turkish government was apparently willing to sign on to the statement to NATO. That Turkey had already made the 鈥減olitical decision鈥� to dismantle the Jupiters made it necessary for the U.S. to address Sancar鈥檚 concerns, such as the nuclear weapons for the F-100s, the delivery of a third F-104 squadron, access to the facilities at Cigli, and Turkey鈥檚 role in the Polaris submarines. Hare also favored a positive response to Sancar鈥檚 proposal for negotiations between U.S. and Turkish representatives.

Consistent with the concerns about target coverage, the plan for Polaris patrols required the presence of at least one submarine in the Mediterranean. The overlapping patrols would begin when the U.S.S. Sam Houston entered the Mediterranean on March 28, followed by the U.S.S. John Marshall on April 10, and the U.S.S. Ethan Allen on 1 June. The Sam Houston could make a port call in Turkey, but the stopover had to occur when another submarine was in the Mediterranean. Taylor recommended the port of Glock as the site of a two-day visit, one day for a visit by officials and the second for a 鈥渄aylight indoctrination cruise by designated observers.鈥� The latter would be barred from sensitive 鈥渟paces鈥� used for communications and nuclear propulsion.

Trying to Nail Down Final Agreements and Obstacles Encountered

The State Department sent the embassies in Ankara and Rome the text of a draft note to be used in negotiations with both countries for formal agreements on the removal of the Jupiter missiles and their replacement with Polaris submarines operating in the Mediterranean. The dismantlement of Jupiter sites in Italy would听 鈥渂egin concurrently with the arrival of the Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean鈥� around April 1, while the dismantling in Turkey would begin with the arrival of the second Polaris submarine on or about April 15.

Hare delivered McNamara鈥檚 response to Sancar鈥檚 letter to Erkin, who found it 鈥渧ery good, very constructive.鈥� While reading it, Erkin observed that Sancar had been difficult, not for 鈥渞easons peculiar to him鈥� but because there was a 鈥済eneral uneasiness鈥� that 鈥渢hings may be happening which affect Turkey, but to which GOT is not privy.鈥� That perception had an impact on Sancar鈥檚 鈥渄esire 鈥� for physical [Turkish] presence on Polaris.鈥�

The U.S. had hoped that an exchange of notes with Turkey on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would facilitate a technical level approach to the Turkish military on the 鈥渕echanics of Jupiter dismantling.鈥� But with parliamentary approval of the notes delayed, and not likely to occur until later in the month, the U.S. needed to make an approach on dismantling so that it occurred in conjunction with the arrival of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. With dismantling scheduled to begin on April 15, the Department would like Hare鈥檚 advice on whether a technical approach could be made 鈥渨ithout running unacceptable political risk.鈥�

General Wood鈥檚 Mission

Following up on earlier ideas about direct talks with Turkish officials, General Robert Wood, the director of Military Assistance Programs at the Department of Defense, would be visiting Turkey for talks. This State Department message notes that in light of proposed overall cuts of foreign aid, projected military aid to Turkey would total $120 million, and U.S. officials would emphasize Washington鈥檚 鈥渃ontinuing long term interest鈥� in Turkey鈥檚 military capabilities. Issues for Hare鈥檚 consideration include the 鈥渁dequacy鈥� of the proposed approach and what needed to be done to bolster Turkish 鈥渃onfidence and morale鈥� and to prevent any 鈥渟talling鈥� on the Jupiters.

The Embassy reports to the State Department that the ratification of an exchange of notes by the Grand National Assembly would not prevent the U.S. from early initiation of a 鈥渢echnical level鈥� approach on dismantling the Jupiters. No 鈥渦nacceptable political risks鈥� would be involved. Turkey鈥檚 participation in the presentation to the NAC meant that 鈥渨e can probably take it for granted we have final answer and proceed accordingly up to point of physical removal.鈥�

According to Talbot, an impasse in the impending talks between General Wood and the Turkish General Staff could have damaging implications for the removal of the Jupiters and for U.S.-Turkish relations. A key issue is the level of Military Assistance Program spending for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces, with the Turks believing that they 鈥渘eed and deserve鈥� a higher modernization rate than the U.S. had programmed. For the Turkish military, $120 million would represent a 鈥渟udden and catastrophic decline.鈥� Citing the importance of keeping the military 鈥渋n line,鈥� Talbot cites Ambassador Hare鈥檚 argument that 鈥渋t would be difficult to conceive a worse time for making a significant reduction in MAP鈥� and urges Johnson to authorize Gen. Wood to start with a 鈥渂ase of least鈥� $150 million.

Concerning levels of military aid, Hare warns that 鈥渁brupt and negative action on our part could have certainly foreseeable reaction detrimental not only to proper resolution of existing problems but also to our fundamental relationship鈥� with Turkey.

