澳门六合彩

U.S.-Thai relations are as complicated as any in Southeast Asia. Bangkok鈥檚 2014 coup and subsequent democratic decline 聽with the United States, and its growing with Beijing . But, Thailand remains a U.S. treaty ally and economic partner within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thailand still 聽U.S. arms and its , and Bangkok likely on China.

In a sign of positive renewal, the United States and Thailand on July 10th to follow up on Bangkok鈥檚 participation in the 听(滨笔贰贵)听补苍诲 . The language used in the communique is revealing for its treatment of fundamental U.S.-Thai disagreements.

The communique frames the U.S.-Thai alliance as 鈥渇orged by shared history and common values, and anchored by our collective commitment to build resilient, inclusive democracies and advance human rights.鈥� It goes on to promote a joint intention to 鈥渁dhere to core principles,鈥� including:

"Promoting democratic development in an open and transparent way is essential to implementing our shared vision of an Indo-Pacific that is free, open, inclusive and sustainable. Strong democratic institutions, independent civil society, and free and fair elections are central to this vision, allowing our respective societies to reach their full potential. We intend to strengthen our shared values and ideals, including the rule of law; protecting human rights and human security; adhering to humanitarian principles, including non-refoulement; promoting sustainable development; and upholding resilient democracies."

With its language on shared values, the document carefully avoids airing disagreements on the issues of democracy and human rights that have hampered U.S.-Thai relations since 2014, such as the Thai government鈥檚 and its ambivalence about countering Myanmar鈥檚 2021 military coup.

Southeast Asia may be a growing and vibrant region increasingly central to the global economy, but the primary driver of renewed U.S. interest in this region is countering Beijing鈥檚 rising influence.

Who is not mentioned in the communique is also telling: China. Southeast Asia may be a growing and vibrant region increasingly central to the global economy, but the primary driver of renewed U.S. interest in this region is countering Beijing鈥檚 rising influence. Washington is especially over Thailand鈥檚 deepening relations with China. But, in a bid to avoid putting Thailand in a politically unpalatable spot that would have likely sunk the agreement, the text scrupulously avoids naming China.

From a wider lens, the communique demonstrates Washington鈥檚 two balancing acts in Southeast Asia: one, promoting values while advancing strategic national interests, and two, threading the needle on building a counter-China coalition without alienating a region that prefers non-alignment. Getting this balance right is something U.S. policymakers are actively calibrating. The rhetoric in the communique and more fully in the 2022 National Security Strategy reflect a recent effort to recalibrate on these axes and achieve a temporary 鈥渂alance鈥� in Southeast Asia before events demand shifts once again. What constitutes an optimal approach in U.S. foreign policy will shift in the future, and Washington has to live with some contradictions and adapt according to the prevailing circumstances of the day without becoming overly passive, lest it risk alienating allies and partners in the region.

Values and Realpolitik

Complicating U.S.-Thai relations, Thailand remains dominated by the royalist military-backed governing coalition of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, the instigator of the 2014 coup. The 2019 election was as unfair, and the constitution鈥攁nd 鈥�. In recent years, the Thai government has harshly on a widespread protest movement.

Considering the recent Constitutional Court decision that Prayuth but the opposition鈥檚 claims that he over-extended his stay in office, it is for non-military-backed parties. The deck is simply too constitutionally stacked against them. Although not as authoritarian as some of its other mainland Southeast Asian neighbors, Thailand ranks as 鈥溾�� according to Freedom House and a 鈥溾�� in the Economist鈥檚 Democracy Index. Nevertheless, Thailand remains a treaty ally of the United States and a strategic player in the region. It may not agree with Thailand鈥檚 domestic policies, but Washington recognizes the need to work with it.

U.S. efforts to foster relations with autocratic or semi-democratic regimes extend beyond Thailand to arguably every Southeast Asian country apart from the junta in Myanmar. The Philippines, a key U.S. treaty ally with a crucial , recently elected Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of its onetime dictator, as its president聽for a six year term. Soon thereafter the United States conducted successful , and President Biden President Marcos in New York, thus signaling positive improvements to the U.S.-Philippine relationship. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Vietnam constitutes one of the closest U.S. security partners in spite of its Communist government鈥檚 , while key regional partner Singapore has long practiced a softer form of authoritarianism. Last year鈥檚 ASEAN Chair Brunei is an absolute monarchy, and the authoritarian governments in and have both received attention from Washington in recent months to counteract Chinese influence. Malaysia and Indonesia meanwhile are more democratic than their neighbors but both have their own challenges with corruption and struggling institutions.

As a result of this regime-type diversity, Southeast Asia does not view the world in ideological terms, which can complicate the U.S. refrain of 鈥�.鈥� The Summit for Democracy perhaps best exemplifies the occasional awkwardness that can arise from U.S. efforts to promote democracy. The administration only invited three countries from ASEAN, which left out the other ASEAN states due to their more autocratic governments.

On the other end of the spectrum, U.S. efforts to appeal to autocratic allies and partners can conflict with its democracy and human rights agenda. For instance, its attempts to roll back the coup in Myanmar have thus far remained limited in scope. Despite to , Washington has refrained from sanctioning the military-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, likely out of concern for angering Thailand, which is .

China and Alignment

Further complicating matters, U.S. policy in Southeast Asia encourages ASEAN countries to push back against Beijing, but Washington must remain mindful of the region鈥檚 preference for non-alignment. While many Southeast Asian capitals recognize the threat posed by a militarily and economically dominant China, it is also a vital trade partner and source of much-needed investment, .

Bangkok鈥檚 authoritarian leaders do not see China as a military threat, but rather an important partner. Over the past two decades, China and Thailand have , both economically and in the security realm, largely at the . This trend accelerated following Thailand鈥檚 2014 coup and the downturn in U.S.-Bangkok relations. Today, China continues to invest , compete with , and with the ruling military-backed government.

Others in Southeast Asia, even those at a more obvious threat from Beijing than Thailand, are similarly loath to incur China鈥檚 wrath. Vietnam and prefers to keep bilateral initiatives quiet. Singapore commonly emphasizes the need to between the United States and China, especially as Beijing remains the main trading partner throughout Southeast Asia. When the United States rolled out the AUKUS security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom, some in Southeast Asia raised public concerns about the and the risk that competing multilateral initiatives, including the , undermine ASEAN鈥檚 centrality.

China will always be Southeast Asia鈥檚 neighbor, while the United States is far away.

On a fundamental economic level, Beijing鈥檚 investments remain attractive to developing countries due in part to the and despite the many clear risks that China鈥檚 Belt and Road Initiative . More importantly, China will always be Southeast Asia鈥檚 neighbor, while the United States is far away.

The challenge facing U.S. policymakers is therefore how to avoid alienating allies and partners who prefer to hedge during a period of heightened great power competition. Public alignment with Washington against Beijing is politically difficult for Southeast Asia, even for the countries that are most welcoming towards U.S. involvement. At the same time, it is also undeniable that Beijing鈥檚 growing threat and dominance are the chief reasons for U.S. engagement and attention, and American naming-and-shaming of China鈥檚 coercive behaviors is necessary.

The July 2022 communique with Thailand points towards one avenue of achieving balance: avoid mentioning China when necessary while still countering Beijing鈥檚 moves. The U.S. Pacific Partnership Strategy similarly minimizes references to China () despite its clear role in countering Chinese moves in Oceania, such as Beijing鈥檚 .

Yet, remaining silent on China runs the risk of ignoring the elephant in the room and failing to signal strong responses to Chinese transgressions. Indeed, Washington must regularly and publicly reinforce its credibility in the region and demonstrate to its allies and partners that it will support them against Beijing, such as . Calling out Chinese coercion is often necessary, regardless of how it may ruffle regional governments.