The Kennedy administration found it necessary to solve the problem raised by Ambassador Hare lest military assistance cuts delay or prevent action to dismantle the Turkish Jupiters. After the Wood mission left Washington, in accordance with NSC 1550 (setting requirements for foreign aid funding decisions), the State Department undid the cuts by authorizing Wood to discuss specific quantities of approved equipment that could be delivered during FY 1963 and quantities and types of equipment that could be provided during FY 1964. For the latter, equipment could be provided up to a level of $150 million (thus providing the modernization resources sought by the Turkish military), but Wood was not to mention any dollar values during the talks.听听听

Having accompanied General Wood on the mission to Turkey, Bowling provides Kitchen with a copy of the top secret record of the discussions with the Turkish General Staff (which remain classified). According to Bowling, Wood 鈥渁ccomplished his mission鈥� by conducting the talks with 鈥済reat skill and vigor鈥�: 鈥淭here will be no stalling on Jupiter removal from the Turkish military.鈥� With the Turkish Chiefs of Staff 鈥渂adly shaken up鈥� by the implications of the Jupiter removal, Wood helped check 鈥渢he slide in 鈥� morale鈥� by addressing concerns about MAP funds, Turkish participation in Polaris targeting, the selection of a port for the Polaris visit (with Izmir preferred by Turkey), and the disposition of facilities at Cigli.

The State Department instructs the Embassy to inform Italian authorities that if the Jupiter dismantling was to be completed within the first 25 days of April, as the Italian government requested, military officials needed to be notified accordingly.听 According to the Deputy CINCEUR, Italian military officials had not yet received authorization on the dismantling. The State Department hoped that Italian military personnel would be available for the operation 鈥渘otwithstanding Easter holidays."

Hare informs the Department that, in light of the Wood mission, the Turkish military would not request any changes in the text of the notes to be exchanged on the Jupiters/Polaris arrangement. It might be possible for the Turkish government to sign an 鈥渆xecutive-type鈥� agreement instead of taking the matter to parliament.听 With the U.S. willing to talk with Turkish officials and provide 鈥渞eassurance,鈥� the Wood mission 鈥減layed large role in obtaining Turkish cooperation鈥� in the details of the 鈥渕issile substitution.鈥�

Moving Forward on Dismantling and Finalizing Agreement with Italy

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had appointed the Air Force as 鈥淓xecutive Agent鈥� for taking charge of the Jupiter removal from Italy and Turkey, and Air Force General William Senter signed off on the plan of action. Under the plan, the Jupiter鈥檚 classified components, including the warheads and guidance systems, would be returned to the United States, while remaining portions of the missiles were to be rendered 鈥渦nidentifiable,鈥� the meaning of which was described in detail (PDF p. 7): removal of the missiles from launching areas, separating the engines from the missiles, dismantling 鈥渟ub-systems,鈥� and 鈥渙rderly disposition of the remaining components.鈥澨� This was consistent with the Joint Staff鈥檚 recommendations for salvage procedures to ensure that both Italy and Turkey had access to useful non-sensitive equipment and parts.听 Under the plan, various U.S. military organizations, including the Italian and Turkish Air Forces, would have specific responsibilities, which were described in detail as were procedures for the return of the warheads, re-entry vehicles and guidance systems to the United States.

The dismantling operation in Italy, nicknamed Pot Pie I, would begin on April 1, while the operation in Turkey, Pot Pie II, would begin on April 15, with a 鈥渕inimum of publicity鈥� in both countries.听 The plan would be classified as 鈥淐onfidential NOFORN,鈥� although, as noted, elements of it were to be shared with Italian and Turkish officials.

The Embassy had informed the Italian Foreign Office of the need to coordinate the dismantling with military officials, but, according to the U.S. military assistance mission, Ministry of Defense officials were without instructions. An 鈥渆arly exchange of notes would help button up matter promptly.鈥� The Embassy made the point that the 鈥渁ction to be completed within 25 days includes removal from Italy of nose cones, warheads and guidance systems, and laying missiles in horizontal positions, but that salvage of missile hulls and disposal of assorted administrative equipment 鈥� might take as long as six-eight months.鈥�

On March 22, 1963, through an exchange of notes, the U.S. and Italy confirmed the final agreement on the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles and their replacement with patrols of Polaris submarines assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The Polaris patrols would begin on April 1, 1963, and the dismantling operation would occur during the next 25 days.

One of the few pieces of declassified evidence showing John McNaughton鈥檚 role in the Jupiter removal process, his report to McGeorge Bundy concerned the 鈥減hysical operation鈥� to remove the missiles and the related press management.听 Dismantlement actions would begin on April 1 in Italy and April 15 in Turkey.听 For both countries, the dismantled missiles would go to a 鈥済raveyard.鈥� The arrival of Polaris submarines during April would be publicized along with a visit to Turkey around April 14-15. No photographers would be allowed on site, but no 鈥渟pecial limitations鈥� would apply when the missiles were in transit. One of McNaughton鈥檚 concerns was that the dismantling operation be handled in a way that 鈥渞educed[d] 鈥� erroneous comparisons with Cuba.鈥�

The State Department instructs the embassies in Ankara and Rome of the importance of avoiding 鈥渇allacious comparison between Jupiter dismantling and withdrawal Soviet missiles from Cuba.鈥� To help do that, the embassies should ensure that 鈥渘o official facilitation will be given press or photo coverage of missile dismantling.鈥� In response to any press queries, the embassies could state that 鈥渄ismantled missiles will be transported over period several weeks.鈥� To avoid an 鈥渁ir of mystery鈥� around the dismantling, the Department opposed efforts to block media coverage of missiles in transit. The embassies should approach Italian and Turkish officials 鈥渁long [those] lines.鈥�

The Last Steps and the Polaris Submarine Stop at Izmir

Walter Stoessel, Political Adviser to SACEUR General Lemnitzer, informs the State Department that Secretary of Defense McNamara has written to Turkish Minister of Defense Sancar that a Polaris submarine 鈥渙n duty鈥� in the Mediterranean would visit the port of Izmir, in compliance with Sancar鈥檚 recommendation. Sancar was also informed that, during the Polaris visit on April 14-15, 鈥渟elected guests will be accommodated.鈥�

The Embassy informs the Department of last-minute developments concerning the exchange of notes on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement. Hare confirmed with Foreign Minister Erkin that the dismantling would begin on April 15, and that was 鈥渞econfirmed 鈥� at working level.鈥�

A SHAPE news release would announce the 鈥渃ourtesy call鈥� by the Polaris submarine, U.S.S. Sam Houston, to Iszmir, Turkey, beginning on April 14. The visit will 鈥減rovide an opportunity for distinguished Turkish officials to view this latest weapon system to be assigned to the defense of Allied Command Europe.鈥�

The U.S. Embassy in Ankara informs the State Department that the exchange of notes has been completed. The agreement text has yet to be declassified.

Reporting on the visit of the Polaris submarine U.S.S. Sam Houston to Izmir, the Embassy finds it to be a 鈥渟uccess from all points of view.鈥� The press provided 鈥渕aximum favorable coverage,鈥� with one headline stating that the 鈥淪ubmarine which scares Soviets is in Izmir.鈥� The press coverage emphasized the 鈥減ower of atomic sub weapons as deterrent,鈥� the 鈥渨armth of welcome extended to ship,鈥� and the 鈥渋mportance of the dignitaries鈥� who visited the ship.

This document is possibly an incomplete cross reference copy, and the original version was not found.

In a hand-written note, McNamara reports that the last Jupiter missile in Turkey 鈥渃ame down yesterday鈥� and that 鈥淭he last Jupiter warhead will be flown out of Turkey on Saturday.鈥�

These excerpts from the memoirs of a former member of Italy鈥檚 36th Air Brigade, published by the Italian Air Force, provides fascinating perspective on the shock felt by officers when they received the dismantling instructions and then how they planned and carried out their tasks. The following sentences convey the emotional reactions: 鈥淭he dismantling, for those who experienced it, was a real demolition. A frenetic destructive activity pervaded the military community which, almost with anger and a certain sadism, destroyed and reduced to useless remains everything on which it had studied, worked and operated.鈥� As the excerpts makes clear, not everything was destroyed and junked. Consistent with the Joint Staff鈥檚 original proposals, sensitive components, such as the warheads were returned to the U.S., while other parts of the missiles were salvaged and made available to other organizations. Some equipment went to Italy鈥檚 鈥淪an Marco鈥� space research program, just as Prime Minister Fanfani had proposed to President Kennedy during their meeting in January 1963.



To what extent the dismantling procedure in Turkey paralleled the one in Italy remains unclear, at least on the basis of available documentation.

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Notes

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[i].听 For studies of the Jupiters in Turkey, see Nur Bilge Criss, 鈥淪trategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959鈥�1963,鈥� Journal of Strategic Studies听 20 (1997): 97-122; Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), and S眉leyman Seydi, 鈥淭urkish鈥揂merican Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957鈥�63,鈥� Middle Eastern Studies 46 (2010): 433-455.

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[ii].听 Barton J. Bernstein, 鈥淭he Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?鈥�, Political Science Quarterly 95 (1980): 107.

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[iii].听 Nash, The Other Missiles of October, 152. In the Kennedy Library interview, McNaughton alluded to a diary, but whether any diary material for 1963 survived is unknown. For the McNaughton diaries during the Vietnam War escalation, see Benjamin T. Harrison and Christopher L. Mosher, 鈥淭he Secret Diary of McNamara's Dove: The Long-Lost Story of John T. McNaughton's Opposition to the Vietnam War,鈥� Diplomatic History 35 (2011): 505-534.

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[iv].听 Nash, The Other Missiles of October, 149.

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[v]. 听Don Munton, 鈥淗its and Myths: The Essence, the Puzzles, and the Missile Crisis,鈥� International Relations 26 (2012): 312-315. For 陌n枚n眉鈥檚 statement see S眉leyman Seydi, 鈥淭urkish鈥揂merican Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957鈥�63,鈥� at 451.

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[vi].听 Bernstein, 鈥淭he Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?鈥�, 97鈥�125.

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