A Recalibration in Southeast Asia in the National Security Strategy

As seen with the U.S.-Thai communique, a recalibration on the two balancing acts after the Biden administration's first-year emphasis on "democracy versus authoritarianism" is increasingly apparent in the administration鈥檚 approach, most notably in the new . The text works to complicate the Biden administration鈥檚 emphasis on 鈥渄emocracy versus authoritarianism鈥�: 鈥淎mericans will support universal human rights and stand in solidarity with those beyond our shores who seek freedom and dignity鈥e do not, however, believe that governments and societies everywhere must be remade in America鈥檚 image for us to be secure.鈥� It carefully distinguishes between 鈥減owers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy鈥� and non-revisionist autocrats by highlighting that 鈥渕any non-democracies join the world鈥檚 democracies in forswearing these behaviors." It thus divides the world into revisionist autocrats led by China and Russia and democracies and non-revisionist authoritarians in favor of a rules-based order. This move, if successful, opens up more space for collaboration with autocratic allies and partners like Vietnam and Thailand.

On the great power competition and alignment issue, the strategy acknowledges that 鈥渟ome parts of the world are uneasy with the competition between the United States and the world鈥檚 largest autocracies. We understand these concerns. We also want to avoid a world in which competition escalates into a world of rigid blocs. We do not seek conflict or a new Cold War.鈥� It recognizes that Russia and China share some common interests with other countries, and specifies that the United States and China can 鈥渃oexist peacefully, and share in and contribute to human progress together.鈥� Clearly, it hopes to reassure many in the Global South that U.S.-China competition will not be totalizing nor will it undermine efforts to address climate change.

Whether the current rebalance works long-term remains to be seen. Autocratic governments could interpret the National Security Strategy鈥檚 goal of 鈥渁n order that is free in that it allows people to enjoy their basic, universal rights, and freedoms鈥� as a long-term domestic security risk, as China does, regardless of U.S. attempts to distinguish between revisionists and non-revisionist actors. Moreover, American support for civil society and human rights must and will continue, and regional democratic backsliding, most notably the coup in Myanmar, demands attention. Regarding alignment, the Biden administration鈥檚 rollout of essentially declares a new Cold War, even if the National Security Strategy attests to the opposite. At some point, U.S. cooperation with Beijing may become politically impossible and it may start demanding more of Southeast Asia.

The United States may aim to carefully calibrate its narratives and policies to garner the widest support in the region, but Southeast Asian states will continue to balance between China and the United States according to their own interests.

Importantly, there are simply limits to Washington鈥檚 ability to persuade the region. Thailand鈥檚 own balancing continues despite the apparent improvement in its relations with America. For instance, Bangkok with an annual air force exercise with amidst the backdrop of the crisis over House Speaker Nancy Pelosi鈥檚 visit to Taiwan. Notably, on the crisis reiterated its 鈥淥ne China Policy鈥� and called for 鈥渦tmost restraint,鈥� reflecting Bangkok鈥檚 between Beijing and Washington. Furthermore, Thailand鈥檚 in an October UN vote on the war in Ukraine is but the latest sign of its reticence towards alienating Russia and China. The United States may aim to carefully calibrate its narratives and policies to garner the widest support in the region, but Southeast Asian states will continue to balance between China and the United States according to their own interests.

This is especially so if the United States fails to back up its words with material actions to . Many in the Indo-Pacific question America鈥檚 long-term commitment, especially in the economic realm. Indeed, reports that President Biden may be聽 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leader鈥檚 meeting in November 2022 will likely be perceived as a sign of American neglect in Bangkok and the wider region. This is especially true if President Xi Jinping attends after his demonstrated willingness to and the 20th Communist Party Congress. Without a high tempo of engagements and initiatives attractive to the region, it will not matter if Washington calibrates the balancing acts correctly on a narrative level.

In an increasingly multipolar world where great power competition is seldom as ideological as rhetoric suggests, or welcomed by countries who fear being caught up in the conflagration, America鈥檚 two balancing acts will continue, as well as a need for regular recalibration. It must both defend democracy and human rights and work with autocratic allies and partners. Washington must also counter China publicly and privately without driving regional capitals away. There is no perfect formula or absolutely persuasive narrative, but rather a complex region on China鈥檚 doorstep replete with hedging, competing interests, and demands for greater U.S. involvement.

The views expressed are the author鈥檚 alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or 澳门六合彩.聽

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